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1. Introduction 
 
Two seemingly irreconcilable, yet related forces are at play in the contemporary global economy. 
On one hand, many international markets are characterised by strong competition between 
companies. According to the prevailing wisdom, this state of affairs should not be lamented. As 
neoclassical economists never get tired of pointing out, free competition is a mechanism that brings 
about all sorts of positive things in capitalist societies, in that it ‘provides everyone with the widest 
opportunities for business and produces the best sectoral and spatial allocation of resources’ 
(Jovanovic, 2005: 269). This is also a view endorsed by most members of the economic and 
political elites, not least in the European Union (EU). For instance, the former President of the 
European Commission (henceforth the Commission), Romano Prodi, mentioned competition in the 
same sentence as values such as democracy and human rights when he outlined his vision for the 
EU in a speech delivered to the European Parliament in 2001:  
 
‘Our ultimate goal is to consolidate a European Union that can guarantee our 
citizens’ prosperity and peaceful co-existence on the basis of democracy, 
competition, solidarity and unconditional respect for human rights’ (Prodi, 2001, 
emphasis added) 
 
The current President of the Commission has also made it clear that he strongly believes in the 
benefits of competition (Barroso, 2005) as has on numerous occasions, the Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, for instance suggesting that ‘[i]t is not through protectionism, but 
through competition that firms innovate, strive to get the best from their people, make the most 
effective use of their resources, push up quality and push down prices.’ (Kroes, 2005) 
 
On the other hand, one can also witness how an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) between large transnational corporations are resulting in a massive concentration of 
economic power. All previous records were broken in 2006 when the value of M&As on a global 
scale reached $3.79 trillion, which was an increase of 38 percent compared to 2005. In December 
2007, the financial press could report that even this record had now been surpassed. Despite a 
significant fall in the number of M&As in the second half of the year, the total value of such deals 
in 2007 was an astonishing $4.74 trillion (Financial Times, 2007g). M&As are a response to 
competition: through greater size it is hoped that the company can undercut its competitors and 
hereby increase its profit margin (Bowles et al., 2005: 276). But at the same time, M&As reduce the 
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number of competitors in a given market. As such they might ultimately threaten to weaken 
competition if they generate a market structure characterised by oligopoly, or undermine 
competition altogether if one company obtains monopoly status. 
 
If competition is a force which is widely considered to have many positive effects it is thus not 
something that can be taken for granted to exist. Laws designed to protect/generate it to varying 
extents have therefore appeared in most parts of the world. In Europe such competition policies 
mainly emerged after the Second World War, not only at the national level but also at the 
supranational level with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1951 and the European Economic Community (EC) in 1957. Gradually, a competition policy ethos 
has developed in which the Commission, or rather its Directorate-General for Competition 
(henceforth; the Competition DG), has far-reaching powers to regulate cartels, market dominance, 
state aid and mergers. It is undeniable that competition policy is at the core of economic governance 
in the EU and has been so for quite awhile. The relatively limited ability of member states to 
interfere in the day-to-day activities of the Commission in this policy area has led some 
commentators to suggest that competition policy is the ‘first supranational policy in the European 
Union’ (McGowan & Wilks, 1995).  
 
 
1.1. The purpose of the thesis 
 
The focus of this thesis is one “component” of EC competition regulation, namely that of merger 
control. Today merger control arguably constitutes ‘the cornerstone of EU competition policy’ 
(McGowan & Wilks, 1995: 152) but this has not always been the case. Indeed, one can identify four 
phases in the history of European level merger control: the 1950s, where merger rules were 
included in the 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (henceforth the 
ECSC Treaty) but not in 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (henceforth 
the EC Treaty)1; the 1960s and 1970s  where attempts to provide the Commission with powers to 
regulate mergers were made but by and large failed; the 1980s where the member states, after 16 
years of negotiations, reached agreement on the Merger Control Regulation (MCR) in 1989; and the 
1990s onwards where the Commission began regulating large mergers under the MCR, which was 
revised in 2003-2004 as part of a wider reform of EC competition law. The overall purpose of this 
thesis is to shed light on the overall history of European level merger control. It thus seeks to 
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answer the following research question: what were the main causes of the major developments in 
the European level merger control area? This is to be achieved by answering a series of sub-
questions, each identifying one or more major developments (or “dependent variables”) to be 
explained: 
 
1. Why were merger rules not included in the EC Treaty when such provisions were contained 
in the ECSC Treaty? 
2. Why did the Commission’s proposals for a MCR fail to gain support from the member states 
in the 1970s and most of the 1980s? 
3. Why was it eventually possible to adopt a MCR and why was designed the way it was? 
4. How has the MCR been implemented by the Commission and how can the revision of it in 
2003 be explained? 
 
To answer these questions, the history of European level merger control will be analysed from a 
critical political economy perspective. Later on it will be explicated in greater details what this 
perspective entails, but it should be emphasised here that this perspective differs significantly from 
those normally applied in studies of this policy area. For one thing, even a cursory glance on the 
literature dealing with competition regulation (in the EU and elsewhere) will reveal that it is 
massively dominated by contributions from economic and legal perspectives. Although such 
contributions can certainly be valuable and offer interesting insights, it cannot be denied that the 
bulk of them focus purely on economic or legal themes, hereby ending up providing a somewhat 
narrow and self-contained perspective on competition regulation2. There might be various reasons 
why economists and lawyers continue to dominate the literature, but surely one of the more 
important ones is that those who approach the topic from other academic disciplines are likely to be 
perplexed by the dry language and overly technical terminology used not only in the bulk of this 
abundant literature but also by the Commission. The representatives of the Commission are only 
happy to confirm the impression that its competition policies concern economic and legal 
technicalities, rather than bigger political questions. This could, for instance, be witnessed in the 
wake of the controversial 2004 Microsoft case, in which the Commission among other things 
imposed a fine of 497 million Euros on the company because it was held to abuse its dominant 
market position. Here Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti made it clear that EC competition 
policy ‘is a matter of law and economics, not politics’ (quoted in Levy, 2005: 131). 
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The critical political economy perspective advocated in this thesis is based on three basic, and to 
some extent related, premises. First, competition policy, in the EU and elsewhere, is precisely as 
political as all other forms of regulation. That is, it results from political struggles and serves to 
benefit certain groups in society more than others. Second, it is only possible to make sense of 
social phenomena, competition regulation included, if they are situated and seen in the context of 
the whole of which it they part. This means that developments in the competition/merger regulation 
area should be analysed not only in the light of concrete micro-processes such as negotiations and 
the day-to-day implementation of competition rules, but also in the context of broader, and by no 
means static, phenomena such as capitalism, competition, class, regulation and the wider 
ideologies/discourses that prevail at a given juncture. Third, and related to this, reductionist 
explanations cannot be accepted as valid. In the social world there is never ‘a cause without cause’ 
(Jessop, 2002a: 23), and indeed only accounts of social phenomena that assign explanatory power to 
structures, ideas and agents can be satisfactory. 
 
By basing the perspective adopted in this thesis on these premises, the examination of developments 
in the merger area differ not only from the analyses found in the legal and economic literatures, but 
also from the way competition regulation (and thus merger control) has so far been analysed in the 
relatively few political science analyses that deal with this topic. Most of these have emerged from 
the mid-1990s onwards and have certainly done much to illuminate various aspects of EC 
competition policy, providing fascinating insights into the regulatory and institutional dimensions 
of this area (see e.g. Bulmer 1994, Cini & McGowan, 1998; Wilks, 2005b). But it is not unfair to 
suggest that the various theoretical perspectives they have put to work in the competition field are 
generally not based on the above-mentioned premises. Probably as a result of this, most political 
science contributions have emphasised the political nature of competition policy insufficiently; they 
have generally failed to place the evolution of competition policy in a broader context, 
concentrating instead on competition policy and institutional issues alone; and in most cases they 
have not assigned importance to both agency, structures and ideas3. Hence, although quite a few of 
the analyses in this thesis draw on the findings of some of these political science contributions, the 
overall form and content of the former differ quite a bit from that of the latter.  
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1.2. Outline of the thesis 
 
In addition to this introductory chapter the thesis contains seven chapters. In Chapter 2 the 
philosophical foundations of mainstream EU studies (EUS) and of the theoretical and empirical 
work in the chapters that follow are explicated. It is argued that the two prevailing paradigms in 
mainstream EUS, namely rationalism and constructivism, are based on philosophies that prevent 
them from conducting anti-reductionist research on European integration. Against this background, 
a version of the philosophy of science known as “critical realism” is introduced as the philosophy 
underpinning the thesis’ critical political economy perspective and the analyses of the developments 
in the merger control area.  
 
In Chapter 3 a critical political economy perspective designed to help us to shed light on the 
history of European level merger control, is outlined. This theory is, as just mentioned, grounded in 
critical realist philosophy and has been developed through dialogues with various empirical data 
and theoretical literatures. In this chapter, concepts such as capitalism, competition, class fractions, 
capital actors, regulation, ideas of regulation, states, supranational institutions and programming are 
theorised before it is described how the theoretical perspective will be applied in the following 
chapters.  
 
In Chapter 4 the introduction of European level competition regulation in the period stretching 
from the early post-war years to the early 1960s, is explored. In particular, this chapter seeks to 
explain three “phenomena”, namely the merger rules of the ECSC Treaty, the missing merger 
provisions in the EC Treaty, and the adoption of the so-called Regulation 17 through which the EC 
Treaty’s competition rules were fleshed out. Hereby it seeks to answer the first sub-question posed 
in section 1.1 above. The chapter focuses both on concrete negotiations and the role played by 
capital actors and on the broader context, not least the post-war world order of embedded 
liberalism, the adoption of competition rules in Germany’s emerging “social market economy” and 
France’s state-led form of capitalism, and the economic situation in these two countries. 
 
In Chapter 5 the evolution of EC competition regulation in the 1960s and 1970s is investigated, 
focussing in particular on the failure of the member states to reach agreement on the merger 
regulation rules that were proposed by the Commission in the early 1970s. Its purpose is thus to 
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provide part of the answer to the second sub-question posed in the previous section. The failure to 
reach agreement is seen in the (to some extent intertwined) contexts of embedded liberalism and the 
“American Challenge”, the wider European integration process in the 1960s and 1970s and 
economic and regulatory developments in the France, Germany and the UK. At a more concrete yet 
related level, the failure is seen as the result of the relative weight of the constellations of agents 
subscribing to particular ideas in the negotiations over the concrete proposal.  
 
In Chapter 6 the broader developments in EC competition regulation in the 1980s are examined, 
with the adoption of the MCR in 1989 being the main phenomenon to be explained. Hereby the 
chapter should allow us to answer the second and third sub-questions. First the broader contexts in 
which the negotiations over the MCR took place are mapped, focussing in particular on the crisis of 
embedded liberalism and the neoliberal turn, the neoliberalisation of national competition regulation 
in the UK, France and Germany and the re-launch of European integration. The revitalisation of EC 
competition policy and the renewed negotiations over a merger control regulation is analysed 
against this background, while the importance played by business actors, the European Court of 
Justice (henceforth: the Court) and pro-active Competition Commissioners is also taken into 
account. The chapter ends with an analysis of the form and content of the MCR, arguing that it 
reflected some remarkable shifts in the positions of the various agents involved directly or indirectly 
in the negotiations. 
 
In Chapter 7 the focus is on EC competition regulation in the period from 1990 to 2007. Its main 
purpose is to answer the fourth sub-question and it thus seeks to explain EC merger regulation in 
the 1990s onwards and especially the processes resulting in a revised MCR that came into force in 
2004. These phenomena are seen against the broader context of neoliberal hegemony and the 
transnationalisation of capitalism, the neoliberalisation and reform of the various components 
making up EC competition policy, some developments in the wider European integration process 
and the “Europeanisation” of national merger control. In a postscript to the chapter the challenges to 
the neoliberal type of competition regulation are considered. 
 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. It summarises the substantive argument advanced in Chapters 
4 to 7 and then moves on to consider some theoretical alternatives to the critical political economy 
perspective on supranational regulation presented in Chapter 3. Moreover it is discussed how this 
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perspective could be further developed and finally the alternative agenda for the study of EC 
competition policy of which this thesis forms part is outlined. 
 
 
1.3. Sources  
 
The questions regarding how the critical political economy perspective on supranational regulation 
has been constructed and how it will be applied in the analyses of the broader developments in the 
merger area will be dealt with in Chapter 2 and 3. There is thus no need to go into a discussion of 
this here. Instead this section will provide an account of the various sources upon which the 
analyses in Chapters 4 to 7 draw and reflect briefly on how they are used. First of all, it can be 
noted that the analyses rely on a wide range of both primary and secondary sources. Although both 
type of sources are used in all the chapters in question, the chapters dealing with the early period 
from the 1950s up to the end of the 1970s (Chapters 4 and 5) draw less on primary sources than do 
the analyses of the period stretching from the 1980s onwards (Chapters 5 and 6). The main reason 
for this is simply that it has been much easier to locate primary sources that were of relevance to the 
analyses of the more recent period. This said, an important part of the data collection process 
consisted in visiting the archives of Westminster (London), the Commission (Brussels) and the 
European Trade Union Confederation (Amsterdam). Documents found in these archives are used in 
the analyses in especially Chapter 5. 
 
One of the most important primary sources used in the analyses is different documents issued by the 
different EC institutions. These include transcripts of debates taking place in the European 
Parliament, the official opinions of the Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee and in particular a number of reports and proposals made by the European Commission. 
These transcripts, opinions, proposals and reports are used to map the views of the EC institutions 
(or rather the agents located within them) and their activities in the merger field. To illuminate the 
views of various other agents who have played a role in the merger/competition area, the analyses 
also rests on position papers, memoranda and reports from business groups (such as the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists), non-business groups (such as the European Trade Union 
Confederation), national competition authorities (such as Germany’s Bundeskartellamt) and 
governments. This type of source is taken for what it is, namely documents that can help us to 
understand the worldviews of particular agents with particular perceived interests.  
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In addition to this, many analyses draw on various sources of law, including the ECSC and EC/EU 
Treaties, Regulation 17/62, the MCR (Regulation 4064/89 and, after the revision, 139/2004), 
rulings made by the Court and decisions made by the Commission in the competition field (for an 
overview, see the section on “legal sources” at the end of the list of references). The credibility of 
the latter can hardly be questioned but of course, particular interpretations of them can. 
 
With a view to illuminate the broader economic context in which European merger regulation has 
evolved, some of the analyses also draw on quantitative data. Such data stems, for instance, from 
the Commission’s annual reports on competition policy, the Competition DG’s webpage and 
national competition authorities – and have in some cases also been reproduced from the secondary 
literature. In particular, such data are used to establish tendencies in the number, scope and 
magnitude of mergers. “Tendencies” is the key word here: it has to be recognised that the 
documentation of developments in the merger area was rather imperfect, especially at the EC level 
prior to the adoption of the 1989 MCR, as companies obviously did not have to inform the 
Commission about their M&A activities. Data collected by national competition authorities in the 
1960s and 1970s should also not be seen as precise reflections of economic reality and, as the 
criteria on the basis on which they have been collected are, to say the least, unclear, no attempt to 
make direct comparisons of M&A activity in the different countries in this period, are made. As 
already mentioned, however, it is maintained that such data can be used to say something about 
tendencies in, for instance, the number and scope of mergers (were they primarily intra- or inter-
national?). The analyses also draws on data, taken primarily from secondary sources that can be 
used to illuminate the general economic situation at various junctures – data on for instance GDP 
growth, inflation and unemployment rates.  
 
According to Moravcsik (1998a: 82), ‘[t]he reliability of a source is a function of the extent to 
which the activity it documents is one in which it is costly to manipulate or misstate the truth’. 
Consequently, he recommends against basing research on a source like newspaper articles and news 
magazine reports as journalists do not really give their readers a chance to evaluate the reliability of 
their sources and may be at least as interested in telling an interesting story as in providing an 
accurate picture of reality. Although I agree that it is problematic if research is based on such 
sources to a very large extent, I see no problem in using them as supplement to other sources. As 
such, the reader will occasionally find references to/quotes from articles and reports in newspapers 
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such as the Financial Times, The Times and the Wall Street Journal as well as from a magazine like 
The Economist. Moreover, the analyses does also to some extent draw on  news bulletins, Agence 
Europe and Europe Daily Bulletin which are valuable sources when trying to get factual 
information about various events in the EC/EU institutions. It should be noted that such sources do 
not provide the decisive information with which the thesis’ analyses stand or fall. But even 
journalists can provide interesting perspectives on concrete developments which it is worth 
referring to and their articles/reports can contain valuable supplementary information and eloquent 
quotes by politicians and others. In one case, namely in some analyses of the most recent 
developments (see section 7.9), information from newspapers is used as the main source simply due 
to the lack of other sources. 
 
The final type of primary data used in the empirical analyses is information gathered through 
interviews conducted by the author. In order to strengthen the analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 I have 
interviewed a couple of persons who played key roles in, and/or have key insights into, the merger 
control area. More precisely I have interviewed three diplomats who were directly involved in the 
negotiations leading up to the revision of the MCR; a senior official of the Commission’s 
Competition DG who was also involved in these processes; a representative of the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) with in-depth knowledge of the 
competition policy area; Etienne Davignon, the former Vice President of the Commission and 
Commissioner responsible for industrial affairs; Peter Sutherland who was Competition 
Commissioner from 1985-1989 and later a key member of the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists; Leon Brittan who was Competition Commissioner from 1989 to 1993; and Jonathan 
Faull who was an important member of Brittan’s cabinet and directly involved in the processes 
leading up to the adoption of the MCR in 1989.  
 
More information about the various interviews appears in endnotes to Chapters 6 and 7 although the 
location and exact date of the interview is not mentioned in those cases where the interviewees 
wished to remain anonymous. All interviews were “semi-structured”: on one hand, I had prepared a 
number of questions designed to confirm or disconfirm the knowledge I already had and to bring 
about new information but on the other hand the interviewees were given plenty of opportunities to 
tell their own story. With one exception, all interviews were recorded and in cases where they were 
conducted in languages other than English, quotes have been translated by the author4. By selecting 
interviewees of very high quality (measured by their knowledge of and/or impact on the evolution 
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of EC merger regulation) I hope and think that the information they have contributed with does 
strengthen the analyses significantly. This said, their “stories” do not constitute the definitive truth 
and may be coloured not only by their position but perhaps also in some situations by the reputation 
they would like to leave behind. Ideally speaking I would have liked to conduct a few more 
interviews. In particular I would have liked to talk with the Competition Commissioners succeeding 
Sutherland and Brittan, but unfortunately my efforts to make an appointment with them failed. 
 
As already mentioned, these various primary sources are to no small extent supplemented with 
secondary sources – that is, with various research publications. Indeed, with a view to present 
nuanced and robust analyses, I have taken care to base them on as rich and diverse a literature as 
possible. So for instance, the analyses rest on work by both political scientists, (international) 
political economists, legal scholars, historians and economists – and in doing this they draw on both 
“mainstream” and “critical” scholarship. To recapitulate, then, the thesis draws on a wide range of 
empirical sources which should enable me to carry out reliable analyses and thereby also allow me 
to reach valid conclusions. 
 
 
1.4. Intended contributions 
 
With this thesis I intend to make a three-fold contribution to the existing literature. First, at the 
meta-theoretical level, the thesis seeks to move beyond the debate between rationalists and 
constructivists and launch (a version of) critical realism as a fruitful alternative to the philosophies 
underpinning these prevailing paradigms in EUS. This contribution consists not only in showing the 
merits of critical realism at the philosophical level but, crucially, also in actually making use of 
critical realist insights at the levels of theory and empirical research. 
 
At the theoretical level the thesis aims at introducing a critical political economy perspective on 
regulation that can be used to link merger control, but probably also other areas of regulation, to the 
broader whole of which it forms part. This perspective does in particular draw inspiration from neo-
gramscian perspectives in EUS and International Political Economy (IPE) as well as from the works 
of Bob Jessop, but it does also seek to “transcend” these sources of inspiration in some important 
respects. It is hoped that this perspective will be a useful addition to the critical tradition in EUS 
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(and perhaps IPE) – but also that it will not be considered altogether unconvincing/useless by those 
analysing competition policy by means of more conventional approaches. 
 
Last but not least the thesis aims to present new knowledge about EC competition policy, which, 
despite its importance, ‘is one of the least understood of all the European Union’s policies’ (Cini & 
McGowan, 1998: 1). The thesis seeks to remedy a significant gap in the existing literature by 
providing a longitudinal, yet up-to-date, analysis of the broader evolution of the EC merger control 
area. In particular, the thesis provides the, to my knowledge, first study of the processes leading up 
to the revision of the MCR in 2003. But it also supplements existing studies of less recent 
developments, such as the negotiations over the MCR in the 1980s, with additional knowledge 
(obtained, for instance, through interviews). Moreover, the different perspective from which 
competition policy is analysed in this thesis means that aspects that are often downplayed or not 
dealt with in other studies are brought into light, a prime example being the role played by 
transnational business groups. 
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2. Beyond rationalism and constructivism: the critical realist 
alternative 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the philosophical5 foundations of mainstream EU studies and of the 
theoretical and empirical work in the chapters that follow. It is divided into five main sections and a 
conclusion. The first part introduces the philosophical terminology and outlines on what grounds 
philosophical positions can/should be criticised. In the next two sections the philosophical 
foundations of the two prevailing paradigms in mainstream EUS, namely rationalism and 
constructivism, are then critically discussed6. Here it is argued that the philosophies in question are 
rather problematic and that this has some serious consequences at the levels of theory and empirical 
analysis. Against this background the fourth section outlines some key features of the philosophy of 
science which is known as critical realism. It is argued that critical realism constitutes a promising 
(if, by and large, overlooked) alternative to the philosophies prevailing in EUS – and this is thus the 
philosophy underpinning the theoretical and empirical chapters that follow. In the fifth section it is 
explicated how critical realism is operationalised in the present thesis. 
 
 
2.1. Philosophy of science  
 
Before we enter the terrain of philosophy of science in the sections to follow, it seems appropriate 
to clarify a few things. First of all it is perhaps necessary to explicate why it is important to deal 
with philosophy of science issues. It would certainly appear that many students and researchers do 
not let philosophy of science questions distract them too much if at all. After all, why not just 
develop and test theory against empirical data and then leave the difficult philosophical issues to the 
people in the philosophy department? The answer to this question is that there is no way to escape 
philosophy of science, as all scientific approaches in one way or another implies a philosophical 
position. This means that even those of us who are actually more interested in doing genuine social 
research than in engaging in abstract philosophical sophistry do have a very good reason to take 
philosophy of science seriously. Only through the philosophy of science is it possible to explicate, 
analyse and discuss all the implicit but basic understandings framing our social scientific practice. If 
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we choose not to do this, as many researchers and students do when they are too busy moving on, 
we will not be able to relate to these basic understandings in a conscious and active manner (Buch-
Hansen & Nielsen, 2005: 11)7.  
 
The second thing to clarify is what “philosophy of science” means. In the present context I use 
“philosophy of science” as a concept that covers ontological and epistemological issues. Ontology 
means “theory of being” and concerns what exists in the world and how. Following e.g. Outhwaite 
(1987) we may distinguish between philosophical and social ontology8, where the former deals with 
abstract philosophical questions such as whether a reality exists independently of our knowledge of 
it (the realism vs. idealism question), and the latter concerns questions related to the nature of the 
social world,  for instance regarding the relationship between agents and structures. We can say that 
a social ontology ‘is an abstract model – or articulation – of social being’ (Patomäki, 2002: 77). 
Epistemology means the “theory of knowledge” and concerns what we can know about the world 
and how. Here we may distinguish between what could be called general epistemology, which 
concerns general questions regarding knowledge and social epistemology, which concerns the 
conditions of knowledge production in the social domain – and which would thus, for instance 
concern the nature and purpose of social science. 
 
This brings us neatly to the final point, which is to clarify how epistemology and ontology are 
related to each other and to other important concepts. According to Bhaskar (1975: 36-38, 1989: 
13), philosophers of science have traditionally privileged epistemology over ontology. That is, they 
have been more concerned with the conditions for the production of knowledge, than with being. 
Indeed, there has been a tendency among philosophers associated with empiricism and positivism to 
ignore ontology or to regard it as altogether unscientific to deal with such “metaphysical” issues. 
One of the merits of Bhaskar’s work is that it breaks fundamentally with this tendency and argues 
that ontology should be given primacy over epistemology, as the latter presupposes the former. 
Take for instance positivism. Here it is argued that the purpose of science is to discover laws and 
regularities. This epistemology, however, presupposes a worldview according to which the world is 
actually to a large extent characterised by such regularities. In other words, it presupposes a 
particular ontology. If we relate this to the various types of ontology and epistemology mentioned 
above, we can say that general epistemology presupposes a philosophical ontology, whereas a 
social epistemology always presupposes a social ontology. It is important to emphasise that this 
does not mean that social scientists and philosophers in practice always start from ontology and 
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then choose a “corresponding” epistemology. On the contrary, the problem (!) is that they often 
start from a particular (epistemological) conception of what social science should be like, and then 
make the (often implicit) social ontology “fit” that conception. 
 
As already mentioned above, the position one takes (consciously or not) at the abstract level(s) of 
ontology and epistemology has consequences for one’s scientific practice. This, I would argue, can 
be seen if we now move on to look at theory. Obviously the construction and application of 
theories is an important part of the social scientific enterprise. So what impact does epistemology 
and ontology have on social scientific theory? My tentative suggestion would be that social 
ontology regulates a theory’s content whereas social epistemology regulates its form. If, for 
instance, one subscribes to a social ontology according to which social structures are much more 
important than agents, this will be reflected at the theoretical level (where particular important 
structures are identified). In this sense social ontology “regulates” the content of the theory, which 
is also to say that is does not determine its content. At the level of ontology it can, for instance, be 
argued that the social world contains structures, but meta-theories ‘cannot tell us what structures the 
world contains or how they differ. These are entirely matters for substantive scientific investigation’ 
(Bhaskar, 1979: 7). 
 
Likewise, the social epistemology to which one subscribes will have consequences for the form of 
the theory. Indeed, there will be huge differences in the way, say, positivists, critical realists and 
hermeneuticists understand the purpose of theory and thus on the form they give their theories. If, 
for instance, one considers the purpose of social science to be the identification of regularities 
through the testing of hypotheses (as many positivists do), then obviously it will be a clear priority 
to construct clear and parsimonious theories from which it is possible to derive testable hypotheses. 
This will typically not be a priority for a hermeneuticist, for whom the purpose of social science is 
to understand the meanings social agents attach to their actions (to simplify slightly). Because of 
such differences at the level of philosophy of science, it would make no sense to suggest a general 
definition of what (the purpose of) social scientific theory is, but it is perfect sense to define it in 
relation to particular philosophy of science positions. 
 
This brings us to methodology, which ‘relates to the choice of analytical strategy and research 
design which underpins substantive research’ (Hay, 2002: 63). More specifically I would suggest 
that methodology concerns two main issues: the choice of appropriate methods for the selection 
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(and perhaps collection) of empirical data and the question about how theory should be applied to 
the analysis of these data. In doing this, methodology is influenced, but not determined, by the 
chosen epistemological position (and thereby also indirectly also by the ontological position). So, to 
give an example, a positivist will often (but of course, not always) prefer to link theory and 
empirical data through the testing of hypothesis, and select data that can be quantified (as this 
enables him or her to make generalisations). Finally it should be mentioned that the empirical 
findings that result from the empirical analysis may (or may not) make it necessary for the 
researcher to modify or discard the theory. But it will not (at least not in the short term) lead to 
modification or discarding of the philosophy of science, as this has not been (and cannot be) put to 
empirical test. 
 
In Figure 2.1 an attempt has been made to schematically illustrate the way the various concepts 
introduced in this section are related. I am fully aware (and so should the reader be) that many 
social scientists and philosophers, critical realists included, define and relate the concepts in all sorts 
of other (possible and impossible) manners. It is precisely because of this confusing state of affairs 
that I have chosen to devote a section to the clarification of the way I think the terminology ought to 
be used. One should also be aware that things are often much more complicated than the way they 
are represented in the figure, but it will suffice for the purpose it is to serve in the present context. 
The main point that has been made here is that philosophy of science matters and that it actually 
matters a great deal. As social researchers we cannot choose whether or not to base our scientific 
practice on philosophy. It is by definition based on philosophy and consequently, as Collier (1994: 
16) puts it, ‘the alternative to philosophy is not no philosophy, but bad philosophy’. If we want to 
do proper social science we should thus do our very best to ensure that our scientific practices are 
based on convincing philosophy of science. Of course, philosophical reflection in no way 
guarantees outstanding social scientific research, but ignorance of crucial philosophical questions is 
a good way to achieve the opposite result. 
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Figure 2.1: philosophy and social science 
 
 
If the importance of philosophy of science, and in particular of ontology, has been established the 
crucial question then becomes how to assess the validity of different ontological positions. As 
already indicated above, one of the defining characteristics of ontological questions is that they, 
unlike other types of questions, cannot be answered empirically: regardless of the quantity and 
quality of our empirical material, we will never be able to find definitive answers to ontological 
questions (Hay, 2002: 62). The reason is, among other things, that we do not have unrestricted 
access to the truth about the phenomena we study, that our social ontology influences our analyses 
and subsequent conclusions. This, of course, is the very reason why it is important to deal with 
ontological questions. However, if ontological questions cannot be settled in any “empirical 
courtroom”, and if not all ontologies are equally valid, then it is evident that we need another 
measure against which the plausibility of different ontological positions can be evaluated. This 
measure should not (at least not exclusively) be one’s own ontological position! For instance, it 
would probably be a waste of time to evaluate the ontological underpinnings of the rationalist and 
constructivist paradigms in EU studies against the standards of critical realism: rationalists and 
constructivists could simply refuse to acknowledge the validity of the premises on which the 
critique is based (this, to be sure, would probably also be the reaction of a critical realist who was 
being accused by a positivist for not living up to positivist standards). Another approach is therefore 
needed if we want to appraise the relative strength of different ontologies. 
 
I am aware of two such approaches, both of which are plausible in my view. The first approach 
quite simply follows from Harré’s comment that ‘[i]n the end the choice of ontology is largely 
justified pragmatically – how much of the phenomena of interest does it enable us to comprehend in 
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a fruitful and constructive way’ (1997: 178). In other words, we should base our scientific work on 
the ontology that enables us to get the most comprehensive perspective on the phenomenon we are 
analysing9. We could call this the pragmatic approach. The second approach is more complicated 
and is inspired by what philosophers sometimes call immanent critique. To put it briefly, the point 
here is to demonstrate that a paradigm (or a philosophy of science) is internally inconsistent or, if it 
is consistent, causes problems that it is unable to handle on its own premises (Bhaskar, 1979: 154). 
As Bhaskar puts it, ‘philosophical arguments, like all good arguments, are arguments which involve 
discussion of your opponents’, your antagonists’, beliefs or values. In other words, you do not start 
from what you believe; you start from what you discussants believe. And if you believe that they 
are wrong or that their views need refining, then you have to show that in terms of their system of 
beliefs or values’ (quoted in Buch-Hansen, 2005). The strength of this method, which will hereafter 
be called the immanent approach, is that theories or paradigms are criticised on the basis of 
premises that their protagonists defend. Potentially, this can make the critique highly invalidating.  
 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3 below a tentative (and thus far from perfect, let alone complete) attempt to 
apply these two approaches in combination to a critique of the philosophies of science underlying 
the two prevailing paradigms in EU studies is made. The argument to be advanced is that social 
epistemologies and social ontologies regulate, respectively, the form and content of rationalist and 
constructivist theory in a problematic way (in relation to the pragmatic approach) as it prevents its 
proponents from studying parts of social reality in a comprehensive and fruitful way. It is 
furthermore demonstrated, that proponents of both paradigms acknowledge the importance of the 
aspects of social reality they tend to neglect in their scientific practice. This is, of course, interesting 
in relation to the immanent approach. This argument is made by looking into the important issues of 
the agency-structure relationship and the role of the ideational.  
 
The former question concerns how to conceptualise the relationship between agency and structure 
in a way that acknowledges the importance of both. Agency denotes the ability of agents, whether 
individuals or groups, to act upon situations and it ‘implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy 
– that the actor could have behaved differently’ (Hay, 2002: 94), whereas structure refers to the 
context within which agents operate. To conceptualise this relationship in a fruitful way is less 
straightforward than it might sound: indeed, it has been a focus of sociological attention since the 
origins of the social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Carter, 2003: 149). But not 
only is it an old problem. More significantly, it is also an important problem, and according to some 
26 
 
scholars, the most important theoretical problem in the social sciences (cf. e.g. Archer, 1995: 65; 
Carlsnaes, 1992: 245; Lloyd, 1993: 43). This is due to the importance of agents and structures in the 
social world and to the fact that it is impossible to offer explanations of events in the social world 
without appealing to some understanding of the agency-structure relation. Indeed, ‘all scientific 
theories embody an at least an implicit solution to the “agency-structure problem”’ (Wendt, 1987: 
337). The challenge is to break with the two ways of conceptualising the relation between agency 
and structure that have traditionally been dominant within social theory, namely structuralism and 
individualism. In their pure versions these positions either picture agents as marionettes 
(structuralism) or as omnipotent puppet-masters (individualism) instead of acknowledging that both 
agency and structure matter (McAnulla, 2002). Nowadays the vast majority of scholars do 
acknowledge this. However, it is not nearly enough to know that both agency and structure matter. 
The real challenge is to explain how they are related and, subsequently, to incorporate this 
explanation in substantial theories. In relation to what I referred to above as the “pragmatic 
approach” this means that a social ontology that acknowledges both agency and structure and 
accounts for their relation should be preferred to an ontology that fails to do this. 
 
The other question concerns how to acknowledge the importance of both the ideational aspects of 
social reality (e.g. ideas, discourses, values and norms) and its non-ideational (or “material”) 
aspects (see also Porpora, 1993: 215). There is a long tradition for reducing the ideational to a by-
product of the material (materialism) or vice versa (idealism) in explanations of social phenomena. 
Today, however, it is widely agreed that social phenomena should be explained with reference to 
both material and ideational factors. Indeed, as Georg Sørensen (1998: 91) notes, ‘One would be 
hard pressed to find examples of theorists who would argue that the social world is purely 
materialist or purely idealist’. In what follows we will thus investigate whether rationalists and 
constructivists take into account both the material and the ideational in a reasonably balanced 
manner or if their positions actually end up being either materialist or idealist. In relation to the 
“pragmatic approach” this means that a social ontology that acknowledges both the material and the 
ideational, and which takes into account the importance of both in relation to preference formation, 
is to be preferred to an ontology that fails to do this.  
 
In the following two sections, where the philosophical foundations of the rationalist and 
constructivist paradigms in EU studies are discussed, it is necessary to paint with a broad brush. 
This means that although I have done my utmost to present the two paradigms in a fair and balanced 
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manner, it is not possible to do full justice to, let alone cover, all the different theories and 
perspectives that form part of the paradigms. Having said this, the arguments advanced here do in 
my opinion apply to the vast majority of rationalist and constructivist studies. 
 
 
2.2. The rationalist paradigm in EU studies 
 
According to Pollack (2001: 233), theories such as neorealism (e.g. Grieco, 1996), rational choice 
institutionalism (e.g. Garrett, 1992, Garrett & Tsebelis, 1996) and liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. 
Moravcsik 1993, 1998a) are ‘all part of an emerging rationalist research programme which is 
rapidly establishing itself as the dominating paradigm in European integration theory, at least in the 
United States’ (see e.g. Pollack, 2006 for a good overview of this paradigm). This paradigm can be 
seen as part of the wider rationalist paradigm in International Relations (IR), a paradigm that was 
facilitated by the gradual and partial fusion of the (neo)liberal and the (neo)realist traditions that 
took place in the 1980s and 1990s10. Like the broader rationalist paradigm in the social sciences, the 
rationalist paradigm in EUS is grounded in a neo-positivist social epistemology11 according to 
which the main purpose of social science is to identify patterns of regularity in the social world in 
order, if possible, to ultimately facilitate the predictions of events (Neuman, 2003: 71; Stoker & 
Marsh, 2002: 6). In accordance with this conception of social science, rationalist theories will often 
take the form of sets of statements about causal relations in the social world and, as a result, theories 
often appear as simplified models of the much more complex reality that they aim to explain. From 
such theories, falsifiable hypotheses are derived and, subsequently, empirically tested. The ideal is 
that such tests function as the basis for further refinement of the theories - if the latter are not 
discarded because their explanations and predictions turn out to be wrong.  
 
This social epistemology requires a particular social ontology according to which social reality is 
characterised by a high degree of regularity. At the same time, however, rational choice theory 
(RCT) is claimed to be based on “methodological individualism”, the view that ‘[t]he elementary 
unit of social life is the individual human action’ (Elster, 1989: 13). If this view is to fit the social 
epistemology described above, then it necessitates a particular conception of agents. RCT is, thus, 
based on the assumptions that agents behave rationally, meaning that they act in a utility 
maximising way in order to realise their ordered preferences12; and that they are very well informed 
about the context in which they operate and the effects of their actions. The result is identical agents 
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who can be expected to act in precisely the same way when confronted with identical situations and, 
thus, agents who do not disturb the orderliness of the social reality envisaged by RCT. Although 
rationalists do, at times, stress that the rational agent is a simplification of reality and that the 
concept should be understood merely as a heuristic device (see e.g. Keohane, 1984: 70), a 
distinction between a “heuristic” and an “actual” agent is rarely made in practice. The assumptions 
translate into a de facto social ontology that influences the content of rationalist theory. 
 
Among critics of the rational choice paradigm, including many constructivists in EUS is a 
widespread assumption that RCT entails a highly individualistic or even voluntaristic perspective on 
agency. For instance, Risse (2004: 161) writes that the ‘prevailing theories of European integration 
– whether neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or “multi-level governance” – are firmly 
committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centred by definition’. Along the same lines, 
Koelbe (1995: 235) writes that ‘[t]he problem for rational choice analysis is … that it attempts to 
ignore social structure in its analysis of human action’, and the rational choice scholar Peter 
Nannestad (1991: 422) states that it would clearly ‘not be consistent with RCT to consider the 
strategies of actors to be structurally determined’ and thus ‘structural or institutional determinism is 
precluded as a valid type of explanation’ (my translation from Danish). Although it might be the 
case that some versions of RCT can be justifiably characterised in these ways, this does not apply to 
the rationalist theories in the field of EUS. Conversely, leading rationalist theories such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, neorealism, rationalist institutionalism and some versions of 
neofunctionalism13 are better described as structuralist perspectives. 
 
The structural bias in RCT follows from the conception of agents described earlier. By substituting 
real agents with identical, well-informed utility maximisers, the preferences and “choices” of such 
agents become a question of the context in which they operate (Hindess, 1984: 270; Porpora, 2001). 
That is, because RCT substitute real agents with calculating robots without any individuality, and 
whose behaviour is therefore ‘oddly mechanical’ (Hollis, 1994: 248), we do not even have to look 
at the agent in order to know how s/he will act14. All we need to do is to look at their environment. 
Consequently, as one rational choice scholar explains, ‘the rational-choice approach is unconcerned 
with individuals or actors ... the prevailing institutions (the rules of the game) determine the 
behaviour of the actors’ (Tsebelis, 1990: 40). To be sure, this type of structuralism differs from 
other types of structuralism by its focus on agents and their “free” choices. But the point is that the 
“methodological individualism” of RCT does not imply a genuine notion of agency in that a free 
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choice is neither free nor, indeed, a real choice, if it is always already given by the context in which 
the agent operates (see also Hay, 2002: 103-104; Hay & Wincott, 1998). 
 
The liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) of Andrew Moravcsik (1998a), which is the most developed 
rationalist theory of integration (see e.g. Friis, 1998; Pollack, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2004), can 
serve to illustrate this point. LI is based on strong rationalist foundations and entails the view that 
agents are ‘purposively directed toward the achievement of a set of consistently ordered goals or 
objectives’ and choose between ‘alternative courses of actions on the basis of a utility function’ 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 481). Moreover they are assumed to make choices on the basis of nearly perfect 
(although not full) information about the consequences of their actions (Moravcsik, 1998a: 23). 
Indeed, as Moravcsik himself puts it, in ‘a world in which the future consequences of actions are 
unknown … LI would make little sense’ (1995: 626).  
 
Now, LI combines a liberal theory of preference formation with an intergovernmentalist theory of 
interstate bargaining in order to explain European integration. National preferences arise in the 
context of domestic politics, where they are formed on the basis of the preferences and actions of 
the most powerful societal groups. The government aggregates these preferences into a national 
position, and European integration is then seen as the outcome of choices made by national leaders 
who consistently pursue their national preferences in international bargaining (Moravcsik, 1998a: 
18-85). It has often been suggested that LI is an agency-centred theory that fails to explain where 
the preferences of the societal groups come from (see e.g. Hix, 1994: 9; McSweeney, 1998: 101; 
Risse-Kappen, 1996: 56; Panke & Risse, 2007: 93-94). Yet Moravcsik does, in fact, very clearly 
explain that ‘I employ a structural theory of those preferences. My structural approach…employs 
trade flows, competitiveness, inflation rates, and other data to predict what the economic 
preferences of societal actors – and therefore governments – should be’ (Moravcsik, 1999: 377). 
Because economic preferences are derived from economic structures, ‘shifts in preferences should 
follow the onset and precede the resolution of shifts or trends in economic circumstances’ 
(Moravcsik 1998a: 50). 
 
It is only because LI is based on the assumption that agents are rational and very well-informed 
about their context that changes in economic structures can be expected to translate directly into 
specific preferences. Only structures matter here, because ‘[p]references are by definition causally 
independent of the strategies of other actors’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 519, see also 1998a: 24-25). This is 
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no different at the intergovernmental level, where it is not considered necessary to study the 
interaction between state representatives in order to explain the outcome of the interstate 
negotiations. The liberal intergovernmentalist couldn’t care less about the creativity, charisma, 
persuasiveness, negotiating abilities and so on of particular agents. It is precisely because agents are 
assumed to be rational in the sense explained above that the outcome of bargains can supposedly be 
derived from the context in which the state representatives are situated. 
 
The problem with this ‘structural perspective’, as Moravcsik (1998a: 501) bluntly calls it, is that 
changes in the economic structures are not theorised. In other words, the relationship between 
economic structures and agents is conceptualised in mono-causal terms: structures determine and 
explain the behaviour of agents, whereas shifts in the economic structures are not explained. 
European integration is hereby presented as an essentially structure-driven process, as the one and 
only choice for Europe. Moreover, the liberal intergovernmentalist concept of structure is under-
theorised so that LI, somewhat paradoxically, ends up as an agent-centred theory devoid of agency 
as well as being a structural-determinist theory lacking a genuine concept of structure. 
 
A further implication of the neo-positivist aspirations to discern patterns of regularities is that 
rationalists have to downplay the importance of the ideational aspects of reality. This is not to say 
that rationalists are unaware of the importance of ideas. Indeed, one of the interesting developments 
in IR and EUS in the 1990s was that prominent rationalists made great efforts to incorporate ideas 
into their theories and models (cf. Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Weingast, 1995). There were 
different reasons why ideas suddenly appeared on the rationalist agenda (see Borrás, 1999: 6-7), but 
the main reason probably was that the rationalists were unable to get rid of a number of anomalies 
within the limits of pure rational choice models. For instance, Garrett & Weingast’s (1993) attempt 
to incorporate ideas in their rationalist analysis of the establishment of the Single Market was, 
among other things, motivated by the fact that conventional rationalist models proved unable to 
explain the choices of (rational) agents in situations with “multiple equilibria”, that is, situations 
where more than one choice is rational. However, it quickly became apparent that the extent to 
which rationalists are capable or willing to take ideas seriously is rather limited. Most importantly, 
they maintain that ideas and preferences are separate variables and that the former has no impact on 
the formation of the latter (Laffey & Weldes, 1997: 207). Instead, ideas are ascribed a certain 
importance in relation to the realisation of preferences, as rationalists consider ideas to be 
“functional tools” that can be used by agents to achieve what they want (Blyth, 2002: 308-309; 
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Jacobsen 1995: 10). Accordingly, it is no great surprise when two prominent rationalists summarise 
the way they understand the importance of ideas in the following manner: 
 
‘...the force of ideas is neither random nor independent. Only certain ideas have 
properties that may lead to their selection by political actors and to their 
institutionalization and perpetuation. It is not something intrinsic to ideas that gives 
them their power, but their utility in helping actors achieve their desired ends under 
prevailing constraints’ (Garrett & Weingast, 1993: 178) 
 
Moravcsik has also, on more than one occasion, signalled that he takes ideas seriously. For instance 
he writes that 
 
‘...collective ideas are like oxygen or language; it is essentially impossible for 
humans to function without them. They are ubiquitous and necessary tools to 
coordinate social life… In this sense, there is little point in espousing or rebutting the 
proposition that ‘ideas matter’, because it is trivial’ (Moravcsik, 2001b: 229) 
 
As one might suspect, however, these remarks are not translated into actual theory. Moravcsik is in 
complete agreement with other rationalists on this issue and does not let ideas influence the 
formation of preferences. Indeed, ‘[i]n the LI account of integration, ideas are present but not 
causally central. They may be irrelevant or random, or, more likely, they are “transmission belts” 
for interests’ (Moravcsik, 2001b: 229). Moravcsik’s conclusion is thus unambiguous: ‘in the 
process of European integration, structural economic incentives have created economic ideas, not 
the reverse’ (1999: 378). 
 
This highly restricted notion of ideas is not coincidental but follows logically from the social 
epistemology underpinning rationalist research. If rationalists were to concede that agents do not act 
mechanically in accordance with material incentives in their context but, rather, that a multitude of 
other (moral, religious, nationalistic, cultural etc.) ideas and motives inform their actions, then they 
would also be forced to concede that it is impossible to predict how agents will act in a given 
situation merely by looking at the context. This, in turn, would completely undermine the 
foundations upon which RCT rests.  
 
In order to conclude this discussion of the rationalist paradigm in EU studies we will now briefly 
attempt evaluate the attractiveness of rationalist social ontology using the two approaches 
mentioned in section 2.1 (although it will obviously not be possible at this point to assess its 
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relative attractiveness). In relation to the pragmatic approach the rationalist social ontology quickly 
runs into trouble. In order to make the ontology fit a restrictive social epistemology the behaviour of 
(rational) agents is ultimately explained with reference to social structures and to make things worse 
the importance ascribed to ideational factors tends to become marginal. The verdict thus has to be 
that rationalist social ontology appears rather unattractive (in absolute terms) as it only allows its 
proponents a rather one-sided perspective on social reality. It is more difficult to assess the 
rationalist approach in relation to the immanent approach. But for instance one can note a 
remarkable inconsistency between, on one hand, the significant importance rationalists ascribe to 
ideas when not engaged in the construction of (rationalist) theory – as when Moravcsik (2001a: 
185) states that ’[s]urely few domains are more promising than the study of ideas in the process of 
European integration’ – and, on the other hand, the very modest role ideas are then allowed to play 
in rationalist theories and explanations of social events.  This contradiction is one example of the 
way rationalist philosophy places significant restrictions on rationalist theorising and thus on the 
empirical focus of rationalist analysis.  
 
 
2.3. The constructivist paradigm in EU studies 
 
In order to understand the background for the emergence of a constructivist paradigm in EU studies 
it is necessary to briefly look at developments within the wider field of IR. As mentioned above, a 
rationalist paradigm emerged in IR when the (neo)liberal and the (neo)realist positions gradually 
and partly merged in the 1980s and 1990s. This provoked a number of attacks from 
postmodernist/poststructuralists, or “reflectivists” as they are called in IR jargon15, who rejected the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying rationalism. For instance, the reflectivists 
rejected the existence of an objective reality that it is possible to obtain knowledge about. The idea 
is that since our theories about the world actually construct this world and establishes what counts 
as facts, then there is no valid knowledge that competing theories can be evaluated in relation to. 
With the appearance of reflectivism, the IR field was split between two camps that had little to talk 
to each other about. On one side neo-positivists/rationalists like Keohane (1988) and Østerud (1996) 
maintained that it is possible to obtain valid knowledge about the social world whereas, on the other 
side, postmodernists/poststructuralists like Ashley (1987) and Smith (1996, 1997b) rejected that this 
should be possible. In this hostile climate “constructivism” was launched as a sort of middle way 
between rationalism and reflectivism, which, to put it crudely, combined the faith in social science 
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of the former with the latter’s focus on the ideational side of reality (e.g. Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992, 
1995).  
 
From the mid-1990s constructivism has also made its entry in EU studies where it is now the main 
“challenger” to the dominant rationalist paradigm (Pollack, 2001)16. Indeed, as one of the 
paradigm’s well-known protagonists is happy to announce, ‘[c]onstructivist approaches to the study 
of Europe are trendy’ (Checkel, 2006: 58). The constructivist paradigm contains a much broader 
range of positions than the rationalist paradigm does, and the former paradigm is thus much less 
homogenous than the latter. Some constructivists subscribe to positions that come close to 
reflectivism (for example, Diez, 2001a). Others follow in the footsteps of Alexander Wendt in IR 
(see Wendt, 1999; Fearon & Wendt, 2005) and downplay meta-theoretical differences between 
constructivism and rationalism and, in some cases, even argue in favour of methodologies usually 
associated with neo-positivism (e.g. Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2004; see also Pollack, 2005: 24). 
Because of this there has been considerable confusion on what “constructivism” actually involves 
(Fierke & Jørgensen, 2001: 4; Risse, 2004: 159).  
 
Bearing this heterogeneity in mind, it is still possible to point to some shared features. In terms of 
social ontology, constructivists believe that social reality is an inter-subjective domain that is made 
meaningful by the people who inhabit it and who construct it through their actions (Kratochwil, 
2001: 16-17). Constructivism is ‘based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do not 
exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meaning’ 
(Risse, 2004: 160). The cultural and institutional environment in which agents are located is thus 
understood as having a strong impact on the creation of the preferences and identities of agents – 
and, therefore, also on the way agents behave. In terms of social epistemology, the constructivist 
paradigm belongs to the hermeneutic or interpretivist tradition. This tradition claims that we need to 
understand the meanings that agents themselves attach to their actions and the way such meanings 
are inter-subjectively constructed if we want to explain social phenomena (Adler, 1997: 328; Marsh 
& Furlong, 2002: 27; Risse & Wiener, 2001: 200). In this view, the main purpose of theory is to 
work as ‘a guide to empirical exploration, a means of reflecting more or less abstractly upon 
complex processes of institutional evolution and transformation’ (Hay, 2002: 47). This implies a 
less parsimonious form of theory than the one preferred by rationalists – and, in fact, constructivists 
in EUS have often based empirical analyses directly on abstract social theories such as Habermas’ 
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theory of communicative action (Risse-Kappen, 1996), Searle’s theory of speech acts (e.g. Fierke & 
Wiener, 2001) and Giddens’ structuration theory, to which we shall return below. 
 
Most constructivists (unlike reflectivists) believe that it is possible to obtain valid knowledge about 
social reality – and that it is therefore possible to construct theories that can be evaluated against 
this reality. According to Risse & Wiener (2001: 200), the constructivists share ‘an epistemological 
commitment to truth-seeking, and the belief that causal generalization in the form of middle range 
theories … is possible’. This statement is, however, more accurate in relation to the (often 
American) constructivists who do not want to distance themselves too much from the rationalists 
(e.g. Checkel, 2001; Haas, 2001; Wendt, 1999), than it is in relation to the more radical 
constructivists who identify more with “reflectivism” than with rationalism (see for instance, Wind, 
1997). 
 
It is, of course, well known that constructivists like Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989) were decisive 
in placing the agency-structure question on the IR discipline’s agenda. In EUS, constructivists have 
also been at the forefront in emphasising the importance of this question – as when Wind (2001: 32) 
states that ‘basic reflections on … agency and structure are the necessary starting point for 
theorising about European integration today’ (see also e.g. Diez, 2001b or Rosamond, 2001). 
Constructivists argue that agents and structures are codetermined or “mutually constitutive”, neither 
being subordinate to the other. Yet one may in fact question whether constructivists in EUS 
generally subscribe to (meta)theoretical frameworks that conceptualise the agency-structure 
relationship in balanced and/or convincing ways. 
 
One of the theoretical frameworks that has been utilised by a rather large number of EUS scholars is 
the sociological institutionalism of March & Olsen (1989)17. According to this view, institutions 
play a major role in shaping the expectations, preferences, experiences and interpretations of agents. 
Moreover, agents are assumed to follow a “logic of appropriateness”, meaning that their actions are 
guided by their understanding of what will be the most appropriate behaviour in relation to the 
existing rules. Thus, ‘[t]he individual personality and will of political actors is less important; 
historical traditions as they are recorded and interpreted within a complex of rules are more 
important. A calculus of political costs and benefits is less important; a calculus of identity and 
appropriateness is more important’ (March & Olsen, 1989: 38). Unsurprisingly, sociological 
institutionalism has often been criticised for giving institutional structures clear primacy over 
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agents, hereby underestimating the importance of agency (cf. e.g. Gorges, 2001; Hall & Taylor, 
1996; Koelbe, 1995). It thus lends support to Checkel’s remark that ‘Constructivists, despite their 
arguments about mutually constituting agents and structures, have advanced a structure-centered 
approach’ (1998: 342). Without doubt, this is a type of structuralism that differs from its rationalist 
counterpart in that it operates with a more explicitly conceptualised notion of structure. Yet the 
problem remains that sociological institutionalism is only capable of explaining institutional 
stability; in order to explain institutional change, it has to rely on the inclusion of non-institutional 
exogenous variables (Gorges, 2001: 141).  
 
Other constructivists in EUS have flirted with Anthony Giddens’s so-called structuration theory 
(see, in particular, Christiansen & Jørgensen, 1999 and Wind, 1996, 2001). Structuration theory 
seeks to overcome the dualism between agency and structure through ‘a reworking both of a series 
of concepts linked to each of these terms, and of the terms themselves’ (Giddens, 1979: 53). In 
particular, the concept of social structure is redefined and now refers to ‘rules and resources’ that 
only exist “virtually” as memory traces in the instantiation in social practice (Giddens, 1979: 64-66; 
1984: 25). This concept clearly differs greatly from more conventional conceptions of social 
structure, for instance by making structures internal to the activities of agents. This means that even 
if one accepted that Giddens has succeeded in transcending a dualism, this is ‘a rather different 
dualism to that which now attracts attention to the theory of structuration’ (Hay, 2002: 121; see also 
Jessop, 1996: 124). 
 
This is one of a number of reasons that structuration theory has been severely criticised (see e.g. 
Archer, 1995; King, 2000; Parker, 2000). Taking into consideration the absence of persuasive 
responses to this critique, it is rather surprising that constructivist scholars in EUS can maintain that 
it is ‘a convincing model of transformation and societal reproduction’ (Wind, 2001: 64). Indeed, 
until the critique of structuration theory is repudiated there are good reasons to dispute this claim 
and, instead, endorse Parker’s remark that ‘the moment of structuration theory passed some time 
ago. It still figures prominently in routine social theoretical talk, but its force is only that of a tired 
conventional wisdom’ (2000: x; see also Buch-Hansen, 2002)18.  
 
Let us now move on to the issue of the ideational. Some constructivists in IR have declared that 
they take the “middle way” with regards to this question – that is, a position that takes into account 
both the ideational and the material. Indeed, as Adler (1997: 325-326) explains, ‘constructivists 
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stand at two intersections – that between materialism and idealism, and that between individual 
agency and social structure’. Adler defines constructivism in relation to this “first intersection” 
when he writes that ‘[c]onstructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world 
shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world’ (Adler 1997: 322, italics removed). As a careful reading of 
this quote reveals, however, only a rather limited significance is ascribed to the material: apparently 
the material has no effects independently of agents’ interpretations of it. It thus becomes clear that 
Adler is not really taking a middle position, but rather a position that gives clear primacy to the 
ideational over the material. Other IR constructivists openly acknowledge that they give primacy to 
the ideational (see, for example, Wendt, 1999: 1, 32)19.  
 
This ideational bias also pervades the constructivist contributions to EU studies, where the 
importance ascribed to material factors is minimal. For instance, in their introduction to a collection 
of constructivist contributions to EUS, three eminent constructivists first acknowledge the 
importance of “material reality” and then go on to write that ‘constructivism focuses on … such 
diverse phenomena as, for example, intersubjective meanings, norms, rules, institutions, routinized 
practices, discourse, constitutive and/or deliberative processes, symbolic politics, imagined and/or 
epistemic communities, communicative action, collective identity formation, and cultures of 
national security’ (Christiansen et al. 2001: 3). In a similar vein, Checkel mentions ‘[d]eliberation, 
discourses, norms, persuasion, identity, socialization, arguing’ (2006: 58) as key concepts in the 
constructivist paradigm. What is noteworthy here is, that material factors are barely mentioned, nor 
do they play a significant role in the other chapters of the book. Various ideational phenomena seem 
to be the constructivists’ paramount concern.  
 
So whereas they (rightly) criticise rationalists for underestimating the significance of various 
ideational phenomena, constructivists themselves end up almost completely ignoring the 
significance of the material. Nowhere do constructivists in EUS actually deny the existence or 
importance of material factors – rather, it appears that they have little or nothing to say about them! 
This ideational bias in the social ontologies and substantive work of the constructivists is related to 
the interpretivist epistemology to which they subscribe: it allows them to focus on the way agents 
use ideational factors to interpret material factors, but does not direct them towards an investigation 
of how the material influences the ideational. This means that the ambition to take material factors 
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seriously has rarely been translated into concrete constructivist research, which, as van Apeldoorn 
et al. (2003: 30) have also noted, ‘in practice has tended towards idealism’.  
 
In terms of the pragmatic approach this ideational bias is of course precisely as problematic as 
rationalism’s materialist bias. The consequence is that only certain parts of social reality can be 
studied in a comprehensive and fruitful manner, whereas other parts are more or less neglected. 
Having said that, the constructivist social ontology is less restrictive than the rationalist equivalent 
and can thus be seen as somewhat more attractive. In terms of the immanent approach it has to be 
concluded that constructivists have in practice generally failed to live up to their own ambition of 
taking the “middle way” in relation to the agency-structure and ideational-material questions. In 
relation to the latter question this has to be seen to some extent in relation to the interpretivist social 
epistemology, as it creates a certain bias in favour of the ideational aspects of social reality. What 
we have here is thus a contradiction at the heart of the constructivist paradigm between the 
proclaimed intention to take the “middle way” and an epistemological position that will never allow 
constructivists to do this. 
 
To recapitulate, both rationalists and constructivists ground their research in problematic 
philosophies that prevent them from dealing with social reality in its entirety. What has emerged in 
EUS is, to simplify somewhat, a tacit division of labour through which rationalists deal with the 
material aspects of reality, whereas constructivists focus on the ideational aspects. This bias in the 
research on European integration is rather problematic and unsatisfactory as it, to a large extent, 
emanates from underlying philosophies. It is not justified by the reality studied by EU scholars 
which, as hardly anyone would want to dispute, contains a mixture of material and ideational 
factors.  
 
Some EU and IR scholars have responded to this by tentatively suggesting a combination of 
elements from rationalism and constructivism (see e.g. Jupille et al. 2003; Fearon & Wendt; 2005). 
At first glance this might seem like a logical and attractive solution, especially as one paradigm 
seems to have strength where the other has a weakness, and vice versa, in relation to the question of 
the ideational and the material. However, as Patomäki & Wight (2000: 213-215) have rightly 
pointed out in a discussion of the attempts in IR to find a middle ground position between 
reflectivism and positivism, namely constructivism, a synthesis between two problematic positions 
results not in an improved position but simply in a problematic position. As they put it, ‘two wrongs 
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do not make a right’. This also applies to the attempts to “bridge” rationalism and constructivism in 
EUS and IR. Not only is it open to grave doubts whether a synthesis could provide a coherent and 
non-biased social ontology; it is also improbable that a coherent view of the nature and purpose of 
social scientific practice can be formulated on the basis of the diverging social epistemologies 
underpinning the two paradigms. In this situation it might be worth considering what an alternative 
position, namely critical realism, has to offer.  
 
 
2.4. Bringing in critical realism 
 
Critical realism is a philosophy of science that constitutes a full-blown but constantly developing 
alternative to, on one hand, different types of (neo-)positivism and, on the other hand, different 
types of interpretivism. It is associated with the early works of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar 
(see Bhaskar, 1975, 1979) and has gradually gained popularity throughout the social sciences in 
various fields such as sociology (e.g. Archer, 1995), history (Lloyd, 1993), economics (e.g. Lawson, 
1997) and political economy (e.g. Jessop, 2002; Nielsen, 2002). Even in IR a few critical realist 
contributions have appeared (e.g. Patomäki, 2002; Wight, 2006). Despite these developments, 
however, this philosophy has so far not really made inroads into EUS, although a few scholars 
working in this field have employed specific insights from it (see Bailey, 2006; Dyson & 
Featherstone, 1999; van Apeldoorn, 2002).  
 
It is not the intention to provide a comprehensive “introduction to critical realism” in what follows. 
This is neither necessary nor possible in the present context (see e.g. Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005, 
Collier, 1994 or Sayer, 2000 for such introductions). Moreover, it is important to stress that CR is 
not a completely unambiguous or homogenous position. To be sure, critical realism is to a large 
extent defined by a number of core features. Yet those scholars who identify with CR disagree on 
all sorts of things and one does not have to search long in the literature to find variations in the way 
central concepts in the critical realist terminology are used. Thus, instead of seeing CR as a narrow 
and well-defined position, it should be seen as a multidimensional spectrum with absolute limits 
(critical realism is e.g. not a type of positivism or postmodernism) but also with inclusive openings, 
which leave room for rather divergent positions in relation to various questions (Buch-Hansen & 
Nielsen, 2005: 104)20. Consequently, neither Roy Bhaskar nor anyone else enjoys a monopoly of the 
one and only true version of critical realism. So although the following account draws extensively 
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on the works of Bhaskar and other critical realists, it also represents an attempt to develop and 
explicate CR in certain respects.  
 
So what are the core features of critical realism? At the most general level, critical realists make a 
distinction between the intransitive dimension, consisting of the reality that exists independently of 
our knowledge of it, and the transitive dimension, consisting of our knowledge at a given time 
(Bhaskar, 1975: 21-24; 1979: 11-17). Hence, ontology concerns the intransitive dimension, whereas 
epistemology deals with questions related to the transitive dimension. These two dimensions are out 
of sync with each other, changes in one of them does not necessarily lead to changes in the other: 
‘Transitive knowledge and intransitive objects, beliefs and beings, thought and things, descriptions 
and referents, can each now change without a corresponding change [...] in the correlative term on 
the other side of the [transitive dimension/intransitive dimension] divide’ (Bhaskar, 1986: 52). 
According to the philosophical ontology of critical realism, reality is deep, stratified, differentiated 
and open. That is, reality contains a level of structures and mechanisms that sustain and generate 
events and phenomena regardless of whether these are observed/observable or not (see e.g. Bhaskar, 
1975: 56); these structures and mechanisms are hierarchically ordered in a number of strata where 
higher strata presuppose lower and less complex strata (see e.g. Bhaskar, 1975: 113; Moll, 2004), 
reality contains a number of complex objects with structures that provide them with very different 
causal potential and liabilities (see e.g. Sayer, 1992: 104-109); and reality is not a closed system 
where consistent regularities of the type “when event A, then event B” are likely to occur over 
longer periods of time (see e.g. Bhaskar, 1986: 107; Jessop, 2005: 53). 
 
This worldview obviously has epistemological implications. In negative terms, an implication of the 
openness of the world is that it becomes impossible to make precise predictions of the future. 
Science should thus primarily be explanatory rather than attempting to be predictive (Bhaskar, 
1979: 27; 1986: 107; although see Næss, 2004 for some important qualifications). In positive terms, 
Bhaskar argues that the essence of science consists in the movement from knowledge of manifest 
events and phenomena to generation of knowledge of the mechanisms and structures that have 
caused and sustained such events and phenomena (Bhaskar, 1975: 143-228; 1989: 20). The 
production of such knowledge is a human activity situated in social relations. New knowledge 
builds upon and transforms existing knowledge and is in this sense a social product. Or as Bhaskar 
almost poetically puts it, ‘the already known is the indispensable means for the production of the 
unknown; models, analogies and so forth provide the only type of craft a science can set sail in as it 
40 
 
embarks on its voyages of discovery, the only kind of resource it can bend and shape as it labours 
on its work of transformation’ (1986: 55). Knowledge is also fallible – that is, it is never certain let 
alone definitive. This is reflected in the fact that, over time, new theories and explanations 
complement, refine and ultimately replace the theories and explanations hitherto regarded as 
correct. This indicates that knowledge is historically conditioned and usually possible to be 
improved upon (Bhaskar, 1986: 60). This does not relieve us of our obligation to produce research 
that, to the best of our knowledge, is valid, nor does it mean that the production of valid knowledge 
is out of our reach. But it means that the aspirations to produce the “definitive account” of some 
social phenomenon should be consigned to the dustbin. 
 
Let us now turn our attention towards realism’s social ontology21. At the heart of this we find an 
account of the agency-structure relation. Or more precisely, we find at least three different, but 
nevertheless cognate, accounts: Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (Bhaskar, 
1978; 1979: 45-47); Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach (see Archer, 1982; 1995; 1998); 
and Bob Jessop’s Strategic-Relational Approach (see Jessop, 2001; 2005). Notwithstanding this, all 
critical realists, like constructivists, argue that both agency and structure matter and that the two 
presuppose each other. Yet, in this view it would probably be considered inaccurate to say that the 
two are “mutually constitutive”, as this would seem to imply that agents, so to speak, create 
structures at the very same time that they are affected by them. In contrast to this, most if not all 
critical realists maintain that structures are always the outcome of human activities undertaken in 
the past, not in the present time. This means that, at any given point in time, agents are confronted 
by pre-existing structures that they then contribute to either reproduce or transform through their 
activities. Such structures confront the agent as an objective phenomenon that influences him or her 
regardless of the way they understand this phenomenon (if they interpret it at all). For instance, 
economic crises such as the Great Depression in the 1930s or the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s have very real effects on the life of millions of people regardless of whether they understand 
the complex causes of the situation or not. Thus, as Isaac (1987: 78) remarks, ‘social life is only 
partly constituted by the concepts of its participants. It is also constituted by a set of enduring 
structural relationships that are likely opaque to their participants’ (see also Bhaskar, 1989: 4). More 
precisely, structures are both facilitating, in that they are the necessary condition for the social 
activities of agents (Bhaskar, 1979: 35), and constraining as they, although they never determine the 
actions of agents, exert ‘an objective influence which conditions action patterns and supplies agents 
with strategic directional guidance’ (Archer, 1995: 196, emphasis removed).  
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In order to link agency and structure Bhaskar introduces the notion of the position-practice system. 
The idea is that agents occupy particular structural positions (such as a job or the role as family 
man) that are associated with particular resources, constraints, predicaments and powers and which 
motivate their “occupiers” to engage in particular practices (Bhaskar, 1979: 51, see also Porpora, 
1989: 200; 1993). No postulates are made that agents are infinitely locked to one position, or that 
such positions are static over time or that the practices of an agent can ever be reduced to the 
positions s/he occupies. For instance, José Manuel Barroso is only able to make “presidential 
decisions” because of a position-practice system which currently constitutes him as President of the 
Commission. In ten years time he will no longer hold this position. But it is possible that, during 
Barroso’s term of office, the “presidential position” will be transformed through his and other 
agents’ activities. Furthermore, it is perfectly conceivable that had another person been elected 
president instead of Barroso, then this person would not have made the same decisions. 
 
On one hand, then, critical realism claims that structures and structural positions are highly 
important in that they condition all social activities. On the other hand, however, this does not result 
in a social ontology that downplays the importance of agency. To be sure, critical realism does not 
offer an “agent theory” of the kind that tells us that agents operate by a “logic of appropriateness” or 
that they are all rational utility maximisers. For reasons discussed in the previous two sections, a 
perspective that claims to take agency seriously must resist the temptation to fall back on such 
assumptions, convenient as they may be. Critical realism entails the view that although the practices 
of agents are intentional, agents also have very different qualities that influence their (positioned) 
practices. They can be charismatic or drab, diligent or lazy, skilful or incompetent, intelligent or 
obtuse, and so on. They may occasionally operate according to logics similar to those identified by 
rationalists and constructivists. But whether agents do so is an empirical question, not something 
that can be settled at the ontological level. In the real world, as opposed to in the fictional universe 
of RCT, agents only have partial knowledge of their structural context and of the exact 
consequences of their actions. This is because social reality is populated by a high number of real 
agents (as opposed to predictable robots) who act in sometimes uncoordinated ways upon structures 
and phenomena that are related to a wider set of, often unacknowledged, structures. Consequently, 
unintended structural consequences often follow from the intentional practices of agents (Bhaskar, 
1979: 42-44).  
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As mentioned above, structural positions facilitate and constrain practices. In order to understand 
the behaviour of an agent, however, it is also necessary to look at his or her preferences. On one 
hand, preferences are not simply reducible to positions. As agents do not have perfect knowledge of 
their context, they have to rely on particular (fallible) interpretations of social reality when 
formulating their preferences and strategies (Hay, 2002: 209-10). This means, as constructivists 
have often (and rightly) pointed out, that preferences are informed by various ideational factors and 
that they, in some situations, are endogenous to the interactions between agents. On the other hand, 
agents always interpret the world from a particular position and this tends to have an impact on their 
ideational inclinations. On this anti-reductionist view, then, the ideational has material effects 
through the activities of agents, just as material circumstances have an impact on the ideational (see 
also Hay, 2002: 210). To sum up, the social ontology of critical realism suggests that the social 
world is populated by a large number of real agents whose positioned practices are never 
structurally determined but always informed by various ideas. This means that social phenomena, 
such as the EU or the regulation of competition, should be understood as contingent (possible but 
not necessary) outcomes of the interactions between a large number of such agents.  
 
Clearly this has epistemological implications. Here we need to distinguish between the general 
epistemology that was outlined above and critical realism’s social epistemology. To be sure, some 
continuity between the two is plausible. What should be preserved are the notions that knowledge is 
both fallible and a social product. This is as true in relation to social scientific knowledge as it is in 
relation to other types of scientific knowledge. But what seems slightly more problematic is to 
argue that social science, like other types of science, concerns the search for underlying structures 
and mechanisms – especially if it is not clarified (as it is often the case) what is meant by the 
concept of “mechanism”. So what is a mechanism? Porpora suggests that a ‘system of relationships 
among social positions may itself constitute the sort of causal mechanism that critical realists have 
in mind’ (1989: 199). And in the postscript to the second edition of The Possibility of Naturalism 
Bhaskar writes that in the past he has often used ‘the term “structure” and “generative mechanism” 
as if they were synonyms’ but that he now considers it better to use the concept of (generative) 
mechanism ‘to refer only to the causal powers of ways of acting of structures things’ (1998: 170). 
Later Bhaskar has explained the meaning of the concept in the following way: 
 
‘A mechanism is just something that makes something else happen – you could say 
that water boils because of its molecular structure. You could say, analytically, that 
this level of the non-actual real is deeper, it describes the level behind; this can 
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sometimes be inside, it can sometimes be smaller as in the case of molecules, but it 
can also be wider (quoted in Buch-Hansen, 2005: 61) 
 
This would clearly seem to indicate that mechanisms cannot just be reduced to social structures as if 
the latter were the only things that made something happen in the social world. Indeed, this also 
follows logically from the social ontology that has been outlined above. As it will be remembered, it 
was emphasised that social change and stability follows from the interplay between agents and 
structures over time, and a case was furthermore made for the importance of the hermeneutic or 
ideational aspects of social reality.  
 
If we are being serious about this, clearly it should be reflected in our social epistemology – and 
thus also when we define what we see as the purpose of our social scientific activities. Accordingly, 
I consider it to be the primary overall purpose of my social scientific practice (in this thesis and in 
general) to explore the structurally conditioned and ideationally mediated interplays between 
agents and the outcomes of such interplays. This conception of social science is compatible with the 
general epistemology of critical realism, as the identification of underlying structures is still seen as 
a crucial aspect of social science. Yet by explicitly adding agency and ideational factors to the 
equation it also transcends it, and does indeed require us to think again about the concept of 
mechanisms. Now, when asking what precisely made something else happen we are in effect asking 
what caused it (see also Sayer, 1992: 104). Here it might be useful to bring in the distinction 
sometimes made between material and efficient causes. In the social world social structures are 
examples of entities that can function as material causes of activity: that is, they condition 
(facilitate and constrain) the activities of agents and cause effects through the actions of agents. But 
only agents can act – that is, only their actions can be efficient causes (Lewis, 2000: 257-258; 2002: 
20; see also Porpora, 1993: 215).  
 
As mentioned agents do not only act in a structural context: they also act on the basis of certain 
(sometimes shared) ideas or ideational factors. Such ideas are not “efficient causes” (ideas cannot 
act for themselves), but nor would it seem entirely appropriate to refer to them as material causes. 
On this basis I suggest that three types of mechanisms are by definition (that is, always) involved in 
causing or blocking any given social events and phenomena: agential mechanisms that consist of 
the agency exercised by (individual and collective) agents; ideational mechanisms that consist of 
ideas, discourses (including ideologies), values, norms etc. on the basis of which agents interpret the 
world and that shape their preferences and identities; and material mechanisms that consist of the 
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non-ideational structures and structural positions that condition practices as well as of other non-
ideational entities. According to this view, social science involves a movement from the knowledge 
of a manifest phenomenon (say, the adoption of a regulation) to the generation of knowledge of the 
combinations of the agential, ideational and material mechanisms that were the most decisive ones 
in bringing that phenomenon about.  
 
This movement is, for different reasons, rarely easy. For one thing, a multiplicity of mechanisms are 
generally involved in causing phenomena (Bhaskar, 1979: 55) – a point that clearly also applies to 
many of those phenomena that are of interest to EU scholars. Moreover, these mechanisms are not 
always directly observable; for instance, social structures only manifest themselves through their 
effects. But critical realism cannot, does not and should not attempt to provide us with “how-to-do-
social-science” cookbook recipes of the kind sometimes found in especially American methodology 
textbooks22. As such it does not provide an answer to the question of how one identifies 
mechanisms (although see e.g. Danermark et al., 2002: 108-12 or Sayer, 2000: 19-29 for some 
helpful suggestions). As Bhaskar writes, ‘it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive 
possibilities for us’ (1979: 31). Consequently, critical realism leaves it to social scientists to 
determine what methods and procedures will be relevant in identifying the causes of the concrete 
social phenomena they are interested in (see also Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005: 64; Wight, 2007: 
385). In the next section it will be elaborated how critical realism it “put to work” in this thesis. 
 
 
2.5. From philosophy to theory... 
 
As Bhaskar (1991: 141) points out, critical realism is a philosophy not just about but also for 
science. It becomes a philosophy for the sciences by serving as an “underlabourer”: that is, it can 
provide a philosophical framework that in various ways can be “connected” to substantive theories 
and empirical research23. But it is still one thing to outline a philosophy of science position; quite 
another to make use of this philosophy in social scientific research. Many philosophers of science 
(critical realists included) apparently feel content by just discussing philosophy and theory and do 
not really engage in the troublesome task it is to do empirically informed research (Buch-Hansen & 
Nielsen, 2005: 64-65). It is not for me to suggest that this cannot be legitimate and important work. 
But as Brante (2001: 186) is surely right to note, it entails ‘a risk that we end up like Freud’s patient 
who always polished his glasses but never put them on’. In this section it is thus the task to begin 
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the process of putting on the glasses – that is, of making sure that this philosophy is actually 
connected to the critical political economy perspective outlined in the next chapter. 
 
In the previous section the exploration of the structurally conditioned and ideationally mediated 
interplays between agents and the outcomes of such interplays was identified as the primary overall 
purpose of the social sciences. In the present thesis, where we seek to explain the history of 
European level merger control, the task is thus to identify the (combinations of the) most important 
ideational, agential and material mechanisms at different junctures. Critical realism cannot help us 
much in this endeavour: it is not a theory of competition regulation, European integration or any 
other concrete matters – and nor can it become so for the simple reason that it deals with a different 
level of abstraction. At this level, it cannot be specified what agents, structures and ideas we should 
regard as significant (see also Bhaskar, 1979: 7). In other words, we will need the assistance of a 
more substantive theory that is compatible with, yet irreducible to, the critical realist position 
described in the previous section. This theory, namely the critical political economy perspective on 
regulation, is outlined in Chapter 3. In what follows it is explained in what sense this theory is 
“critical realist” and how it has been constructed. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.1 my suggestion is that social ontology regulates a theory’s content 
whereas social epistemology regulates its form. Having outlined a social ontology according to 
which social change and stability emerges from the structurally conditioned and ideationally 
mediated interplays between agents, it would clearly not be acceptable to suggest a theory that 
explains everything with reference to, say, social structures. As regards the content, then, any kind 
of theoretical reductionism is ruled out from the outset and anything less than a theory that ascribes 
importance to specific agential, material and ideational mechanisms and the way they are related 
must be regarded as insufficient. Moreover, it follows from a critical realist position that one should 
not analyse the parts of the social world in isolation from the greater whole of which they form part. 
Rather theoretical perspectives should aid what Ollman (2003: 14) refers to as dialectical research. 
Here one ‘begins with the whole, the system, or as much of it as one understands, and then proceeds 
to an examination of the part to see where it fits and how it functions, leading eventually to a fuller 
understanding of the whole from which one has begun’ (Ollman, 2003: 14; see also Dean et al., 
2006: 23-24). The theoretical perspective should thus allow us to understand merger control in 
context. 
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Moreover, critical realists assert that ‘most social phenomena […] in general have to be explained 
in terms of a multiplicity of causes’ (Bhaskar, 1979: 55). This seems to suggest that a theory which 
attempts to explain phenomena with reference to one set of mechanisms only might be problematic. 
This relates to the form of the theory. In a somewhat different context Bob Jessop distinguishes 
between strong and weak theory. Whereas the former purports to explain a phenomenon with 
reference to a single set of mechanisms, the latter is understood as ‘a useful set of guidelines’ that 
‘would point us towards the most important factors which conjointly shape that “complex synthesis 
of multiple determinations”’ we are studying’ (Jessop, 1990: 249). The theory to be presented in the 
next chapter is in this sense a “weak theory” that makes no attempt to single out the “cause without 
cause”, the “grand mechanism of everything”.  
 
One compelling reason why only a “weak theory” can be formulated here is that it is to be applied 
to the analysis of a rather long period of time, stretching from the early post Second World War 
years to present time Europe. As even the most cursory glance at the literature dealing with the 
developments of capitalism and its regulation during this time span will reveal, it was an era 
characterised by fundamental transformations. What we need when we try to shed light on a period 
like this is thus a theoretical perspective that allows us to take into account such fundamental 
transformations; not yet another theoretical straitjacket that prevents us from doing this because the 
world is assumed to be essentially unalterable24. A more general point is that “strong theories” are 
by definition deeply political in that they advocate a somewhat closed and mechanical perspective 
on the existing social reality hereby leaving no hope for a significantly different world (Cox, 1996: 
89 and Wight, 2006: 8 make a similar point). If we claim to take agency seriously we cannot 
advocate strong theory – and indeed no truly convincing “strong theory” of, say, the state, 
international relations, regulation or European integration can ever be constructed as this would 
imply neglect of the open-ended nature of history and politics (see also Hay & Lister, 2006; Jessop, 
1990: 249).  
 
What this means more concretely is that the theoretical perspective outlined in Chapter 3 has to be 
formulated in a rather general way, thereby leaving plenty of room for different agents, ideas and 
structures to play a role. It thus seeks to identify particular mechanisms as being the most important 
to the explanation of economic regulation while, crucially, at the same time remaining open to the 
importance of other mechanisms as well. Besides introducing a number of concepts and accounting 
for their relation it also identifies some tendencial causal relationships. Readers anticipating a 
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parsimonious and unambiguous theory that can account for the history of European level merger 
control with reference to a few mechanisms (or “independent variables”) might just as well prepare 
for disappointment. 
 
In a discussion of the differences in the possibility of measurement in the natural and social 
sciences, Bhaskar writes that ‘the conceptual aspect of the subject matter of the social sciences 
circumscribes the possibility of measurement’ in a ‘fundamental way. For meanings, cannot be 
measured, only understood’ (1979: 59). This leads him to suggest that in the social sciences, 
‘precision in meaning now assumes the place of accuracy in measurement as the a posteriori arbiter 
of theory’ (1979: 59). The irony that Bhaskar of all people would stress the need for conceptual 
clarity will not be lost on those who have struggled to understand his own prose. Indeed, as a 
reviewer of The Possibility of Naturalism (which reads rather easily compared to most of Bhaskar’s 
later works) bluntly put it, this book ‘is written in the worst form of jargon that I have seen since my 
lawyer drew up the mortgage on my house’ (Ruse, 1981: 495). Nevertheless this is an important 
point that deserves to be taken seriously. In outlining the theoretical framework in the next chapter 
great care has thus been taken to define or explain all the important concepts introduced.  
 
The critical political economy perspective presented in Chapter 3 has obviously not just come out of 
the blue. It has been developed through three dialogues: a dialogue with the empirical sources 
described in section 1.3 (various empirical data/accounts of European integration, capitalism and 
developments in the competition policy domains); a dialogue with various theoretical literatures; 
and finally a dialogue with the critical realist framework outlined in the previous section, with 
which the theory clearly had to be compatible. These dialogues have not been completed for the 
simple reason that they cannot be completed. As Aglietta explains, 
  
‘Theory […] is never final and complete, it is always in the process of development. 
The progression of thought does not consist simply of hypothetico-deductive phases; 
these rather alternate with dialectical phases. It is the dialectical phases that are most 
important, and make history something other than the exposition of conclusions 
already implicitly contained in an axiomatic system’ (Aglietta, 1979: 15-16). 
 
I share this view that theory construction should follow a dialectical path and involve reciprocating 
movements between the theoretical and empirical levels. Such a process has elsewhere been well 
described with the word “iterative” (see Ougaard, 1988: 74), designating a sort of spiral trial and 
error process where one continuously moves back and forth between analysing empirical data on 
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the basis of the theoretical framework, and revising the theoretical framework on the basis of 
empirical findings. This process ‘does neither involve letting the theory dictate the empirical data, 
nor letting empirical data speak for themselves, but both-and’ (Ougaard, 1988: 73, my translation 
from Danish).  
 
In principle, such iterative processes can go on forever. As Aglietta points out above, the result is 
that theory is never complete – and the same goes for the empirical analyses and the meta-
theoretical framework. Yet for practical reasons it is of course at some stage necessary to “stop the 
pendulum” and put pen to paper. This is also the case in relation to the present study where the 
knowledge I present (and have) about the developments in the merger control area and elsewhere is 
fallible and incomplete and where there is indeed room for improvement at all levels of abstraction. 
It is thus possible, and indeed likely, that new empirical information that contradicts some of the 
sources used in the present study emerges or that other theoretical concepts than those I propose can 
be shown to be more suitable to the analysis of the history of European level merger control. Rather 
than lamenting this, it should be regarded as one of the basic conditions in the social sciences. 
 
This procedure of theory construction raises the question of what the theory to be presented in 
Chapter 3 is a theory of? I first and foremost consider it a theoretical perspective that can help to 
shed light on the establishment, reproduction and transformation of regulatory regimes, hoping and 
suspecting that its central components will be (or relatively easily can be made) useful in analyses 
of many other aspects of regulation and integration than the one analysed in the present study. For 
that reason I refer to it as a critical political economy perspective on regulation. But clearly it is a 
theory that has been made specific to be able to shine light on developments in the merger 
control/competition policy area. It thus pays much more attention to phenomena like competition, 
mergers and merger control than “general” theories of regulation would do. Whether it will in actual 
fact also be a fruitful perspective in contexts other than the one I deal with here is a question I have 
to leave open. The perhaps more important question of how the theoretical perspective is linked to 
the empirical analyses is answered in section 3.7. 
 
Finally, anticipating charges that the content of the following five chapters has got little to do with 
critical realism, it should be stressed that indeed the philosophical framework will not be in the 
foreground in these chapters. That is, concepts associated with critical realism will only rarely be 
used explicitly here. This is no coincidence but a deliberate decision that follows logically from 
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what has been said above; philosophical terms do not belong in theoretical and empirical 
expositions. Implicitly the critical realist social ontology and epistemology will, of course, be 
present as the various levels of abstraction are intertwined. That is, the crucial notion of ideational, 
agential and material mechanisms appears in the form of theoretical concepts that are relevant in 
this context:  concepts such as “ideas of regulation”, “programmers” and “concentration of capital”. 
As such both the theory and the empirical analyses that follow are grounded in critical realism. 
 
 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
 
Both the rationalist and the constructivist paradigms in EUS are grounded in philosophies that only 
allow their proponents to study some parts of social reality in a comprehensive manner, leaving 
other parts more or less neglected. Rationalists tend to reduce agents to rational utility-maximisers 
who act in accordance with incentives in the structural context and, thus, leave no room for real 
agency. In addition, the ideational is given no real significance in comparison with the material. 
Constructivists have, in practice, failed to live up to their own ambition of taking a middle position 
in relation to these issues. They have prioritised the ideational at the cost of the material and have, 
generally speaking, not managed to conceptualise the agency-structure relationship convincingly.  
 
Against this background critical realism was brought in as the alternative philosophical framework 
that will underpin the present work. Critical realism neither can nor should replace substantive 
theory – neither is it a magic formula that can guarantee outstanding research. But unlike the 
philosophies that give rise to ontologically biased research on European integration and politics, 
critical realism offers a “permissive” social epistemology and a “rich” social ontology which allows 
a focus on a broad spectrum of reality. According to this philosophy (at least the version presented 
here) social phenomena and events are the outcome of structurally conditioned and ideationally 
mediated interplays between agents, and social science involves a movement from the knowledge of 
a such phenomena and events to the generation of knowledge of the combinations of the agential, 
ideational and material mechanisms that were the most decisive ones in bringing those phenomena 
and events about. In the next chapter we turn to the task of outlining a theoretical perspective that 
can help us to identify the mechanisms that caused the overall development in the way mergers 
were and are regulated in Europe. 
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3. Theorising regulation. A critical political economy 
perspective 
 
‘Theories are the crown of science, for in them our understanding of the world is 
expressed’ (Harré,1985: 168) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to unfold a theoretical perspective that can help us to shed light on the 
history of European level merger control in the subsequent chapters. The chapter is divided into 
seven main sections. First, the theoretical perspective is placed in the context of critical perspectives 
in EUS. In the following sections the main concepts and ideas of the perspective are then explained. 
These include capitalism and competition (section 3.2), class fractions and capital actors (section 
3.3), regulation and ideas (section 3.4), states and supranational institutions (section 3.5) and 
programming (section 3.6). Before a concluding section summarises the key points, section 3.7 
describes how the theoretical perspective will be put to work in the following chapters.  
 
 
3.1. Critical perspectives in EU Studies 
 
The perspective to be outlined in this chapter belongs to the “critical theory” tradition in EUS/IPE. 
Despite their differences, the theories in this tradition have important features in common. Most 
importantly, they do not take the current neo-liberal type of governance and integration in Europe 
for granted. Unlike the conservative theories making up the mainstream in EUS, they do not see this 
order as “rational” or superior to any imaginable alternative (see also van Apeldoorn et al., 2003 for 
an insightful critique of such theories)25. Instead they ask how this order came into being and seek to 
highlight its problematic features (see also Cox, 1996: 89; van Apeldoorn, 2002: 16-17). 
Importantly, the difference between critical and conservative theories is not that the former are 
more “normative” than the latter: the difference is that critical theorists generally make no secret of 
their (normative) wish to see changes in the existing social order, whereas conservative theorists 
often pretend (and perhaps believe) that they are just providing neutral and non-normative accounts 
of European integration and governance. 
 
51 
 
Another defining feature of critical research is that it seeks to place the particular object it seeks to 
explain in the context of the broader whole of which it forms part (Cox, 1996: 89; see also Ollman, 
2003: 14)26. The current work is no exception. Throughout the thesis the developments in the field 
of EC merger control will be seen in the light of broader ideational and material developments, 
hereby bringing it into line with the critical realist position outlined in Chapter 2. Although a focus 
on such macro-trends cannot (and does not) replace analyses of concrete political micro-processes 
in the merger field, it is maintained that any adequate analysis of the history of European level 
merger control needs to situate the phenomenon in the broader contexts of which it forms part. 
These contexts include not only national and European level competition regulation more generally 
but also the broader transformation of capitalism and the way it is regulated at different levels and 
in different European countries (see also section 3.7 below). 
 
As mentioned above, one can identify various strands of critical research on European integration27. 
Of the critical analyses of the integration process and the EU that have emerged over the years quite 
a few are written from what could be called classical Marxist perspectives. Here European 
integration and politics is explained by means of time-honoured Marxist features such as value 
theory, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the concentration/centralisation of capital and of 
course the struggle between labour and the capitalist class(es). Examples of this type of work 
include Mandel (1970; 1975), Poulantzas (1974), Cocks (1980), Bonefeld (2001; 2002) and 
Carchedi (2001). But many more could be listed28. To be sure, these contributions are very different 
and indeed often incompatible and their authors often make no secret of (what they perceive as) the 
grave and inexcusable mistakes of other “so-called” Marxists let alone of course all non-Marxist 
scholars29. Reacting against developments in the EU and frustrated with bourgeois scholarship on 
European integration some of these classical Marxist scholars have ended up with some rather 
unsubtle, unsubstantiated and thus also untrustworthy analyses of the subject (see e.g. Callinicos, 
1994; Carchedi, 2001). In other words, they end up going to the opposite extreme of the uncritical 
perspectives of the mainstream. Needless to say this is not a particularly fruitful way forward. 
 
A more forward pointing strand of critical research dealing with European integration and politics 
are the neogramscian contributions that appeared from the 1990s onwards. The “classical Marxist” 
type of work on European integration does generally not serve as an important reference point for 
such contributions. But drawing on the seminal works in IR/IPE of Robert W. Cox (1987, 1996), 
Stephen Gill (1990; 1993) and/or Kees van der Pijl (1984) neogramscian scholars have illuminated 
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how social (mainly class) forces working in and through states and supranational institutions have 
shaped the integration process. Although the neogramscians bring into the foreground class 
struggles and do subscribe to a “transnational historical materialism” (Overbeek, 2000; van 
Apeldoorn 2004) this is a further developed and unconventional type of Marxism. Important 
neogramscian contributions dealing with matters related to European integration include Bieler 
(2002), Bieler & Morton (2001a), Cafruny & Ryner (2003), Gill (1992; 1998), Overbeek (2003), 
van Apeldoorn (2002) and van der Pijl (1984; 2006). Due to its roots in the work of Gramsci this 
literature is sometimes referred to as the “Italian school” (see e.g. Jessop & Sum, 2006b). But this is 
rather misleading as we are dealing here with a diverse range of neogramscian perspectives rather 
than with a unified theory or school (see also Morton, 2001). Like their classical Marxist 
colleagues, neogramscians take a critical stance in relation to European integration (or more 
precisely, in relation to integration of the neoliberal type). But it is a somewhat more informed and 
tempered critique. And the principal merit of the neogramscian perspectives lies not so much in 
their aspiration to be critical as in their ability to serve as central elements in an exciting and 
progressive research programme that, over the years, has dealt with topics related to numerous 
aspects of European integration and politics (although not yet the competition policy area).  
 
The theoretical perspective outlined in this chapter first and foremost draws inspiration from the 
neogramscian contributions in the field of EUS and IPE. This said, it is by no means a loyal 
restatement of one of the existing neogramscian perspectives and it does indeed seek to develop 
these in certain respects. This is done by bringing in some concepts and ideas of my own 
(constructed through the iterative process described in section 2.5) as well as some elements from 
the work of other scholars, most of whom are associated with historical materialism if the latter is 
understood in its broadest sense. In particular, Bob Jessop’s work has served as a major source of 
inspiration here. Whether the resulting theoretical perspective on regulation deserves to be labelled 
a neogramscian (or for that matter a historical materialist) theory is an open question. Personally I 
think of it is as a post- or neo-neogramscian perspective on regulation and elsewhere jokingly 
referred to an earlier version of it as the “Copenhagen Perspective” (Buch-Hansen, 2006)30. In any 
case, the main concern has been to develop a theoretical perspective that can be useful in the 
empirical analyses that follow, not to come up with new grandiose labels. 
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3.2. Capitalism and competition 
 
Contemporary western societies are capitalist societies. This is not to say that all phenomena in such 
societies can be reduced to manifestations of capitalism and its functioning. But in social spaces 
where the economic sphere is capitalist, this sphere will generally be dominant vis-à-vis the other 
spheres in the sense that it is able to impose its primary logic on institutions in other spheres more 
than they are able to impose their primary logics on the economic sphere (see also Jessop, 2000, 
Lipietz, 1983: 19). The logic overshadowing other logics in capitalist economies is that of capital 
accumulation, with “capital” denoting accumulated wealth that can be used to accumulate more 
wealth. Indeed, ‘[c]apitalism as a historical system is defined by the fact that it makes structurally 
central and primary the endless accumulation of capital’ (Wallerstein, 2000: 147, 2004: 24; see also 
Jessop, 1990: 152 on the notion of “capital”).  
 
In order to understand this it is necessary to take a closer look at what capitalism is. To be sure, any 
attempt to provide a general description of capitalism runs into the problem that the particular forms 
of capitalism have varied from location to location and over time. Indeed, ‘capitalist relations are 
themselves subject to profound historical alteration and to major variations between one socio-
economic formation and another, depending on the history of struggle and social movements’ 
(Lipietz, 1983: 19, see also Robinson, 2004: 4-5). When trying to make sense of the history of 
European level merger control in Europe by conceptualising it as a phenomenon related to the 
nature of capitalism (see also van Apeldoorn, 2002: 45) one thus needs to not only look at the 
different models of capitalism in the core European countries (namely Germany, Britain and 
France), but also to look at the broader transformation of capitalism that has taken place in the past 
fifty years or so. We will come back to this below. 
 
Even though capitalism is a phenomenon that has to be grasped in a longitudinal perspective, the 
core features of capitalism remain the same. At a general level, capitalism is an economic system in 
which a large number of firms using privately owned capital goods and wage-labour produce and 
sell goods and services with the intention of making a profit. This process is also known as “the 
circuit of capital” and was represented by Marx with the formula M-C-P-C’-M’, signifying a 
process where money (M) is used to buy commodities (C) that are used in the production (P) 
process in order to create new commodities (C’) the sale of which results in the generation of more 
money (M’) than were present at the beginning of the process (Robinson, 2004: 15). Capital 
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accumulation is premised on the ability of the capitalist to realise profit by producing and, crucially, 
selling goods and services and capitalists thus tend to allocate their resources to different fields of 
production on the basis of expectations of profit (Jessop, 2002a: 16). It is the labour power 
consumed in the production process that is the main source of real added value and which, 
ultimately, makes possible this process where capital expands through the successful reinvestment 
of past profits. In other words, a distinguishing feature of capitalism is its commodification of 
labour: workers exchange their capacity to work for a wage and then accept the right of their 
employee (the capitalist) to reap the profit (or absorb any losses) that results from the sale of the 
goods and services they have produced. This brings us to the point that capitalist societies are class 
societies; a point that we come back to in the next section.  
 
Expansion/growth is an absolutely necessary condition for capitalism because without such growth 
capital accumulation cannot take place - which, in turn, renders the realisation of profit impossible. 
This is the light in which the historical development of capitalism as a system which has continued 
to expand outwards ever since its inception should be seen. However, the process of capital 
accumulation is not unproblematic but on the contrary pervaded by contradictions (see e.g. Jessop, 
2002a: 20-21). One contradiction which is particularly relevant in the context of the present study 
arises because capital accumulation generally takes place in the context of competition, viz. the 
process of rivalry between particular companies in their struggle for profits. Companies inhabit 
positions in a market where they compete with other firms for profit and where the firm which is 
more efficient is likely to gain more profit than its competitors. This creates a spiral of competition 
which Pierre Bourdieu has described aptly in the following way:  
 
‘It [competition, HB] springs from the actions and reactions of the agents, who, short 
of opting out of the game and falling into oblivion, have no choice but to struggle to 
keep up or improve their position in the field, i.e. to conserve or increase the specific 
capital which is only created within the field. In so doing, each one helps to subject 
all the others to the often intolerable constraints arising from competition. In short, 
no one can take advantage of the game, not even those who dominate it, without 
being taken up and taken in by it’ (Bourdieu, 1981: 307-0931) 
 
In its strongest form competition faces capitalist firms as an objective threat ‘which strikes not at 
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives’ (Schumpeter, 1947: 84). It is an objective threat in the sense that, even though economic 
agents can interpret and choose to react to the competition they are exposed to in different ways, 
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their interpretations will not make competition go away. And the consequences can be disastrous 
(seen from the perspective of the individual firm) if their interpretations are wrong. Competitive 
pressures are thus very real as are their effects.  
 
In the long run only the strongest survive while the rest are either absorbed by other companies or 
simply perish. As Marx put it, ‘competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse 
proportion to the magnitudes, of the antagonistic capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small 
capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their conquerors, partly vanish’ (1965: 626). 
The result is a tendency towards concentration of capital by which we will understand the organic 
growth of particular capitals as well as the ‘...concentration of capitals already formed, destruction 
of their independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into 
few large capitals’ (Marx, 1965: 625)32. M&As are thus one important mechanism through which 
the concentration of capital takes place and here we may crudely distinguish between three forms of 
this type of capital concentration: (1) the form that involves the merging of firms located in the 
same country and which does thus only lead to concentration at the national level; (2) the form that 
involves the merging of companies located in different EC/EU countries and which does thus lead 
to supranational concentration; and (3) the ‘form of “international” concentration under the force of 
the logic of an internationalized and internalized reproduction of capital which entails in the 
European context the fusion of European capital with foreign capital or rather the absorption of 
national companies by the American multinationals’ (Moschonas, 1996: 20).  
 
Certainly other mechanisms are at work in the capitalist system: for instance various forms of 
legislation (including competition laws) or economic crises might slow down, block and indeed 
temporarily dissolve the process of concentration. The existence of such countervailing mechanisms 
means that there will be periods where no or little concentration of capital takes place. The rhythm 
of concentration is, in other words, far from constant (see also Poulantzas, 1975: 145). Yet we are 
nevertheless dealing with an inherent feature of capitalism, which is likely to manifest itself over a 
longer period33. If we think about capitalist markets in terms of position-practice systems (see 
section 2.4), we can say that their inbuilt positions encourage practices that ultimately lead to 
concentration at a general level and thus, also to subsequent transformations of the positions of the 
system34. Although we are dealing here with a tendency rather than with a law set in stone, this does 
create a significant contradiction at the heart of capitalism. On the one hand, competition is a 
driving force in capitalism – a force that most economists believe to have a number of desirable 
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effects, for instance, providing firms with an incentive to innovate and cut prices, hereby benefiting 
the consumer (see e.g. Eekhoff & Mock, 2004 or Murray & Johnstone, 2005). Yet on the other 
hand, particular firms refer to avoid competition, as this puts them in a situation where they are able 
to increase their profits. Consequently, ‘[c]apitalism is driven by competition, yet capital must 
always seek to thwart competition’ (Wood, 2003: 22). Wanniski (1992: 18) captures this 
contradiction well when he notes that ‘Marx was extremely close to the truth’ when he discovered 
that ‘[c]apitalism could not succeed because capitalists would sow the seeds of their own 
destruction. That is, if capitalism requires relentless competition, yet capitalists are doing 
everything they can to destroy competition, we have a system that is inherently unsustainable – as 
with animals who devour their young’.  
 
Principal means through which capitalist firms can ease the competitive pressures they are faced 
with are various forms of collusive arrangements and M&As. The latter ‘can offer firms the 
immediate freedom from the nuisance of having to compete with each other. They can thereby 
avoid the need to earn their monopoly power the hard way, by persuading enough customers to buy 
their products’ (Neven et al., 1993: 11-12). If the merging parties are big enough (relative to the 
market(s) in which they operate) the merger will result in some degree of market power – that is, 
the ability to influence the price taken for the produced good or service. This obviously makes such 
mergers potentially very profitable. Importantly, mergers are thus both responses to and elements of 
the concentration of capital: firms often merge in response to (expectations of) concentration in the 
markets in which they operate, thereby contributing to further concentration in that market (see also 
Chapman, 2003: 312). But concentration at the system level does not happen because those in 
charge of individual firms want it to happen. Generally, the purpose of a merger is to improve the 
competitive position of the firms involved in various respects. Thus, the tendency of concentration 
is to a large extent an unintended consequence of their intentional strategic actions. And it is an 
unintended consequence that threatens to negatively affect the accumulation of capital at the general 
level if it is not controlled in one way or the other. This is one important context in which the 
widely perceived need for regulation of competition should be seen. However, before we can 
address this theme, we first need to bring in some notions of agency. 
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3.3. Agency: class and beyond  
 
In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels famously suggested that ‘[t]he history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles’ and that the capitalist societies of their time were 
‘more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each 
other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ (Marx & Engels, 1992: 3). The latter class, the proletariat or 
workers, consists of those who have to sell their labour power in exchange of a wage or salary in 
order to survive, whereas the bourgeoisie or capitalists are those who get their income not from 
direct labour but who own the means of labour (land, tools, raw materials) thereby enabling them to 
extract surplus value created by the workers. In other words, capitalism is premised upon the 
exploitation by one class of the other class35, hereby giving rise to the class struggles referred to by 
Marx.  
 
When thinking about class we need to distinguish between its structural and agential dimensions. At 
first a class is defined with reference to the position of its members in the economic structure: ‘A 
person’s class is established by his objective place in the network of ownership relations … His 
consciousness, culture, and politics do not enter the definition of his class position’ (Cohen, 1978: 
73). This is the objective or structural dimension of class. But classes only become driving forces 
of history insofar as a circle of their “members” unite – that is, when a group of agents occupying 
similar class positions (hereby constituting what Marx calls a “class-in-itself”) develop a common 
class consciousness, articulate their common preferences and then work for their realisation 
(thereby becoming a “class-for-itself”). Insofar as such groups work to further what they perceive of 
as the interests of the class to which they belong, rather than just their own narrow interests, then we 
can talk of class agency. As these remarks suggest, it is thus crucial to distinguish between the 
structural aspect of class and the process of class formation: ‘that is, the moment when class 
becomes the basis for collective action; a movement from class structure to class agency’ (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002: 21; see also Wright, 1985: 9-10)36. 
 
Needless to say, the complex late (or post-) modern societies we live in can hardly be described 
adequately in terms of struggles between two large classes. Indeed, as was already acknowledged 
by Marx himself, society ‘by no means consists only of the class of workers and the class of 
industrial capitalists’ (quoted in Bottomore, 1983: 75) and in the short final chapter of Capital III he 
mentions how, in England, ‘the stratification of classes does not appear its pure form’ as the lines of 
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demarcation are obliterated by ‘middle and intermediate strata’ (Marx, 1966: 885). Indeed, the 
emergence of large middle classes in contemporary societies constitutes a challenge to Marxist class 
perspectives, but does not in itself invalidate such approaches. In the present context it is not 
necessary to go into a discussion of this (but see e.g. Wright, 1985). We can simply note the 
existence of a literature that convincingly testifies to the continued relevance of class analyses in the 
contemporary world37, which is indeed a world in which a small minority still owns the vast 
majority of the economic resources and where most people have to sell their labour power in order 
to sustain a tolerable standard of living.  
 
Moreover, the “polar opposites” of the two fundamental classes (capitalists and workers) are 
internally fractionalised in various ways rather than constituting unified wholes. The defining 
feature of a class fraction is that its members perform similar economic functions in the process of 
capital accumulation, the result being that they tend to have specific ideological inclinations 
organically related to these functions (van der Pijl, 1989: 11; 1998: 49-53; see also Hudson, 2005: 
18). This is interesting in relation to the process of class formation as it might result in, say, capital 
fractions with vastly different outlooks and preferences, resulting in class struggle between these 
capital fractions, not only between classes38. As Overbeek (1990: 25) notes, ‘[c]onflicts between 
fractions of capital tend to transcend the competition between individual capitalists, because these 
conflicts do not take place within the existing framework of the economic, political and ideological 
conditions for capital accumulation but are concerned with changing these conditions’.  
 
The fractionalisation of capital can take place along different axes that give rise to different 
conflicts. One axis is the one hinted at by Overbeek (1990: 25) when he explains that capital 
fractions are ‘groupings of capitalists with structurally comparable positions in the overall circuit of 
capital’. This gives rise to a fractioning of productive and circulative capital which manifests itself 
at the concrete level as two fractions, viz. those of industrial versus money capital, with members of 
the latter fraction having a much more liberal outlook than those of the former (Overbeek, 1990: 25-
27; Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 3-5; van der Pijl, 1984: 4-8). But fractioning can also take place 
along other axes. For instance, it has been suggested that it can take place between monopoly and 
non-monopoly capital (see e.g. Poulantzas, 1975: 144-145). And others have pointed to the spatial 
aspect of capital accumulation. Here the main question concerns whether accumulation is a 
phenomenon that predominantly takes place at the national level or whether it is transnational in its 
orientation (Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 5-7; Robinson, 2004: 49-53; van Apeldoorn, 2001: 72-
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73). It is in particular this latter axis of fractioning that is relevant to the present study, where a 
central theme is the way in which the regulation of mergers in Europe increasingly came to be 
displaced from the national to the supranational level. 
 
This brings us to the point that classes are not a static phenomenon. Over time, the significance of 
particular fractions changes in dialectical interplays with the transformation of capitalism itself. As 
mentioned above, M&As both contribute to and are a response to the concentration, and thus 
ultimately the internationalisation, of capital. Cross-border mergers thus in fact constitute one of the 
most important mechanisms through which the material basis for the formation of transnational 
classes comes into being (Robinson, 2004: 57-62). Indeed, such mergers are crucial means through 
which firms that have previously been oriented toward national markets expand their activities 
beyond the national level and become transnational – and through which firms that already span 
more than one country become increasingly transnational. Mergers are thus a mechanism through 
which transnational class fractions in the structural sense emerge and are consolidated. As structure 
is prior to agency, cross-border mergers, or for that matter the internationalisation of capital they 
contribute to bring about, do not in themselves guarantee the emergence of transnational class 
agency. But they serve as a crucial structural precondition for such agency.  
 
Now, when analysing a concrete phenomenon, say policy-making in the EU, it quickly becomes 
clear that we do not encounter a number of easily identifiable class fractions each defending a 
distinct position in a political battle. Alas, social reality is more complex. If one looks at the 
business groups seeking to influence developments in the EU one will see that they differ in nature. 
Some groups can indeed be seen to “represent” fractions of capital: the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists represents transnational (primarily industrial) capital (see section 6.3 for more details), 
whereas a group such as the European Roundtable of Financial Services represents transnational 
money capital. BusinessEurope (previously UNICE), the members of which are national business 
federations, presents itself as ‘the voice of business’ in Europe. However, although it does, as such 
claim, to represent Europe’s capitalist class as a whole it seems that it, since the late 1980s, has 
predominantly sought to further the interests of transnational capital (see e.g. van Apeldoorn, 2002: 
102-103). National business federations are also often directly involved in lobbying processes at the 
European level, but whether they defend the interests of nationally or internationally oriented 
companies located in the country in question is not a foregone conclusion. Still other groups may, 
so to speak, cut across the axes defining class fractions. In particular, it is not unusual to see groups 
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representing both national and transnational companies operating within a particular sector of the 
economy (say agriculture or chemicals).  
 
While this does not mean that the notion of class fractions becomes irrelevant, it does seem that a 
concept that can supplement it when studying concrete micro-processes (such as those leading up to 
the adoption of a treaty or a regulation) is needed. Against this background, the concept of capital 
actors (see also Chari & Kritzinger, 2006: 54-56, 217-220) will tentatively be used in the chapters 
that follow to denote individuals that are members of the capitalist class as well as 
groups/organisations that seek to further the interests of smaller or larger segments of this class. 
Unlike the concept of capital fractions this concept can thus be used to describe more traditional 
interest groups and single issue groups, while emphasising that the latter’s agency is related but not 
reducible to a class position.  
 
In most political economy perspectives, including the neogramscian contributions in EUS and IPE, 
business actors (whether in the form of the “capitalist class”, particular “class fractions” or merely 
“capital actors”) are considered to be very important, and often the most important, agents in the 
explanation of political outcomes (such as the adoption of a regulation). The perspective advocated 
here does not dispute that business actors are particularly important, as long as it is acknowledged 
that they are not the only important agents and that there are significant limitations to their ability to 
shape political outcomes and the course of history. Other important agents in political decision-
making generally include not only policy-makers such as ministers and parliaments, but also 
various diplomats/bureaucrats and other institutional actors as well as interest groups/organisations 
not representing business. Neglecting the significance of such agents, for instance by reducing them 
to powerless servants of the capitalist class, is highly misleading. Before elaborating on these points 
in sections 3.5 and 3.6 below, we shall now develop some concepts that can make intelligible the 
phenomenon of regulation. 
 
 
3.4. Regulation and ideas 
 
As hinted at above, the expanded reproduction of capitalism cannot be secured by markets or 
market actors alone. Markets do not represent some sort of God-given order that existed prior to and 
despite of various extra-economic “interferences”. On the contrary, markets are social constructs 
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that only exist because of the existence of extra-economic spheres that includes education, nature, 
security, the family etc. and the interventions by legal-regulatory and political institutions (see also 
Horn & van Apeldoorn, 2007: 211-215). The reproduction of capitalism thus ‘depends on its 
achieving an inherently unstable balance among market-oriented economic supports whose efficacy 
depends on their location beyond market mechanisms’ (Jessop, 2002a: 19). This “balance” is by 
definition unstable and thus temporary due to the contradictions at the heart of capitalism and the 
inherently dynamic nature of this system. Over time, then, the continued accumulation of capital 
depends on gradual transformations and eventually replacement of the various “supports” (see also 
Joseph, 1998).  
 
Now, one of the “supports” consists of various forms of regulation of the economic system. 
Regulation theorists, at least those associated with the dominant Parisian School, use the concept of 
“regulation” in a very inclusive sense to refer to all those extra-economic mechanisms that stabilise 
the accumulation of capital (see e.g. Jessop & Sum, 2006a: 15, 44; Torfing, 1994: 95; see also 
Boyer, 1990: 117-123 on different Parisian notions of regulation). In the present context, the 
concept of regulation is used in a more narrow and indeed also more conventional sense, viz. as 
different types of interventions in (parts of) the economic sphere by political and legal-regulatory 
institutions39. In any given form or model of capitalism, the economic system is regulated in a 
number of ways by institutions that are generally located at different scales (see also section 3.5). 
Indeed, the way the economy is regulated is a defining feature of the model of capitalism itself.  
 
In the analyses that follow in Chapters 4 to 7 we need concepts that are not primarily designed to be 
applied to analyses of regulation of the whole economy in a given social space. Or rather, we need a 
conceptual architecture that links specific forms of regulation, such as the control of mergers, to the 
way capitalism is regulated more generally in various social spaces. In what follows, we will refer 
to the totality of regulatory practices in a given social space (such as a country or a region) and the 
institutions “carrying them out” as the ensemble of regulation40 whereas the part of this social space 
that is subject to regulation is denoted the field of regulation. A given ensemble of regulation is 
made up of multiple units of regulation41, each defined in relation to some object of regulation42 
forming part of the wider field (competition, trade, environment, monetary issues etc.). Moreover, a 
particular unit of regulation can often be seen to consist of various subunits of regulation that relate 
to a number of somewhat more delimited or concrete objects of regulation. For instance, 
competition regulation may involve regulation of “objects” such as mergers, cartels, state aid etc. 
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Importantly, such (sub)units are not isolated entities but are instead often connected to other 
(sub)units of regulation in a given social space  as well perhaps to (sub)units of other social spaces. 
It is thus important to analyse them in the context of both the transformation of capitalism and of 
the way capitalism is regulated.  
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptualising regulation 
 
 
Conceptualised in these terms, the Competition DG and its regulatory practices (which are 
obviously based on various rules) constitute a unit of regulation in which the regulation of mergers 
is but one subunit. One important purpose of the latter is to ensure that the merger activities of 
companies are conducive or at least not destructive to the accumulation of capital at the more 
general level. As such it can be understood as an attempt to, among other things, establish a 
mechanism that seeks to remedy one of the inbuilt contradictions in the economic sphere – that is, 
as a mechanism designed to block or eliminate the workings and effects of other mechanisms. This 
does not necessarily mean that merger control primarily serves to prevent a high number of mergers 
from taking place: it can just as well serve to facilitate certain mergers if this is considered 
desirable. Whether merger control actually succeeds in having the intended effects is obviously a 
completely different matter.  
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As the above remarks indicate, the form and content of competition policies is not something that is 
carved in stone. Moreover, it is not the case that such policies can be reduced to an automatic or 
functionalist response to the needs of the economic sphere. Capitalism cannot “speak for itself”: it 
cannot articulate its preferences for and against particular interventions in the economic sphere. 
Only agents have opinions about how capitalism should be regulated and only agents can 
subsequently act on them. And such opinions are informed by certain ideas that may or may not 
come to be institutionalised. Competition policy, like all regulation, is thus based on particular 
ideas, and the latter are, in turn, related to broader discourses that prevail at a given juncture. 
 
This would seem to suggest that just as we can look at regulation from different perspectives (that 
is, in terms of ensembles, units and subunits), so it might also be fruitful to operate with different 
levels of ideas of regulation. Here we will distinguish between three such levels, defined in terms of 
their relative degree of concreteness (see also Table 3.1 below). At the highest level of abstraction 
we have general discourses of regulation (GDR). These are overall perspectives or philosophies on 
how the economy in a given social space ought to be regulated. Such discourses (or sets of ideas) 
relate to the overall nature of the ensemble of regulation and thus also to particular models of 
capitalism. So, for instance, neoliberalism is a GDR that inter alia prescribes a market oriented 
form of regulation (and which resonates well with the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism), whereas 
mercantilism is a GDR that, among other things, ascribe an important role to states in protecting and 
promoting domestic industries, for instance, through active industrial policies (hereby resonating 
well with the model of state-capitalism) (see e.g. Coates, 2000 or van Apeldoorn, 2002: 72-78 on 
various models of capitalism). To be sure, when looking at concrete ensembles of regulation it will 
generally be possible to identify traits of different GDRs. Notwithstanding this, one GDR will be 
dominant and thereby define what model of capitalism we are dealing with. 
 
At the next level we have unit-specific discourses of regulation (USDRs). Such discourses so to 
speak “emerge” out of GDR and translate them into perspectives on regulation in particular areas. 
That is, they deliver the broader ideational content to the different (sub)units of regulation, in 
particular with respect to their overall content, form and scope. So for instance, we can identify 
various USDRs each providing a particular perspective on what purposes competition policy 
(including merger control) should serve and what concrete “objects” it should target (content), how 
it should be enforced (form) and what jurisdiction it should cover (scope). This is why competition 
policy cannot just be defined, as does for instance, Nicolaides (1994: 9), as ‘practices and policies 
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that seek to exclude or discriminate against rival firms or that intend to reduce competition among 
incumbent firms’. “Competition policy” is a label that, properly used, can be attached to regulation 
that serves various purposes (including the partial elimination of competition), and that can involve 
very different ideas about how competition should be regulated, if it should be regulated at all. 
Motta (2004: 17-26) lists a number of objectives that competition policies have pursued in different 
contexts: economic welfare, consumer welfare, protection of smaller firms, promoting market 
integration, guaranteeing economic freedom, promoting fairness and equity and fighting inflation. 
So, to use poststructuralist jargon, it is a “floating signifier” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 113) that can 
be filled with different sorts of content43. 
 
This can be seen if we take a small excursus and glance superficially at the economic literature. For 
one thing “competition”, which is a highly central concept here44, is defined in incompatible ways in 
classical and neoclassical theory (see e.g. McNulty, 1968: 649 for details). More importantly, 
however, different schools of competition theory have gradually emerged and very different 
competition policy implications follow from these. Suffice it to mention perhaps the two most 
influential schools, viz. the Harvard and Chicago Schools. Proponents of the Harvard School regard 
a “polypolistic” market structure in which firms have small market shares (and thus little market 
power) to be the optimal state of affairs (e.g. Clark, 1940: 241). In order to reduce or prevent 
concentration, the Harvard School calls for interventionist competition policies that can serve a 
large number of both economic and non-economic policy goals, including efficiency, innovation, 
consumer welfare, protection against unfair competition, international competitiveness, economic 
integration of regions and low unemployment (see e.g. Budzinski, 2003: 7, Young & Metcalfe, 
1994: 120). Members of the Chicago School like Stigler, Demsetz and Friedman reject the notion 
that government interventions into the market structures are necessary in order to prevent 
monopolies from coming into being and thus deny the need for comprehensive competition policy 
regimes. Instead they generally recommend that policy makers leave the job of establishing an 
equilibrium to the “invisible hand” of the market (see e.g. Friedman, 1999: 6-7). However, some 
Chicago scholars do in fact accept the need for competition policies that prohibit cartels and 
horizontal mergers resulting in extreme concentration (Voigt & Schmidt, 2003: 18)45. Nevertheless 
this is clearly a laissez-faire approach to competition regulation, especially when compared to the 
Harvard School approach. 
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Elements from these and other scientific perspectives can be integrated into particular USDRs and 
can indeed be used to turn a GDR into somewhat less abstract perspectives in a particular area. But 
this is of course not to say that USDRs are necessarily always informed by economic theory. In the 
analyses contained in Chapters 5 to 7, four main USDRs on EC merger control are identified: (1) a 
national-mercantilist perspective that was oriented towards national industrial policy and the 
creation of “national champions” while opposing European regulation of mergers; (2) a Euro-
mercantilist perspective that was oriented towards European level industrial policy and the creation 
of “European champions”, insisting that such considerations should be taken into account in the 
EC’s regulation of mergers; (3) a neoliberal perspective according to which politically independent 
authorities should regulate mergers on the basis of objective competition criteria only; and (4) a 
centre-left perspective according to which the effects on unemployment and the rights of workers 
should be taken into consideration in the regulation of mergers (see section 5.5 for more details). 
Each of these USDRs represents a distinct perspective on the desired content, form and scope of 
merger control. The relative weight or significance of these perspectives has changed considerably 
decisively over time, corresponding with the shifting constellations of agents formulating their 
preferences and positions on the basis of them, something that was, in turn, related to broader 
ideational and economic developments. The significance of these USDRs is thus that not only were 
they reflected in the positions of the agents involved in the long process leading up to the adoption 
of the MCR in 1989; some of them were also reflected in the MCR itself, in the implementation of 
this regulation as well as in the reform of the MCR in 2003.  
 
Now, a USDR offers a somewhat abstract perspective on the desirable regulation of a particular part 
of the field of regulation without actually showing how this perspective can be turned into practice. 
This brings us to the lowest level of abstraction where we have concrete ideas of regulation (CIRs). 
These ideas, which to some extent emerge out of USDRs, serve as the basis on which actual 
regulation is implemented. To put it differently, actual regulation can often be seen to reflect a 
compromise between various CIRs. To use merger control as an example, this could be concrete 
ideas about the threshold level (precisely when should mergers be regulated by national institutions 
and when should they be regulated by supranational institutions), about what concrete tests the 
Competition DG should apply in its regulation of mergers and ideas about the ideal decision making 
procedures and time-limits in the assessment of mergers. Because many CIRs are grounded in, but 
of course not reducible to, a USDR and thus ultimately also a GDR these higher-order 
ideas/discourses are reflected in actual regulation. It is thus important to keep in mind that CIRs and 
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the way they are manifested in actual regulation concerns more than mere technicalities. Ultimately 
CIRs are attempts to translate higher order discourses (USDR and GDR) into practice and such 
discourses are thus inherently political in that they, if institutionalised, will tend to favour particular 
groups in society at the cost of others. The perspective outlined here thus breaks with the tendency 
in the new governance literature in EUS (e.g. Majone, 1996) to see the EC/EU as ‘an apolitical, 
positive-sum resource allocation’ (Johansen, 2001: 119).  
 
Table 3.1: Ideas of regulation 
General discourses of 
regulation (GDR) 
 Overall perspectives or philosophies 
on how the economy in a given social 
space ought to be regulated 
 
Unit-specific discourse of 
regulation (USDR) 
 Translate GDRs into perspectives on 
regulation in particular areas such as 
competition policy 
 
Concrete idea of regulation 
(CIR) 
 Translate USDRs into actual 
regulation (which often reflects a 
compromise between several CIRs) 
 
 
 
3.5. States and supranational institutions 
 
When dealing with a phenomenon like European level regulation of mergers it is difficult, if not 
impossible (and certainly inexpedient) to ignore the role played by the national states and the EU. 
Indeed, much can be and has been written about the nature and functions of both states and a 
phenomenon like the EU. As regards the latter it has, for instance been conceptualised, as a regime 
(Hoffmann, 1982), as a federation (Burgess, 2000), a political system (e.g. Hix, 1999; Kelstrup, 
1993), a political platform (Johansen, 2001), a new form of political domination (Schmitter, 1991) 
and even as an “onion” (De Neve, 2007). Similarly, it is well-known that “the state” has been 
theorised in a number of different ways from various perspectives (compare e.g. the various 
understandings of the state to be found in the edited volumes by Hay et al., 2006 and Berg-Sørensen 
& Greve, 1998). In other words, it is not a foregone conclusion how one should conceptualise the 
states and the EU. In the present thesis where we are mainly interested in their role as regulators of 
capitalist economies, it is by no means the ambition to develop a full-blown theory of the capitalist 
state or supranational institutions.  
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If we look briefly at the way the state is conceptualised by the neogramscian scholars in IPE and 
EUS it is perhaps interesting to note that many of them would seem to have adopted a somewhat 
narrower view of the state than that of Gramsci. Indeed, the latter analysed the state in a highly 
inclusive sense where civil society was, at times, considered part of the state (see Gramsci, 1971: 
261-263; also Jessop, 1982: 146-147). But from a neogramscian perspective the state ‘is regarded as 
a structure within which and through which social forces operate rather than an actor in its own 
right’ (Bieler & Morton, 2001b: 18). This view is more or less confirmed by  Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn, one of the scholars associated with the neogramscian “Amsterdam perspective”, who 
writes that it ‘tends to see the state only as an arena for (transnational) class forces’ (2004: 168, see 
also van Apeldoorn, 2002: 46-47). Here the state is seen as distinct from yet fundamentally shaped 
by forces in civil society (mainly class forces) (although see Cox, 1996: 479) and state power is 
understood as something that emerges from social forces46. The EU and other international 
institutions are essentially conceptualised in these terms as well: that is as a supranational arena or 
structure or terrain in and through which social forces operate.  
 
The neogramscian perspective on the state and supranational institutions certainly has its merits and 
does indeed constitute a major step in the right direction compared to the perspectives offered by 
the realist and liberal schools in IR/IPE/EUS. However, it is still a somewhat one-dimensional 
notion that, with respect to states, does not really take into account the various “moments of 
stateness” (Hay, 1996: 9) or “aspects of statehood” (Ougaard, 2004: 66) such as the state as a 
nation, the state as a territory, the state as an entity that enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence, the state as an institutional ensemble and so on. More importantly in the context of the 
present thesis, is the danger that the neogramscian perspective leads to an inadequate perspective on 
the regulation of capitalism (including competition). That is, a perspective that would tend to reduce 
regulation to a reflection of the “balance of power” between the various social forces of the day.  
 
What needs to be taken into account here is that, whereas states and supranational institutions are on 
one hand crucially influenced by underlying class compromises and often seek to accommodate the 
preferences expressed by the prevailing social forces in society, they also at the same time possess a 
significant degree of independence from such forces. That is, whereas various social forces can and 
often do provide inputs into policy processes, they rarely get to design the rules on the basis of 
which the objects in the field of regulation are regulated. Political decision-makers, bureaucrats and 
others, who act on the basis of ideas of regulation that may or may not diverge from those of the 
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prevailing social forces, generally leave their imprint on the various (sub)units of regulation. Hence, 
rather than perfectly reflecting the outcome of class conflicts, states and supranational institutions 
‘act as a distorting mirror to reproduce a highly imperfect reflection of these conflicts and one that 
imprints its own image on their resolution’ (Hall, 1986: 233). 
 
This would seem to indicate that rather than reducing the state and the EU to structures, terrains or 
arenas where class struggles take place, it might be more precise to conceptualise both as ensembles 
of institutions, that are inter alia form part of various (sub)units of regulations making up the wider 
ensemble of regulation. Needless to say, “institution” is one of those concepts that social scientists 
tend to use almost indiscriminately to refer to more or less everything under the sun47. But here we 
will understand institutions to be, at the most general level, a variant of what was earlier on termed 
as a position-practice system (see section 2.4). That is, it is basically an ensemble of related 
positions that engender particular practices (without determining them). Institutions perform 
particular tasks and are distinguished from other position-practice systems by their ability, in 
principle at least, to communicate and act as one agent when interacting with their environment 
(which in part consists of other institutions) – despite being composed of positions filled by a 
number of individuals. To be sure, all decisions in an institution are made by such institutional 
agents. But they are made “on behalf” or “in the name” of the institution, not of the institutional 
agents themselves, and this is what enables the institution to appear as an agent in itself. This is a 
deliberately narrow concept of institutions that does not, for instance, cover the buildings of a 
hospital, democracy, property rights, marriage, contract enforcement, table manners or money (and 
which has much in common with what is sometimes called “organisations”). 
 
To say that the EU and its member states can be conceptualised as “ensembles of institutions” is to 
provide an “empty” definition that leaves open all the questions regarding the precise purpose and 
functions of states and supranational institutions. This is a deliberate choice. Of course it is well 
known that, say, states have played and do play a substantial role as regulators of capitalist 
economies, for instance providing ‘stability and predictability by supplying an elaborate legal and 
institutional framework, backed by coercive force, to sustain the property relations of capitalism, its 
complex contractual apparatus and its intricate financial transactions’ (Wood, 2003: 17). Moreover, 
it is possible to put together long lists of tasks performed by the capitalist state (see e.g. Hudson, 
2005: 98 and Jessop, 2002a: 45). But although it is possible to point to certain characteristic features 
of the national state, it is crucial to emphasise that the numerous ways in which state institutions 
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(like supranational institutions) relate to the field of regulation within a given social space are far 
from static; they may vary greatly from institution to institution, from one social space to another 
and from epoch to epoch (Hay, 1996: 5, see also Flinders, 2006). This is what makes it impossible 
to articulate a strong theory that captures the essence of the state and or the EU in terms of a single 
mechanism. 
 
This is also a main reason why the either-or logic embedded in much of the mainstream theoretical 
literature on European integration is problematic. Here the relation between states and supranational 
institutions has of course been a central theme since the 1950s. But for decades the mainstream of 
EUS was (and to some extent still is) pervaded by what has been referred to as the 
“supranationalist-intergovernmentalist dichotomy” (Branch & Øhrgaard, 1999). Advocates of the 
former position argued for the importance of supranational institutions and in some cases suggested 
that they would to a smaller or larger extent replace national states (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963), 
whereas the intergovernmentalists saw the EC as merely a regime or an international organisation 
and moreover, regarded European integration as a process that states were in charge of, and that 
they would remain more or less unaltered by (Grieco, 1996; Moravcsik, 1998; Taylor, 1982). Yet 
this was, in fact not only a mainstream phenomenon. A similar disagreement can be seen in the 
early Marxist studies of European integration. Here one group of scholars argued that the state 
would more or less automatically be replaced by new supranational structures when capital 
accumulation could no longer adequately be facilitated within the boundaries of nation states (e.g. 
Mandel 1970, 1975; Murray, 1975). And other scholars argued that one crucial role of the state is to 
ensure the coherence in society which is why it cannot be taken for granted that it will be replaced 
by new supranational structures just because it does no longer sufficiently match the needs of the 
“economic base” (see e.g. Deubner, 1979; Poulantzas 1974). 
 
Considering the relationship between the member states and the EC/EU with the benefit of 
hindsight, it can indeed be concluded that the latter has developed into more than just an 
international organisation/regime. As any decent textbook on European integration will testify, the 
portfolio of the EC/EU institutions has expanded significantly over the years and indeed 
Community law has come to enjoy primacy over national law (see e.g. Weiler, 1999). Yet on the 
other hand, supranational institutions like the Commission, the Court or the Parliament have not 
replaced or marginalised nation states as crucial centres of regulation. States, or perhaps rather 
national governments, remain the primary “scale managers” that have a decisive say when it comes 
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to determining at what level (sub-national, national, supranational) the regulation of particular 
objects should be placed (Hudson, 2005: 110). The supranational institutions are related to 
institutions at the national (but also regional and international) levels and institutions at various 
levels may thus have part of the responsibility for the management of the same unit of regulation 
within Europe (say, competition policy). As such the EC/EU is best seen ‘as one element within a 
more complex multiscalar and multidimensional system of governance and regulation in Europe’ 
(Hudson, 2003: 58; see also Holman, 2004).  
 
 
3.6. Programming institutions 
 
Although it is impossible to construct a convincing “strong theory” of states and supranational 
institutions, it is of course, relevant to consider how such ensembles of institutions come to perform 
their specific tasks with respect to the various objects of regulation. One way of thinking about this 
is to say that such institutions have been “programmed” (for instance through the adoption of 
treaties and regulations) in particular ways that define their concrete tasks, objectives and working 
procedures and thus also the way they are supposed to regulate concrete objects in a given social 
space. States and the EU are thus, inter alia, ensembles of institutions each programmed in different 
ways, on the basis of particular ideas of regulation, more precisely USDRs and CIRs 
 
We will refer to the group of agents involved in the programming of an institution as the 
“programmers”, being well aware that not all the agents involved in a programming process are 
actually capable of influencing the outcome of this process. Of interest here is obviously who the 
programmers are – or rather where they are positioned. Here one distinction can be made between 
external and internal programmers. The external programmers are those who are involved in the 
programming of an institution from a position located outside this institution. A new institution is 
the outcome of external programming, but over time external programmers do not enjoy the 
monopoly of deciding the institution’s development. This is, of course, because the positions 
making up political and legal-regulatory institutions (whether national or supranational) are not just 
empty slots filled with robots that can be programmed in accordance with the preferences of various 
external programmers. On the contrary, they are populated with real individuals who will often 
attempt to influence the workings of the institutions on the basis of motives related, for instance, to 
their past experiences, their personal ideological inclinations or simply their desire to further their 
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own careers. Such internal programmers are often neglected, or their importance is downplayed, in 
society-oriented perspectives such as the neogramscian ones, where the focus is primarily on 
“external programmers” in the form of various class forces. 
 
An institution may come to be more powerful in relation to other institutions than was intended by 
those who programmed the institution in the first place. Cox puts it this way: ‘Institutions reflect the 
power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective 
images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on their own life...’ (Cox, 
1996: 99). Indeed, internal programmers may be able to gradually “re-programme” an institution. 
This means that it is often difficult for institutional “architects” to fully foresee let alone control the 
long-term development of institutions,  which is by the way a well-known theme in the “historical 
institutionalist” literature (see e.g. Pierson, 1996; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). But re-programming is 
of course also something external programmers can initiate in order to influence the way an 
institution (or an institutional ensemble) is managing its tasks – for instance, in order to bring an 
institution “back on track” or in response to developments in the field of regulation. 
 
As programming often takes place through processes or struggles in which a large number of 
different types of agents with diverging preferences may be involved, the programming of 
institutions is often a compromise rather than something that is carefully planned by rational actors. 
Consequently, not only the wider ensemble of regulation but also the (sub)units of regulation in a 
given social space may contain a number of ‘irrelevant, residual, marginal, secondary, and even 
potentially contradictory elements’ (Jessop, 2002b: 106). When dealing with a group of 
programmers we may make a second distinction between those who are directly and those who are 
indirectly involved. Governments involved in international bargains over some regulation or treaty 
would be a prime example of direct programmers, whereas the various lobbyists, expert groups, 
foreign governments and other actors who attempt (and perhaps manage) to influence direct 
programmers can be denoted as indirect programmers. Generally speaking, class fractions and 
capital actors will thus fall into the latter category. Also, it can be noted that whereas the direct 
programmers generally interact with each other in the programming process, indirect programmers 
do not necessarily do that. The types of programmers are summed up in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Types of programmers  
External programmers 
Those agents located in a position 
outside the institution that is being 
programmed. 
 
 Internal programmers 
Those taking up a position inside the 
institution that is being programmed. 
Direct programmers 
Those directly involved in the 
programming of institutions (e.g. 
legislators)  
 
 Indirect programmers 
Those who successfully influence the 
direct programmers (e.g. class fractions, 
lobbyists, expert groups, foreign 
governments) 
 
  
Institutions/institutional ensembles enjoy a degree of “operational autonomy” (Jessop, 2000: 330; 
1990: 102) which, although it is not absolute (see below), is nevertheless a necessary precondition 
for them to be able to perform their tasks. In fact, the institutions making up the state and the 
EC/EU are to some extent operationally autonomous in a double sense: that is, not only vis-à-vis, 
say, powerful capital actors, but also vis-à-vis each other. The operational autonomy between two 
given institutions can be assumed to be particularly strong if they operate in different social spaces 
or if we are dealing with different types of institutions. As an example of the latter, a legal 
institution like a court cannot be fully controlled by a political institution, say a parliament. The 
latter can pass legislation, but the way it is interpreted and implemented by the former over time 
cannot be fully controlled. To put it differently, courts and parliaments have to be operationally 
autonomous from each other if they are to perform their respective tasks properly. This means that 
there is no central control room from which entities like the modern state or the EU can be fully 
steered, and that consequently there is no single agent (or single type of agents) who is able to take 
on the job as captain. In order to understand the development of given units of regulation over time, 
one thus needs to study the dialectical interplay between the various external and internal 
programmers.  
 
Despite its notion of operational autonomy the perspective outlined here does thus not imply the 
‘kind of “water- and airtight” separation of the political from the economic sphere as is the case 
with neoclassical economics and non-Marxist political theory’ (Moschonas, 1996: 27). As already 
mentioned, capital accumulation is the most important driving force in capitalist societies (see also 
Joseph, 2002: 210). This means that in any capitalist society, political power is closely related to 
economic performance. Indeed, the determination of political power is dual: ‘by its institutional 
form, access to political power is determined through the rules of democratic and representative 
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government, by its material content, the use of state power is controlled by the course and the 
further requirements of the accumulation process’ (Offe & Ronge, 1975: 140). These two 
dimensions are, however, related in the sense that political decision-makers can only expect to 
remain in power insofar as they manage to create conditions conducive to production and the 
accumulation of capital (see also Lindblom, 1977: 172). Despite the operational autonomy of 
regulatory, political and/or legal institutions from capital actors, the different orders are thus in 
effect “substantively interdependent” (Jessop, 2000: 330, 1990: 102). That is, whereas such 
institutions depend on the economic resources generated by capitalist firms, the latter depends on 
various forms of regulation that they cannot provide themselves (and nor can the market). 
 
Since the capitalist class is divided along different axes and since particular capital actors may 
therefore well have different, and possibly directly contradicting, preferences with respect to the 
preferred type of regulation it is not necessarily straightforward for the direct programmers to 
determine what preferences to “comply with”. Moreover, one should not take the above remarks to 
suggest that political decision-makers are incapable of acting against the expressed preferences of 
economic groups or that the preferences of all non-economic groups are necessarily ignored. But 
the point remains that successful capital accumulation is always an essential policy consideration 
due to political systems’ dependence on economic prosperity. Political decision-makers therefore 
constantly have to find ways to facilitate accumulation while at the same time making sure not to 
disappoint their electorates too much.  
 
Now, in the process leading up to the establishment of a new institution, or the re-programming of 
an institution forming part of an already existing (sub)unit of regulation in a given social space, a 
number of competing ideas of regulation will often be articulated and promoted by various 
programmers. Whether an idea is actually institutionalised depends not so much on how “good” it 
is, as on whom its advocates are. That is, it clearly matters whether the support for a particular idea 
of regulation comes from a powerful direct programmer (say, a government of a core EU member 
state) or if it comes from an indirect programmer with few resources (say, a non-governmental 
organisation or an “expert”). In practice, changing constellations of internal/external and 
direct/indirect programmers may support a particular idea of regulation – and the relative 
political/economic weight of such constellations over time will do much to explain the impact (or 
lack of impact) of the particular idea. In turn, it should be recalled that political and economic 
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weight is related to structures and structural positions. As such agential, material and ideational 
mechanisms all need to be taken into account. 
 
This brings us neatly to the notion of hegemony which is often used to describe ‘a type of rule 
which predominantly relies on consent alongside coercion’ (Bieler & Morton, 2001: 20). Here we 
will both narrow down and broaden the concept. First, in the present context there is little need to 
retain the element of “coercion” in the definition of hegemony: that is, it seems plausible to think of 
it as something that merely relates to a significant degree of consent with respect to particular ideas 
of regulation (see also Jones, 2006: 52). Second, hegemony is one of those concepts that Marxist 
and neogramscian scholars have tended to use in an overly class-centric way, for instance when 
talking about “hegemonic class fractions”. In the present context, we do not operate with any notion 
of a “ruling class”, for the simple reason that classes or class fractions do not “rule” capitalist 
societies. Indeed, due to the double operational autonomy of political, legal and regulatory 
institutions, hegemony is not something that can be established by one type of institutional agents 
or by class fractions. This suggests that we ought to think of hegemony as a broader phenomenon. 
That is, as something that, to use the words of Jessop (1990: 336), must ‘emerge from the 
interaction of various social forces rooted in different orders so that they share common 
programmatic objectives despite their differing codes’48.  
 
In the present context we can talk of hegemony if the vast majority of programmers of an institution 
subscribe to a particular GDR and particular USDRs so that disagreements pertain to the level of 
CIRs. That is, if programmers generally agree on the purposes the regulation of, say, mergers 
should serve but have certain disagreements regarding the practical details. The hegemony of 
particular ideas may thus lead to the marginalisation of those minorities who subscribe to different 
ideas. To be sure, hegemony is not a precondition for the programming of institutions as the 
programmers may subscribe to different GDRs and USDRs. However, a lack of common 
conceptions among key external programmers may of course lead to a more “blurred” or messy 
programming of an institution or even block its establishment entirely.  
 
3.7. Putting theory to work 
 
A crucial question confronting anyone engaged in theoretically informed empirical research is how 
to link theory and empirical analyses. In section 2.5 the procedure followed in order to construct the 
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theoretical perspective outlined above was explained. As it will be recalled, it has been developed 
through dialogues with not only critical realist philosophy and with various theoretical literatures; it 
has also been developed through iterative movements between theory and various empirical 
sources. This method of theory construction has implications for the way one can meaningfully 
apply the perspective in the analyses of the history of European level merger control. Certainly it 
would seem rather futile to perform the ritual of presenting a theory, deriving hypotheses from it 
(and hypotheses derived from other theories) and then showing how this theory is superior to the 
available alternatives. For one thing it would appear like a circular exercise, as hypotheses derived 
from a theory would be tested against empirical data that already informed the construction of this 
theory in the first place. Moreover, the perspective presented here is a “weak theory” (see section 
2.5) which does not lend itself easily to the construction of testable hypotheses about the causal 
relationships between clearly demarcated independent and dependent variables.  
 
Chapters 4 to 7 do therefore not serve as a theoretical testing ground. Instead they contain empirical 
information that has been interpreted or “processed” through the theoretical perspective. That is, 
the concepts and ideas presented in this chapter are integrated in a “historical narrative” about the 
developments in the merger area. It should be remembered that the phenomena to be explained in 
the different chapters are quite different: in Chapter 4 the main task is to explain why merger rules 
were not included in the EC Treaty when such provisions were contained in the ECSC Treaty; in 
Chapter 5 it is the failure to adopt a merger regulation in the early 1970s; in Chapter 6 it is the 
adoption and design of the 1989 MCR; and in Chapter 7 it is EC merger control in the 1990s and 
the revision of the MCR.  
 
If only for that reason it is inexpedient to squeeze the analyses into a uniform straitjacket. To put it 
differently, the different chapters are not structured in a completely identical manner, nor are all 
components of the theoretical perspective used in all chapters. This said, the history of European 
level merger control is to no small extent explored by looking at key “programming outcomes” 
(such as the adoption of treaties and regulations) as the result of micro-processes that took place in 
broader contexts. Indeed, as it appears from figure 3.2 such outcomes are explained by looking at 
the interactions between different types of programmers who, located in a number of wider 
contexts, act on the basis of and/or promote various ideas of regulation targeting concrete objects of 
regulation.  
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Figure 3.2: Studying programming processes 
 
 
Each of Chapters 4 to 7 thus start out by mapping the wider and by no means static contexts against 
which the developments in the merger area should be understood. It follows as a logical 
consequence of the content of this chapter that it is particularly relevant to focus on three types of 
contexts. A first context is the overall developments of the capitalist system and the way it was 
regulated in the period in question. Here the focus is on “mega-trends” such as the 
transnationalisation of capitalism and the shift away from the Keynesian welfare state towards 
neoliberal forms of regulation. A second, and to some extent related, context is the developments in 
the core member states, namely Germany, France and (from the 1970s) the United Kingdom (UK). 
Here attention will be paid to broader trends at the level of the ensemble of regulation and in the 
unit of regulation dealing with competition in these social spaces, with particular focus on the 
subunit dealing with merger control. Needless to say mergers, and the way this concrete “object of 
regulation” came to “transcend” the national social spaces, are of particular interest here. A third 
context is developments in the EC, that is, the overall “trends and events” in the integration process. 
Here the unit of regulation of which merger control came to form part, namely the EC competition 
unit, is of course of particular interest (needless to say, this third context is irrelevant to Chapter 4). 
As such, what follows in the next four chapters is not just the story of EC merger control but a 
much more comprehensive “narrative” of the transformation of European capitalism and the 
EC/EU.  
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Having outlined the broader contexts the task becomes to throw light on the concrete “micro-
processes” leading up to “programming outcomes”, whether positive (such as agreement on a 
regulation) or negative (failure to reach agreement). A crucial aspect in explaining the outcome of 
(re-)programming processes is to identify the main ideas of regulation, more concretely USDRs and 
CIRs on merger control, and the (possibly changing) constellations of different types of 
programmers that formed their preferences and articulated their positions on the basis of these 
ideas. Hence, in the analyses that follow in the next four chapters an attempt to categorise the 
relative impact of different ideas of regulation at different junctures is made. Here we will 
tentatively distinguish between primary, secondary and marginalised programmers and ideas. The 
ideas most clearly reflected in the outcome will be categorised as primary and so will the 
programmers actively promoting these ideas. Programmers that passively support such ideas or 
actively support any other ideas of regulation that are reflected in the outcome are categorised as 
secondary and so are these “other ideas”. Finally, ideas of regulation that are not reflected in the 
outcome are categorised as marginalised and so are their “supporters”.  
 
The purpose of this categorisation is to think about the impact of particular ideas of regulation in a 
systematic way. Unfortunately social reality does not lend itself easily to “categorisation exercises”: 
it is not always possible to identify all types of agents and ideas; that an idea has come to prevail 
does not necessarily mean that all of its supporters were equally “primary”; and the distinction 
between active and passive support for ideas is not always an easy one to make. The categorisations 
are thus thought of as being no more than tentative and thus also by no means perfect. To explain 
the relative impact of ideas of regulation at a given juncture one needs to look at the “balance of 
power” between the programmers, which is in turn related to the wider contexts. As such, the 
explanations of programming outcomes will refer back to contextual developments. 
 
 
3.8. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter a critical political economy perspective on regulation has been outlined. This 
perspective seeks to make sense of the phenomena of mergers and merger control by seeing them, 
respectively, as parts of capitalism and capitalist regulation. Both the parts and the whole of which 
they form part are understood to be inherently dynamic and changeable phenomena. This 
necessitated the introduction of a number of relatively open theoretical concepts that can be used to 
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analyse the link between merger control and broader socio-economic and ideational developments 
over time: concepts such as “ensembles of regulation”, “unit-specific discourses of regulation” and 
“programming”. In the chapters that follow the history of European level merger control is analysed 
through the lenses of this theoretical perspective.  
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4. The establishment of a European level competition unit of 
regulation 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the establishment of a European level competition unit of 
regulation in the period stretching from the early post-war years to the early 1960s. In particular it 
seeks to explain the inclusion of merger control provisions in the 1951 ECSC Treaty and the 
exclusion of such rules in the competition regulation provisions of the 1957 EC Treaty (in Article 
66). Hereby it seeks to answer the first sub-question posed in section 1.1: ‘Why were merger rules 
not included in the EC Treaty when such provisions were contained in the ECSC Treaty?’ In 
addition to this the chapter also explains a third development, viz. the adoption of Regulation 17 
through which the EC Treaty’s competition rules were fleshed out.  
  
The chapter proceeds in six steps. The first three sections set out to map the broader context against 
which these “outcomes” should be understood, focussing respectively on the post-war world order 
of embedded liberalism, the adoption of competition rules in Germany’s emerging “social market 
economy” and the small and reluctant steps taken towards the introduction of such rules in France 
where a state-led form of capitalism was taking shape. In the next three sections the processes 
leading up to the three above-mentioned “outcomes” are then dealt with, exploring in turn the 
programming processes resulting in the inclusion of competition rules in the two treaties and the 
adoption of Regulation 17. A short conclusion summarises the findings. 
 
 
4.1. Embedded liberalism 
 
The end of World War Two signalled the beginning of a new era where the United States (US) 
assumed leadership of the capitalist world. The new order that emerged, which is sometimes 
referred to as the Pax Americana, ‘was brought about through a change in the power relations 
among the major states, reflecting a decisive shift in their relative economic-productive powers’ 
(Cox, 1987: 212). On one hand, the new order marked a departure from the GDR that had prevailed 
since the end of the First World War. This discourse had given primacy to industrial capital over 
money capital; to the national over the international level; to active state interventions and social 
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protection over the invisible hand of the market. On the other hand, however, it did not constitute a 
return to a liberal order identical to the one characterising the Pax Britannica era (stretching from 
the 1820s to 1914). This system had given primacy to money capital over industrial capital; to the 
international over the national level; to the free play of market forces over state interference in the 
economy. What emerged after the Second World War was instead an order based on a synthesis that 
has been denoted as “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982) which allowed for ‘Keynes at home and 
Smith abroad’, to borrow an expression used by Gilpin (1987: 355). The new order involved the 
construction of national welfare states that were based on a compromise between organised labour 
and national industrial capital. But it ‘combined aspects of expanding production with a measure of 
re-liberalization in the international sphere. Trade, however, held priority over money capital (in 
line with the hegemony of the productive capital view)’ (Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 6; see also 
ibid: 11-14; Rupert, 2007: 160-161).  
 
Embedded liberalism, had originated in the US with the New Deal, and was then ‘projected on to 
Western Europe through the Marshall Plan’ (Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 11). The American 
strategy in the post-war reconstruction phase was, on one hand, to transform the capitalist world, 
not least the Atlantic social space, into a zone where money, goods and technology could move 
freely – that is, to (re)create an open world economy. Yet on the other hand, the Marshall Plan 
which gave the Western European (henceforth European) countries a strong incentive to become 
incorporated in this economy (inter alia by breaking down barriers to trade) was also an attempt ‘to 
kick-start the transformation towards Fordism’ in Europe (van der Pijl, 2006: 38; see e.g. Jessop & 
Sum, 2006: 123-151 on Fordism). 
 
As an occupying power in Germany, the Americans were in a good position to influence the 
developments in post-war Europe and they did indeed seize this opportunity (see Djelic, 1998 for a 
detailed account). Not least in Germany, of course. One of the policies pursued by the Americans 
and their allies was to take action against the cartels and significant concentrations in German 
industry. In the US, an extensive antitrust regime had evolved since the adoption of the 1890 
Sherman Act. From 1914, the year the Clayton Antitrust Act was enacted as a supplement to the 
Sherman Act, this administration explicitly prohibited M&As that would “substantially lessen 
competition” (see e.g. Bork, 1978: 15-49 or Dumenil et al., 1997 on the historical foundations of 
the US antitrust regime). In Europe, on the contrary, many industries had traditionally been shielded 
from competitive pressures, either through private arrangements or through regulatory interventions 
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(see Wigger 2008a: 111-116 for a good discussion of this). This was certainly the case in sectors of 
key importance such as coal and steel. In the steel sector, cartelisation was the rule, rather than the 
exception and had become an international phenomenon in the 1920s and 1930s, where the 
International Steel Cartel consisting of members from seven European countries had controlled a 
significant proportion of world production and exports. In the coal sector, private and state 
monopolisation was widespread in countries like Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
(see Schmitt, 1964: 103-104 for more details). 
 
Cartels had traditionally been considered legitimate under German law and had in some cases even 
been compulsory (see Marburg, 1964). It was widely known, however that cartels and monopolies 
had served as an important factor for the rise of Adolf Hitler and the military power of the Nazis. 
Consequently, the US and her allies saw it as a precondition for future peace and democracy in 
Europe that German companies were downsized considerably (e.g. Monnet, 1976: 351; van der Pijl, 
2006: 40). Naturally the Allies took particular interest in the Ruhr district which, at the time, 
constituted the industrial heartland of not only Germany but of Europe. With the so-called Potsdam 
Agreement, the Allies thus agreed that measures were required in order to de-concentrate vital 
sectors of the German economy: ‘At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be 
decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentrations of economic 
powers as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic 
arrangements’ (Paragraph 12, Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, quoted in Eyre 1999: 
97).  
 
Accordingly, the Allies imposed decartelisation laws on Germany during the years of occupation, 
under which companies in sectors such as chemicals, coal, iron and steel, banking and plastics were 
decartelised and often divided into smaller entities. To mention but a few examples, the giant 
chemicals company IG Farben was split into three new companies, namely BASF, Bayer and 
Hoechst (Goyder, 1993: 17)49. The Vereinigte Stahlwerke group, which had produced 40 percent of 
the Reich’s crude steel output in 1937, was also broken up. After de-concentration its largest 
successor, August Thyssen Hütte (ATH), accounted for about 10 percent of the output in federal 
Germany (McLachlan & Swann, 1967a: 197). And in the banking sector, the Grossbanken were 
divided into 33 smaller units (Djelic, 1998: 165). 
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In the immediate post-war period, the European economies did generally not perform well in 
relative terms: in 1950 ‘Western Europe’s GDP per person was 10 percent below that of Argentina; 
France’s was over 15 percent lower, Germany’s over one-third lower, Italy’s 45 percent lower, 
Spain’s less than half. Germany and Italy were poorer than Chile’ (Frieden, 2006: 281). 
Accordingly, at first the overriding priority of the European countries was to simply recover and get 
back to pre-war production levels and living standards. However, from the early 1950s to the early 
1970s the European economies, or rather the world of developed capitalism, experienced an 
exceptional economic boom, later sometimes referred to as the “Golden Age”. In this period the 
world scale output of manufacturers quadrupled and world trade in manufactured goods increased 
tenfold (Hobsbawm, 1994: 258-261). 
 
 
4.2. Competition policy in Germany’s “social market economy” 
 
In Germany, a long period of sustained growth and full employment, known as the “economic 
miracle” or Wirtschaftswunder, assisted the rehabilitation of the country greatly (Davies, 1996: 
1074). Whereas the average annual growth rate as measured in GNP had been 1.06 % in the period 
1914-1950, its annual average was an astonishing 8.6 % in the 1950-1959 period (Dormois, 2004: 
12, 18). The “miracle” was fuelled by significant state aids for industry but was also due to the 
heritage from the Reich: ‘German industrial capacity had been enormously expanded by the Nazi 
war economy and only marginally destroyed by Allied bombing and the subsequent dismantling of 
industrial installations’ (Spohn & Bodermann, 1989: 82; see also Küster, 1974: 65). The 
modernisation of German industry in the 1950s also entailed the introduction of Fordist production 
methods. The political sphere was characterised by great stability after 1949 (the year where the 
Federal Republic was founded). According to one historian, ‘West German politics were, frankly, 
unexciting’ from this moment and onwards (Davies, 1996: 1074). A coalition government led by 
the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) was in power for seventeen years (up to 1966) and sought 
to construct a system combining free markets with a welfare state, a so-called social market 
economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft). The main elements in this system was ‘price stability, the 
creation of favourable conditions for production, a system of social security, and international free 
trade’ and ‘the regulatory role of the state in this approach was and still is by and large restricted to 
securing general conditions’ (van der Wurff, 1993: 164-165; see also Jessop & Sum, 2006: 130-
133). 
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Intellectually speaking, the social market economy was associated with the ideas of the ordoliberals 
of the so-called Freiburg School (for detailed accounts see Gerber, 1998: 232-265 or Smith, 1994: 
16-20, see also Eucken, 2006 for a classic statement of ordoliberalism). According to 
ordoliberalism, the state should create a proper legal environment for the economy and maintain a 
healthy level of competition. If the state failed to take active measures to foster competition, 
ordoliberals feared that oligopolies or even monopolies would emerge, thereby undermining the 
advantages offered by the market economy. Ultimately this would also pose a threat to democracy 
since strong economic power can be transformed into political power (see also Lemke, 2001 on 
ordoliberalism). As Gerber (1998: 240-241) explains, many ordoliberals ‘sought an economy 
composed to the extent possible of small and medium-sized firms and thus a society with a 
minimum of “big business”’ and all ordoliberals ‘tended to view economic concentration with 
suspicion’.  
 
The preservation of competition was thus a cornerstone in ordoliberalism, and there is no doubt that 
the advocates of ordoliberal ideas did shape the way regulatory institutions were programmed in 
post-war Germany. Certainly, such ideas can be detected in the German competition law that, after 
years of negotiations and heated debates, replaced the Allies’ decartelisation laws in 1957. The 
German competition unit of regulation came into being with the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) with which the politically independent Bundeskartellamt 
(BKartA) was programmed to take responsibility for combating cartels, a quite daunting task 
considering Germany’s history in this area. The BKartA was to be exclusively concerned with the 
preservation of competition, something that clearly fell in line with ordoliberal thinking.  
 
On the other hand, however, ordoliberal ideas were far from hegemonic in Germany. This also had 
consequences in relation to the GWB. Its adoption was delayed for several years and previous drafts 
of the law would have implied much tougher policies on anti-competitive practices than those 
following from the law that was eventually adopted (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 9). In particular, it is 
noteworthy that the GWB did not include provisions for merger control, although mergers would 
clearly be one important mechanism through which concentration could take place. That merger 
provisions were initially left out of the GWB was due to strong opposition from large sections of 
German industry and their allies in especially the CDU and its sister party, the Christian-Social 
Union (CSU). Their argument was that ‘many German firms had not yet reached their optimal size, 
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and merger controls might have inhibited their doing so’ (Gerber, 1998: 302). Although 
“ordoliberal forces” in both the BKartA and the SDP soon after the enactment of the GWB began 
pressing for such provisions (Gerber, 1998: 302-3), they did not become part of the German 
competition policy regime before 1973. In other words, the ordoliberals had not been entirely 
successful in their efforts to introduce a strong competition law at the national level. Accordingly, it 
is necessary to take a balanced view on the importance of ordoliberal ideas in Germany and 
acknowledge that although they were influential among important members of the political elite, 
they also had very strong enemies in both the economic and political elites. 
 
Soon after the de-concentration processes had ended ‘German industry was once again on the path 
of concentration and centralization’ (Spohn & Bodermann, 1989: 85). Unfortunately the 
documentation of the magnitude of merger activities in the period prior to the adoption of the GWB 
leaves much to be desired – and the same goes for the merger activities in the other European 
countries in this period. But there is no doubt that a significant concentration of both industrial and 
money capital took place. For instance, a number of mergers took place in the banking sector in 
1956, hereby allowing resurrection of the Grossbanken (van der Pijl, 1984: 164; see also Canelos & 
Silber, 1970: 30-33). 
 
 
4.3. Competition policy in France’s state-led form of capitalism 
 
In France, the war had cost approximately a quarter of the country’s wealth, the infrastructure had 
been seriously damaged, agricultural and industrial production was very low compared to the pre-
war levels and inflation was high (Dormois, 2004: 17). The path chosen here in order to bring the 
economy back on track was one of state-led growth. Indeed, there was a long tradition for economic 
interventionism by the French state, but now it was decided to use the state to spur significant 
transformations in an economy characterised by many small and stagnant producers (Hall, 1986: 
139; Michalet, 1974). The state took control over key sectors of the economy: the Bank of France 
and several private banks were nationalised, as were the coal, gas, railroad and electricity industries 
along with Air France and the largest insurance companies. Moreover, a national planning board, 
the Commissariat Général du Plan, was created and given responsibility for the preparation of 
plans designed to enhance the performance of French industry (Hall, 1986: 140-141, 166-167). 
Among the members of the first planning board, which was led by Jean Monnet, it was generally 
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believed that industrial units in France were too small by international comparison. In their view, 
‘[m]odernization meant concentration within each sector of industry, larger production units and 
firms, the adoption of machines and technologies that would make mass production possible, and a 
rationalization of management and production methods’ (Djelic, 1998: 137). As later chapters will 
show, this positive attitude towards concentration of capital was to endure for many years in French 
economic and political circles. 
 
The work of the planning board was mainly carried out in a number of Modernisation Commissions 
consisting of representatives from big business and labour as well as of experts and planning staff. 
The trade unions were however marginalised from the outset, and the two largest unions thus chose 
to boycott the proceedings for many years (Hall, 1986: 158; see also Cox, 1987: 229-230 for an 
interesting discussion of “two-tier corporatism” in France). In the words of one commentator, the 
Commissions ‘have contributed largely toward bringing together the state on the one hand and large 
enterprises on the other’ (Michalet, 1974: 113). Whereas the model of capitalism that emerged in 
Germany was one where the state was mainly preoccupied with creating and sustaining a legal 
framework within which companies could operate, the model that emerged in France was thus one 
where the state rather manifestly sought to steer the economy through the Plans, and where the ties 
between the big capitals (oligopolies and monopolies) and the political system were particularly 
strong. It is not possible to go into a discussion of the various ways in which this steering was 
carried out, let alone of the content of the various plans (but see Hall, 1986: 139-191; Djelic, 1998: 
135-150). Suffice it to mention that the first plan, the so-called Monnet Plan, identified six sectors, 
namely coal, steel, electricity, transportation, agricultural machinery and cement, as the most crucial 
for the development of France’s economy and outlined a detailed investment programme for each of 
these sectors (Hall, 1986: 142).  
 
The attempt to put the French economy back on track through planning was apparently successful. 
As Hobsbawm (1994: 274) comments, ‘[t]his adaptation of Soviet ideas to a capitalist mixed 
economy must have had some effect, since between 1950 and 1979, France, hitherto a by-word for 
economic retardation, caught up more successfully than any other of the chief industrial countries 
with US productivity’. To be sure, the significance of the influx of American aid through the 
Marshall Plan should not be overlooked in this context. But in any case the Trente Glorieuses, the 
French version of the Golden Age, had begun, manifested by the fact that the average annual 
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growth rate as measured in GNP went from 1.15 % in the period 1914-1950 to 4.6 % in the 1950-
1959 period (Dormois, 2004: 12, 18).  
 
According to Venturini (1971; see also Haas, 1958: 81), France was the European country with the 
highest rate of mergers in the immediate post-war years. As already mentioned, the merger activity 
figures for this period are uncertain and inadequate. Bearing this in mind, data presented in 
Suleiman (1975), suggests that 849 French firms were involved in concentrations between 1950 and 
1960, mainly in industries of mechanics and electronics (181), banking and insurance (183) and 
chemicals (149). These figures do not show whether the number of mergers was increasing in this 
period, nor do they document the extent to which these mergers were intra-national. However, other 
data show that the 500 largest French enterprises were involved in 536 mergers in this period and 
that the annual “number of operations of concentration” rose, although not in a constant manner, in 
the period. It thus increased from 21 (1950) and 9 (1951) to 68 (1959) and 75 (1960) (see Suleiman, 
1975: 27-28). That such a relatively large proportion of the mergers involved the biggest capitals is 
probably not a coincidence but directly related to the fact that whereas the state did not take much 
interest in smaller companies, it directly attempted to promote concentration among the larger ones, 
a phenomenon that became more pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s with the conscious attempts to 
create “national champions” through industrial policies (see Chapter 5). 
 
As this might also indicate, the French approach to competition was one that differed a great deal 
from the German and indeed there was no competition policy tradition in France (Venturini, 1971: 
9). As such, mergers were not a concrete object of regulation at this juncture. It should be 
mentioned, however, that in August 1953 Decree 53-704 was adopted, hereby adding to the Price 
Control Ordinance of 1945 (which gave the government the power to freeze wages and to control 
all prices) three articles dealing with the “Maintenance of free competition” (Article 59 bis, ter and 
quater). It appears from the first of these articles that:  
 
‘All concerted actions, agreements, express or implied, understandings, or coalitions 
under whatever form or for whatever reason, which have as their object or may have 
as their effect the restriction of the full exercise of competition by placing an 
obstacle in the way of a lowering of production costs or sales prices or by favouring 
an artificial increase of the prices, are prohibited, except as provided in article 59 ter’ 
 
Article 59 ter exempts from prohibition those cases where it can be justified that the agreement will 
have the effect of ‘improving or extending the outlets of the production, or of assuring the 
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development of economic progress by way of rationalization or specialization’ (both articles quoted 
from Riesenfeld, 1960: 595).  
 
Although the adoption of the Decree did signal that not all agreements between companies would 
be accepted, the inclusion of these rather broadly formulated exemptions reflect that it should not be 
seen as a radical departure from the path chosen in the past. The main reason why the provisions 
were passed at all was US pressure: in exchange for financial aid to the reconstruction of Europe, 
the Americans pushed for antitrust measures that would prevent distortions of free trade on national 
and global markets (see e.g. Pedersen, 1996). According to Dumez & Jeunemaitre (1996: 221), the 
French head of government only approved it ‘on condition that “no one would ever hear about it”, a 
political manoeuvre designed to pacify one of the parties in the governing coalition’. It is thus not 
terribly surprising that the rules were never strictly enforced. As one scholar put it, ‘cartels and 
similar combinations have been subjected to an ever increasing control and curbing of manifest 
abuses. But they still enjoy a wide area of toleration and legitimate action and, above that, there are 
many conditions or sectors of the economy in which the government considers combinations and 
their discipline as salutary and in the public interest with the attendant grant of privileges and 
subsidies’ (Riesenfeld, 1960: 587). Other commentators went somewhat further and wondered 
whether French competition regulation was not ‘an exercise in futility’ (see Jenny & Weber, 1975). 
In other words, the provisions were mainly included in the Ordinance for the sake of appearances 
and were, importantly, not designed to target mergers. Such provisions did not become part of 
French law before 1977 (Garnier & Asselineau, 1991: 43).  
 
As regards the other countries that were to join the ECSC and later the EEC, Belgium and 
Luxembourg did not have any competition laws. In Italy the 1942 Civil Code did only to a limited 
extent regulate monopolies and restrictive practices and under the Dutch 1956 Wet economische 
mededinging (Economic Competition Act) cartels were permitted as long as they were not 
“abused”. On balance it seems fair to say that ‘competition law in the Six was in a primitive state’ 
towards the end of the 1950s (Goyder, 1993: 30).  
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4.4. The first step: competition policy and the ECSC Treaty 
 
On 9 May 1950, the so-called Schuman Plan, named after French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman, was announced with a declaration. The idea was to establish a new supranational 
organisation that would place the ‘Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole … under 
a common High Authority’ and the Plan was presented as an important step towards a united 
Europe, as an attempt to overcome ‘the age-old opposition of France and Germany’ (Schuman, 
1950). Moreover, the declaration vaguely hinted at the need for the competition rules that would 
later form part of the ECSC treaty by stating that ‘[i]n contrast to international cartels, which tend to 
impose restrictive practices on distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain 
high profits, the organization will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production’ 
(Schuman, 1950). The Schuman Plan had first been drafted by Jean Monnet, the French civil 
servant who led the first planning board (see section 4.3 above). To understand how radical and 
remarkable it was one has to keep in mind the importance of coal and steel at the time. As Lovett 
(1996: 426) writes, coal ‘provided European industry with three-quarters of its energy needs. No 
wheel turned, no machine operated without coal’ and steel ‘occupied a position of unchallenged 
supremacy’ in this period, where plastic or composite materials had yet to be invented. With the 
plan the French thus ‘appeared to be surrendering control over two sectors vital both to the 
economic well-being of France and its physical defence’ (1996: 426).  
 
Indeed, this initiative would never have seen the light of day had it not been because it was the only 
way in which the French could influence developments in Germany’s coal and steel sectors. At 
first, the French policy towards Germany had involved attempts to win control over the coal 
resources in the Saar and to prevent economic recovery in the Ruhr. This was understandable as the 
Ruhr had ‘become a synonym for the evil German military-industrial complex’ and as ‘its 
resuscitation would threaten France’s own economic revival’ (Dinan, 1999: 19; see also Scheingold, 
1965: 226). But whereas France was capable of influencing developments in the Saar, for the 
simple reason that it formed part of the French zone of occupation, the Ruhr was British “territory” 
and not subject to French influence. And as the governments of the UK and in particular the US had 
come to the conclusion that Ruhr’s recovery was the key to the recovery of the European 
economies, they ‘gradually loosened the Ruhr’s economic shackles’, while a frustrated France could 
merely watch from the sidelines (Dinan, 1999: 20).  
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What made a common market for coal and steel an attractive solution to these problems was that it 
‘would open for France a new outlet for her vastly expanded steel production, thus safeguarding the 
planning and investment for steel carried on in the four previous years by Monnet’s Commissariat 
du Plan, then beset by fears of having overinvested. The common market, finally, would assure a 
French coal supply from the Ruhr…’ (Haas, 1958: 242). Initially a bi-lateral arrangement with 
Germany was what the French had in mind, but it was soon decided also to invite other 
neighbouring countries who would be affected by the new organisation. Accordingly, six countries 
participated in the negotiations over the ECSC Treaty that began on 20 June 1950 in Paris. This 
made the negotiations somewhat more complex than they would otherwise have been, even though 
both the German and the French proved willing to make some minor concessions to the other 
countries (see e.g. Lovett, 1996: 431).  
 
The inclusion of competition rules in the treaty that was to result from these negotiations was 
important for the French negotiators. Indeed, according to one commentator ‘[i]t was the intention 
and the goal of the architects of these communities to rely on competition as the principle auto-
mechanism of their common markets and as a main force making for technological progress and 
economic growth’ (Riesenfeld, 1960: 575). But reaching agreement on such provisions proved very 
difficult. During the negotiations, in November 1950, Jean Monnet wrote to Robert Schuman that 
“substantive differences” still existed with regard to (among other issues) the competition policy 
provisions. And he then went on to describe the importance of such rules in the following way: 
 
‘…the provisions on cartels and industrial concentrations affect the very substance of 
the Schuman Plan. The question is whether […] the planned organisation will be the 
opposite of an international cartel, or whether the High Authority will have authority 
in name only, with the powers transferred by the governments to the European Coal 
and Steel Community actually being diverted and handed over to coalitions of 
private interests. In particular, these provisions must, without creating any 
discrimination or economic disadvantage for any of the Member States, ensure that it 
is impossible for firms in the Ruhr to rebuild the political power, which they wielded 
with such disastrous effects for Germany and for Europe as a whole’ (Monnet, 1950) 
 
These remarks by Monnet suggest that the difficulties in reaching agreement on the provisions were 
due to the fact that the programmers were informed by some largely incompatible unit-specific 
discourses of regulation (USDRs). The main issue at stake was, to put it crudely, who was to 
determine the mode of operation of the coal and steel sectors. Was it to be determined by companies 
or by bureaucrats? In other words, some programmers subscribed to a discourse according to which 
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cartels and mergers should not be hindered by the new supranational institutions. If anything, they 
should be facilitated by them. And other programmers subscribed to a discourse according to which 
the preservation of competition through the establishment of a well-functioning European level 
competition unit of regulation was seen as desirable. Let us first take a look at the programmers 
who were informed by the former discourse, which can be thought of as the “pro-concentration 
USDR”.  
 
The most significant opposition to the proposed competition rules came from indirect programmers 
in the form of German, French, Italian and Belgian capital actors. In Germany, such actors 
generally welcomed the Schuman Plan as they saw the projected ECSC as an opportunity to get rid 
of the above-mentioned decartelisation laws that had been imposed upon Germany by the Allies. 
However, although the German capital actors generally liked the prospect of a common market for 
coal and steel, they also wanted certainty that the new regulatory institutions would not prevent 
German re-concentration to a level corresponding to the size of French capitals. This was especially 
the case, as ‘massive concentrations in France’ had been ‘achieved since 1945’ and these 
concentrations would not be reviewable by the ECSC institutions as they had taken place prior to 
the establishment of the projected organisation (Haas, 1958: 81). Hence, ‘[o]bjections were raised 
against the anti-cartel features of the draft Treaty, which were derided as one more instance of the 
post-war mania to remake the European economy in the American image’ (Haas, 1958: 153).  
 
In particular, the German steel industry lobbied the German government in order to persuade it to 
resist the inclusion of antitrust provisions. In a memorandum from the Wirtschaftsvereinigung 
Eisen- und Stahlindustrie submitted to Bonn on 4 July 1950, it was argued that, rather than giving 
an international bureaucracy in the form of the High Authority wide-ranging powers to intervene in 
the common market for coal and steel, the relevant trade associations should be allowed to play a 
much more important role in coordinating the activities in the market. That is, the 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung would have liked the ECSC to become a sort of international cartel where 
the High Authority would still have some limited powers, but where ‘a directorium of industrialists 
of all participating countries’ would in effect make the important decisions (memorandum quoted in 
Berghahn, 1986: 127). This was not regarded as an unrealistic scenario. Indeed, it was suggested 
that it would be impossible to avoid ‘certain coordinations in the fields of production, sales or prices 
– to mention merely the most important cartel elements’ and that, insofar this was considered 
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‘unacceptable, it is more practical not even to start work’ on the ECSC (memorandum quoted in 
Berghahn, 1986: 127). 
 
In France, the ratification of the Schuman Plan ran into massive opposition from a broad range of 
capital actors. A campaign led by the Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française, the national 
association representing the steel industries, attracted support from e.g. the Association of 
Engineering and Metal-processing Industries, representing more than 10.000 companies; the 
Association de Cadres Dirigeants de l’Industrie pour le Progrés Social et Economique, the 
members of which were a few hundred managers of large industrial companies; the Confédération 
Générale des Petites et Moyennes Enterprises, claiming to represent as many as 800,000 smaller 
companies; and not least the general employers’ general organisation, the Conseil National du 
Patronat Français (CNPF), representing most of the various capital actors and fractions of the 
French capitalist class (Ehrmann, 1954: 454-458, see also Berghahn, 1986: 128; Haas, 1958: 176-
177). There were different reasons why French capital actors opposed the draft proposals of the 
ECSC Treaty. One reason was that Monnet and his staff had not consulted with the different 
business associations prior to the announcement of the Schuman Plan – and as if this was not bad 
enough, these associations soon discovered that they were only to be assigned an “advisory” role in 
the projected scheme. Yet there were also more substantive reasons for opposition. Of these, the 
most important was ‘true anxieties over future competition from participating countries, and 
especially from Germany’ (Ehrmann, 1954: 461).  
 
Like it was the case in Germany, then, the anti-trust provisions became the main bone of contention. 
In particular, French capital actors strongly opposed the idea that some supranational bureaucracy 
should be granted the authority to enforce strict anti-cartel rules and to prevent them from merging. 
That they considered this to be an important question was also understood by the National 
Assembly’s rapporteur for the ratification bill who pointed out that if the articles containing the 
competition provisions ‘had not been incorporated, organised French industry would not have 
opposed the treaty’ (quoted in Ehrmann, 1954: 460). At the same time, however, the French capital 
actors would like somewhat different standards to apply to their German colleagues. If possible, 
Germany’s companies should be prevented from “re-concentrating” so that they would not grow 
beyond the size of industrial units permitted under the decartelisation laws. And if this was not 
possible, a (moderate) re-concentration process should be vigorously monitored and strictly 
regulated by the ECSC institutions, more precisely the High Authority. ‘What is wanted’, writes 
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Haas (1958: 185), ‘is freedom for French firms to merge as they please coupled with careful 
supervision over the parallel German process’. 
 
In Italy the two steel associations, Assider and Isa, were against the Treaty as was the Federation of 
Industrialists. This was, inter alia, related to the fact that the steel industry was undergoing a 
modernisation and concentration process in 1950-1951 and it was thus afraid that the ECSC would 
block this process via the anti-trust provisions (Haas, 1958: 199-200). Likewise, the Belgium steel 
industry had a number of objections to the emerging Treaty. For a while it joined forces with the 
coal industry in a campaign against certain parts of the Treaty, for instance arguing in a position 
paper of 7 December 1950 that the new organisation ‘would completely curb the initiative and 
responsibility of firms and establish a complete dirigisme of the High Authority equivalent in fact to 
a disguised nationalization’ (quoted in Milward, 2000: 80). 
 
In the political sphere, a number of political parties also expressed their reservation vis-à-vis the 
anti-cartel provisions. In Germany, the position of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was rather 
hostile towards most aspects of the Treaty, including the anti-cartel provisions, and also the right-
wing liberalist Free Democratic Party (FDP), a party that was associated with the views of heavy 
industry (see Lovett, 1996: 445), was concerned with these provisions but decided in the end to 
support the Treaty. In France, opposition to the ECSC Treaty mainly came from the extreme left 
and right. The communists were against any form of integration due to its alleged negative 
consequences for the working classes of the participating countries. The Gaullist Rassemblement du 
Peuple Français (RPF) was not in principle against European integration, but raised numerous 
objections to the projected common market, arguing for instance that it would work primarily to 
Germany’s advantage and result in French unemployment (Haas, 1958: 114-115). The ECSC was 
also opposed by the extreme right and left in Italy, and moreover the conservatives were worried 
about the effects of increased competition on Italian industry (Haas, 1958: 140, Eyre 1999: 103).  
 
As this account shows, the group of opponents to ECSC competition rules included both a number 
of political parties and some powerful capital actors. The latter constituted important members of 
the fraction of industrial capital in France, Germany, Belgium and Italy. In France in particular, a 
wide range of capital actors (in addition to those of coal and steel) joined forces against the 
provisions. As mentioned above the “opponents” can all be categorised as indirect programmers. 
That is, all of them had to exercise their powers through the national governments if they were to 
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influence the programming of the new regulatory institutions. Moreover, they were not a 
homogenous group. Not only did they not coordinate their activities beyond national borders; their 
reasons for opposition also varied greatly. What unified them was that they did not want their 
national industries to be subject to ECSC antitrust regulation (even if they would not object to the 
imposition of such rules on their foreign competitors). Many of the capital actors argued that the 
treaty was dirigiste, although not in the sense that it prevented free competition: ‘Dirigism in the 
eyes of these businessmen was a term applied to any interference by officialdom which prevented 
them from doing what they wanted, including not competing’ (McLachlan & Swann, 1967a: 81). In 
their view, concentration and cartels were not an illness and indeed, de-concentration ‘ran counter 
to the basic instincts of the European business community’ (Lovett, 1996: 443). The terms of 
competition and fear of whether national industries would be competitive vis-à-vis the industries of 
other member states were thus clearly important concerns to all the adherents of the pro-
concentration USDR.  
 
Given the strong opposition to the proposed ECSC competition policy provisions among French, 
Italian, Belgian and to some extent German industrial capital actors, it is easy to understand why it 
was difficult to reach agreement on the establishment of a European level competition unit of 
regulation in the sectors in question. To be sure, there were also capital actors that more 
wholeheartedly gave their support to the Treaty. In France, Monnet managed to get the support 
from the coal and railroad industries. According to Ehrmann (1954: 473), it turned out to be 
important that these industries had been nationalised (see section 4.3): ‘Had the coal and railroad 
industries still been in private hands, and had the important media of communication which were at 
their disposal before the war joined in the campaign of the Steel Association, the treaty might not 
have found the necessary support in parliament’. Some “members” of the steel industry were also in 
favour of the Treaty, although their voice was often drowned in the noise from the capital actors 
that opposed the Treaty. As mentioned above, German business was generally in favour of the 
Treaty, even if many capital actors would clearly have preferred it if the competition policy 
provisions had not been included. On balance, however, this was still a price that many of them 
considered worth paying. Also in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, industry was generally in 
favour of the Treaty and its competition policy rules was not a major topic of discussion, although it 
is probably fair to say that many industrialists in these countries shared the same attitude towards 
cartels as their French and German colleagues (see Lovett, 1996: 442). 
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Despite the opposition to the Treaty from important capital actors in Germany, Italy and especially 
France, it was eventually adopted in the various Parliaments with rather large majorities. In the 
French National Assembly, it passed by a vote of 376 to 240; in the Bundestag by 232 to 143; in the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies by 275 to 98; and in the three Benelux countries, approval of the 
Treaty was almost unanimous (cf. Haas, 1958: 124, 132, 141, 143, 149, 150-151). In the three big 
countries the Treaty was carried through the national parliament with the support of the Christian 
Democrats. In France, the Christian-Democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), led by 
Robert Schuman, was one of the centre-right parties advocating the ECSC Treaty. Also the French 
Socialist Party (SFIO) did, in principle, support the ECSC Treaty but was concerned with the 
competitiveness of French industry and argued that it would be necessary to modernise and invest 
in industry independently of the High Authority (Haas, 1958: 116). In Germany leading members of 
the CDU were the most eager advocates of the ECSC but the Treaty was also supported, albeit 
somewhat more cautiously, by the smaller parties making up the governing coalition, namely The 
Refugee Party and The German Party. As mentioned above, the FDP also ended up supporting the 
Treaty (Haas, 1958: 129-30). In the Italian parliament the Treaty was supported by Christian-
Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats and Republicans (Haas, 1958: 141). 
 
Although the circle of agents who supported the inclusion of competition rules in the treaty thus 
included the direct programmers in the form of the ruling political coalitions, as well as some 
business groups, Berghahn is surely correct to note that it is questionable if Monnet’s programme 
‘could have succeeded against the combined phalanx of European heavy industry if a “federator” … 
had not existed on whom he could ultimately rely’ (1986: 132). This brings us to the role played by 
US government officials in the negotiations. As already mentioned in section 4.1 above, the US had 
been very keen to de-concentrate German industry, an ambition that was directly related to the 
prevailing antitrust USDR in the US. This USDR was not at all compatible with the culture of 
cartels and other forms of anti-competitive behaviour that existed in German industry and elsewhere 
in the European business communities. And hence the Americans did not want the ECSC to 
become, in the words of one commentator, a ‘monster international cartel hidden beneath M. 
Schuman’s diplomatic dress’ (Parker, 1952: 381, see also Wigger 2008b). That competition had to 
be safeguarded by the new organisation was the view not only of leading US decision-makers such 
as Marshall Plan co-ordinator Paul Hoffmann and President Harry S. Truman, but also of important 
US capital actors. For instance, Berghahn mentions that the National Association of Manufacturers 
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contacted Schumann, requesting him to ensure that the ECSC did not become a giant monopoly or 
cartel (see Berghahn, 1986: 134-137).  
 
Americans certainly did not take a direct part in the ECSC Treaty negotiations. Instead ‘they kept 
themselves well briefed about the proceedings. And the more clearly it emerged that the discussions 
were being pushed into an unacceptable direction by a cartel-minded West European heavy 
industry, the more Washington began to intervene’ (Berghahn, 1986: 134). The precise nature and 
magnitude of the American influence in relation to articles 65 and 66 is, however, a debated issue. 
Cini & McGowan (1998: 17) probably exaggerate somewhat when they suggest that ‘there is even 
some evidence to suggest that the precise wording of the ECSC competition provisions was insisted 
upon by the US representatives’. An apparently more accurate version is the one provided by 
Gerber (1998: 338-339) who writes that the competition law provisions were drafted by a US 
professor of antitrust, Robert Bowie (see also Monnet, 1978: 352-353), commented on in 
Washington, but then rewritten ‘in a European idiom’ by a draftsman of the Conseil d’Etat in Paris. 
As Gerber (1998: 338) comments, ‘the US role was concealed as much as possible for the fear that 
the project would be seen as controlled by the US and rejected by some participants on those 
grounds alone’.  
 
That the governing political elite in Germany went against the preferences expressed by important 
capital actors and accepted the inclusion of competition rules in the Treaty, was not only due to 
presence of the US. It also has to be seen in the context of the influence of ordoliberal ideas on 
several members of Germany’s political elite, not least the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard 
(CDU). However, not even the ordoliberals in the German government were willing to accept that 
their domestic capitals should be significantly smaller than their competitors in the new common 
market. On the contrary, they wanted to establish a framework that would allow the firms to 
compete on equal terms. In his Memoirs, Jean Monnet recalls how Erhard told him in a private 
conversation that ‘[w]e don’t understand why the Allies insist on decartelizing the industries of the 
Ruhr ... It’s as if you were deliberately trying to put German industry in an inferior competitive 
position vis-à-vis its partners’ (Monnet, 1978: 351). Although the ordoliberals did, as a matter of 
principle, advocate an anti-concentration position, this should thus not be mistaken for a lack of 
concern with the international competitiveness of German industry. So, on one hand the 
governments of the other future member states and the US were keen to prevent re-concentration of 
the German economy and in particular the former saw this as an opportunity to improve the 
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competitiveness of their own industries vis-à-vis German companies. Yet on the other hand, the 
ECSC was only acceptable to the German government because it was interpreted as a framework 
that would in fact establish a level playing field in the coal and steel sectors.  
 
So let us take a look at the outcome of the negotiations, namely the ECSC Treaty which was signed 
in Paris on 18 April 1951. The Treaty committed the Six to pool their coal and steel resources by 
providing a common market for their coal and steel products, lifting restrictions on imports and 
exports, and creating a unified labour market. As regards the institutional structure of the ECSC this 
consisted of four principal institutions: the High Authority, a supranational institution which was 
programmed to take responsibility for achieving the Treaty’s objectives and which was assisted by a 
committee consisting of representatives of both capital and workers; the Court of Justice which 
would ensure that the law was observed and which adjudicated disputes; a Council of Ministers 
consisting of representatives of the national governments which would have to approve the High 
Authority’s most important decisions; and a Common Assembly consisting of 78 deputies from 
national parliaments, that, although it only had supervisory power, served to ‘give the ECSC the 
appearance of direct democratic accountability’ (Dinan, 1999: 25). 
 
The ECSC Treaty contained some quite far-reaching rules that were designed to control the level of 
concentration in the coal and steel industries. Article 5 of the ECSC Treaty reads that the 
Community shall ‘ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive 
conditions and exert direct influence upon production or upon the market only when circumstances 
so require’. The principal competition rules governing the coal and steel sectors are spelt out in 
Articles 65 and 66. Article 65 deals with anticompetitive agreements and the first paragraph of this 
article states that ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
all concerted practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal 
competition within the common market (whether or not they affect trade between Member States) 
shall be prohibited’. The merger rules are set out in detail in Article 66. According to the first 
paragraph ‘[a]ny transaction shall require the prior authorization of the High Authority […] if it has 
in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing about […] a concentration between undertakings’ 
within the territory covered by the treaty. In other words, the treaty granted exclusive jurisdiction to 
the joint High Authority over all mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving coal and steel 
companies regardless of the turnover of these companies.  
 
97 
 
The second paragraph stated that this authorisation would be granted by the High Authority insofar 
as the transaction would  
 
‘not give the persons or undertakings concerned the power to determine prices, to 
control or restrict production or distribution or to hinder effective competition in a 
substantial part of the market for those products; or to evade the rules of competition 
instituted under this Treaty, in particular by establishing an artificially privileged 
position involving a substantial advantage in access to supplies or markets’  
 
If, however, the High Authority did not find that a concentration fulfilled these conditions, it was 
authorised to ‘declare the concentration unlawful’ and to ‘order separation of the undertakings or 
assets improperly concentrated or cessation of joint control, and any other measures which it 
considers appropriate to return the undertakings or assets in question to independent operation and 
restore normal conditions of competition’ (Art. 66, paragraph 5).  
 
The outcome of the programming process reflected that the ideas of some programmers prevailed, 
while others were marginalised. From the outset the primary programmers were the governments of 
Germany, France and the US. It was unthinkable that the ECSC would come into being, let alone 
would become a success, without the consent of all three. The inclusion of competition rules in the 
Treaty was thus above all something these three programmers had to agree upon. As we have seen, 
there were different reasons, both geopolitical and economic, why they were capable of agreeing 
upon some rather far-reaching rules. But it seems reasonable to claim that the rules would not have 
had this ideational content had the prevailing US antitrust philosophy and the ordoliberal discourse 
subscribed to by leading members of the German political elite not been compatible in relation to 
the questions of concentration and cartels. And in this context it was not insignificant that Monnet, 
who negotiated for France, ‘had a deep distrust of private associations between businessmen and a 
great belief in the power of public authority to make them compete’ (Milward, 2000: 81; see also 
Berghahn, 1986: 129). The resulting support for what could be called the “pro-competition USDR” 
made it possible to reach agreement on the anti-concentration and anti-cartel provisions of the 
ECSC, hereby marginalising the ideas advanced by those social forces who opposed the inclusion 
of such rules in the Treaty. Given the economic weight of the “opponents” it seems plausible to 
suggest that this would hardly have been possible, had not the US been present in Europe at the 
time.  
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As regards the other governments participating in the negotiations these can cautiously be 
categorised as secondary programmers in relation to the competition rules. To be sure, it is 
improbable that they actually influenced the content of articles 65 and 66 in any significant way 
(even if they to a limited extent influenced other parts of the Treaty). Yet as it seems that they did 
not disagree with or attempted to alter the content of these articles and as they were signatories of 
the Treaty it seems reasonable to place them in this category. The capital actors that supported the 
Treaty, limited in number as they were, can also be seen to belong to this category, albeit as indirect 
programmers.  
 
Table 4.1: ECSC Treaty merger rules - programmers and ideas  
 Programmers Ideas 
 
Primary The governments of Germany, 
France (incl. Monnet) and the US 
Pro-competition USDR 
informed by the US antitrust 
tradition and compatible with 
ordoliberalism. 
Secondary Governments of Italy and Benelux 
countries and a limited number of 
capital actors. 
 
Marginalised Significant capital actors in France, 
Germany, Italy and Belgium. 
Pro-concentration USDR 
 
The ECSC began operating in August 1952 and Monnet was appointed the first President of the 
High Authority. But during its first five years the competition rules were only used to a rather 
limited extent. In fact, in this period High Authority ‘did not prohibit any concentrations, and its 
enforcement of other provisions was quite limited’ (Gerber, 1998: 342). In other words, those 
programmers who had expected the High Authority to take a hard line vis-à-vis the German coal 
and steel industries in their re-concentration process had every reason to be disappointed. In a 
number of cases the High Authority allowed German steel firms to acquire or merge with coal 
companies that had been part of their holding prior to the decartelisation process (see Schmitt, 1964: 
120). This was not popular in all circles, especially not in France. For instance, the Gaullist Michel 
Debré, who was later to serve as French Prime Minister (1959-1962), complained in an inquiry to 
the High Authority in 1955 that ‘[i]t appears confirmed that, despite commitments made at least 
before the French Parliament, important  reconcentrations operate in Germany now, and that others 
are in progress’ (quoted in Schmitt, 1964: 119). The response from the High Authority was that it 
could not be held responsible for any interpretations of the treaty that had been presented to the 
French Parliament prior to its ratification (ibid: 119)50. With the benefit of hindsight it seems 
reasonable to conclude, as do Leucht & Seidel (2007) that ‘Articles 65 and 66 were not 
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implemented successfully’ as the High Authority ‘failed to realize decartelisation in the six member 
states and allowed for the formation of a steel export cartel’. 
 
 
4.5. The next step: competition policy and the EC Treaty  
 
The decision to start the negotiations over a common market was taken by the governments of the 
Six at a conference that was held in Messina in 1955. In the final resolution of the conference, the 
governments declared that ‘the establishment of a united Europe must be achieved through the 
development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a 
common market, and the gradual harmonization of their social policies’. It was moreover made 
clear that this ‘European Common Market free of internal duties and all quantitative restrictions’ 
would, among other things, require ‘[t]he development of rules assuring the free play of competition 
within the Common Market, particularly in such a way as to exclude all preferences of a national 
basis’ (Messina, 1955). In order to prepare the Treaty of this common market (the EC Treaty), a 
committee of representatives from the various governments, assisted by experts, was set up under 
the chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.  
 
The report of this group, the so-called Spaak Report, gave as one of the grounds for the need of a 
Common Market that  ‘...in many branches of industry, the national markets offer the opportunity of 
attaining optimum dimensions only to firms enjoying a de facto monopoly. The strength of a large 
market is its ability to reconcile mass production with the absence of monopoly’ (quoted in 
Moschonas, 1996: 33)51. In order to ensure that competition was not undermined in this new large 
market, paragraph 55 of the report stressed the need for provisions that would ‘counteract the 
formation of monopolies within the Common Market’ and pointed toward some of the same 
features that were later to be found in the EC Treaty (quoted in Goyder, 1993: 24-25). However, 
unlike the ECSC Treaty, the Spaak report does not mention mergers with a word. The report was 
accepted with only small modifications by the Foreign Ministers of the Six at a conference in 
Venice in May 1956 and over the next ten months the more precise wording of the various articles 
was negotiated. 
 
If we concentrate here on the negotiations over the establishment of a competition unit of regulation 
in the EC, the two USDRs that were identified in the analysis of the processes leading up to the 
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adoption of the ECSC Treaty’s competition rules can once again be identified. That is, a discourse 
according to which rather strict competition rules were to be enforced by supranational legal-
regulatory institutions (the pro-competition USDR) and another discourse according to which 
competition should only be regulated to a very limited extent (the pro-concentration USDR). As we 
have seen, it was due to the strength of the programmers advocating the former discourse (in the 
form of US antitrust philosophy and ordoliberal thinking) that merger rules had been included in the 
ECSC Treaty. However, in the interval between the two treaties the strength of this constellation of 
programmers had been weakened significantly and this was clearly reflected in the way the 
competition rules of the EC Treaty ended up being designed.  
 
First, US influence in Western Europe had decreased by the time the EC Treaty was negotiated. 
With the US government not being a decisive factor in the programming process, the main driving 
force behind the relatively strict merger rules of the ECSC Treaty had vanished. Second, the French 
government which had worked for and supported the inclusion of strong competition rules in the 
ECSC Treaty, primarily in order to prevent re-concentration and re-cartelisation of German heavy 
industry, saw no reason to give the EC real powers to regulate competition. This difference in 
attitude was not least due to the radically diverging contexts in which the two treaties were 
negotiated. Most importantly, the threat of war appeared less imminent and the European 
economies were and had been booming for some years when the EC Treaty was negotiated (see 
section 4.1; see also Bayliss & El-Agraa, 1990: 141). When one adds to this the lack of a French 
competition policy tradition, the position of the French coalition government, led by Guy Mollet of 
the SFIO, is not terribly surprising. According to one historian, the French Ministry of Economics 
‘worked in close cooperation with French companies in order to define which agreements were best 
for the French economy’ leading to a position according to which EC competition policy ‘had to 
focus solely on prohibiting only the most protectionist agreements and tolerating most of the others’ 
and where the Commission’s role would merely be to ‘coordinate the general framework of the 
different national competition policies in order to make them compatible’ (Warlouzet, 2005: 66). 
 
With neither the Americans, nor the French political decision-makers supporting strong EC 
competition rules the most important remaining advocate of such rules was the German Adenauer 
government, or rather those leading members of the German political elite who were influenced by 
ordoliberal thinking. These included, for instance, Ludwig Erhard, Walter Hallstein (the first 
president of the European Commission) and Hans von der Groeben (later to become the first 
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Competition Commissioner). It has been suggested that now the Germans ‘emerged as leaders’ in 
the competition policy area (Hildebrand, 2002: 161) and some scholars even go as far as to claim 
that ‘this time it was the Germans who were both to determine and to dictate the pertinent 
competition clauses in the Treaty’ (Bayliss & El-Agraa, 1990: 140). Although this latter statement 
is surely an exaggeration (see below), there is indeed no doubt that Germany did play a key role in 
pushing for the inclusion of the competition law provisions in the EC Treaty. According to 
Moravcsik (1998: 149), it was Erhard who had insisted on the call for competition policy provisions 
in the Spaak report and in fact this part of the report was written by von der Groeben together with 
the Frenchman Pierre Uri, who was one of Monnet’s associates (see also Laurent, 1970 for a 
detailed discussion of the activities of Spaak and his working group).  
 
In the negotiations the Germans were, according to one scholar, ‘imbued with the ordoliberal 
orthodoxies so powerful in Germany and sought a strict form of competition law’ (Gerber, 1998: 
343). This involved that the Commission was to become a supranational version of the BKartA that 
would be given far-reaching powers to enforce this law in such a way as to prevent anti-competitive 
practices in the member states. This tallies with what Hanns-Jürgen Küsters, a member of the 
German negotiation delegation, later explained, namely that both the French and the Germans ‘tried 
to transfer important basic elements of their national economic systems to the Common Market’ 
(quoted in Gerber, 1998: 343). The Dutch government advocated a position quite similar to the 
German, stressing the need to give the Commission decisive powers to regulate competition. This 
should not disguise that the programming process in this field was to a large extent a double-handed 
game: ‘once Mollet and Adenauer had laid out the path for the rest of the negotiations the smaller 
countries simply had to take what was handed down to them by the French and Germans’ (Milward, 
2000: 217-218). 
 
Another noteworthy aspect of the programming process is that the proposed competition rules did 
not come up against any grandiose campaigns from various capital actors. Whereas different 
industrial groups in the Six opposed various other parts of the proposed Treaty (see e.g. 
Kniazhinsky, 1984: 126-140), it seems that capital actors’ concern with the competition rules was 
very limited indeed. This might seem surprising; especially when the situation prior to the adoption 
of the ECSC Treaty is taken into consideration (see section 4.4). McLachlan & Swann (1967a: 82) 
do however provide us with various explanations for this. For one thing, the cartelisation culture 
was particularly strong in the coal and steel industries, meaning that the attitude of these capital 
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actors towards competition law did not represent the attitude of business as a whole. Another reason 
was probably the coal and steel industries’ experience with the ECSC. As the High Authority had 
not enforced the competition rules rigorously, it seemed that those who had feared the regulatory 
behaviour of the new supranational bureaucracy had been proven wrong in this respect. Hence, 
capital actors had little reason to believe that the Commission was going to depart from this 
behavioural pattern. Last, but certainly not least, the proposed competition provisions were rather 
vague and flexible compared to the ECSC rules (see also below). Hence, it is probably correct to 
say that the prevailing view in European business circles at this juncture was that the area of 
competition regulation was not going to be a particularly prominent feature of the EC and 
consequently the various capital actors focussed their energy on other parts of the Treaty.  
 
The outcome of the negotiations, the EC Treaty, was adopted on 25 March 1957 by the 
governments of the Six. Hereby the EC came into being, establishing a customs union with 
common external tariffs in which there would be free movement of goods, capital, services and 
persons (in principle at least – in practice there were numerous limitations). Article 2 of the EC 
Treaty provides that  
 
‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living and closer relations between States belonging to it’ 
 
Moreover, the EC Treaty also provided for common policies in fields such as agriculture and, to a 
rather more limited extent, transport and social policy. The institutional framework from the ECSC 
was continued, albeit with certain amendments. The High Authority was now renamed the 
Commission and its advisory committee (consisting of representatives of capital and labour) 
became the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC); the Common Assembly developed 
into the European Parliament (henceforth: the Parliament); the Court of Justice became the 
European Court of Justice (henceforth: the Court) and the Council of Ministers (henceforth: the 
Council) was given more weight vis-à-vis the supranational institutions (see e.g. Dinan, 1999: 31-
33; Mazey, 1996: 30). Article 3 sets out the activities to be carried out by the Community in order 
to establish this Common Market and these shall include, Article 3(f)[3(g)] states, ‘the institution of 
a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted’. Article 3(f) is made 
more concrete by a section in the EC Treaty entitled “Rules of Competition”, comprising of Articles 
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85-90[81-86]. Here a European level competition unit of level regulation consisting of four subunits 
is outlined. The subunits are cartels/restrictive business practices Art. 85[81]), abuse of dominant 
position (86[82]), public undertakings (90[86]) and state aid (92[87]). In other words, two subunits 
of regulation aimed at controlling the behaviour of companies, whereas two other subunits aimed at 
preventing undue state intervention in the market place. 
 
In the present context Articles 85 and 86 are the most important. Article 85(1) prohibits ‘all 
agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’. This however, is 
softened somewhat in Article 85(3), which exempts certain forms of anticompetitive agreements 
insofar as they contribute ‘to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit’. 
Article 86 prohibits ‘[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it’ insofar as ‘it may affect trade between Member 
States’. It is thus not a sin in itself to hold a dominant position. The sin is to “abuse” it and Article 
86 gives some examples of what abuse might consist of e.g. ‘directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’ and ‘applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties’. 
 
In his Memoirs Jean Monnet looks back on the competition policy provisions in the ECSC treaty 
and claims that ‘[f]or Europe, they were a fundamental innovation: the extensive antitrust 
legislation now applied by the European Community essentially derives from those few lines in the 
Schuman Treaty’ (Monnet, 1978: 353). This view needs to be corrected somewhat. It is true that the 
provisions of the ECSC were a “fundamental innovation” as they, after all, established the first 
European level competition unit of regulation. But as the above account of the EC Treaty’s 
competition rules already serve to indicate, these rules differed in crucial respects from those of its 
predecessor. In fact, there were significant differences in terms of both form and content. As regards 
the form, Bulmer (1994: 427) points out that whereas the ESRC Treaty is a traité-loi which to a 
large extent specifies the regulatory content, the EC Treaty is a traité-cadre, which sets out a 
broader legal framework that needs much secondary legislation or jurisprudence from the Court in 
order to have any actual effects. To put it differently, whereas the competition rules of the ECSC 
Treaty embodied a number of CIRs, the EC Treaty’s competition rules were mainly formulated at 
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the more abstract level of USDRs, hereby making it less clear precisely how they were to be 
converted into regulatory practice.  
 
As regards the content, the two treaties ‘have very different emphases in their policies towards 
concentrations of economic power’ (McLachlan & Swann, 1967a: 196). Although it is widely 
perceived to be the case that the competition policy provisions of the Treaty reflect ordoliberal 
thinking (see e.g. Gillingham, 2003: 249; Hildebrand, 2002; Monti, 2002a), this is only a half-truth. 
It is, to be sure, true that the EC Treaty’s competition policy provisions can be interpreted precisely 
as an attempt to create a regime that fosters competition. According to one scholar they constitute ‘a 
firm attempt to create a neoclassical liberal economic structure based on as close an approximation 
as possible to the “ideal type” of perfect competition’ (Allen, 1977: 94). Moreover, it seems fair to 
suggest that had not the ordoliberals in the German government insisted on the inclusion of 
competition provisions in the Treaty, then such provisions would not have been included  or at the 
very least they would have been even vaguer than they turned out to be. In this sense it is not too 
misleading to suggest, as does for instance Moravcsik (1998: 149), that competition policy was an 
area ‘where Germany succeeded in imposing its views’.  
 
However, even though the German influence was crucial Articles 85 and 86 fail to reflect a 
wholehearted commitment to ordoliberalism, let alone the perfect competition ideal type, in at least 
three respects. Not only are mergers and acquisitions not mentioned with a single word although 
they are surely an important mechanism through which competition can be undermined; Article 86 
was drafted in such a way that it would not prohibit dominant positions (including monopolies) as 
long as no “abuse” was taking place (thereby potentially allowing for significant degrees of 
concentration); and Article 85(3) even makes it possible to exempt certain forms of anticompetitive 
agreements from prohibition. As McLachlan & Swann (1967b: 49) bluntly put it: ‘Clearly the 
Treaty cannot be regarded as in any way an obstacle to concentration. On the contrary, by providing 
what is virtually a carte-blanche, it seems to permit the creation of market power even in situations 
where no real technical arguments could be urged in its support’.  
 
Consequently, one could make the argument that the competition rules of the EC Treaty, in 
particular Article 85, had much in common with Articles 59 bis and ter of the French law (see also 
Warlouzet, 2005: 66). In fact it could be argued that in this respect the competition rules of both the 
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ECSC Treaty and the EC Treaty reflected French preferences, rather than reflecting German 
ordoliberalism, despite the widely diverging approaches to concentration they embody: 
 
‘the severity of the ECSC régime was largely the result of attempts to placate French 
fears, while the comparatively permissive attitude towards the establishment of 
dominant positions adopted in the Rome Treaty accords completely with the French 
view (although it is by no means exclusively a French view) that the size of 
enterprises in Europe is frequently far below what is necessary if the benefits of large 
markets are to be achieved’ (McLachlan & Swann, 1967a: 218) 
 
So even if the EC Treaty’s competition rules do to some extent reflect ordoliberal ideology, they 
also at the same time throw the door wide open to practices and developments that ordoliberals 
would not approve of. This suggests that just like ordoliberal ideas had powerful enemies inside 
Germany, so this was not a hegemonic discourse at the EC level. Articles 85 and 86 should thus be 
seen as a compromise reached by advocates of the two by and large incompatible USDRs. This 
compromise gave the proponents of ordoliberalism competition provisions but at the same time 
reflected the prevailing view of the French government and the vast majority of capital actors in the 
Six, namely that such provisions were not to serve as the basis for strict competition regulation. 
This is the very reason why, as one scholar puts it, ‘[i]t is difficult to see exactly what the objectives 
of competition policy were for those who drafted the Treaty of Rome’ (Motta, 2004: 14). The 
vagueness of the provisions simply reflects the diverging objectives of the direct programmers. This 
also explains why merger rules were not included in the EC Treaty. Although some programmers 
would have preferred it, the prevailing view at the time was that mergers were desirable rather than 
a danger: ‘Concentration was deemed to be a good thing as it assisted in the process of post-World 
War II economic reconstruction and helped to make West European industry competitive vis-à-vis 
U.S. big business’ (Cini, 2002: 247).  
 
To recapitulate, the German and French governments would seem to be the primary programmers at 
this stage. The negotiators representing the two governments subscribed to two rather incompatible 
USDRs: the Germans to an ordoliberal discourse, the French to a pro-concentration discourse 
(which gave rise to the position that the EC should only be given the minimum of powers in this 
field). The French position was formulated in collaboration with national capital actors and the 
latter can thus be categorised as secondary programmers. The other governments participating in the 
programming processes seem to have been in agreement with either the French or the German 
positions in this area and they can also be placed in this category. As the proposed competition rules 
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did not come up against noticeable opposition from other governments, national capital segments or 
others it does not really make sense to talk of marginalised agents and ideas in this context.  
 
 
 
Table 4.2: EC Treaty competition rules - programmers and ideas  
  Programmers Ideas 
 
Primary The governments of Germany, 
France. 
Provisions were formulated vaguely 
in order to appear compatible with 
both pro-competition and pro-
concentration USDRs. 
Secondary Governments of Italy and Benelux 
countries and certain French 
capital actors 
 
Marginalised   
 
 
4.6. Regulation 17 
 
As mentioned, the competition policy provisions of the EC Treaty needed to be implemented 
through further legislation if they were to have any effect. For instance, the Treaty did not 
unambiguously explain ‘which institution should decide what constitutes an abuse under Article 86 
or what agreements qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3)’ (Schwartz, 1993: 611). Instead its 
Article 87(1) reads: ‘Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly 
[European Parliament], adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 85 and 86’. A Directorate-General (DG) within the Commission, 
namely the Competition DG52, was made responsible for the enforcement of the competition policy 
provisions of the EC Treaty.  
 
This DG was thus given the task of making the proposal that would give effect to Articles 85 and 
86. In the first years of its existence, then, the Competition DG was busy preparing what was later 
to become the famous Regulation 17/62, widely known as Regulation 17. The importance of this 
Regulation lies in the fact that it essentially programmed the Competition DG with potentially far-
reaching tasks and powers, hereby opening the passage for the EC competition unit of regulation 
that was to develop over the years. The preparations took place on the basis of consultations with 
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the various member states as well as with experts and organisations and a number of meetings and 
conferences were held in the context of which the content of the regulation was discussed (Goyder, 
1993: 35). Once the Competition DG had completed a satisfactory draft of the regulation, it first had 
to be accepted by the College, the supreme decision-making body of the Commission which 
consists of all the various commissioners (see e.g. Dinan, 1999: 205-236 or Hix, 1999: 32-41 on the 
institutional structure of the Commission) and was then passed on to the EESC and the Parliament 
(see Goyder, 1993: 36-37 on the proposals made by the Parliament). 
 
Ultimately, however, the regulation had to be adopted by the Council (the institution consisting of 
the member states’ ministers). The crucial negotiations, which took place in November and 
December 1961, has been described by Hans von der Groeben who had been appointed as the first 
Competition Commissioner, as ‘extremely tense’ (von der Groeben, 1987: 108). The main 
disagreements were between, on one hand, France and Luxembourg and, on the other hand, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Commission. A major disagreement concerned the 
degree of autonomy the Commission should enjoy in its decision-making. France and Luxembourg 
preferred a model where the member states concerned and the Commission would take joint 
decisions as this would prevent the Commission from undermining domestic industrial policies. The 
other countries supported the Commission’s proposal which would not only grant the Commission a 
significant degree of autonomy but also arm it with significant powers to shape the evolution of the 
competition policy area. 
 
Regulation 17 was unanimously adopted by the Council on 6 February 1962 and it came into force 
on 13 March. This regulation, which has been described as ‘one of the most important ever enacted’ 
(Wilks & Bartle, 2002: 164), gave the Commission ‘power to apply Article 85 (1) and Article 86 of 
the Treaty’, although it would be ‘[s]ubject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice’ (Article 
9, paragraph 1). It created a notification system under which existing and new agreements, 
decisions and practices of the kind described in the Treaty’s Article 85 (1) had to be notified to the 
Commission if they were to be exempted from prohibition under Article 85 (3) (see Regulation 17, 
Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8 on notification requirements and the criteria for exemption). The Competition 
DG was given far-reaching powers to carry out its duties. It was empowered to ‘undertake all 
necessary investigations into undertakings’, including ‘(a) to examine the books and other business 
records; (b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records; (c) to ask for oral 
explanations on the spot; (d) to enter any premises; land and means of transport of undertakings’ 
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(Article 14(1)). And in this context, it was also given the powers to impose fines on firms who 
failed to comply with the rules in various ways (Article 15). However, in making decisions, the 
Commission was required to consult with the ‘competent authorities of the Member States’ (Article 
10(2)) and to hear the views of the “Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies” 
consisting of officials from the member states (Article 10). Regulation 17 was noteworthy in that it 
‘represented a drastic reversal in the traditional relationship between the Commission and the 
member states. Its enactment was one of the rare occasions after 1957 when member states agreed 
within the Council of ministers to limit their own competence by giving wide ranging powers to the 
Commission’ (Kon, 1980: 156). 
 
Von der Groeben later interpreted the final agreement (Regulation 17) as a compromise between the 
two camps whereby ‘the Commission bears sole responsibility for decisions but processes are 
carried out in close and continuous association with the responsible authorities of Member States’ 
(von der Groeben, 1987: 110). Yet this is surely to grossly overstate the involvement of member 
state authorities in the Commission’s decision-making in this area. It is true that the Commission 
would be required to hear the views of the “Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and 
Monopolies” consisting of officials from the member states – but this committee was programmed 
with no decision-making power whatsoever. So what was created with Regulation 17 was in fact ‘a 
competition law system in which the enforcement of policy-making prerogatives were centred in 
the Commission and the role of national legal systems was marginalised’ (Gerber, 1998: 349). This 
clearly reflected German (in particular German ordoliberal) preferences more than it reflected 
anything else. That a member state like France was willing to give the Commission such powers 
was largely due to the limited importance of competition law at the national level. It was assumed 
that ‘competition law would play the same limited role in the Community that it played in the 
Member States’ (Gerber, 1998: 348). This partly explains why the French government was ready to 
“compromise”. The other part of the explanation is that it was willing to make concessions to the 
German government in order not to endanger agreements that had been reached in the agricultural 
policy area (see von der Groeben, 1987: 108, 110).  
 
With this regulation the Competition DG was given a significant degree of operational autonomy, 
enabling it to ‘build up a policy incrementally and independently, without continuous reference to 
the Council of Ministers and without the need to achieve consensus amongst the member states’ 
(Allen, 1983: 213). It seems fair to suggest that, initially, this was not fully realised by neither 
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academics nor the direct programmers. For instance, one legal scholar suggested that Regulation 17 
‘grants to the Commission only very little regulating power’ (van Gerven, 1974: 41). Nor are there 
any reasons to think that the majority of the direct programmers in the Council fully understood the 
implications of the Regulation (see Wilks & Bartle, 2002: 164) 
 
 
4.7. In conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to explain the inclusion of merger control provisions in the 
ECSC Treaty and the exclusion of such rules in the competition regulation provisions of the EC 
Treaty. With the enactment of the ECSC Treaty the first European level competition unit of 
regulation came into being53. Figure 4.1 below is an attempt to visualise the argument made in this 
chapter as to why merger rules were included in this treaty. In the processes leading up to the 
outcome (the merger rules) one can identify two major USDRs on the basis of which the various 
(all external) programmers articulated their positions. A constellation of indirect programmers 
which included the US government/government officials, a minority of capital actors in the sectors 
in question and majorities in the national parliaments (led by Christian Democratic parties) 
subscribed to the pro-competition USDR – as did all the direct programmers, namely the 
governments of Six.  
 
That the governments were willing to programme the High Authority with the powers to regulate 
mergers (and competition more generally) was to no small extent due to a number of factors in the 
wider context. For one thing the presence of the US as an occupying power in Germany and as a 
donator of economic aid to the reconstruction process gave the Americans substantial influence on 
the outcome. The Americans pushed for the establishment of competition units of regulation at both 
national and European level and as the Europeans had little or no experience with this type of 
regulation at the time the ECSC Treaty was negotiated, they were prone to let the Americans have 
their way. This was of course also the case because merger and cartel rules of the Treaty were 
perceived of as an instrument that could prevent the “decartelised” German industry from “re-
cartelising”, or more generally “re-concentrating”, in the context of the projected common market 
for coal and steel.  
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However, in the coal and steel industries an anti-competition culture had existed for long – both in 
Germany and in the other countries. A constellation (as opposed to coalition) of capital actors from 
in particular Germany, France and Italy vehemently opposed the inclusion of merger and cartel 
rules in the Treaty. Arguing on the basis of a pro-concentration USDR, they were against giving the 
High Authority the powers to prevent economic concentration. Indeed, having never been subjected 
to such regulation at the national level they saw no needs whatsoever for such rules. These capital 
actors were not the only indirect programmers subscribing to this USDR: a number of political 
parties were also took positions based on this discourse. The outcome of the negotiations reflected 
that none of those subscribing to this discourse were direct programmers and that they failed in their 
attempts to influence the latter. As such the discourse and its proponents ended up being 
marginalised whereas the pro-competition discourse and its “supporters” prevailed. In the end, the 
efforts of in particular the governments of the US, France (as personified by Monnet and 
Schumann) and Germany resulted in the inclusion of merger rules in the ECSC Treaty. The article 
containing these rules ended up being the longest article in the entire Treaty, ‘its length being 
proportional to the significance that was attached to the control of economic power at the time when 
the Treaty was being negotiated’ (McLachlan & Swann, 1967b: 44). 
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Figure 4.1: Explaining the inclusion of merger rules in the ECSC Treaty 
 
 
The EC Treaty, which was adopted a few years later, constituted the next real step towards the 
establishment of a European level unit of competition regulation. On one hand the scope of the rules 
in this treaty was much wider than the scope of its predecessor (covering not just the coal and steal 
sectors). On the other hand, Cini & McGowan (1998: 17) are clearly right to point out that the 
competition provisions in the EC Treaty were ‘a much watered-down version of the ECSC rules’. 
Unlike its predecessor it did not include any merger rules, reflecting that those who drafted the 
Treaty did not intend that the EC should be given powers to control mergers (see Goyder, 1993: 31, 
386) – or perhaps rather that those programmers who were against the inclusion of merger rules had 
their way. The argument that has been advanced in this chapter with a view to explain this lack of 
merger rules is visualised with Figure 4.2. To put it succinctly, the negotiations took place in a 
radically altered political and economic context: the US was no longer an occupying power in 
Germany; competition laws had been passed at the national level, but due to opposition (especially 
in Germany) merger rules were not adopted; and an economic boom was gaining momentum 
throughout the capitalist world. If one adds to this that capital accumulation was still being 
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primarily oriented towards the national level, and that M&As generally taking place within the 
same state, then it is not terribly surprising that fewer programmers formulated their position on the 
basis of the pro-competition USDR this time around. Indeed two of the driving forces behind the 
inclusion of competition rules in the ECSC vanished in the changed circumstances. First, the US 
government was not pulling the strings in these negotiations and was not there to back up the 
European political elites against national capital actors. Second, the French government no longer 
advocated the inclusion of such rules but saw them instead as a potential obstacle to the 
concentration of capital. In other words, the ordoliberals in the German government, backed up by 
the Dutch government were the main proponents of competition rules at this stage. That 
competition provisions, however vague, were after all included in the treaty was related to the fact 
that few (perhaps except the ordoliberals) expected competition policy to become a particularly 
important feature of the EC. Thus the French government decided to agree to include provisions the 
wording of which were rather ambiguous while the various national capital actors did not bother to 
oppose it. 
 
Figure 4.2: Explaining the exclusion of merger rules from the EC Treaty 
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Some commentators have later suggested that it turned out to be less difficult to reach agreement on 
the competition rules in the ECSC Treaty than on the competition rules in the later EC Treaty 
because they only were to cover a specific industrial sector, rather than being generally applicable 
(see McGowan & Cini, 1999: 178). Yet as we have seen in this chapter, the opposite was in fact the 
case. The provisions of the ECSC Treaty were difficult to reach agreement on as they were opposed 
by important capital segments, whereas competition regulation was only taken seriously by a 
minority of those who were directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations over the EC Treaty. 
This was also the main reason, together with agricultural policy issue-linkages, why Regulation 17 
came to include rather far-reaching rules that programmed the Competition DG with the powers to 
investigate, consult, make decisions, punish, exempt, and even conduct “dawn raids”. Only at a 
much later point in time did it become apparent that these rules could be (and were being) used to 
turn competition policy into a central feature of European level regulation.  
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5. The 1960 and 1970s: merger control in the era of embedded 
liberalism 
 
This chapter deals with the regulation of mergers in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, focussing in 
particular on the unsuccessful attempt in the early 1970s to provide the Competition DG with 
powers to regulate large M&As. Hereby it contributes to answer the second sub-question posed in 
section 1.1: ‘Why did the Commission’s proposals for a MCR fail to gain support from the member 
states in the 1970s and most of the 1980s?’ It will be suggested that neither the 1973-proposal for a 
MCR nor the failure to reach agreement can be adequately understood without taking into account 
the impact of the (by no means static) contexts mentioned in section 3.7. The chapter thus starts out 
by exploring embedded liberalism and the American Challenge (section 5.1), the wider European 
integration process (section 5.2) and the merger subunits of regulation that were established in 
France, Germany and the UK (sections 5.3 and 5.4). Against this background the negotiations over 
the Commission’s MCR proposal are analysed in section 5.5 and an account of the stagnation of EC 
competition policy in the 1970s is provided in section 5.6. The main findings are summarised in 
section 5.7. 
 
 
5.1. Embedded liberalism and the American challenge 
 
The era of embedded liberalism stretched from the 1950s to the early 1970s and is also often 
referred to as the era of Atlantic Fordism (e.g. van der Pijl, 1984: 233). As already hinted at in 
section 4.1, this stage ‘can be characterised as Fordism when considered at the level of the 
organization of production, as the era of the Keynesian welfare state when looked at from the level 
of society and state, and as the Pax Americana when looked at from the perspective of the overall 
organization of the capitalist world system’ (Overbeek, 1990: 87). As Jessop (2002a: 56-58) points 
out, Fordism should be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon. In the present context it will 
suffice to understand Fordism as a phenomenon associated with mass production techniques and/or 
as a mode of growth involving ‘a virtuous circle of growth based on mass production, rising 
productivity based on economics of scale, rising incomes linked to productivity, increased mass 
demand due to rising wages, increased profits based on full utilization of capacity and increased 
investment in improved mass production equipment and techniques’ (2002a: 57; see also Jessop & 
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Sum, 2006: 124-125). As mentioned in Chapter 4, Fordism was “exported” to Europe from the US 
(see Djelic, 1998 and van der Pijl, 1984 for detailed accounts). In particular the three big 
economies, namely those of France, Germany and the UK, ‘acquired a mainly Fordist dynamic with 
growth based mainly on expanding home markets’ but also a number of the smaller European 
societies moved towards mass consumption societies (Jessop, 2002a: 58).  
 
The Fordist growth mode fuelling the post-war period of economic growth in Europe was stabilised 
by what Jessop has dubbed the “Keynesian Welfare National State” (KWNS). The KWNS was thus 
an important part of the ensemble of regulation in the era of embedded liberalism/Atlantic Fordism. 
It was Keynesian in the sense that it sought to promote full employment through counter-cyclical 
demand management policies (e.g. active fiscal policies); it was a welfare state insofar as it 
promoted the expansion of universal welfare rights to all citizens; it was primarily oriented towards 
the national level; and it was e.g. statist in the sense that it was state institutions that would 
compensate for the failure of markets to deliver e.g. economic growth or full employment (Jessop, 
2002a: 59-61; see also Torfing, 2001: 278-279). Importantly, the KWNS did not emerge in order to 
make Fordism function: it was the contingent outcome of political struggles between various social 
forces, not an automatic response to the “needs” of the Fordist accumulation structures. More 
precisely, it came into being because of working class pressure for better wages and social security 
and because political and economic elites saw it as a way to minimise working class support for 
communism (see e.g. Lipietz, 1992: 5-8; Klein, 2007: 251-253). However, as the KWNS proved 
capable of facilitating Fordist growth, it was gradually embraced in both social democratic and 
conservative/Christian democratic circles (see also Lipietz, 1992: 12). 
 
To be sure, it was not the case that identical KWNS suddenly existed in all European countries. As 
already hinted at in Chapter 4, where the focus was restricted to Germany and France, the welfare 
states emerging in the various European countries after the War differed in many respects. This was 
of course the case because they were the outcomes of political struggles. Yet the ensembles of 
regulation emerging in the various European countries were not completely different in all respects. 
By pointing to certain general similarities in the ensembles of regulation in the era of embedded 
liberalism, the KWNS scheme constitutes a useful supplement to a perspective that only emphasises 
differences. 
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How does the EC fit into this scheme? Certainly not as an attempt to establish some supranational 
version of the KWNS! ‘Indeed’, as Bonefeld (2002: 118) puts it, ‘the Treaty of Rome contains little, 
if anything at all, of what is commonly understood as Keynesianism or associated with so-called 
Fordism’. Contrary to what Bonefeld claims, however, this does not necessarily mean that the EC 
was established by the “ruling classes” in order to undermine the welfare state. The EC did rather 
amount to an attempt to stabilise and facilitate capital accumulation at the national level and as such 
most programmers did not intend the EC to replace the KWNS, but to support or, arguably, 
“rescue” it (Milward, 2000). This was not least to be accomplished by creating a large free market 
for the trade of goods produced by nationally based companies. Hence, the EC Treaty is a document 
predominantly (but not exclusively) incorporating a liberal GDR that emphasises the desirability of 
free trade and competition (see also Swann, 1983: 15). However, as we saw in the previous chapter 
(section 4.5) this was not translated into competition provisions that would necessarily enable EC 
institutions to effectively safeguard competition.  
 
As mentioned the Common Market was to be shielded by external tariffs (see section 4.5). 
Obviously, this was a disadvantage to those US companies exporting to EC countries and 
consequently such companies were given an extra incentive to establish a commercial base inside 
the EC. This meant that a large number of American companies were drawn to the EC, especially 
prior to the completion of the Customs Union in 1968. In 1967 French journalist Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber’s book, The American Challenge was published. The book, which was widely 
discussed and quickly became a bestseller, argued that US companies were the main beneficiaries 
of the Common Market. According to Servan-Schreiber, Europe had been the target for an 
economic invasion by American industry. Americans had started up 3,000 new businesses in 
Europe since 1958 and had now outclassed European industry in sectors of vital importance such as 
chemicals and electronics.  
 
The American companies had more economic resources and were much better managed and more 
flexible than their European counterparts. Servan-Schreiber thus warned that the Common Market 
was being overtaken by US companies and that immediate and drastic action was necessary if 
Europe was not to ‘become an annex of the United States’ (1968: 139). This was in large part 
related to the inability of European capital actors to come up with an adequate response to the 
American challenge. In many cases, they operated in markets where they were in various ways 
shielded from competitive pressures. Consequently they did not at all welcome the aggressive 
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strategies of US companies that were in many ways superior. This is, for instance reflected in a 
remark made in a 1967 declaration by UNICE:  
 
‘It has become clear ... that certain American firms have been badly informed about 
the price mechanisms used in the European market – mechanisms which the various 
Continental rivals respect. A joint study of production costs has allowed us to set up 
rules which, while safeguarding competition, prove beneficial to all. We must not 
allow American firms, from lack of knowledge of our methods, to provoke a price 
war that would cause serious difficulties in the market’ (quoted in Servan-Schreiber, 
1967: 17) 
 
One of the several problems identified by Servan-Schreiber was that many European companies did 
not have the size necessary to compete with their American counterparts. Although The American 
Challenge probably did exaggerate the extent to which US enterprises were outclassing their 
European counterparts (see e.g. Holland, 1980: 68-71), Servan-Schreiber was neither the only nor 
the first to identify the insufficient size of European companies as a problem. In fact this had been a 
major concern to European, especially French, corporate actors for quite some time.  
 
These concerns had not been diminished by a 1965 report by UNICE that contained a number of 
worrying figures. For instance, the report compared the 1963 size, measured by annual turnover, of 
the three largest companies in the EC with those of the US in the automobiles, chemicals, rubber, 
electronics, steel and petroleum sectors. It appeared from the data that in all cases, the US 
companies were bigger than their opposite number in Europe, with the European companies being 
only half their size in two-thirds of the cases. Moreover, it appeared that 11 out of 18 of the largest 
European companies in these key sectors were German, whereas only 3 were French (Swann & 
McLachlan, 1967a: 236-237). The state of affairs described with such figures, which were generally 
felt to be indicative of the general picture outside the sectors in question, were ‘at the root of 
European fears, especially French fears, of American competition’ (Swann & McLachlan, 1967a: 
237). An important reason for the small size of European companies was that the vast majority of 
M&As were at this stage still intra-national. This appears from the Commission’s 1970 
memorandum Industrial Policy in the Community according to which 257 mergers or takeovers 
between firms in different member state countries took place in the period 1961-1969, whereas 
1861 mergers took place between firms in the same country in this period (Commission, 1970: 
92)54. As one scholar commented, ‘[t]he record of fusion of enterprises across national frontiers 
must be accounted one of the failures of the EEC’ (Harrison, 1974: 190).  
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According to Servan-Schreiber this “failure” was partly due to the ‘almost insurmountable 
difficulties to business concentration’, including mergers, posed by ‘the diversity of legal and fiscal 
systems in the various Common Market countries’ (1968: 118). ‘Should the Italian and the Belgian 
industrialists unite their businesses and operate on an international level?’ he asked rhetorically, and 
then continued: 
  
‘They don’t know. They don’t even know if it is legal. So they wait. How can 
businessmen really believe they should stake their plans, their investments, indeed 
their whole future, on real economic integration when the member states of the 
Common Market still show their politics by preparing and managing national 
budgets – where each country is concerned only with its own individual efforts, even 
for advanced research that clearly demands European unity?’ (Servan-Schreiber, 
1968: 116-17) 
 
This analysis found support, and was further developed, in a study from the early 1970s by Renato 
Mazzolini. Based on interviews with the top managers of 154 major European companies in the Six 
and the UK, this study identified several reasons for the limited number of cross-border M&As. A 
number of the obstacles to such mergers were internal to the companies and their managers. These 
included language difficulties, management difficulties in evaluating potential foreign partners’ 
congruency with one’s own company, lack of professional skills in the management of European 
companies, lack of an analytical approach to marketing and finally the lack of international business 
skills (1975: 45-46). In addition to such “internal” hindrances, the study pointed to the existence of 
a number of legal and regulatory obstacles, including the lack of legislation permitting cross-border 
mergers to take place.  
 
Finally a host of “bureaucratic obstacles” to international mergers were identified. Among the most 
important of these was political opposition, an obstacle mentioned by no less than 66 % of the 
interviewees. As Mazzolini (1975: 43) commented, ‘[t]his is unexpected and contradicts the official 
position of most government heads who are eager to picture themselves as Europeans and who 
frequently express their encouragement for transnational business’. Political opposition, which was 
thus disguised, could for instance, take the form of threats that a company would lose its subsidies 
from the state if it merged with a “foreigner”. There could be different reasons for such political 
opposition to cross-border mergers, such as preservation of a particular firms’ know-how within 
national borders and fear that a firm would invest less in its domestic operations if it merged with a 
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foreign company55. As one of Mazzolini’s interviewees, a German executive put it: ‘Politicians do 
not have a European mentality. They still think national and they consequently protect their national 
interests. They have no European Community feeling and they don’t feel they are in the same boat 
with the other EC countries. Thus they defend their country to the detriment of the Community’s 
best interest’ (quoted in Mazzolini, 1975: 43)56.  
 
 
5.2. European integration in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
Those who had hoped that the steps taken towards political integration in the 1950s would be 
followed up by new sweeping initiatives in the 1960s were soon to be disappointed. When looking 
at the EC system after 1962 (where Regulation 17 had been adopted) and up to the early 1980s it 
can roughly be described in terms of three phases: crisis from 1963 to 1969, renewed momentum 
from 1970 to 1972, and crisis/stagnation from 1973 onwards. Towards the end of 1958, the year the 
EC Treaty came into force, the Fifth Republic of France was formed and General Charles de Gaulle 
was elected its first president. This came to mark a turning point in the process of European political 
integration. Some of those who had been directly and indirectly involved in the programming of EC 
institutions ‘had intended that the European Commission would become a technocratic, 
supranational European executive, embodying the European general will’ (Mazey, 1996: 31). And 
in its early life the Commission, under the strong leadership of Walter Hallstein (who served as its 
President between 1957 and 1967), did indeed actively seek to push the European integration 
process forward. Yet if there had been a pro-European integration consensus prior to the election of 
de Gaulle, then this consensus no longer held. Lending his name to the political ideology of 
“Gaullism”, above all entailing the idea of a strong French state that would play an important role in 
world politics and a France that was kept independent from foreign power, de Gaulle strongly 
opposed European supranationalism. From this viewpoint, the EC was only acceptable to the extent 
it could be used to further French interests – and undesirable to the extent it would weaken the 
sovereignty of the Fifth Republic57.  
 
The role played by de Gaulle in especially two events has earned him the reputation as the villain 
who sabotaged the European integration process in the 1960s. First, there was the so-called “empty 
chair crisis” in 1965 where French ministers were ordered not to take part in Council meetings. The 
background was the Commission’s proposal for financing the CAP which would have entailed a 
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significant increase in the powers of the Commission and the Parliament in this area at the expense 
of the member states. This directly contradicted everything Gaullism was about and the crisis was 
only solved at a meeting between the foreign ministers in January 1966 with the so-called 
Luxembourg Compromise. This informal agreement meant that when a decision was subjected to 
qualified majority voting, the Commission would postpone a decision if any Member State(s) felt 
that very important interests were threatened. As one scholar puts it, this ‘effectively confirmed the 
right of member states to veto EC legislative proposals, thereby reversing the federalist ambitions of 
the Commission’ (Mazey, 1996: 32). 
 
Second, it was de Gaulle who vetoed British membership of the EC in 1963. The UK, Ireland and 
Denmark applied for membership in 1961 and their example was followed by Norway in 1962. The 
UK government, backed up by important British capital actors, had initially not joined the EC,  
most importantly because of the relationship to the Commonwealth countries. But already from the 
early 1960s, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), which was at this stage dominated by 
large companies, began pressing for British membership (Overbeek, 1990: 100-102). The main 
reason for this was that the Common Market became an increasingly important destination for the 
export of British manufactured products58, making UK membership of the EC increasingly 
attractive for many British capital actors. De Gaulle’s veto was motivated by fears that British entry 
would threaten the CAP in the name of free trade and moreover mean that the EC would ‘become a 
colossal Atlantic community under American dominance and direction’ (de Gaulle, quoted in 
Dinan, 1999: 52). None of the four applicant countries joined the Community this time around but 
made their second application for membership in 1967. Again de Gaulle blocked British 
membership.  
 
Although the political integration process stopped in the de Gaulle era, another form of European 
integration flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. Article 220 of the EC Treaty provides that the role of 
the Court is ‘to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaty, the law is observed’. 
If those who programmed the Court thought they had merely established a law enforcing institution 
this was certainly not all they got. Almost from the outset, the Court took full advantage of the high 
degree of operational autonomy it had been given, and which was only reinforced by the initial lack 
of political and public attention given to its work. Programming itself to perform the role as a motor 
of European integration, it gradually “constitutionalised” the legal system of the EC. That is, it 
transformed it from a system that was based on conventional international law, which applies only 
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to states, to ‘a new form of law, much more like the internal law of a state’ (Wincott, 1996: 171). In 
other words, in a phase which was characterised by a shift in the direction of intergovernmentalism 
and hence a sharp decrease in the number of political initiatives that would give the EC system 
more powers, a number of Court rulings radically transformed the nature of the EC legal order (see 
e.g. Weiler, 1999: 16-39 or Wind, 2001 for interesting discussions of this)59.  
 
At the December 1969 Hague meeting, taking place not long after the resignation of de Gaulle in 
April and marking the beginning of a short phase of optimism with respect to the European 
integration process, the Six decided to open accession negotiations. Whereas the Norwegian EC 
membership was rejected in a 1972 referendum, the other three countries joined the Community in 
1973. In the Conclusions of the summit between the political leaders of the (enlarged) EC in Paris 
on 19-21 October 1972, it reads that ‘the Member States of the Community, the driving wheels of 
European construction declare their intention of converting their entire relationship into a European 
Union before the end of this decade’ (EC Summit, 1972). One element in this by all means 
remarkable and unrealistic ambition to create a European Union in less than eight years was the 
desire to establish a European level industrial policy60. For instance, the British Prime Minister, the 
Conservative, Edward Heath, gave a speech in which he stated that  
 
‘We need an industrial policy which will enable our manufacturers to realise the 
potential of a single market of 250 million people. We need a policy which will 
encourage the formation of European companies, which are able to stand on an equal 
footing with the industrial giants of the United States and elsewhere, and are capable 
of making full use of the inventiveness and talents of the European peoples, 
particularly in the products of advanced technology’ (Heath, 1972)  
 
And in the Conclusions of the summit it is stated that  
 
‘The heads of state or of Governments consider it necessary to seek to establish a 
single industrial base for the community as a whole. This involves a formulation of 
measures that ensure that mergers affecting firms established in the Community are 
in harmony with the economic and social aims of the Community’ (EC Summit, 
1972, point 7) 
 
Although the EC Treaty had not mentioned industrial policy in a word (Swann, 1983: 15), the 
Commission had already been exploring the possibilities of introducing such policies for some time 
at this stage. This is reflected in the publication of a number of memoranda in the early 1970s, not 
least the one already referred to above (see Commission, 1970; Cini & McGowan, 1998: 25). In this 
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memorandum the Commission suggested that the Community should actively support various forms 
of business integration, including cross-border mergers between firms that could engage in the 
development of new technologies (see Warnecke, 1975 for a discussion of industrial policy in the 
EC). Although such plans were initially well received by the member states, not least at the Paris 
summit, it became apparent over the course of the 1970s that they were, or to an increasing extent 
became, unwilling to put  them into practice (see e.g. Swann, 1983: 138-139, 181).  
 
Indeed, the summit came to mark the high point of Euro-optimism in the 1970s. In 1973 the Golden 
Age ended and the Crisis Decades in the developed capitalist world began. This was a crisis of 
embedded liberalism/Atlantic Fordism: that is, of the Fordist growth model, of the KWNS and 
arguably of Pax Americana. In the next chapter we will come back to this. Suffice it to mention 
here that from this point onwards ‘soaring inflation, rising unemployment, yawning trade deficits, 
and a worsening oil crisis undermined the EC’ (Dinan, 1999: 69). When the political leaders of the 
EC met at the next summit, which was held in Copenhagen on 14-15 December 1973, the Euro-
optimism of the previous year was replaced with deep divisions and disinclinations to follow up the 
Paris summit conclusions. Although some steps were taken in the direction of increased European 
integration in the 1970s, (for instance, the so-called “currency snake” was introduced in 1972, the 
European Council was established in 1974 in the context of which the heads of state or government 
subsequently met regularly and in 1979 the first elections to the Parliament were held) the balance 
now tipped decisively in favour of those favouring intergovernmentalist arrangements and against 
those with federalist aspirations. This also meant that despite the apparent intentions, however 
short-lived they were, to seriously tackle the American challenge at the European level, the 
challenge was ultimately ‘taken up primarily along national lines’ (van der Pijl, 1984: 246-47). One 
important element in the strategies of most or all EC governments became to ‘promote national 
mergers to establish “national champions” in the Community area’ (Holland, 1980: 66, emphasis 
added) and in some cases also to subsidise specific companies or sectors.  
 
 
5.3. Merger control in France and Germany 
 
In France the Fifth Plan (1965-1970) and in particular the Sixth Plan (1970-1975) had as important 
objectives to create a small number of giant companies who would be able to compete on world 
markets. These “national champions”, were ‘groomed to carry the colors of France on the battlefield 
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of the new international economic order’ (Hall, 1986: 149). That is, not only were they meant to be 
competitive vis-à-vis companies based in other EC countries; they were also intended as a response 
to the “American challenge”. This was made quite clear in the Fifth Plan which states that ‘[t]he 
benefits of the establishment of a European Common Market will not be fully realized unless 
French firms participate in the construction of larger conglomerates. Such European consolidation 
must be all the more encouraged and aided since, in a number of cases, only they will permit 
resistance to the financial and technical power of the large American firms’ (quoted in Suleiman, 
1975: 30-31). The French approach was thus to foster flagship companies by encouraging 
concentration both through state subsidies and by encouraging mergers between large companies. 
That this policy was not without effects appears from table 5.1. Bearing in mind that the figures 
should be treated with caution and only regarded as indicative, it seems safe to suggest that whereas 
no significant increase in the number of mergers taking place was recorded, the average value of 
mergers rose dramatically after 1965. Whereas the average 1960-1965 value of each operation as 
3.38 million French francs it had risen to an annual average of 13.57 million French francs in the 
1966-1969 period.  
 
Table 5.1: Number of M&As in France, 1960-69 
Year Number of 
operations of 
concentration 
Average remuneration 
of each operation 
(millions of francs) 
1960 75 2.20 
1961 70 3.28 
1962 93 2.16 
1963 131 2.27 
1964 113 1.45 
1965 96 2.90 
1966 79 10.34 
1967 57 13.21 
1968 56 12.85 
1969 72 17.87 
Source: reproduced from Suleiman (1975: 27) 
 
 
Even though giant companies were brought about in important industrial sectors, the new 
“champions” did not always perform as well as hoped for. According to Hall (1986: 149) many of 
them ‘proved to be a massive drain on the public treasury without ever achieving the levels of 
efficiency that would have made them powerful competitors even for the French market’.  
Consequently, in the second half of the 1970s, the planning board began taking some interest in 
smaller companies in niche sectors that had hitherto been neglected.  
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When seen in the context of French industrial policy it is not surprising that the enforcement of the 
competition policy provisions that had been adopted in the early 1950s (see section 4.3) was very 
weak. However, in 1977 a number of additions to the competition law were adopted under the 
premiership of Raymond Barre. A new regulatory institution, the Commission de la Concurrence, 
was established and programmed with the powers to initiate and prosecute cases and to impose 
fines on companies who engaged in anti-competitive practices. Although some civil society 
organisations were allowed to make complaints to the Commission, it was the Minister of 
Economics who would have the final say and who could thus determine whether a company was to 
be punished for its practices. Moreover, merger control did now become part of French competition 
policy, albeit the subunit of regulation that was hereby established was almost doomed to be 
inefficient from the outset. The control was to be implemented by the government through an 
agency that formed part of the Price Control Ordinance department. No mandatory merger 
notification system was established but mergers that would result in a company with market shares 
exceeding 40 % and 25% for horizontal and non-horizontal mergers respectively could be examined 
by the Commission. Between 1977 and 1986 (where the system was changed) only 8 mergers were 
examined. Only one of these was prohibited by the Commission, namely the merger between 
Ashland Chemical France and Cabot Corporation, but due to procedural mistakes, this decision was 
subsequently overturned by the French Administrative Supreme Court, the Conseil d’Etat 
(Voillemot & Michel, 1988: 33). In fact it seems that the most important function of the merger 
provisions was that they could be (and on some occasions were) used by the government to prevent 
the acquisition of French companies by foreigners (Souam, 1998: 207-208). 
 
The inclusion of merger provisions in French competition law was in part a response to the high 
degree of concentration that occurred in some sectors as a consequence of the French industrial 
policy in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Jenny (1990: 150), a ‘vocal minority of economists 
and public-policy-makers’ began calling for a strengthening of French competition law as they felt 
‘that the lack of aggressiveness of French firms on international markets was partly a consequence 
of weak competition on their domestic market’. Interestingly, Jenny also links the adoption of 
French merger rules to the developments that were taking place at the EC level (see section 5.5 
below). French planners were afraid that the EC merger control rules could be used by the EC 
Commission to ban mergers between large French companies, hereby undermining the further 
concentration of French industry, which remained an important element in French industrial policy. 
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Hence, ‘although public-policy-makers in charge of French industrial policy still believed in the 
positive effect of concentration and mergers, they were led to favour the adoption of some kind of 
merger control at the French level … as a way to defeat the European merger-control project’ 
(Jenny, 1990: 151). 
 
In Germany, the GWB was amended in 1965. Hereby the law was modified somewhat but 
remained oriented against cartels. No merger control provisions were included at this juncture but 
with the amendment a new system was introduced (in Article 23) under which mergers of a certain 
magnitude had to be notified to the BKartA (on the criteria, see Canellos & Silber, 1970: 32). It was 
only in 1973 that merger provisions were included in the GWB thanks to the efforts of the 
SPD/FDP coalition government. Five institutions were programmed to take part in the regulation of 
mergers: (1) The BKartA, which was given powers to investigate and regulate mergers with 
turnovers greater than DM 50 million. If the merger involved companies with aggregate turnovers 
of DM 2 billion or more, or one of the parties had a turnover of more than DM 1 billion, then pre-
merger notification would be required. Otherwise post-merger notification would be sufficient. 
Mergers that would lead to or strengthen a position of market dominance were to be prohibited by 
the BKartA unless the involved firms could show that the merger would result in improved 
competitive conditions (Schwartz, 1993: 629); (2) the Monopol-kommission, which would publish 
opinions and reports on the developments regarding the climate of competition; (3) the 
Kammergericht, which would function as the first court of appeal against decisions made by the 
BKartA; (4) the Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal Supreme Court), which would constitute the 
highest instance of legal appeal; (5) and finally the Ministry of Economics, or more precisely the 
Minister of Economics who would be the highest instance of appeal and who was thus given the 
powers to overrule a decision by the BKartA to prohibit a merger. According to Section 24(3) of the 
GWB, s/he could do this ‘when in the specific case the restraint of competition is more than offset 
by the general economic advantages of the merger or when an overwhelming public interest 
justifies the merger’ (quoted in Baur, 1980: 459). Although the minister would have to permit a 
merger on the basis of a report from the Monopol-kommission, s/he would thus basically be allowed 
to do this on criteria chosen by her- or himself (Smith, 1994: 438-442; see also Wilks & McGowan, 
1995 for more detailed discussions of the German regime).  
 
The widespread view that German authorities have vigorously been pursuing a tough “competition 
über alles” approach to combat cartels and concentration at all costs (e.g. Cini & McGowan, 1998: 
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9; Woolcock et al., 1991: 101-102) should be taken with a pinch of salt. As Cable (1979: 2, 24) 
noted, the stance towards cartels had in practice been permissive as numerous exemptions were 
granted by the BKartA. Thus, in 1973 there were over 200 legal cartels in Germany (Smith, 1994: 
437). One scholar goes as far as to suggest that ‘Germany’s post-war political and economic rebirth 
has relied considerably, some might say excessively, on collusion among major industries, banks, 
and regional political bodies with mutual interests and holdings in one another’ (Schwartz, 1993: 
627). Nor did the BKartA ban many mergers. Of the 582 mergers that were notified between 1973 
and 1975 only 4 were prohibited (Schwartz, 1993: 629). And of the 10,849 mergers that were 
notified between 1974 and 1989, only 90 were prohibited by the BKartA. Nearly all prohibitions 
were appealed and ultimately less than half of them were upheld and became effective (Smith, 
1994: 442). On a number of occasions in the 1970s, the Minister of Economics overruled BKartA 
decisions that had been backed up by the courts and gave his/her blessings to big mergers. The 
justifications given for this ranged from considerations of employment levels over preservation of 
petroleum supplies to the attainment of international competitiveness in specific sectors (for more 
details, see Baur, 1980: 460).  
 
As table 5.2 shows, a very significant rise in the yearly number of mergers took place between 1960 
and 1977. The increase was not constant, however. Whereas the development was relatively 
undramatic in some periods, namely the one from 1960-1968, other periods were characterised by 
merger waves. Prior to the inclusion of merger rules in the GWB in 1973 such a merger wave was 
experienced between 1969 and 1971 and, paradoxically, an almost explosive growth in mergers set 
in the very year these rules were enacted. At the end of the period, then, the yearly number of 
mergers was over 25 times as high as it had been in 1960.  
 
Table 5.2: Number of M&As notified under section 23 of the GWB, 1960-77 
1960 22 1969 168 
1961 26 1970 305 
1962 38 1971 220 
1963 29 1972 269 
1964 36 1973 243 
1965 50 1974 318 
1966 43 1975 448 
1967 65 1976 453 
1968 65 1977 554 
Source: Statistiches Jahrbuch (as reproduced in Cable 1979: 5) 
 
There is no doubt that significant concentrations of capital were allowed to take place through 
mergers. Many of the mergers that took place after 1973 did not involve firms of equal size and 
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were moreover conglomerate mergers (that is, they involved firms operating in different markets). 
The reason for this was that a loophole in the merger rules, namely the DM 50 million turnover 
threshold enabled large firms to merge with companies operating in markets dominated by small- 
and medium sized capitals. This, as Smith (1994: 446) notes, ‘led to a severe deterioration in the 
competitive structure of these markets, since between 1973 and 1979, 1,390 out of a total of 3,388 
notified mergers were covered by this exemption’. Only with an amendment in the rules in 1980 
was the loophole closed (see Smith, 1994: 439, 446).  
 
As these remarks serve to indicate, it was only at the level of discourse that the competition unit of 
regulation that developed in Germany was one that valued competition above everything else. 
Certainly it was in practice far from living up to the ideals of the ordoliberals, allowing, as it did, for 
a significant cartelisation and concentration of the German economy. Indeed, the inclusion of 
merger provisions in the GWB constituted a genuine strengthening of the system. But the fact that a 
political decision-maker was elevated to a position where s/he was empowered to overrule BKartA 
decisions on the basis of various political motives ran directly counter to ordoliberal thinking. 
 
One could thus argue that the broader synthesis between free markets and a social welfare state (the 
“social market economy”) was reflected in the area of competition regulation. That is, as a starting 
point it was the aim to preserve competitive structures along what we can call neoliberal lines: 
competition was to be regulated on the basis of objective criteria, such as clearly defined thresholds, 
rather than on the basis of political discretion (see section 5.5 below). Competition rules were 
enforced ‘by independent authorities, insulated from (short-term) political pressure’ (Woolcock et 
al., 1991: 102). However, even if the BKartA was politically independent we have also seen that its 
decisions could be overruled by the Minister of Economics of the day and that it had indeed been 
rather generous in permitting mergers and cartels. The desire to preserve competition thus clearly 
had its limits, and could be (and was) dispensed with on occasions where it was considered 
convenient, for instance for broader social reasons.  
 
  
128 
 
5.4. Merger control in the UK 
 
As already mentioned, the UK joined the EC in 1973. Historically speaking, ‘Britain can be 
regarded as the home ground of economic liberalism, dictating a minimum role of government, 
relying on the self-regulating market instead’ (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 72-73). Indeed, the Pax 
Britannica era, stretching from the first industrial revolution and/or the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
to the beginning of the First World War, is associated with free trade and the freedom of finance. 
This was a consequence of the hegemonic status of the “liberal international” GDR promoted by 
Britain’s finance capital sector, known as the City, which constituted the world’s financial centre at 
the time (Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 7-9; see also Cox, 1987: 123-147 on the liberal world 
order of Pax Britannica). However, a settlement involving a class compromise between labour and 
(in particular industrial) capital introduced a model of capitalism after the Second World War that, 
like the forms of capitalism emerging in France and Germany, combined market economy with a 
comprehensive welfare state. Initially, however, the emphasis was more on welfare than on free 
markets.  
 
After winning the July 1945 election by a landslide the new Labour government implemented a 
programme that was, in the words of one scholar, ‘the most radical of any administration before or 
since’ (Hall, 1986: 70). This involved three main elements (Hall, 1986: 70-76): First, a 
comprehensive nationalisation process took place. The Bank of England was nationalised, as was 
inter alia the railways, the iron, steel, coal and gas industries along with the electricity sector and 
telecommunication company, Cable and Wireless (see also Overbeek, 1990: 114-119). Second, the 
commitment to introduce a welfare state in the UK that would provide the broad population with 
health care, social security, education and more. Third, the goal to achieve full employment by 
means of Keynesian counter-cyclical demand management policies. When the Conservatives took 
over from Labour in 1951, no dramatic policy shift took place although the iron and steel industries 
were denationalised. That is, the Conservatives, who were to remain in power for 13 years, came to 
endorse Keynesian economic policies and the continued development of the welfare state. 
 
However, the post-war governments were still unable ‘to prevent the British economy very quickly 
resuming the decline which had temporally been suspended by the Depression and the war’ 
(Overbeek, 1990: 122)61. Initially, the political response to this was to let (what was left of) the 
private sector, operate on its own without too much interference from the state. And until the 1960s 
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state aid to industry was relatively small. However, during the 1960s and 1970s this changed (see 
Coates, 1999: 651-652 for some details). The 1964-1970 Labour government made some rather 
unsuccessful attempts to introduce interventionist industrial policies formed along French lines, for 
instance establishing the “Industrial Reconstruction Corporation” which was programmed to 
facilitate mergers. And especially after the recession hit in 1974, the same year a new Labour 
government took office, state aid channelled to declining industries became normal. According to 
Hall (1986: 52), the government spent £9290 million on state aid to nationalised and private 
companies between 1971 and 1979, hereby almost bringing UK spending on a par with the amounts 
used in France and Germany (measured as percentage of GDP).  
 
In the field of competition policy, the UK was a pioneer: with the enactment of the 1948 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Enquiry and Control Act, the UK was the first European 
country to establish a competition unit of regulation after the war (see e.g. Utton, 2000 for more 
details). Similar to the case in France and Germany, this happened against the background of 
American pressure which the UK had to comply with in order to receive the financial aid so badly 
needed in the reconstruction process (see Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 1996: 218). However, it was only 
with the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act that merger control became part of the UK’s 
competition unit of regulation. This time, the background was an explosion in the number of 
mergers taking place in late 1950s and early 1960s. According to one estimate, 3384 mergers took 
place in the UK between 1958 and 1962, whereas the number for the entire EC in this period was 
approximately 1000 (Overbeek, 1990: 124). The resulting level of concentration in certain sectors 
and other side effects of certain mergers caused political concern led to broad political support for 
the adoption of rules that could be used to control mergers (Paines & Reynolds, 1988: 185). Initially 
proposed by the Conservative government with a 1964 White Paper, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Act was passed in August 1965 under the Labour government supported by both the Conservatives 
and the Liberals and to some extent the Trade Union Congress (TUC), but opposed by the CBI (see 
Wilks, 1999: 195-204; Eyre, 1999: 67-68).  
 
With the 1965 Act, the President of the Board of Trade (later to become the Department of Trade 
and Industry) could decide to refer mergers to the Monopolies Commission in cases where the 
merged companies would obtain a UK market share of one third or more or where the value of all 
acquisitions would exceed £5 million (Paines & Reynolds, 1988: 186). In 1973, the 1965 Act was 
replaced by the Fair Trading Act and the system was hereby given the institutional configuration 
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and content it was basically to have until it was reformed in 2002 (see Chapter 7). With the 1973 
Act a new institution, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), was programmed to screen all mergers. As 
no compulsory notification system was established, OFT staff had to perform this task by reading 
the financial press and other relevant publications, as well by following up on information provided 
by concerned companies and interest groups (Kryda, 2002: 255-256; Paines & Reynolds, 1988: 
187). However, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry retained the powers to decide whether 
or not mergers were to be referred to the Monopolies Commission, which was now renamed the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), for detailed scrutiny. And the Secretary of State was 
free to decide whether or not s/he would follow the recommendations of the MMC. In other words, 
a political decision-maker was empowered to take the final decisions.  
 
In the UK system, mergers were to be regulated by “public interest” criteria not merely by whether 
or not they have anti-competitive effects. Thus, if a merger could be shown (by the MMC) to be 
against the public interest, the Secretary could either prevent the merger or order its dissolution 
(depending on whether it had already taken place or not)62. Section 84 (1) of the 1973 Act specifies 
that in assessing whether a merger is in the public interest, the MMC should among other things 
take into account the desirability 
 
‘(a) of maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons supplying 
goods and services in the United Kingdom; 
(b) of promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users of goods and 
services in the United Kingdom in respect of the prices charged for them and in 
respect of their quality and the variety of goods and services supplied; 
(c) of promoting, through competition, the reduction of costs and the development 
and use of new techniques and new products, and of facilitating the entry of new 
competitors into existing markets; 
(d) of maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of industry and 
employment in the United Kingdom; and 
(e) of maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets outside the United 
Kingdom on the part of producers of goods and of suppliers of goods and services, in 
the United Kingdom’ (quoted in Paines & Reynolds, 1988: 216) 
 
In other words, then, consumer protection, export volumes and employment were made some of the 
criteria that could be used in the assessment of whether or not a merger was to be allowed. 
 
A 1978 report entitled A Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy, which was presented to the 
Parliament by Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection, Roy Hattersley, dealt with 
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merger activity in the UK from the early 1960s. The annual number of mergers had fluctuated 
significantly between 1963 and 1977, displaying neither a clear upward nor a clear downward 
tendency (see table 5.3). Yet the report clearly stated that ‘[m]ergers have been an important source 
of increasing market power in the last decade’, with one-quarter of the 1500 mergers falling within 
the legislation resulting in the creation of strengthening of a statutory monopoly (Hattersley, 1978: 
16). Despite this, less than 3 per cent of the mergers taking place since 1965 had been referred to 
the MMC, and of these ‘only 13 were found to be against the public interest and a further 15 were 
abandoned’, meaning that ‘under 2 per cent of mergers falling within the legislation have been 
prevented by present policy…’ (Hattersley, 1978: 17). 
 
Table 5.3: Number of M&As in the UK, 1963-1977 
1963 888 1971 884 
1964 940 1972 1210 
1965 1000 1973 1205 
1966 807 1974 504 
1967 763 1975 315 
1968 946 1976 353 
1969 907 1977 482 
1970 793   
 
 
So what should we make of this brief account (in this and the previous section) of the merger 
subunits of regulation that appeared in France, Germany and the UK in the 1970s? In particular we 
should notice how key characteristics of the broader ensembles of regulation of which they formed 
part were reflected in their content and form! For one thing, the commitment to full employment 
underpinning the KWNS was to some extent brought into the regulation of M&As. In the UK the 
MMC was explicitly programmed to regulate mergers on the basis of “public interest” criteria 
which included the maintenance and improvement of employment levels, whereas it would be up to 
the political decision-maker to ban or allow mergers on such grounds in Germany and France. 
Moreover all three subunits were designed in such a way as to ensure that the emergence of big 
(Fordist) enterprises could be allowed even if they would undermine competition in the market in 
which they operated63. Although the competition authorities in the UK and, especially, Germany 
were programmed to safeguard competition, they could be overruled by the minister if their 
decision to ban a merger was not regarded convenient. This can hardly be regarded as a trivial 
matter in relation to a growth model where economies of scale, carried out by large corporations 
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engaged in mass production, played (and was perceived to play) such a vital role and where greater 
corporate size was considered a necessity if the American challenge was to be successfully dealt 
with. In sum, although the national subunits of regulation discussed here cannot meaningfully be 
denoted as “Keynesian” (as cannot any merger policies), it seems reasonable to suggest that they 
were nevertheless designed to supplement, or at least not contradict, the KWNS and its facilitation 
of Fordist growth. 
 
 
5.5. EC merger control?  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (see section 4.5), a Directorate-General within the 
Commission, viz. the Competition DG, was programmed to enforce the EC Treaty’s competition 
rules. Through Regulation 17 it had been armed with powers that were potentially more far-
reaching than those enjoyed by any other DG as well as a significant degree of operational 
autonomy vis-à-vis member states and other EC institutions. However, Regulation 17 gave rise to 
some unexpected problems, above all because it required companies to notify their agreements to 
the Commission before a specified deadline. The result was that by 1 February 1963 the 
Commission had received an overwhelming total of 34,500 notifications of bilateral agreements 
between companies (Goyder, 1993: 50). For a new and modestly staffed regulatory institution like 
the Competition DG it was impossible to handle this excessive workload64. The solution was that 
the Council extended the powers of the Competition DG by approving the introduction of the so-
called block exemption system in 1965, hereby giving the Commission the powers to exempt entire 
groups of agreements from regulation (see e.g. Cini & McGowan, 1998: 66-69 or Goyder, 1993: 
56-73 for more details). Allen (1983: 214-215) provides an account for how the DG then went on to 
categorise, group and exempt agreements, for instance exempting certain “exclusive dealing” and 
“cooperation” agreements. 
 
Moreover, the precise portfolio, working procedures and indeed organisation of the Competition 
DG was not yet settled. As a matter of fact the DG, ‘had to create an entire substantive and 
procedural system and explain it, frequently to governmental and business leaders unfamiliar with 
such norms, and/or dubious of their legitimacy’ (Gerber, 1998: 353). Given the lack of experience 
with competition policy at the national level this was no small task. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the EC competition unit of regulation thus gradually took shape through processes of internal 
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programming in the Competition DG and of external programming carried out by in particular the 
Court but also to some extent by the wider Commission and the member states. In its early years the 
Competition DG was almost exclusively preoccupied with the cartel sub-unit of regulation, 
meaning that the questions of state aid and economic concentration were neglected (see Cini & 
McGowan, 1998: 22).  
 
However, from the mid 1960s the DG began exploring its powers in the field of merger control. We 
have already seen that the EC Treaty mentioned no such powers, nor did of course Regulation 17. 
But in 1963 the Commission appointed an expert group to, among other things, ‘examine the 
connection between concentration and the application and interpretation of Article 86 and also the 
possibilities of justifying compulsory notification for enterprises with a strong position on the 
market for mergers and for particular practices covered by Article 86’ (Commission, 1964: 58). 
Partly on the basis of the work of these experts, the Commission published a memorandum in 
December 1965, later to be known as “the 1966 Memorandum”, in which it made its own views 
concerning the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations clear. Contrary to the opinion of 
the experts (see Schwartz, 1993: 615) the Commission stated that Article 85 would not be 
applicable to mergers, a point that was later repeated in its Ninth Report on the Activities of the 
Community where it reads that ‘[t]he ban on cartels (Article 85) is, in the Commission’s opinion, 
neither intended nor suitable to prevent the domination of a given market by mergers or other forms 
of combination’ (1966: 81). However, the Memorandum suggested that Article 86 might be 
applicable to the regulation of mergers in cases where a merger could result in the monopolisation 
of a particular market. According to Goyder (1993: 387), this suggestion was made ‘in spite of 
considerable doubts even within the DGIV’. It was then decided to find out whether this 
interpretation was, or could be made, valid by testing it in practice, hereby possibly also achieving a 
ruling from the Court (see Goyder, 1993: 387). 
 
Perhaps because of the French hostility towards the EC from the mid to the late 1960s, the 
Commission waited until the early 1970s before picking a case. It then chose what was later to be 
known as the Continental Can case. To put it briefly, American company Continental Can, a 
producer of metal containers and various other packages, had gained control over the largest 
German producer of metal packages, SLW. In collaboration with British company Metal Box, 
Continental Can furthermore planned to set up holding company Europemballage with the intention 
of purchasing the majority of shares in Dutch company TDV, which was a leading manufacturer of 
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metal packages in the Benelux countries. SLW and TDV had both specialised in metal caps for 
glass containers and the packaging of crustacea, fish and meats. When the Commission found out 
about these plans it threatened to charge Continental Can and Europemballage with violation of the 
Treaty’s Article 86(1). It believed that Continental Can had achieved a dominant position in the 
Common Market’s markets for “packaging of crustacea, fish and meats” and “metal caps for glass 
containers” and that the company would be guilty of abusing this dominant position if 
Europemballage bought TDV. Metal Box withdrew from the deal, whereas Continental Can went 
ahead and, via Europemballage, bought the vast majority of shares in TDV. 
 
The Commission thus opened proceedings against Continental Can and ultimately decided to 
prohibit the concentration. Continental Can appealed against this decision to the Court which in its 
ruling of 21 February 1973 went against the Commission. The Court found that the Commission 
had applied a too narrow definition of “markets” in its decision. Rather than seeing the firms in 
question as operating in some highly specialised market for “packaging of crustacea, fish and 
meats” and “metal caps for glass containers” the Court found that they should be seen as operating 
in the much wider general market for packaging (where Continental Can could not be seen as 
abusing a dominant position). The Commission’s decision was thus annulled. But what was much 
more remarkable was that the Court accepted the Commission’s interpretation of article 86 as being 
applicable to mergers that would strengthen a dominant position. As Gerber (1994: 117) explains, 
‘[t]raditional legal analysis provided little support for this use of article 86. The text of the treaty did 
not indicate that article 86 was applicable to acquisitions. On the contrary, it seemed to indicate that 
the article was not applicable to such cases’. Ignoring this, the Court instead referred to ‘the spirit, 
general scheme and wording of article 86, as well as to the system and objectives of the Treaty’ 
(Court, 1973: p. 243). 
 
The Competition DG’s potentially significant powers combined with the potential of competition 
law to facilitate market integration, made the DG a highly interesting “partner” for the Court. In 
fact, both institutions had a strong interest in a partnership. The Competition DG would have to 
enforce the competition rules if the Court was to make any rulings in this area, and the Court 
needed to support the DG’s interpretation of the rules if its work was to have any effect (Gerber, 
1998: 354). Hence, a close relationship developed between the two institutions in which  
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‘the Commission tended to follow the lead of the Court, thereby taking full 
advantage of the Court’s symbolic status and its relative immunity from political 
pressure. The Court’s decisions were largely shielded from such pressures because 
they were understood as applications by a neutral, non-political body of juridically-
determined principles, and thus the Commission could achieve a degree of political 
security by operating in the Court’s “tow”’ (Gerber, 1998: 354) 
 
From the mid 1960s onwards, then, the Court interpreted the competition provisions using the 
teleological method also used in the wider constitutionalisation of the Treaty (see section 5.2 
above): it interpreted the provisions ‘according to its own conception of what was necessary to 
achieve the integrationist goals of the Treaty’ (Gerber, 1998: 353). The Court clearly believed that a 
strong Commission would be desirable, and in interpreting the competition provisions it thus sought 
‘to interpret the competition provisions so as to give the Commission the greatest possible scope for 
intervention’ (Wyatt & Dashwood, 1980: 281; see also Goyder, 1993: 493). It is probably not to go 
too far to suggest that the Court established itself as the most important external programmer of the 
Competition DG in the 1960s and 1970s once Regulation 17 had been adopted. 
 
However, even the Court could not provide the Competition DG with an effective merger regulation 
instrument. Although the Continental Can ruling constituted a small victory for the Commission, 
the problem remained that Article 86 only refers to companies that can be proven to abuse a 
“dominant position” (that is, their oligopoly or monopoly status). This meant that not only was it 
not in itself unacceptable if a company had a dominant position; a further implication was that the 
Commission was not allowed to prohibit a merger that was likely to result in a dominant position in 
the market in advance (Allen, 1977: 102). In practice, the Competition DG was thus given the 
rather difficult task to regulate mergers that had already taken place65. Consequently, and not least 
in response to the positive signals that had been coming from the Member State governments at the 
1972 Paris summit (see section 5.2 above), the Commission presented its first proposal for a merger 
control regulation in July 1973 (Commission, 1973a). Just like the proposals that were to follow it, 
it had its legal base in Article 87 and Article 235 of the EC Treaty (see also Commission, 1973b). 
The latter states that ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of 
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has 
not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures’ 
(emphasis added). In other words, a merger control regulation could only become reality insofar as 
136 
 
it was actually wanted by all the direct programmers: a veto from a single Member State would be 
enough to prevent its adoption. 
 
The main points in the 1973-proposal can be summarised as follows: the Commission should be 
notified three months prior to any merger which would either produce a yearly turnover of 1,000 
million units of account (hereafter: ECU) or which already involved firms with a yearly turnover of 
ECU 1,000 million. If the Commission within 90 days estimated that a notified merger would 
potentially be problematic it would then have an additional nine months (!) to make its final 
decision. In principle all mergers hindering competition could be blocked by the Commission. 
Exempted, however, would be smaller firms with a yearly turnover of less than ECU 200 million 
and concentrations within industries ‘which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective 
which is given priority treatment in the common interest of the Community’ (Commission, 1973a: 
article 1 (3)). This second exemption is particularly interesting as it illustrates the contradiction 
between the aim to ensure competition in the market and the goal to create companies large enough 
to be able to compete with, in particular, American companies. This exemption would leave the 
Commission with significant discretionary powers, especially as it refused to clarify precisely on 
what grounds it could be made: ‘In the interest of preserving future flexibility for possibly changing 
Community needs, the Commission has resisted requests to specify in advance in what 
circumstances such exemptions will be granted’ (Commission, 1974: 16). 
 
In order to convince the Council that there were good reasons to adopt the proposal, the 
Commission had produced a number of statistics showing how a significant increase in mergers had 
taken place in the Common Market (Agence Europe, 1973: 2). The Council consulted the 
Parliament and the EESC, both institutions that have no other competencies in this area than 
expressing their opinion when consulted, and both approved the Commission’s proposal with large 
majorities (Commission, 1981). However, in this connection, the Parliament did suggest some 
minor changes in the text – for instance, that the threshold in the proposal was changed from 1000 
million to ECU 1250 million. Also the EESC proposed some amendments in the text. Among other 
things, it aired the opinion that the regulation ought not to be exclusively focussed on the impact of 
potential mergers on competition, but that it should also take other factors into consideration. These 
factors included ‘the commercial and regional interests of the Community, the industrial interests of 
the Community, notably the effect on small- and medium-sized businesses and the social interests 
of the Community, notably the impact on employment and the rights of the workers’ (EESC, 1974: 
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article 6). A more far-reaching formulation regarding this “social interest” and the rights of workers 
in merging companies was, however, voted down (with the votes 51 against 46) in the Committee 
(EESC, 1974: Annex). 
 
Despite the support from the Parliament and the EESC, agreement could not be reached in the 
Council and the Commission’s proposal was thus not adopted. The main reason for this was that the 
various programmers advocated positions grounded in incompatible USDRs. Indeed, one can 
identify four such discourses, namely a national-mercantilist, a Euro-mercantilist, a neoliberal and a 
centre-left USDR. As can be seen from table 5.4 each of these constituted a distinct perspective on 
the desired content, form and scope of merger control66. 
 
Table 5.4: USDRs and EC merger control 
 National-mercantilism Euro-mercantilism Neoliberalism Centre-left 
 
Content  Oriented towards 
national industrial 
policy and the creation 
of “national 
champions”. Merger 
control must take this 
into consideration. 
 
Oriented towards 
national industrial policy 
and the creation of 
“European champions”. 
Merger control must take 
this into consideration. 
 
Merger regulation on the 
basis of “competition 
only” criterion. No 
industrial or social policy 
considerations in merger 
control. 
The regulation of 
mergers should take 
into consideration 
effects on 
unemployment and 
the rights of workers 
Form Involvement by 
national political 
decision-makers in 
merger control 
 
Little involvement from 
national political 
decision-makers, but the 
Commission should be 
given far-reaching 
discretionary powers in 
its regulation of mergers 
 
No or little room for 
“political discretion” in 
the regulation of 
mergers. Regulation on 
the basis of clear and 
transparent rules. 
Should allow for 
some degree of 
political involvement 
in order to ensure 
democratic 
accountability. 
 
Scope Only national 
regulation of mergers 
EC level regulation of 
big mergers 
EC level and possibly 
global regulation of big 
mergers. However, also 
nationalistic type of neo-
liberalism 
 
Of secondary 
importance as long 
as social 
consequences are 
taken into 
consideration 
 
 
The national-mercantilist USDR was oriented towards national industrial policy and the creation of 
“national champions”. France, Italy, Ireland and the UK belonged to the group of countries that 
wanted more than just competition criteria to be applicable in the regulation of mergers. These 
countries saw the proposed EC merger regulation as a potential limitation of their ability to pursue 
national industrial and social policy goals and were thus not willing to hand over competencies to 
the supranational level in this area (Allen, 1977: 107; Woolcock, 1989: 12)67. As regards the French 
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government, it did ‘not relish commission interference in its cosy and effective system of control, 
exercised by discrete telephone calls to corporate boardrooms’ (Economist, 1974b: 62). As we saw 
in section 5.3 above, the French even went as far as to introduce merger control at the national level 
partly in order to avoid supranational legislation in this field. The Italians had no competition unit 
of regulation worthy of the name and displayed ‘a profound lack of interest in allowing the 
commission to fill the vacuum’ (1974b: 62). 
 
Capital actors can also be placed in the group that supported this position. Indeed, the main 
representatives of business in the different countries were not at this stage particularly concerned 
with whether mergers were to be regulated at the supranational level or they directly opposed that 
the EC was given competencies in this area (Jacobs & Steward-Clark, 1990: 80). As Allen noticed 
in his analysis of the reactions to the publication of the Commission’s 1973 draft regulation: 
 
‘Neither the member states nor industrial interests such as UNICE and COCCEE 
[Committee of Commercial Organizations of the EC, HB] have been enthusiastic and 
this accounts for the lack of progress in the Council of Ministers. European business 
circles have over the years regarded trade restrictions and cartel arrangements as 
normal and have therefore regarded Community competition policy with 
considerable suspicion’ (Allen, 1977: 107). 
 
In the UK, the CBI did not have confidence in the ability of the Competition DG to control mergers, 
and proposed ‘that investigations of mergers by the Community should be conducted by a body 
independent of the Comission’ (House of Lords, 1974: 2). A similar view was expressed by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (Economist, 1973: 53). Moreover, the British Law 
Society’s Standing Committee on Company Law criticised the proposal at length in a Memorandum 
dated October 1974, for instance pointing out problems related to definitions, criteria and time 
limits (House of Lords, 1975: 2-3). In France, the CNPF opposed any form of EC merger control 
going beyond the scope of Article 86 (Economist, 1973: 53). It is thus not surprising that UNICE, 
the organisation representing national industrial federations in the EC, was also expressing strong 
reservations with respect to the proposed regulation (UNICE, 1974). 
 
As mentioned above, majorities in the Parliament and the EECS were in favour of the proposed 
regulation. However, it appears from the transcript of the debates taking place in the Parliament on 
12 February 1974 that both the Conservative Group and the European Progressive Democrats 
opposed the proposal. For instance, the Conservative peer, Lord Mansfield argued that  
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‘Basically the proposed powers which the Commission seeks in these matters are too 
cumbersome, too slow and too Draconian in that they will leave far too much to the 
discretion of the Commission, which will act as prosecutor, judge and executioner in 
its own court. They will be far too costly for the firms who wish to concentrate their 
undertakings’ (Parliament, 1974: 73; see also Economist, 1974a: 56-57) 
 
And Mr Cousté of the European Progressive Democrats added that ‘in the final analysis we are 
against prior control of concentrations because we believe the European undertakings are not yet 
concentrated enough to successfully compete against the huge American and Japanese corporations. 
They are not yet big enough’ (Parliament, 1974: 74). 
 
The Euro-mercantilist USDR was oriented towards European level industrial policy and the creation 
of “European champions”. It seems that the Commission was the principal supporter of this position 
(which was very similar to that advocated by Servan-Schreiber in The American Challenge) 
although some of the governments favouring industrial policies at the national level might also have 
been willing to accept a regulation based on European level industrial policy as long as it did not 
disturb their national activities in this field. This, however, made little difference as those 
programmers subscribing to the neoliberal USDR would not have accepted it.  
 
The neoliberal USDR gave rise to a position according to which the EC (as well as national 
authorities) should regulate mergers on the basis of objective criteria and transparent procedures in 
order to protect the process of competition, and not intervene in the economy in order to promote 
particular sectors or firms. The neoliberal GDR entails a commitment to the separation of key 
institutions from democratic accountability (Gill, 1998; Harvey, 2005: 66). Advocates of the 
neoliberal USDR, which can be seen as originating in (or at least related to) ordoliberal thinking, 
did thus support a form of merger regulation that would leave little room for political discretion and 
thus a limited role for democratically elected policymakers. The German government, together with 
the Danish government, was the principle advocate of this “anti-EC-industrial policy” position. To 
be sure, the two governments were not enthusiastic about granting the Commission the powers to 
regulate mergers. But if it was to do so they were eager to ensure that merger control allowing for 
industrial policy goals to be pursued at the EC level would not come into being. In one sense this is 
a bit ironic, given that the German competition unit of regulation was far less strict than its 
proponents would generally like it to appear (allowing, as we have seen above, for both cartels and 
significant concentrations). However, under the German merger sub-unit (which had barely begun 
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operating at this stage) the use of non-competition criteria in the regulation of mergers was kept as a 
last resort. That is, it was not an instrument in the BKartA’s tool box but something the Minister 
could make use of now and then. Consequently, it is not terribly surprising that the German 
government wanted the Competition DG to regulate mergers strictly on the basis of competition 
criteria. 
 
Finally, the centre-left USDR gave rise to a position according to which the Commission’s 
regulation of mergers should take into consideration effects on unemployment and the rights of 
workers. This was, as we saw above, the position subscribed to by the majorities in the Parliament, 
namely the centre-left parties (see Parliament, 1974), and the EESC but some of the governments 
subscribing to the “national interventionist” position, such as the UK government (especially after 
Labour took office in 1974), were probably also sympathetic towards this perspective.  
 
In the end, the national-mercantilists prevailed, hereby rendering it impossible to reach agreement 
on an EC merger regulation. That this position had so many supporters has to be seen in relation to 
the contexts described in the first part of this chapter. The low level of inter-national economic 
integration in this area was one important factor. As we saw in section 5.1, the limited number of 
cross-border M&As in Europe was the outcome of a complex combination of different types of 
obstacles to “international concentration”. So for instance in the legal sphere there was no law to 
permit mergers to take place across borders, in the political sphere decision-makers often attempted 
to prevent national companies from merging with foreigners and in the economic sphere many 
companies were primarily oriented towards their national home markets. Had the concrete object of 
regulation, namely M&As, been a more international phenomenon at this juncture, it could have 
served as an argument for the establishment of a European level subunit of regulation.  
 
To understand the timing of the 1973 proposal it has to be seen against the background of what 
proved to be a rather brief moment of pro-Europeanism and aspirations to create a strong EC 
industrial policy. But as governments chose to respond to the economic crisis of the 1970s by 
opting for national, rather than European, solutions, the proposal turned out to be well too 
optimistic regarding their willingness to transfer power to the Commission. Moreover, the threshold 
proposed by the Commission was ‘extremely low’ (Goyder, 1988: 323), and the proposed 
regulation would thus have given the Commission the powers to regulate a very large number of 
mergers that had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of national authorities. This, of course, was 
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in itself a major issue as member states were unwilling to accept an EC subunit of regulation that 
undermined or contradicted their national control of mergers (or in most cases lack of such control).  
 
With the only serious pressure for a merger control regulation coming from the Court and the 
Commission no agreement could ultimately be reached in the Council. An increasingly impatient 
Competition DG could only watch from the sidelines while the negotiations over the proposal went 
on for years. The core countries, not least Britain, were not enthusiastic and engaged in what The 
Economist (1974d: 31) described as “spoiling tactics” in order to prevent progress in the 
negotiations. For instance, in September 1974 the Council requested four additional documents 
from the Commission’s working group in this area, leading to (justified) accusations by the 
Commission that some of the governments were systematically dragging out time in order to avoid 
making a final decision (Agence Europe, 1975: 4). And it appears from the Commission’s Sixth 
Report on Competition Policy that significant issues had still not been resolved in 1976. These 
included ‘the principle of premerger control and the legal basis of the proposed regulation, the field 
of application, the possibility of derogations from any prohibition, the notification of planned 
mergers and the decision-making procedure’ (Commission, 1977: 21). As Allen (1983: 229) later 
put it, the proposal ‘stagnated in the Council machinery for a number of years’ as it quite simply 
‘lacked any real support as the economic climate progressively worsened and interest in 
competition declined’. Only in 1981 did the Commission submit a modified proposal to the 
Council. 
 
 
5.6. The stagnation of the EC competition unit of regulation 
 
The proposal for a merger control regulation was not stagnating alone: by the early 1970s the whole 
EC competition unit of regulation had arrived at an impasse. The member states responded to the 
economic recession by inter alia increasing state aid and various measures designed to protect 
national industries from foreign competition (Dinan, 1999: 391-392). Under these circumstances the 
Competition DG was not capable of using the potentially significant powers it had acquired with 
Regulation 17: it had to tread cautiously if the continued existence of the unit of regulation (and 
hence of the DG itself) was not to be jeopardised. But it was not clear how it was to carry out its 
task in this situation: ‘Not only was it without clear policy priorities, but it was also struggling 
against the practical problems associated with an ever-rising tide of restrictive agreements, 
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concentrations and protectionist national subsidies, all of which made a mockery of attempts by 
DGIV to implement its policy effectively’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 27). 
 
The Competition DG had to adjust to this situation – to temporarily re-programme itself. To be 
more precise, the chosen strategy seems to have been one of turning a blind eye to even significant 
breaches of EC competition law if the enforcement of the latter would be politically controversial, 
whilst taking a great interest in relatively minor matters that would not arouse too much political 
attention. As Allen (1983: 232) puts it, ‘[t]he tenacity with which many of those working within 
DGIV adhere to the exact letter of the law on relatively minor technical matters, whilst ignoring 
more serious infringements in politically sensitive areas, can be said to reflect either a sensible and 
pragmatic awareness of political realities or, perhaps more accurately, a bureaucratic desire not to 
rock the boat’. Hence, the Commission deliberately took a very permissive stance in relation to 
concentrations, subsidies and cartels by applying the EC Treaty’s article 85(3) in a highly generous 
manner. Despite the member states’ widespread use of subsidies, the Commission prohibited only 
21 instances of state aid in the 1970s (Allen, 1983: 217).  
 
Although it took a somewhat tougher stance vis-à-vis cartels, the Commission and the Court on 
numerous occasions allowed their existence if they were perceived to help the integration of the 
nine national markets. And in some cases the Commission even promoted so-called “crisis cartels” 
– that is, temporary cartel arrangements between companies in sectors hit by recession. This 
allowed companies in sectors such as steel, coal, shipbuilding and textiles to temporarily stop their 
rivalry and instead coordinate activities and prices. The Commission did not only allow and support 
such anticompetitive practices for strategic reasons but also because it hoped that it would allow the 
companies and sectors in question to recover and hereby have long-term positive effects (see Cini & 
McGowan, 1998: 66; Dolan, 1983; Wigger, 2008a for more details). It should be mentioned, 
though, that on more than one occasion it was the DG for Industrial Affairs, which had been 
established in 1967 to promote cross-border cooperation between companies, rather than the 
Competition DG, that sought to sponsor crisis cartels. For instance, the Competition DG was very 
reluctant to permit a crisis cartel in the textile industry that had been promoted by the Commissioner 
for Industrial Affairs, Etienne Davignon as this arrangement was not regarded to fall under Article 
85(3) (see Dolan, 1983).  
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Despite its good start in life in the 1960s, the Competition DG thus dragged on a languishing 
existence in the 1970s and early 1980s. It turned into ‘an uninspiring and fringe directorate’ which 
was perceived ‘as being too bureaucratic, too slow in dealing with cases and as suffering from low 
staff morale’ (McGowan & Wilks, 1995: 151). According to Allen, the Commission’s working 
procedures required the involvement of a seemingly endless string of officials with the result that it 
could easily take it three or four years to reach a decision in an average case. To make things worse, 
‘[t]he slowness of this procedure is often prolonged by the attempts of frustrated officials to cut this 
chain which can result in internal frictions and thus further delays’, sometimes ‘for up to two or 
three years’ (Allen, 1983: 221-222).  
 
Although this rather depressing state of affairs should in large part be explained with reference to 
the wider context in which the Competition DG found itself, the issue of leadership should also be 
briefly considered here. That is, one might consider the importance of who the occupant of the 
“competition commissioner” position is. This is particularly important as the Commission’s high-
profile decisions are taken in the College, which consists of the Commissioners from the different 
DGs. Consequently, ‘[m]uch of the impact of any DG within the Commission rests on the ability of 
its Commissioner to act as a voice for its policy and to create coalitions of support with other 
Commissioners’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 43). In other words, the power of the Competition DG 
within the wider institutional ensemble of which it forms part is to no small extent related to the 
qualities of the Commissioner of Competition. As already mentioned the first occupant of this 
position was Hans von der Groeben who has been described as an ‘avid advocate of economic 
liberalism, determined to ensure that the Community as a whole should benefit from the fruits of the 
free working of the market mechanism’ (Holland, 1980: 13). Despite being put in charge of an area 
that was generally expected to be of limited importance in the EC, the result of von der Groeben’s 
efforts (which were supported by the ordoliberals in the German government) was that the 
Competition DG was given potentially very far-reaching powers with Regulation 17. It was also 
under his leadership that the Commission got its first group exemption powers and moreover began 
exploring the possibilities of introducing EC merger control (resulting in the 1966 Memorandum).  
 
Von der Groeben’s successors in office were, to put it bluntly, not of his calibre. In 1966 he was 
replaced with Dutchman, Emanuel Sassen who served as Competition Commissioner until 1970 
without achieving much. Next in the list of kings came Albert Borchette and Raymond Vouel, both 
from Luxembourg, serving respectively from 1970-1976 and 1977-1980. Whereas Vouel was 
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relatively anonymous and kept a low profile, Borchette was ‘very well respected’ (Cini & 
McGowan, 1998: 43; see also Economist, 1974c: 52) and the main architect of the first proposal for 
a merger regulation. Bearing in mind that it would not have been easy for anyone to draft a proposal 
that would satisfy all the involved parties, one might still wonder whether he could have played his 
cards better and made a proposal that would have been less unacceptable to the governments and 
capital actors: that is, a proposal involving a higher threshold (and thus a smaller jurisdiction for the 
Commission) and which would have given the Commission more reasonable time limits within 
which to assess notified mergers (instead of a whole year). However, if what has been said here 
about the diverging USDRs subscribed to by the various agents involved in the negotiation 
processes is correct, then even a more “realistic” proposal from the Commission would not have 
been sufficient to facilitate agreement in the Council. And in any case, one might speculate whether 
the “low-profile” Commissioners who followed von der Groeben did not in fact benefit the DG and 
EC competition regulation in the longer run. By adjusting to the context and enforcing the 
competition provisions in a very “generous” and creative way the Competition DG rode out the 
storm and ensured the survival of the unit of regulation of which it formed part. 
 
 
5.7. In conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to explain why the Commission’s 1973 proposal for a MCR 
ultimately failed to gain support from the member states. To this end, it focussed both on the 
positions of the various indirect and direct (and internal and external) programmers involved and on 
the broader contexts influencing the outcome of the negotiations. With Figure 5.1 an attempt has 
been made to visualise this.  
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Figure 5.1: Explaining the failure of the 1973 MCR proposal 
 
 
The chapter identified four USDRs, each constituting a distinct perspective on the desired content, 
form and scope of merger control, to which various constellations of programmers subscribed: a 
national-mercantilist USDR the main proponents of which were the French, Italian, and British 
governments, most capital actors and some parties in the Parliament; a Euro-mercantilist USDR 
which gave rise to the position advocated by the Commission; a position grounded in a neoliberal 
USDR which was (at least in principle) favoured by the German and Danish governments; and a 
centre-left USDR which gave rise to a position subscribed to by majorities in the Parliament and the 
EESC, and probably also most trade unions. The outcome of the negotiations, namely that no 
agreement could be reached, reflected that the national-mercantilist position prevailed. To 
understand the “popularity” of this position, a number of factors need to be taken into consideration.  
 
In the era of embedded liberalism capital accumulation was primarily oriented towards and 
organised at the national level. European capital actors generally operated in national markets that 
were shielded from strong outside competition, albeit the American challenge threatened to change 
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this state of affairs. In 1960s and 1970s the national business climate ‘was one dominated by 
national mergers and acquisitions, basing-point pricing, and even explicit market-sharing 
agreements’ (Franco, 1976: 146). Especially after 1973, when the Golden Age came to an end and a 
long and deep economic crisis began, did member states respond by opting for national, rather than 
European level, initiatives. That is, national industrial policies, often entailing various forms of state 
aid for declining industries, became an increasingly popular instrument in most or all member 
states, often in combination with various other forms of national protectionism. A major reason why 
no agreement on an EC merger regulation could be reached was thus fears among governments and 
capital actors that such rules could serve as an instrument for the Commission to interfere in what 
was considered to be the internal affairs of member states. 
 
It is thus not surprising that the merger subunits of regulation that were established in the 1970s 
were established at the national level. Although the French, German and British subunits differed in 
important respects, they also shared two crucial similarities: political decision-makers were allowed 
to overrule the decisions made by competition authorities and various “public interest” criteria 
could be taken into consideration in the regulation of M&As. Hereby much was done to ensure that 
merger regulation would not contradict the full employment commitment underlying the KWNS 
and not obstruct concentrations that were deemed strategically important, even if they threatened to 
undermine competition. The latter was of course important in relation to the Fordist growth model 
where economies of scale, carried out by large national firms engaged in mass production, played 
such a vital role. In this way the broader class compromise between organised labour and industrial 
capital underlying the KWNS was also reflected in the merger subunit of regulations in the UK, 
France and Germany. Yet the differences in the national subunits also meant that the three 
governments ended up advocating positions that were not grounded in the same USDR. At the 
centre of Germany’s subunit of merger regulation stood the politically independent BKartA, 
programmed to regulate M&As on the basis of a “competition effects only” test (the Minister of 
Economics was the last appeal and only s/he could make decisions on the basis of “public interest” 
criteria). The German government was therefore unwilling to accept an EC subunit that would 
regulate mergers on the basis of industrial policy considerations and which would be subject to 
political influence. The British and French governments were, just like the German government and 
most capital actors, not particularly excited about EC merger control. However, if an EC merger 
subunit was to be established they wanted to make sure that they would be able to interfere in its 
regulatory practices. Obviously this meant that the negotiations quickly reached a deadlock. 
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If the external programmers (both direct and indirect) were not particularly keen on establishing an 
EC merger subunit of regulation, then the internal programmer, namely the Commission, was its 
strongest advocate. That the Commission “dared” to made its bold, Euro-mercantilist 1973 proposal 
in the first place was because it had been encouraged to do so by the member states in their short 
moment of Euro-enthusiasm and willingness to establish a strong EC industrial policy. However, 
once the tide turned the only genuine pressure for EC merger control came from the Commission, 
backed up by the Court and majorities in the Parliament and the EESC (although the latter two 
institutions advocated a somewhat more centre-left type of merger control). After the mid-1970s it 
became clear the Commission’s attempt to obtain genuine powers to control mergers (in addition to 
those granted to it by the Court in the Continental Can case) was going to fail. Once again the 
Competition DG was forced onto the defensive and the EC competition unit of regulation stagnated. 
At this juncture the ‘advocates of a strong competition policy seemed to be swimming against an 
ideological tide’ (Cini, 2000: 78). 
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6. The 1980s: the neoliberal turn and the EC Merger Control 
Regulation 
 
In this chapter we turn our attention to the developments in the 1980s. The main phenomena to be 
explained are the continued failure to reach agreement on an EC merger control regulation 
throughout most of the decade and the adoption of the MCR in 1989. Hereby the chapter should 
allow us to answer the second and third sub-questions (section 1.1), namely ‘why did the 
Commission’s proposals for a MCR fail to gain support from the member states in the 1970s and 
most of the 1980s?’ (which was partially answered in the previous chapter) and “why was it 
eventually possible to adopt a MCR and why was designed the way it was?”. The chapter is divided 
into seven main sections and a brief conclusion. Similar to the previous chapter, the first four 
sections deal with four “contexts” that had a decisive impact on the negotiations over the MCR. 
These were the crisis of embedded liberalism and the neoliberal turn (section 6.1); the gradual and 
partial neoliberalisation of the British, French and German merger subunits of regulation (section 
6.2); the re-launch of European integration, with a particular focus on the role played by the capital 
actors in the European Roundtable of Industrialists (section 6.3); and finally the revitalisation of the 
EC competition unit of regulation in the 1980s (section 6.4). In the following three sections, we 
focus on the renewed negotiations over an EC merger control regulation (section 6.5) and the 
changing position of capital actors in the late 1980s (section 6.6), before analysing the form and 
content of the 1989 MCR by identifying the primary, secondary and marginalised ideas and agents 
in the programming process (section 6.7). A short conclusion summarises the findings. 
 
 
6.1. The crisis of embedded liberalism 
 
By the early 1970s the Golden Age came to its end. The world economy entered a deep crisis 
which, especially after 1973, was reflected in sharp decreases in output, productivity and export 
growth combined with increasing unemployment and inflation in all industrial countries (see e.g. 
Glyn et al. 1990: 43-47 for figures). The crisis had various economic, political and social causes all 
of which cannot be discussed here (see instead e.g. Glyn et al., 1990: 72-113; Jessop ,2002a: 80-90; 
Lipietz, 1992: 14-19 for details). Suffice it to mention but a few. The post-war economic boom was 
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in no small part due to the increase in productivity that resulted from the introduction of Taylorism 
and Fordist mass production in a number of sectors (see Chapter 5). However, there was a limit to 
how far such methods could be generalised and once this limit was reached it became difficult to 
increase productivity levels. In this situation, many Fordist firms began expanding into foreign 
markets with a view to achieve further economies of scale, in some cases leading to the emergence 
of multinational companies that could avoid national controls (Jessop, 2002a: 81). World trade now 
began growing much more than demand in the different countries. This was also related to the two 
“oil shocks” of the 1970s (see also Lipietz, 1983: 117-118). Fordist accumulation had come to 
depend on ever increasing quantities of oil at declining prices, but with the massive rise in oil prices 
orchestrated by OPEC, the oil importing countries now had to export more in order to be able to 
afford their energy imports. As Jessop & Sum (2006a: 126) explains, ‘with growing 
internationalization of production as well as capital flows and trade, it became harder to close the 
virtuous circuit of mass production and mass consumption within national economies’ (see also 
Lipietz, 1992: 18). 
 
The crisis of the Fordist mode of growth was also due to growing discontent among the workers. By 
the end of the 1960s, the Fordist labour process with the “Taylorist” separation between those who 
design tasks and those who perform them was increasingly perceived of as inhuman and met with 
growing resistance from workers who demanded more job satisfaction. In addition to this, the high 
unemployment rates resulting from the economic crisis made the rather generous welfare systems 
associated with the KWNS very expensive. Initially, the political response to the crisis of Atlantic 
Fordism/embedded liberalism was to intensify the features of the KWNS, rather than to transform it 
radically (Jessop, 2002a: 90). However, as this did not lead to the desired results governments 
increasingly began to opt for new ways to facilitate economic growth. Although this obviously took 
different forms in different countries, neoliberal ideas of regulation gradually became influential in 
many European countries. Neoliberal ideas had of course been around for quite some time but in the 
course of the 1980s they were increasingly accepted by the political and economic elites (see also 
section 7.1 on the three moments of neoliberalism). At the international level, the OECD was at the 
forefront promoting neoliberalism, not least after 1977 where the so-called McCracken report was 
published. This report, which was produced by eight economists, prescribed far-reaching neoliberal 
reforms as the way to cure “sick” economies. That is, ‘the main drift of the recommendations was to 
pursue non-inflationary growth through tight monetary policy, prudent fiscal policy, reforms to 
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make markets function better (especially labour markets), and further trade liberalization’ (Ougaard, 
2004: 90). 
 
Indeed, the neoliberal GDR prescribes a radical break with the KWNS type of regulation: ‘For the 
public sector, it involves privatization, liberalization and the imposition of commercial criteria in 
the residual state sector; for the private sector, it involves deregulation and a new legal and political 
framework to provide passive support for market solutions’ (Jessop, 2002a: 260; see also Harvey, 
2005: 2). We have already described what neoliberalism involves as a perspective on the desired 
concept, form and scope of merger control in section 5.5 (as a USDR). Most importantly, it 
prescribes merger control that exclusively seeks to preserve competition. This is directly related to 
the way competition is perceived in the neoliberal GDR, namely as a phenomenon which can cause 
all sorts of good things by forcing companies to be competitive. In other words, the competitiveness 
of national or European companies in international or global markets is seen as something that 
cannot be brought about through interventionist state policies (such as state aids) but which needs to 
be facilitated by exposing companies to the forces of competition.  
 
 
6.2. The neoliberal turn and national merger control 
 
In no member state was the break with the KWNS as sharp as in the UK, where the Conservative 
Thatcher government came to power in May 1979. Acting on the basis of neoliberal ideas of 
regulation the government, for instance privatised large parts of the public sector and succeeded in 
weakening the power of the unions significantly (Coates, 1999: 653). Moreover the Conservative 
government ‘found little difficulty in denying itself in practice use of discretionary powers available 
under British statutes to promote national industrial-policy objectives’ (Woolcock et al., 1991: 98). 
All of this was part of the governments’ commitment to restore what it perceived as the ‘over-
governed, over-regulated and over-taxed’ UK economy of the 1970s (Coates, 2000: 193). However, 
the election of the new government did not lead to a comprehensive re-programming of the 
competition authorities, although some changes were introduced. For instance, the threshold above 
which authorities would be allowed to intervene in mergers was raised to £15 million in 1980 and 
then to £30 million in 1984, hereby increasing the scope for industries to restructure (Schwartz, 
1993: 636). Moreover, the existing provisions dealing with the investigation of firms’ anti-
competitive practices were streamlined with the 1980 Competition Act (Cini, 2006; Utton, 2000: 
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276) and the 1989 Companies Act gave the OFT more negotiation power vis-à-vis companies 
seeking merger clearance (Kryda, 2002: 255).  
 
Although the public interest criterion was retained in British merger legislation in the Thatcher era, 
some scholars have observed that now merger control became ‘exploited to redirect attention in an 
increasingly economics-oriented direction’ which was a phenomenon related to ‘the underlying 
shift in the political environment towards market-based economics that accompanied the election of 
Mrs Thatcher’s governments’ (Scott et al., 2006: 7). More concretely this meant that, despite the 
continued existence of the public interest criterion, mergers were increasingly regulated primarily 
on the basis of their alleged effect on competition. This was especially the case after 1984 where the 
so-called “Tebbit Guidelines”, named after Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Norman 
Tebbit, were issued, establishing (in a legally non-binding way) competition as the primary criterion 
in merger inquiries (see Wilks, 1999: 221-223 for a more detailed and nuanced account). In this 
sense the wider neoliberal shift taking place in the UK also became reflected in the regulation of 
mergers. 
 
In France a socialist government, under Francois Mitterrand’s presidency, took office in 1981. As 
Gourevitch (1986: 185) observes, ‘[t]he ending of over two decades of right-center rule occurred 
just as the international economy was entering the worst depression since 1929’. In an attempt to 
restore the economy, characterised as it was by high inflation and rising unemployment, the new 
government lowered the minimum wage, reduced the workweek and hired 100,000 new workers. 
Moreover, 49 companies were nationalised and state aid to industry went from 25 billion francs in 
1981 to 86 billion in 1986 (Schwartz, 1993: 633). The operation was, to say the least, not a great 
success. Partly due to the unfavourable climate in the international economy, the situation in France 
only got worse. Already in 1983 the government began opting for new solutions. After three 
consecutive devaluations, it decided to more or less discard Keynesian economic policies. In 
particular, it was the Minister of Finance, Jacques Delors, who advocated an acceptance of the 
market economy and who introduced a plan which aimed at reducing inflation in order to achieve 
international competitiveness (at the cost of high unemployment) (Dormois, 2004: 24). France 
remained within the European Monetary System and at this stage the government also began 
embracing European integration more wholeheartedly (see also Moravcsik, 1991: 51). Moreover, 
the Socialist government began “rolling back” parts of the industrial policy it had been introducing  
and this process was continued once a centre-right coalition led by Jacques Chirac gained majority 
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in the National Assembly in 1986. The new prime minister argued in favour of privatisation and 
indeed a rather limited number of state owned companies were sold before the Socialists regained 
their majority in the National Assembly in 1988. Yet one should not take this to mean that the 
French governments of the 1980s entirely turned their back on the dirigist policies of the 1960s and 
1970s. As one scholar has observed, ‘[t]he step back from state interventionism was significant, but 
complex and ambivalent beneath the surface. France’s wavering between dirigisme and 
privatization paralleled its ambivalence toward the European Community’ (Schwartz, 1993: 634).  
 
This was, for example reflected in the competition unit of regulation. For instance, the Chirac 
government adopted legislation that made it more difficult for foreigners to buy French companies 
and in the mid 1980s the inefficient 1977 merger control legislation was amended. The Ordinance 
of December 1986, which was apparently meant to liberalise the French economy (see e.g. Garnier 
& Asselineau, 1991: 44), introduced some changes in the existing competition unit of regulation. In 
particular one development deserves mentioning here. The Commission de la Concurrence was 
replaced with the Conseil de la Concurrence. Hereby a quasi-judicial institution which was 
independent of the Ministry of Economics, namely the Conseil, was programmed to function as the 
main enforcer of French competition law. This was significant as it substituted ‘judicial oversight 
over interpretation and enforcement for political discretion’ (Souam, 1998: 209), hereby 
representing a turn towards neoliberalism. However, it is also worth noting that in the sub-unit of 
merger control the Minister of Economics retained the decision-making powers that had been 
established with the 1977 law (see also Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 1996: 226). As two scholars pointed 
out in a publication from 1991, the number of merger decisions by the Conseil was very limited 
indeed: it had issued only six opinions on merger transactions at this stage (Garnier & Asselineau, 
1991: 44).  
 
In Germany, the SPD Government (which had been in power for 16 years) was replaced with the 
Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU/FDP) Kohl Government in 1982. This signalled a partial re-
orientation of German politics in a more neoliberal direction, although it should be mentioned that 
such a shift had already taken place in the monetary unit of regulation in the mid 1970s, where the 
Bundesbank ‘shifted away from a focus on growth … to one emphasising economic stability, 
through a non-accommodating, hard money policy’ (Schmidt, 2002: 70). In other words, the 
Bundesbank embraced a “monetarist” USDR entailing a commitment to ensuring low inflation 
above all other goals. As regards the economic policies of the Kohl government, these did not 
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constitute a radical break with the past (Jessop & Sum, 2006a: 145). The government believed that 
the best way to deal with the economic crisis was to promote free markets and to strengthen the 
international competitiveness of German industry through an increase in the flexibility of capital 
and labour, and  through deregulation and tax reductions and through a reduction of the power of 
trade unions (van der Wurff, 1993: 176). However, this latter aspect did not amount to a frontal 
attack on the unions similar to the one launched by Thatcher: indeed, rather than trying to exclude 
them from influence, the Christian-liberal strategy was to tie them into the flexibilisation process 
(Jessop & Sum, 2006a: 139).  
 
In the competition unit of regulation, where cartels had previously been the main concrete object of 
regulation, merger control became increasingly important in the 1980s. Against opposition from 
many German capital actors, the GWB was to a limited extent revised in 1980 in order to enable the 
BKartA to deal effectively with conglomerate and vertical mergers (see also Smith, 1994: 446). 
This was the only example of an external amendment of German merger legislation in this period, 
but as it turned out not to function as hoped for, the BKartA and the courts engaged in a process of 
internal programming in which they developed some instruments and procedures that could be used 
to deal more effectively with this sort of merger (see Gerber, 1998: 323-324 for details). An 
interesting development in the Kohl era was that merger regulation in practice tended to become 
less politicised, marking an “informal” neoliberal turn. To be sure, the BKartA had been 
programmed to be politically independent from the outset and did regulate mergers purely on the 
basis of their effects on competition. But whereas the Minister of Economics had overruled the 
decisions of the BKartA on some occasions in the 1970s, this became a rare phenomenon in the 
1980s (see also Heidenhain, 1991: 67). Although the Minister remained the highest instance of 
appeal, it only happened on one occasion that a merger which had been prohibited by the BKartA 
was subsequently allowed by the Minister68. This can be seen as an intensification of the neo-liberal 
features of the German merger sub-unit of regulation. 
 
 
6.3. European integration and the ERT 
 
The state of paralysis that the EC had found itself in the late 1970s continued into the early 1980s. 
The Community was enlarged with Greece in 1981 but apart from that the period is primarily 
remembered for Thatcher’s rather aggressive attempts to decrease what she considered to be the 
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unacceptably high financial burden of British EC membership. Indeed, from 1979 to 1984 the 
agenda was dominated by the British budgetary question and by increased awareness of the effects 
of the not-so-well functioning CAP (Johnson & Turner, 2006: 34). The national political leaders 
appeared unable or unwilling to take an initiative that could effectively give rise to the common 
market already envisioned in EC Treaty, a common market that was still effectively blocked by the 
continued existence of numerous barriers to the free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital.  
 
By the mid 1980s the European integration process gained momentum again. Jacques Delors had 
become President of the Commission in 1985, taking over from the rather anonymous Gaston Thorn 
(Luxembourg) who had served since 1981. Unlike his predecessor, Delors ‘possessed an abundance 
of ambition, competence, and resourcefulness’ (Dinan, 1999: 103) and decided to make the 
promotion of the single market his main project (see also Tsoukalis, 1997: 42-43). In the spring of 
1985 the internal market Commissioner, Lord Arthur Cockfield, presented a White Paper in which 
almost 300 obstacles that had to be removed in order to truly integrate markets were identified 
(Commission, 1985a). The year 1992 was suggested as the date by which the internal market should 
be completed. The White Paper was endorsed by the European Council at their Milan Summit in 
June 1985 but as Delors pointed out on this occasion, this would not be sufficient: the 
implementation of the internal market had to be facilitated by institutional reform.  
 
The Single European Act (SEA) which was adopted in 1986, and constituted the first major revision 
of the EC Treaty, was a response to this perceived need for institutional reprogramming – not only 
in the light of the “1992 programme” but also because Spain and Portugal were to join the 
Community in 1986. With the SEA most legislation related to the single market was now to be 
adopted with qualified majority (as opposed to unanimity) voting; the Parliament was given slightly 
more power in the decision-making processes with the so-called cooperation procedure; a new 
court, namely the Court of First Instance (CFI), was created in order to relieve the Court of some of 
its work; and the EC was given more competences in units of regulation such as environment, 
research and technology, and cohesion policy (see e.g. Bache & George, 2006: 160-163). Although 
Delors played an important role in the re-launch of European integration it would be erroneous to 
think that it can be explained solely with reference to his qualities as an agent. Indeed, he was only 
capable of making the difference he made because of the favourable context in which he found 
himself. In particular, the European Council had managed to reach a settlement on the budget issue 
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and to agree on a limited CAP reform in 1984, meaning that when Delors took office the political 
conditions were better than they had been for a long while (see Dinan, 1999: 103 for more details).  
 
In addition to this, the developments that were taking place in the economic sphere turned out to be 
of decisive importance. More precisely, the increased internationalisation of the economy and the 
emergence of multinational companies in the 1970s created the material basis for the gradual 
transnationalisation of fractions of the capitalist class. During the 1980s such transnational social 
forces were to make a difference in relation to developments in the European level political sphere. 
In particular, the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), which is identified by van 
Apeldoorn (2000: 157) as an important elite platform for an emerging transnational class, deserves 
attention here69. Consisting of top executives from a range of Europe’s largest industrial companies, 
the ERT was formed in 1983 in order to push for a European level initiative that could help to end 
the economic crisis. At this stage large parts of industry felt threatened by competition from in 
particular American and Japanese companies and many business leaders had already for some time 
been frustrated with the EC’s lack of drive and efficiency. However, no major political initiative 
was likely to be around the corner.  
 
The ERT was formed against this background. Among its main initiators, in particular Pehr 
Gyllenhammar of Volvo (Sweden), who became the Roundtable’s first Chairman, and Wisse 
Dekker of Philips deserve mentioning. Wisse Dekker publicly declared that ‘If we wait for our 
governments to do anything, we will be waiting for a long time. You can’t get all tied up with 
politics. Industry has to take the initiative. There is no other way’ (quoted in Gutteridge, 2000: 16). 
However, the idea to create a European business elite forum was born by the Commission, or more 
precisely by Etienne Davignon, the Commissioner for Industry and International Markets, and 
Francois-Xavier Ortoli, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs (and former 
President of the Commission). Although UNICE was formally the most important representative of 
European business, it had a reputation for being somewhat inefficient and was not held in very high 
regard by the political and economic elites (see also van Apeldoorn, 2002: 102). The two 
Commissioners desired a different type of interlocutor: 
 
‘when national governments have to speak with industry they speak with the 
federation of industry or business or whatever it’s called in the different countries 
and the responsible business leaders are there. At the European level UNICE does 
not have that status. UNICE is a federation of federations. So you speak to the 
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officials of the federation which does not give you the feedback that you require ... 
and so with my friend Ortoli ... we told the business leaders that if they would come 
up with something, which involved significant business leaders, we would be ready 
to ask them questions and we would be ready to speak to them. So that was how it 
started’ (Davignon, Interview70) 
 
The ERT was what business leaders came up with. Originally composed by the leaders of 17 large 
European companies (including Shell, Fiat, Unilever, Renault and Siemens), the Roundtable 
constituted an interlocutor that differed a great deal from UNICE and any other business group 
operating at the European level. Because its members occupied positions as important managers of 
European industrial capital (with an attendant impact on growth and employment), the ERT 
constituted a force that had to be taken seriously by political decision-makers. As van Apeldoorn 
puts it, ‘[t]he political power of the ERT is … directly related to the structural power of 
transnational capital’. This force was operating at different political levels: at the national level its 
members had direct access to government ministers; at the intergovernmental level ERT members 
would meet on a regular basis with ministers of the government taking over the Presidency of the 
EC71; and at the supranational level the Roundtable had very close connections to the Commission. 
As mentioned, Davignon and Ortoli had acted as midwives of the Roundtable and both of them took 
part in the first ERT meeting that took place in April 1983. Over the years what has been described 
as a “symmetrically interdependent” relationship developed between the ERT and the Commission: 
the ERT needs the Commission due to the latter’s role as an important agenda setter in the EC/EU 
system, whereas the Commission needs the ERT due to its power vis-à-vis member state 
governments (see Holman, 2001: 171-172).  
 
It is not only its power and influence that distinguishes the ERT from traditional lobby groups; the 
purpose of its operations is also of a different nature. Whereas economic lobby groups normally 
seek to further the (perceived) self interest of some smaller or larger group of companies (e.g. a 
particular sector), the ERT seeks to develop more general strategies in order to improve the overall 
business climate in Europe. As Davignon, who was later (in 1986) to become a member of the ERT 
himself in his capacity as chairman of Société Générale de Belgique72, puts it, ‘The Roundtable 
would not ... deal with individual questions ... we would deal with general questions of interest to 
business, but not with sectorial issues’ (Davignon, Interview).  
 
Although the ERT is formulating strategies “on behalf” of business as a whole, it is doing this ‘from 
the vantage point of a particular class fraction’ (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 106), namely that of 
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transnational (and primarily industrial) capital. Yet, as shown by van Apeldoorn (2002: 118-123) a 
fractional struggle took place within the ERT in its early years. In its first five years a “Europeanist” 
fraction was dominant vis-á-vis a “globalist” fraction. The former fraction, the members of which 
did not perceive their companies to be truly globally competitive, wished for the creation of a 
European home market that, to some extent would shield them from competition from US and 
Japanese companies, and pushed for European level policies that could support the emergence of 
globally competitive “European champions”. That is, this fraction formulated its strategies on the 
basis of what we could call Euro-mercantilist ideas of regulation (see also section 5.4).  
 
It was the members of the Europeanist fraction, including the abovementioned CEOs of Volvo and 
Philips, who began pushing for a European solution to the crisis in the immediate wake of the 
Roundtable’s creation. As some scholars have noted, the abovementioned 1985 White Paper was 
strongly inspired by plans for a single market drafted by Wisse Dekker already in 1983 (Cowles, 
1995: 514-516), plans in which Dekker had suggested the need to set a target date for its completion 
(precisely as the Commission later chose to do). That the White Paper was endorsed by the 
European Council, was to no small extent due to the pro-active efforts of Roundtable members and 
once the SEA had been adopted, the ERT established an Internal Market Support Committee, 
consisting of ten ERT-members, which kept an eye on the actual implementation of the 1992-
project. This group had several meetings with the Commission and Member State governments 
where it exercised strong pressure in order to ensure that they lived up to their promises (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002: 130).  
 
The success of the Europeanist fraction in initiating the re-launch of European integration and in 
ensuring the implementation of White Paper is well documented (Cowles, 1995: 518-520). 
However, as van Apeldoorn points out, the internal market that emerged ‘in many ways did not turn 
out to be the kind of home market that many of the early Roundtable members (of the Europeanist 
fraction) had envisaged … in the end, the internal market was not, or was only minimally, 
supported by the kind of “flanking” policies that the neomercantilists had hoped would nurture the 
growth of European champions and protect them against global competition’ (2002: 130-131). 
Indeed, the Euro-mercantilist ideas of regulation were losing momentum towards the end of the 
1980s: at the EC level, member states like the UK and Germany blocked industrial policy proposals 
made by France and Italy. And the managers of transnational capital were also becoming 
increasingly wary of such interventionist policies. This was also reflected in the ERT, where the 
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ideological outlook became increasingly neoliberal concurrently with the strengthening of the 
globalist fraction. This was especially the case after 1988 where the Roundtable merged with the 
Groupe des Présidents the members of which were industrial capital actors oriented towards the 
global level (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 87-88).  
 
 
6.4. The revitalisation and transformation of the EC competition unit of regulation 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the competition unit of regulation had not become as 
prominent a feature of the EC as some programmers (namely the German ordoliberals) had 
originally hoped for. In the heydays of the KWNS most member states and capital actors did not 
genuinely perceive a need to strengthen the powers of the Commission in this area: capitalist 
production was primarily (but of course not exclusively) organised at the intra-national level and 
here concentration was generally regarded as a positive phenomenon which it was rarely considered 
desirable to prevent through regulation (whether national or supranational). The futile attempt by 
the Commission to obtain genuine powers in the merger regulation area in the early 1970s (beyond 
those granted to it by the Court in the Continental Can case) in no uncertain manner confirmed that 
member states were unwilling to equip it with additional powers. In this not-so-friendly 
environment the strategy followed by the Competition DG was to keep a relatively low profile and 
to interpret the rules rather generously in order not to create more enemies than necessary.  
 
However, at the same time the significant degree of operational autonomy acquired through 
Regulation 17 enabled the Competition DG to incrementally expand its powers on a case-by-case 
basis, not least due to its “partnership” with the Court. In a long string of rulings throughout the 
1970s, ‘the frontiers of competition law were pushed forward and its detailed application was 
clarified’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 29). In this period, then, the programming of the Competition 
DG was thus to a large extent delivered by the Court and the DG itself, rather than by member 
states and/or indirect programmers such as capital actors. However, incrementalism had its price. 
Both the Competition DG and the Court was overburdened with the high number of notifications 
and appeals that kept piling up, and hence the DG earned itself the widespread reputation of being 
ineffectual and incompetent. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s EC competition policy ‘was 
condemned as overcentralised and overambitious, as possessing inadequate decision-making and 
enforcement procedures, as proving too readily susceptible to political pressures, and as failing to 
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deliver what it promised’ with the result that ‘morale was at an all-time low within DGIV’ (Cini & 
McGowan, 1998: 29). 
 
That the 1980s witnessed a major revitalisation and transformation of the EC competition unit of 
regulation, which culminated with the adoption of the MCR in 1989, was related to the wider 
revival of the integration process in the mid 1980s. But the ground had been prepared by the 
Competition DG from the early 1980s, or more precisely after the appointment of Frans Andriessen 
(Netherlands) as new Commissioner of Competition in 1981. Andriessen’s leadership style was 
much more proactive than that of his predecessors and his outlook was more neoliberal. That is, he 
saw competition as an inherently positive phenomenon, believing that the depressed European 
industry would prosper from being exposed to, as opposed to being shielded from, increased 
competition. Translating this into a neoliberal USDR, he now began promoting ‘competition policy 
as a European-level response to the industrial malaise that had swept the region over the previous 
decade’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 31). During the Andriessen era, the competition unit of 
regulation thus became an increasingly important and high-profiled element in the broader EC 
ensemble of regulation. As we will come back to below this also involved a renewed attempt on 
part of the Commission to obtain powers to regulate European level M&As. 
 
In 1985, when Delors became president of the Commission, Irishman Peter Sutherland replaced 
Andriessen. Sutherland, an ex-attorney general and a former rugby player, had asked Delors for the 
job ‘because of its economic importance, and because a close reading of the Treaty of Rome had 
shown him that, in theory, the commission had more power in this field than in any other’ (Ross, 
1995: 160). Eager to turn these theoretical powers into practice, Sutherland’s became known for an 
aggressive style: a style that induced Delors to dub him the “little sheriff” (Schwartz, 1993: 639). 
The Financial Times described him as an ‘increasingly controversial Commissioner’ who ‘stuns his 
opponents with shows of aggression, only to tie them up later in legal argument (skills which he 
learnt during training as a barrister)’ (1987b). To an even larger extent than his predecessor, 
Sutherland was a neoliberalist and hence a strong believer in free competition. This ideological 
outlook resonated well with the abovementioned ideological developments taking place in some 
member states (above all of course the UK), and at the broader EC level, where a neoliberal GDR 
(translated into various USDRs) was gaining momentum. On the other hand, neoliberalism was not 
(yet) the hegemonic discourse: many agents in the political and economic elites still subscribed to 
(or had at least not completely abandoned) a national-mercantilist position. Although it was thus the 
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case that large segments of such elites were much more receptive to this ideology than they had 
been ten years earlier, the Commission’s pro-competition discourse was certainly not universally 
embraced in the member states. This was not only reflected in the negotiations over the merger 
regulation (see section 6.6 below) but also in the state aid sub-unit of regulation.  
 
Like it had been the case in the 1960s and especially the 1970s state aid to industry in the form not 
only of direct subsidies but also, for instance of tax breaks, loans and loan guarantees, continued to 
constitute an important element in most of the member states’ industrial policies in the 1980s. 
According to one estimate, which was reported in the Economist (1988: 68), the EC governments 
aided industry with 93 billion Euros in 1986, an amount almost three times as large as the EC’s 
entire budget. And in 1988 ‘state aid accounted for about 10 per cent of public expenditure or 3-5 
per cent of GDP, in other words, a hugely distorting degree of cross-subsidy from the taxpayer to 
industry’ (Wilks, 2005a: 124). Although the EC Treaty (Article 92) states that aid to industry which 
result in a distortion of competition are incompatible with the common market, the Competition DG 
had often chosen not to interfere. Each year from 1981 to 1986, the member states reported between 
92 and 200 cases of state aid to the DG and the latter only acted against less than 10 per cent of 
these cases (Dinan, 1999: 385). Yet in the mid 1980s, after the appointment of Peter Sutherland and 
the adoption of the 1992-program, the DG began to take a much more proactive stance vis-à-vis the 
competition distorting forms of state aid. Obviously, this was a difficult task as member states were 
rarely eager to let the Commission obstruct their attempts to, for instance rescue declining 
industries. As a response to such difficulties Sutherland invented a new “naming and shaming” 
strategy where the size of state aid granted by each member state government was made public in 
periodic surveys (Wilks, 2005a: 124). Although the Commission’s efforts did not eliminate the state 
aid phenomenon, it is indisputable that the amounts spent on state aid began to decrease 
significantly from the late 1980s onwards (see Chapter 7). 
 
The Commission’s attempts to force the Council to adopt a merger control regulation were 
intensified in the Sutherland era (see section 6.6 below). These attempts continued with 
undiminished zeal when Leon Brittan replaced Sutherland in early 1989 (as did the Competition DG 
campaign against state aid). Like Sutherland, Brittan was a ‘genuine neo-liberal to whom a fully 
open market was the only industrial policy’ (Ross, 1995: 130). To him the objective of the EC 
competition unit of regulation is ‘to help European capitalism become more healthy, vibrant and 
competitive and prevent its decline into the cosy corporatism that so much of the European left used 
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to espouse’ (Brittan, quoted in Allen, 2003: 64). Brittan’s leadership style had much in common 
with that of his predecessor. Indeed, he has been described as ‘a bulldog of a politician inside the 
Commission, determined to struggle for his own goals, armed with the personal self-confidence of a 
top class English barrister and backed by a top-notch cabinet’ (Ross, 1995: 130). McGowan & 
Wilks (1995: 151-152) describe the common features of the two competition commissioners with 
the following words: ‘Both were ambitious, energetic and dynamic personalities and seized the rare 
opportunity presented by the single market programme to advance both the spirit of competition and 
their own political futures. Both also possessed excellent public relations skills…’ (McGowan & 
Wilks, 1995: 151-152). To this, one can add that ‘Sutherland and Brittan were both extremely 
skilful negotiators, well-connected with industry, and also good negotiators with ministers’ (Faull, 
Interview73).  
 
Under the leadership of Andriessen, Sutherland and Brittan, the EC competition policy was 
revitalised and the Competition DG went from being ‘an uninspiring and fringe directorate into one 
of the most prominent and important’ (McGowan & Wilks, 1995: 151). But as already hinted at 
above, the agency of the three competition commissioners alone cannot account for the 
transformation of EC competition policy and of the DG. First, there is no doubt that the 
aforementioned transformations taking place in the wider context, not only in the wider institutional 
ensemble of which the DG formed part and in key member states, but also in the ideological climate 
and in the economic sphere, were preconditions for the revitalisation of EC competition policy. This 
is also the context in which the processes leading up to the adoption of the MCR in 1989 should be 
seen. Second, the revitalisation was made possible by the above-mentioned incremental evolution of 
EC competition law and the regulatory experience accumulated by Competition DG staff over the 
years. And thirdly, the revitalisation was accompanied with and reinforced by the recruitment of 
new staff, mainly lawyers from national competition authorities (NCAs) over the course of the 
1980s (Cini, 2000: 79). Especially from the mid-1980s neoliberalism became the prevailing 
ideology (or GDR) within the DG. As Cini (2000: 85) explains, the neoliberal rhetoric of 
Competition DG staff  
 
‘...underpins a shared view of the world which almost goes as far as delineating good 
from evil and right from wrong. The language used to define interventionist or anti-
competitive acts is almost biblical in the sense that images of evil firms or good 
governments simplify an extremely complex process of analysis. The biblical 
imagery can also be applied to the “missionary” zeal with which DGIV staff pursue 
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their cases. There exists amongst officials a shared commitment to the spread of 
DGIV values, not only within the EU but also globally’ 
 
 
6.5. Moving towards an EC merger regulation 
 
The negotiations over an EC merger control regulation resumed in the early 1980s. In June 1981 the 
Parliament complained that it had not been possible for the Council to reach agreement on the 
proposed 1973 regulation (cf. Parliament, 1981). The Commission and Andriessen agreed. Hence, 
in December 1981 an amended proposal for a merger regulation was issued. The proposal contains 
a number of revisions to the 1973 proposal, many of which were designed to show that the proposal 
only implied mergers with “community dimension”. Indeed, it was suggested that the initially 
proposed threshold values were raised from ECU 200 million to 500 million (this refers to 
aggregate yearly turnover of the companies involved in a merger) (Article 1(2)). According to The 
Economist, ‘Mr Andriessen reckons the regulation has a good chance of getting through this time, 
since he has had some encouragement from the new French government. Britain is expected to be 
pliable, too; but Italy is unpredictable’ (Economist, 1981: 64). However, when reading the 
Commission’s comments for the proposal, which contains a brief account of the position of the 
different member states, a somewhat different picture emerges. Here it appears that the Commission 
was anything but confident that the proposal was going to be adopted in the Council (see 
Commission, 1981: 1). 
 
And indeed there turned out to be little reason for optimism on the part of the Commission. Like it 
had been case in the 1970s, the involved programmers subscribed to more or less incompatible 
USDRs: USDRs that by and large were similar to those identified in the previous chapter. This 
turned out to be decisive in relation to the two main bones of contention, namely the division of 
labour between the national and the supranational level and the criteria on the basis of which the 
Commission was to regulate mergers. Article 1(3) in the Commission’s 1973 proposal already 
allowed for exemption from prohibition of mergers that were ‘indispensable’ for the realisation of 
goals that were in the general interest of the Community (see section 5.4). But for some countries 
this was not enough whereas others thought it went too far: ‘France, the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Ireland have requested that exemption should also be possible on grounds of national industrial, 
regional or social policies. Germany and Denmark oppose this idea’ (Commission, 1981: 3)74. In 
163 
 
other words, a number of member states, led by the governments of France and Italy, still advocated 
a position grounded in the national-mercantilist USDR. As regards the UK, the Thatcher 
government was certainly less in favour of industrial policies than its predecessors had been (see 
section 6.2). As such it would probably be misleading to categorise it as a proponent of national-
mercantilism. It might be argued that the UK government was taking a particular nationalist 
position grounded in the neoliberal USDR – but then one should not forget that the “public interest” 
was still taken into consideration in the UK merger subunit of regulation, meaning that it had not 
yet been consistently “neoliberalised”. The bottom line is that at this stage the UK government was, 
to say the least, reluctant to cede any genuine powers to the Commission in this field.  
 
Hence, it formed part of a group of important member state governments demanding that the 
Council was to play an important role in the regulation of mergers. In accordance with Article 19 of 
the Commission’s draft proposal an advisory committee was to evaluate the Commission’s 
decisions in specific cases. If the committee opposed a decision with qualified majority the Council 
was to be involved in the case. The member states could agree this far. But the question was what 
precisely the Council should be allowed to do in such cases. France, Italy and UK demanded that 
the Council should have the right to make the final decision regarding whether such mergers should 
be approved or not (Commission, 1981: 3). Obviously this would entail a more 
“intergovernmentalist” form of merger control regulation that would enable the member states to 
ensure that the Commission would be kept on a short leash.  
 
Important European capital actors also opposed granting the Commission the proposed powers in 
the merger area. In particular, UNICE did certainly not welcome the draft proposal. It appears from 
a position paper dated 24 June 1982 that ‘UNICE’s objections to the draft remain fundamental’ 
(1982: 1). More precisely, UNICE had three main objections. First, that the criteria to be applied by 
the Commission were too unclear and that ‘[a] much more concrete approach than this is necessary’ 
(1982: 1). Second, that the proposed system would be far too bureaucratic: ‘It would be 
cumbersome, and the delay and uncertainty over a year or more, during which information would 
be leaked and pressure brought to bear, would mean the failure of a considerable proportion of the 
mergers of any significance’ (1982: 2). In this context it was questioned whether a European level 
system would be needed at all: ‘In fact, the degree of concentration in Europe, and in certain 
member states especially, hardly justifies a system of control involving the failure of schemes 
which might be vital to the industrial and trade future of the Community’ (1982: 2). Third, that the 
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draft proposal did not ensure that double control (that is, control at both national and supranational 
level) would not take place. The conclusion was thus clear: ‘UNICE is opposed to the present draft 
Regulation, which needs major reconsideration’.  
 
The Commission and another group of governments, namely those of Germany, Denmark and the 
Benelux countries, wanted to give the Commission the right to make the final decision in merger 
cases (Commission, 1981: 3). They feared that the regulation of mergers would get too politicised if 
the Council was going to be the body that (in some cases) would make final decisions. In particular 
Germany and Denmark still insisted that the Commission should regulate mergers exclusively on 
the basis of competition criteria, not on the basis of industrial and/or social policy goals. Unlike the 
Commission which remained the main advocate of a position grounded in the Euro-mercantilist 
USDR (despite Andriessen’s personal inclination towards neoliberalism), these two member states 
remained the main proponents of a position grounded in the neoliberal USDR. The position 
grounded in the centre-left USDR was still articulated by majorities in the Parliament and the EESC. 
Like they had done in 1973, they backed the Commission’s draft proposal although certain 
amendments were also suggested this time. For instance, the EESC still wanted industrial and social 
policy goals to be taken into consideration by the Commission in its regulation of mergers (EESC, 
1982). To sum up, it seems that at this stage little had changed in the Council since the 1970s. The 
Council was unable to reach agreement on a merger regulation and history repeated itself when, in 
February 1984, the Commission made a new proposal (Commission, 1984), which contained some 
rather minor amendments to the 1981 proposal (most importantly that the abovementioned 
threshold values were raised from ECU 500 to 750 million).  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Peter Sutherland took over the position as Commissioner for 
Competition from Andriessen in 1985 and from the outset of his tenure the adoption of a merger 
control regulation was a top priority to him. Yet, given the history of negotiations in the Council he 
was also aware that it was going to be easy for the Commission to obtain powers in this field. Hence 
a new strategy was designed: 
 
‘The whole approach that we adopted from the very beginning was to test the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 to see what mechanisms would in any event allow 
for an approach to merger control outside the existence of a merger control 
regulation and thereby stimulating interest in looking at a regulation as such’ 
(Sutherland, Interview75)  
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In other words, in order to put pressure on the member states the Commission now began exploring 
its possibilities of regulating mergers independently of the adoption of a regulation in this field. As 
Sutherland openly put it, ‘[t]he issue is not whether Europe has a merger policy but what type it 
has’ (Economist, 1988: 68). This new strategy was certainly more pro-active, one might say 
aggressive, than the one followed hitherto. Notwithstanding this, the Council turned down a new 
proposal for a regulation made by the Commission on 21 November 1986. This new proposal 
contained a number of minor amendments, of which the most important was that the Commission 
suggested abolishing the provisions in the regulation that would allow the Council to intervene in 
the Commission’s decisions (Commission, 1986). This move towards neoliberalism contradicted 
the position defended by France, Italy and the UK in 1981 (see above) and did therefore not 
constitute the magic formula that made it possible to reach agreement in the Council.  
 
The Commission’s attempts to put the member states under pressure were eased significantly with 
the Court’s ruling in the Philip Morris case in November 1987. This case had arisen when two 
tobacco companies, BAT Industries and R.J. Reynolds complained to the Commission about an 
agreement between two of their rivals, namely Philip Morris and Rembrandt Group. This agreement 
did not only give Phillip Morris control over half of the shares in Rothman Tobacco Holdings (one 
of the Rembrandt Group’s subsidiaries) but also the right to veto a possible future sale of 
Rothman’s shares. On the basis of its investigations the Competition DG concluded that the 
agreement had to be changed. Phillip Morris appealed the decision, but the Court decided to uphold 
its most important aspects and furthermore took the opportunity to comment on the applicability of 
Article 85 to mergers. Contrary to common perception, which was also the view articulated by the 
Commission in its 1966 memorandum (see section 5.4), the Court stated that Article 85 could be 
applied if a concentration resulted from the merger between two or more companies. In other 
words, the Court interpreted Article 85 to the effect that it would be applicable to the regulation of 
so-called “friendly mergers” (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 119). 
 
With this ruling, which has been described as ”ground-breaking” (Majone, 1996: 272), ‘the Court 
was contradicting the mood of the member states as expressed in their refusal to accept drafts of a 
merger regulation placed before them in 1982 and 1984’ (Wincott, 1996: 179). But the ruling 
should be seen as an element in the more general strategy of the Court (see section 5.2). As Gerber 
(1994: 109) explains 
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”the Court interpreted the treaty’s competition law provisions in light of its own 
conception of what was necessary to achieve the integrationist goals of the treaty. It 
conveyed a clear message that this goal-driven methodology was not merely to be 
one of many principles to be used in interpreting the treaty, but rather the dominant 
interpretive method” 
 
There can hardly be any doubt that the intention of the Court was to assist the Commission in its 
efforts to put the member states under further pressure. If the governments had not already 
understood the message it was unmistakable now: the Commission was determined to obtain the 
competencies necessary to regulate mergers and the Court was willing to interpret the Treaty in 
creative ways in order to help it to succeed! The practical consequence of the Philip Morris ruling 
was that a regime with multiple controls of certain mergers arose – that is, regulation from both 
NCAs and the Competition DG. As one can imagine this created a lot of uncertainty and costs for 
some parts of industry, that now began to notify mergers to the Competition DG although no rules 
existed that demanded them to do this (Bulmer, 1994). Hence, when GEC/Siemens made a bid for 
Plessey in 1988, it chose to notify it to seven competition authorities; namely those of the UK, 
Germany, the Commission, Australia, Canada, South Africa and the US. Seven law firms were 
involved in this process (Woolcock et al., 1991: 16). Although the different authorities reached 
similar conclusions in this particular case, it nonetheless made it clear that the existence of multiple 
national rules could turn out to be a major threat towards cross-border M&As, especially in a 
situation where their number was increasing rapidly (see below). Meanwhile Sutherland was 
determined to show the surrounding world that his threats of using Articles 85 and 86 to regulate 
M&As were not just empty words: in March 1988 he forced British Airways to give up some of the 
routes it had acquired when taking over British Caledonian, although the deal had been approved by 
the British competition authorities (Grant, 1994: 161; Economist, 1988: 67). 
 
In the wake of the Philip Morris ruling in November 1987, the Council gave the Commission its 
permission to draft a new proposal for a merger regulation (McGowan & Cini, 1999: 180). In April 
1988 the Commission presented its fifth proposal for a regulation (Commission, 1988a). The 
Council once again chose to consult the EESC and the Parliament. And in its opinion of 2 June 
1988 the EESC once again emphasised the need for a regulation: a need that, according to the 
Committee, had become even more pressing with the Court’s ruling in the Philip Morris case. At 
the same time the EESC deplored the fact that the Commission had failed to take into account the 
previous opinions made by the committee. Among other things it was again emphasised that the 
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merger control regulation ought to ensure ‘that in concentrations of undertakings in the Community, 
account is taken of established employee rights’ (EESC, 1988). 
 
The Parliament expressed a similar standpoint. In its report of 30 September 1988, the Parliament’s 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy suggested 30 changes in the 
Commission’s proposal (Parliament, 1988a). The purpose of a number of these changes was to 
secure the rights of employees in merging companies. Among other things, it was suggested that the 
Commission, instead of just being concerned with competition in the Single Market, should also 
make its approval of mergers ‘contingent upon conditions and requirements designed to ensure that 
the collective workers’ rights are in force in one of the undertakings involved in the takeover are not 
restricted’  and it was furthermore suggested that the employees in merging companies should be 
given the right to be heard by the Commission during its review process (Parliament, 1988a: 10). 
On 26 October 1988, the Parliament gave its support to the committee’s changed version of the 
Commission’s proposal (Parliament, 1988b). 
 
Against this backdrop and the ongoing negotiations in the Council, on 19 December 1988 the 
Commission presented a slightly changed version of its March proposal (Commission, 1988b),  a 
version that did not contain any references to rights of employees in merging companies. In 
particular two articles in this proposal are worth mentioning here. First, Article 1(3) in which the 
Commission suggested that mergers with a total global turnover above one billion ECU or a 
Community-wide revenue of at least ECU 100 million  should be subject to the Regulation. Second, 
Article 2(3), according to which, the Commission’s regulation of mergers, would not be solely 
based on pure criteria of competition. More precisely, this article states that in situations where 
certain mergers will lead to market domination ‘the competitiveness of the sectors concerned with 
regard to international competition and the interests of consumers shall be taken into account’ 
(Commission, 1988b). With this formulation it would seem that the Commission would be given 
the power to regulate mergers on the basis not only of competition criteria but also industrial and 
social policy goals. This was noteworthy, when one takes Sutherland’s neoliberal inclinations into 
consideration: he certainly didn’t believe in industrial policy. Indeed, as he has later explained, ‘I 
was always somewhat doubtful of that but it was part of the politics of getting a merger control 
regulation through. I mean, I have always been inclined to the view that competition policy should 
be uncontaminated by other issues’ (Sutherland, Interview). The continued inclusion of these 
provisions should thus be interpreted as an attempt to comply with the wishes of the countries 
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advocating a mercantilist position, in particular France and Italy, rather than as a reflection of the 
position of the Competition DG and its Commissioner. The latter would clearly prefer a neoliberal 
type of merger regulation á la the one favoured (and insisted on!) by Germany (on the various 
countries’ positions, see section 6.7 below).  
 
 
6.6. The changed position of capital actors 
 
There is no question that the relentless efforts of the Commission and to some extent the Court to 
induce the member states to reach agreement on a merger regulation turned out to be crucial for the 
eventual adoption of the MCR in 1989. Yet it also seems safe to suggest that this would have been 
an unlikely outcome if not important European capital actors had begun supporting EC regulation in 
this field. Before moving on to look at the positions of the various direct programmers and the 
negotiations in the Council, it is thus relevant to look at the crucial shift in the position of important 
European capital actors vis-à-vis EC merger regulation and the structural background against which 
it took place.  
 
Whereas most capital actors had been opposed to (or at least been very sceptical towards the need 
for) the establishment of an EC merger subunit of regulation since the 1970s, this was to change 
after the mid 1980s. An important reason for this was the increased transnationalisation of European 
business which was reflected in (and partly caused by) the nature of the mergers that were taking 
place in Europe. Mergers had previously predominantly been an intra-national phenomenon, 
something taking place between companies located within the same country, rather than an 
international phenomenon. But this gradually began to change during the 1980s, as can be seen 
from the data presented by the Commission in its annual reports on competition policy dating from 
this period. This data shows that from the beginning of the 1980s and up to the eventual adoption of 
the MCR in 1989, a significant increase in the number of mergers between companies in different 
EC countries (EC level) and between companies located in member states and third countries 
(international level) took place. 
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Table 6.1: Mergers and acquisitions at national, EC and international level 1983-1990 
Source: Based on data from Commission (1985b, 1988, 1989, 1992), data collected by the Commission 
1) Amalgamations of companies in the same Member State 
2) Amalgamations of companies in different Member States  
3) Amalgamations of companies in Member States and third countries with effect on the common market 
 
As it can be seen from Table 6.1, it was the development in the number of EC level mergers that 
was most significant. Whereas only 29 EC level mergers took place in 1983/1984, this number had 
increased to 257 in 1989/1990. To put it differently, the proportion of EC level mergers out of the 
total number of mergers went from 18.7 % in 1983/1984 to 41.3% in 1989/1990. The increase in 
EC level mergers was most significant in the period after 1985 where the number increased from 75 
such mergers in 1986/1987 to 257 in 1989/1990, in other words an increase of 242.7 %. In the same 
period the number of international mergers also increased significantly although at a lower level; 
viz. from 17 to 124. This is almost equivalent to a quintuplication in the number of mergers taking 
place at international level. The number of national mergers was larger but on the other hand, the 
increase in this type of mergers was moderate in this period: it rose from 211 in 1986/1987 to 241 in 
1989/1990. It was thus in particularly the developments in the number of cross-border mergers that 
are noticeable in the period preceding the adoption of the MCR. Or to put it differently, the number 
of this type of mergers exploded in a period where considerable uncertainty surrounded the existing 
rules in this area. 
 
Geographically speaking, the largest number of mergers taking place in the period from the mid 
1980s to the adoption of the MCR occurred in the three large member states: Germany, France and 
Britain. For instance, it can be mentioned that of the total 383 mergers taking place in 1987/1988, 
122 involved France, followed by the UK with 106, Germany with 52 and Italy with 49 
(Commission, 1988c: 216). That two new countries, Spain and Greece, became members of the EC 
in 1986, did not have a significant impact on the trends appearing from table 6.1 as only a modest 
number of mergers involved companies in these two countries in the years preceding the adoption 
of the MCR (cf. Commission, 1989: 233; 1992). The chemical industry was the sector in which the 
largest number of mergers took place: 56 of the 197 EC level mergers taking place in 1988/1989 
occurred in this sector, and this number rose to 75 out of a total of 257 in 1989/1990 (Commission, 
1989: 215-216; 1992: 443-445).  
 1983/1984 1984/1985 1985/1986 1986/1987 1987/1988 1988/1989 1989/1990 
National level1) 101 146 145 211 214 233 241 
EC level2) 29 44 52 75 111 197 257 
International level3) 25 18 30 17 58 62 124 
Total 155 208 227 303 383 492 622 
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Table 6.2: Mergers and acquisitions at EC level, 1987-1990, classified by  
 aggregate turnover of the companies involved 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Commission (1989; 1992), data collected by the Commission 
1) amalgamations of companies in different Member States  
 
Another matter of interest here is the size of the mergers taking place prior to the adoption of the 
MCR. It can clearly be seen from table 6.2 that the mergers taking place at EC level in the period 
from 1987-1990 involved an increasing number of companies with large aggregate turnovers. It is 
worth noting that the number of mergers involving an aggregate turnover of more than ECU 10 
billion, was almost trebled in this period. If seen in relation to the trends that appear from table 6.1 
this clearly indicates that a significant concentration of capital took place in the common market in 
this period (cf. Commission, 1987: 233; 1992: 443). 
 
On the basis of information collected from the specialist press the Commission’s report on 
competition policy from 1989 enumerates the motives that were mentioned in relation to the 383 
mergers taking place in 1987/1988. The data shows that the desire to achieve a strengthened market 
position was the by far most important motive for merging, viz. in 25 % of the cases. Among other 
motives expansion and synergy are mentioned in 20 % of the cases and restructuring in 15 % of the 
cases. The desire to strengthen R&D was only mentioned in relation to 2 of the 383 M&As and this 
motive thus takes the last place on the Commission’s list (Commission, 1989: 221). This seems to 
confirm what the secondary literature dealing with the economic context in which the adoption of 
the MCR took place: viz. that the growth in the number of cross-border mergers should be seen in 
connection with the member states’ above-mentioned decision to make the internal market a reality 
by 1 January 1993 (the “1992” programme). As a consequence of this decision, a number of 
European companies could foresee a situation where they would be faced with considerably tougher 
competition than they had been used to. This made many companies realise that their national 
markets were insufficient if they were to survive the increased competition at EC level and 
internationally. This was the primary reason why a comprehensive restructuring process was set in 
motion (see also Tsoukalis, 1997: 82; Woolcock et al., 1991: 11).  
 
> ECU 1 billion  108 163 237 
 1987/1988 1988/1989 1989/1990 
> ECU 2 billion  80 123 176 
> ECU 5 billion  44 79 115 
> ECU 10 billion  25 55 74 
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Now, there is little doubt that the tendency appearing from the data presented by the Commission 
was a real shift: that is, the number of all three types of M&As did increase in the period in 
question. However, one should keep in mind that companies were not required to notify their 
mergers to the Commission at this stage, and hence the data had been collected mainly on the basis 
of information ‘from the specialist press’. One consequence of this seems to have been a rather 
serious underestimation of the actual number (and perhaps also magnitude) of M&As taking place. 
There is no point in going into a long and tedious methodological discussion here. But fact is that in 
works by scholars who mainly draw on data collected by NCAs, a somewhat different picture 
generally emerges. Suffice it to give but a few examples, all taken from a study by Gray & 
McDermott (1989). In the UK a merger boom was taking place from around 1984. Prior to this year, 
the record level of spending on acquisitions had been £2.53 billion, set in 1972. This record was 
broken in 1984 when £5.47 billion was spent, a number which first rose to £7.09 billion in 1985 and 
then to an astonishing £14.9 billion in 1986. The number of mergers in 1986, namely 695, was 
approximately half the 1972 level, meaning that the mergers were now taking place between large 
companies. Indeed, ‘[i]n 1986 the value of the three largest bids equalled the 1985 total’ (1989: 11). 
From 1986 the number of UK mergers rose explosively; first to 1,125 in 1987 and then to 1,338 in 
1988. The largest acquisition to take place in 1988 was when Swiss company Nestlè took over 
Rowntree in June 1988 in a £2.6 billion deal (1989: 10). In Germany, a record number of mergers 
was recorded in 1987: namely 887, of which 405 in one way or the other involved foreign 
companies. Similar to the case in the UK, some of these mergers took place between companies that 
were already large (see below). In public debates, such mergers were referred to as “elephant 
mergers” and in particular the SDU was arguing that the BKartA should do more to block them 
(1989: 15; also Financial Times 1986). In France, the level of merger activity was also rising, not 
least in the field of foreign acquisitions. These rose from 70 in 1985, over 134 in 1986, to 194 in 
1987 (1989: 15). All in all, it seems fair to suggest, on the basis of these selective examples, that 
merger activity in Europe was probably at a somewhat higher level than that recorded by the 
Commission.  
 
Having looked at some structural changes in the economic sphere, we now move on to consider the 
agential and ideational dimensions. As mentioned above, it is well documented that the ERT played 
an important role in relation to the re-launch of the European integration process in the 1980s 
(Cowles, 1995; van Apeldoorn, 2002). Some scholars have indicated that the Roundtable was also 
involved in the processes leading up to the adoption of the merger regulation in 1989. For instance, 
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McGowan & Wilks (1995: 152) write in passing that ‘the European Roundtable of Industrialists 
were at the forefront in pushing for EU merger control’ while Hix (1999: 219) also briefly suggests 
that the merger control regulation was adopted by the member states in response to ‘the rise in 
cross-border mergers in anticipation of the single market and to heavy lobbying by multinational 
firms (in the European Roundtable of Industrialists)’. 
 
Although it is true that transnational capital actors supported the adoption of a merger regulation 
towards the end of the 1980s, it is crucial to clarify that their support for European level regulation 
was not something the Commission could just take for granted from the outset. Even after the mid 
1980s, many in the business community had their doubts as to whether the Competition DG would 
actually be able to enforce merger regulation rules in a reasonable way that would not make life 
even harder for companies involved in cross-border mergers. In the DG the analysis was that 
without business support for the regulation, member states would not be under sufficient pressure to 
give the Commission powers in this field and hence it was vital to persuade important capital actors 
of the need for the regulation. Capital actors thus became important indirect/external programmers 
in the processes leading up to the adoption of the MCR in 1989. 
 
In this context it proved important that a person of Sutherland’s calibre and ideological conviction 
was now in charge of the area. As one key member of Brittan’s cabinet explains, the Commission 
was lucky to have Sutherland (and later Brittan) as this enabled it ‘to get crucial support from 
industry at the time we needed it’ (Faull, Interview). Sutherland had to invest a lot of time and 
energy in order to achieve this support:  
 
‘I spent a lot of time speaking to the corporate world at conferences, and individuals 
in powerful companies, the European Roundtable of Industrialists and so on, to make 
the point that the control of mergers at a national level ultimately meant the division 
of the internal market often on the basis of less than objective criteria and political 
influence and interference. And therefore the corporate world which in general, apart 
from small protectionist elements, wants a market economy structure to work should 
be in favour of a merger control regulation. And I think that we brought them 
onboard at an early stage, in general, the corporate world. A great deal of effort was 
spent on that in a lot of speeches and so on’ (Sutherland, Interview) 
 
Several meetings between Sutherland and ERT members took place (Davignon, Interview; see also 
van Apeldoorn, 2002: 114). And so, although merger control was not one of the areas the ERT had 
initially involved itself in, its members gradually, and especially once the number of cross-border 
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mergers began to rise explosively, came to perceive of the adoption of an EC regulation as 
potentially desirable (Davignon, Interview). In this context it should not be overlooked that a 
number of “ERT companies” were themselves involved in mergers in the 1980s. Nestlé’s 
acquisition of Rowntree was already mentioned above as the biggest merger involving a UK 
company to take place in 1988. Here we can add that Nestlé’s CEO, Helmut Maucher, was a 
member of the ERT (from 1983-1999). British American Tobacco Industries, “represented” in the 
ERT by first Patrick Sheehy (1986-1995) and later Simon Cairns (1996-1998), acquired Eagle Star 
in a 968 million deal in 1983 (the largest acquisition in the UK that year). Unilever, from which a 
number of CEOs have been members of the ERT over the years, took over Brooke Bond in a £ 389 
million deal in 1984 (Gray & McDermott, 1989: 10) and regularly bought up small- to medium-
sized businesses in Europe in the mid 1980s. German chemicals producer Hoechst, represented in 
the ERT by Wolfgang Hilger from 1988 to 1994, acquired US company Celanese in a $2.8 billion 
deal in 1987 (Plastiques Modernes et Elastomeres, 1987). Dutch electronics group Phillips, whose 
CEO Wisse Dekker played an important role in the formation of the ERT and served as its chairman 
from 1988 to 1992 (see above), acquired control over German consumer-electronics company 
Grundig in April 1984 (Wall Street Journal, 1984). And Germany’s biggest industrial group, 
Daimler-Benz, “represented” in the ERT by Werner Breitschwerdt (1986-1987) and Edzard Reuter 
(1988-1998) was involved in a mega-merger when it took over the AEG electrical company in a 
deal that was only reluctantly approved by the BKartA (Financial Times, 1986). In 1987 French 
company Thomson, the CEO of which (Alain Gomez) was an ERT member from 1987 to 1992, 
acquired the consumer electronics division of one of its biggest foreign competitors, US company 
General Electrics in a $3 billion deal (Financial Times, 1987a). Gray & McDermott (1989: 15) 
point out that in Italy there was ‘an increasing number of foreign acquisitions by major companies 
such as Fiat, Ferruzzi, Olivetti and Pirelli’. Suffice it to say that CEOs/chairmen from all these four 
companies were ERT members in the 1980s. This is not intended as an exhaustive list; several other 
examples of “ERT companies” involved in M&As in this period could probably be cited. But the 
above will suffice to drive home the point that a number of ERT members were positioned in 
companies that took part in the “merger madness” of the mid 1980s and as such it was only natural 
that they also took an interest in the establishment of an EC merger sub-unit of regulation76.  
 
The Roundtable’s position was first articulated in a standpoint paper of 1 June 1988. It is probably 
fair to suggest that it was not too pleased with the Commission’s April draft proposal. At a general 
level, the ERT was concerned that the proposal did not ‘sufficiently support corporate restructuring 
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in the E.C.’ (ERT, 1988a). More concretely it believed that the draft proposal, if adopted, would 
allow the Commission to prohibit concentrations that should in fact be allowed. ‘It should be made 
clear’, the standpoint paper thus states, ‘that the concentrations creating or strengthening a dominant 
market position should not per se be incompatible with the Common Market’. It then continues: ‘To 
block a concentration, the Commission should demonstrate that the concentration would eliminate 
effective competition in the relevant market’ (1988a, emphasis added). These remarks seem to 
suggest that the ERT was worried that the Commission would be able to block far too many 
mergers and that it, accordingly, would like to see its powers to do this significantly reduced. 
 
Yet there is no doubt that the ERT was in favour of an EC merger regulation at this stage. In a press 
statement of 15 June 1988, the ERT made clear that ‘[a]ll concentrations having a Community 
dimension should be controlled and judged only at a Community level, and by a single procedure 
rather than having national and Community controls overlapping and contradicting each other’ 
(1988b). To this it was added that ‘[t]he criteria for judging merger proposals should be clear and 
workable and the administrative procedures permit rapid decisions’ (ERT, 1988b). Yet the draft 
proposal was considered to be a disappointment in this regard as the criteria ‘governing whether a 
concentration has a European dimension are unclear and unworkable’ (ERT, 1988a). It is interesting 
to note how the ERT used these rather imprecise formulations when talking about the criteria used 
in the regulation of mergers: that is, the ERT as a whole did not really “take side” with either the 
neoliberalist or the Euro-mercantilist USDR, although one might argue that the preference for 
“clear” criteria would bring it more into line with the neoliberal USDR (where discretion and 
political intervention in merger decisions was not welcomed) than with the Euro-mercantilist 
USDR. Whether or not this was the case, one might see the vagueness of the formulations in the 
light of the fractional struggle that was going on inside the ERT during these years. That is, the 
above-mentioned struggle where the globalist (and neoliberally inclined) fraction was only 
gradually beginning to prevail over the Europeanist (and more protectionist) fraction (see section 
6.3). In any case, ERT members now actively began pushing for the establishment of an EC merger 
regime at meetings with the member state governments (ERT, 1988b; Davignon, Interview). 
 
UNICE was one of the other significant capital actors that began supporting (in principle, that is) 
the adoption of a merger control regulation in the late 1980s. Again, this was to some extent due to 
the efforts of the Commission: ‘Certainly a lot of efforts were made with the employer’s federation, 
UNICE. And a lot of people went out and gave speeches, went to meetings, went to conferences, at 
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all levels in the DG…’ (Faull, Interview). That UNICE became actively involved in the processes 
leading up to the adoption of the MCR is reflected in the fact that it produced five 
declarations/position papers from November 1987 to December 1989. It appears from these that the 
greatest concern to UNICE was the establishment of a clear division of labour between the member 
states and the Commission, so that companies would not have to notify mergers to more than one 
authority. In other words, it argued strongly in favour of what was to become denoted as a “one-
stop-shop” where mergers covered by the MCR would never be subject to national control.  
 
The shift in UNICE’s position was of course not only (or for that matter, mainly) caused by the 
persuasiveness of the Commission. It was above all caused by the fact that the number of cross-
border mergers was increasing explosively in a situation where the legal context was unclear to say 
the least: as mentioned above the existence of different by and large uncoordinated national merger 
subunits of regulation placed potentially significant administrative costs on merging companies and 
caused uncertainty regarding by what rules mergers would be regulated. The Commission and the 
Court had of course done what they could to increase the uncertainty of transnationally oriented 
capital actors. Heinz Kroger, the Head of UNICE’s Company Affairs division probably expressed 
the sentiment of such actors towards the end of the 1980s rather well, when he stated that ‘[w]e 
have the worst of all worlds at the moment - narrow national controls supplemented by a 
Community control where nobody knows which criteria apply. The sooner we get the regulation the 
better’ (Financial Times, 1988c). Some studies single out the Philip Morris ruling as the crucial 
turning point that triggered the shift in UNICE’s position (see e.g. Bulmer, 1994: 431; Woolcock 
1989: 18). However, it is probably more correct to say that the ruling intensified business support 
for the regulation. The ruling was made on 17 November 1987, and UNICE had already stated in its 
position paper of 10 November same year that ‘UNICE is in favour of a Council Regulation 
providing for the observance of the rules of competition in the form of Community-level control of 
European-scale company mergers’ (UNICE, 1987). In other words, all the UNICE members (that is, 
the national central industrial and employers’ federations) were already at this point in favour of an 
EC level regulation, the only exception being the Federation of Danish Industries which ‘does not 
see the need for a regulation. This Federation would prefer to see the present situation maintained’ 
(UNICE, 1987: 1). The shift in UNICE’s position vis-à-vis the establishment of an EC merger sub-
unit of regulation was probably also related to the fact that towards the end of the 1980s 
transnational corporations (TNCs) played the key role in a process where UNICE was streamlined. 
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Subsequently, TNCs have to a large extent assumed leadership in UNICE and other groups 
comprised of national federations (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 102-103). 
 
Yet although UNICE did now in principle support the adoption of a regulation, it did not find it 
difficult to identify flaws and shortcomings in the Commission’s draft proposals. In particular, these 
were criticised for not establishing a clear division of labour between authorities at national and 
supranational level (UNICE, 1988, 1989b). UNICE suggested that the Commission should make its 
decision regarding whether a merger should be blocked or not within two months of the 
notification. And furthermore it was suggested that the Commission should be given the 
opportunity to be somewhat flexible in its regulation of mergers to the effect that mergers ‘which 
cannot be approved by the Commission under the rules of competition [are] to be authorised in the 
Community public interest’ (UNICE, 1987). This latter statement clearly suggests that UNICE was 
in favour of a subunit of regulation that would (or at least could) entail control mergers on the basis 
of more than just competition criteria, just like the British regime. As such its position at this stage 
seems to have been formulated on the basis of a Euro-mercantilist USDR. Yet all in all UNICE did 
not find the Commission’s draft of April 1988 to be very convincing: ‘As it now stands, the text of 
the envisaged regulation is poorly drafted and difficult to understand’ (UNICE, 1989a).  
 
As mentioned the changed position of UNICE reflected that its member federations did now, albeit 
only in principle, support the adoption of an EC merger control regulation. In the UK, the CBI 
became strong supporters of EC merger control that would establish a one-stop-shop regime (see 
CBI, 1988). In July 1988 the Financial Times reported how the Director General of the CBI, John 
Banham, had told members of the American Chamber of Commerce at a lunch in London that in the 
new competitive environment that would exist when the internal market was completed in 1992, ‘it 
was essential for the European Commission to have responsibility for competition policy and the 
control of cross-border mergers’ (Financial Times, 1988b). In a memorandum of August 1988 the 
position of the CBI was articulated in more detail, for instance making clear that in the CBI’s view 
‘the sole appropriate [merger] test is one based on market dominance’ (pt. 9) and that the proposed 
50 million ECU threshold ‘should be raised to at least ECU 100 million (pt. 17). Other British 
capital actors also expressed their views. The UK-based Institute of Directors (IoD), representing 
several thousand company directors, also produced a discussion paper, in which they somewhat 
reluctantly expressed support for an EC merger regulation, insofar as this would in no way allow 
the Commission to pursue industrial/social policy goals. The promotion of competition was seen as 
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the only legitimate goal, and referring in an ill-concealed manner to the public interest criterion in 
the British merger regime, IoD warned against ‘the development in the Community of the 
ambivalence which besets competition policy in the UK’ (IoD, 1988, pt. 28). The Bar Association 
for Commerce, Finance & Industry also expressed support for ‘exclusive control of mergers of a 
European dimension by the European Commission, on the basis of competition criteria only’ 
(BACFI, 1988) in a memorandum of December 1988. 
 
Despite the neoliberalist leanings of important representatives of British capital such as CBI and 
IoD, representatives of the two main capital fractions (productive and financial capital) in Britain 
were not necessarily unified in their position on the criteria of EC merger regulation. A main reason 
for this was the nature of the British corporate environment in the UK as compared to that of 
continental Europe. Whereas hostile takeovers were an almost unknown phenomenon in countries 
like Germany and France due to the existence of various “protectionist” arrangements and a specific 
company culture, this was not the case in under the company legislation in the UK’s more liberal 
model of capitalism. Some capital actors feared that with the rise in inter-national mergers this 
would put UK companies in an unfavourable situation where they would be exposed to take-over 
bids from foreign companies that were themselves shielded from such bids (The Times, 1988b). 
Although the proposed EC merger regulation (or for that matter EC competition policy more 
generally) did not directly concern this lack of “reciprocity” with respect to hostile bids, it did lead 
some of those capital actors operating in sectors particularly vulnerable to hostile takeover bids 
from foreigners to support ‘the retention in the merger Regulation of national public interest, as a 
means of blocking bids where reciprocity conditions are not met’ (Woolcock, 1989: 26). This gave 
rise to two conflicting positions in Britain’s capitalist class. Many “members” of the fraction of 
productive capital subscribed to the view that unless the other EC countries were willing to 
transform their systems in order to bring them into line with the British model, it would be 
necessary to implement measures that would generally make it more difficult to take over 
companies in the UK. Yet, as Woolcock (1989: 27) pointed out, this ran ‘against the interest of the 
British financial community in maintaining an open environment for investment’. In other words, 
whereas many members of the productive fraction tended to subscribe to a position grounded in a 
national-mercantilist USDR, the members of the financial fraction were generally advocating a 
position based on a neo-liberal USDR. The result was that ‘British business as a whole is split on 
the issue’ (1989: 27).  
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In Germany, the BDI was now in favour of a regulation, provided that it would entail a clear 
division of labour between the national and the supranational level so that merging companies 
would not need approval from more authorities than necessary. In other words, the BDI also wanted 
the above-mentioned one-stop-shop (Woolcock, 1989: 23). Also in France it was becoming clear to 
many capital actors that if they wanted to compete on a global level, ‘French firms had to become 
global players themselves, and national controls in other EC countries were … an obstacle to this 
aim’ (Woolcock et al., 1991: 16). However, some members of this elite were concerned with the 
Commission’s proposed pre-notification system, worrying that it ‘would offend French traditions of 
confidentiality’ (Schwartz 1993: 648). Notwithstanding this, the CNPF began supporting the 
establishment of a European merger regime. Towards the end of the 1980s other capital actors also 
supported the adoption of an EC merger regulation. Among these were, for instance the European 
Council of Chemical Industry Federation (CEFIC) (Agence Europe 1988: 16), which is not 
surprising when taking into consideration that more cross-border mergers took place in the chemical 
sector than in any other sector (see above). US interests were also involved in these processes. The 
American Bar Association and individual American law firms were in contact with the Commission 
(Faull, Interview). The EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (AmChamEU), the 
organisation in Europe representing the views of European companies of American parentage, also 
expressed its views on the Commission’s draft proposals in 1988 and 1989 and did in this context 
demand a one-stop-shop system (AmChamEU, 1989).  
 
The group of external/indirect programmers also consisted of some non-business groups. The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the most important representative of trade unions at 
EC level, as well as some national trade unions were not opposed to the proposed merger control 
regulation. But they were concerned with the employees’ rights in merging companies and thus 
wanted it to include some sort of employment test, so that the Commission would have the power to 
ban a merger if it would have devastating employment consequences (Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998: 
100; Faull, Interview). BEUC, the European consumers’ organisation, argued that the regulation 
should include a specific test about interests of the consumer. But the Commission’s argument that 
the proposed regulation already covered such concerns via the text it included from Article 85(3) 
was accepted by the BEUC (Faull, Interview). 
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6.7. The establishment of an EC merger sub-unit of regulation 
 
In order to explain the 1989 MCR, it is logical to first look at the positions of the German, British 
and the French governments. These governments were crucial direct programmers in the sense that 
a programming outcome that did not to some extent reflect their preferences was unlikely. Our 
focus here will mainly be on the two issues that, unsurprisingly, turned out to be the most 
controversial ones: namely the question about how far-reaching competencies the Commission 
should be given (the question of jurisdiction) and the question about the criteria that should be 
applied to the regulation of mergers (Woolcock et al., 1991: 16; Tsoukalis, 1997: 81-82).  
 
As we have seen Germany and UK differed from the other member states by having well-
established national merger sub-units of regulation (see also Sturm, 1996). And as the only member 
state Germany had a national merger sub-unit which was based on stricter rules than the ones 
suggested in the Commission’s April 1988 proposal. That is, it was stricter in the sense of being 
based on a pure competition criterion (at least at the level of the BKartA). This was reflected in the 
German position regarding how an EC merger regulation should look. The German position was 
that only an EC regulation based exclusively on the competition criterion would be acceptable. And 
this had been the view through all the 15 years that the discussions regarding the MCR had lasted at 
this point. As Jonathan Faull of the Commission recalls:  
 
‘Germany had what it thought of as a very successful system with merger control 
and believed that anything we could do in Brussels would be less effective and that it 
was giving up to Brussels one of its major powers ... There was a real fear in 
Germany that giving up competition policy, which was the way they thought of it, to 
Brussels would lead to a less independent, more industrial policy, more social policy, 
a more employment based system’ (Faull, Interview) 
 
As we have seen, this “competition only” view was firmly grounded in the neoliberal USDR, and 
was moreover incompatible with Article 2(3) of the Commission’s 1988 draft proposals, where the 
door was thrown open for various forms of political discretion in the Commission’s assessment of 
mergers (see section 6.4 above). Yet the government did support an EC regulation, and this was in 
fact expressed at the highest political level when Chancellor Helmut Kohl told the other heads of 
government at a meeting in the European Council in May 1988, that an agreement on a merger 
regulation was needed ‘very urgently’ (The Times, 1988a). 
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It has already been mentioned that at this stage (in the late 1980s) the BDI was in favour of a 
European level one-stop-shop regime. Yet German industry was not the only indirect programmer 
that sought to leave an imprint on the negotiations by influencing the government. During 1989 the 
politically independent BKartA, probably not delighted with the prospects of handing over some of 
its powers to another institution, involved itself in the ongoing debate in Germany and severely 
criticised the Commission’s draft proposals. Described by the Financial Times (1988c) as the 
Commission’s ‘main critic outside the UK’, the BKartA started a campaign in order ‘to swing 
Bonn’s cautious acceptance of the scheme into line with its own outspoken opposition’. Its 
President, Professor Wolfgang Kartte, pointed out that the proposed Article 2(3) in the 
Commission’s December 1988 proposal would entail that market dominating mergers could be 
approved with reference to industrial policy goals.  
 
The German government did not ignore the views expressed by the BKartA and entered the final 
negotiations with the demands that the Commission’s right to make this sort of discretionary 
assessments had to be limited considerably, and that NCAs (in the German case, BKartA) should 
under exceptional circumstances be given the right to block mergers that the Commission had 
approved for political reasons. Ironically, the German government hereby in effect came to 
advocate the type of double control that German capital actors, as well as capital actors more 
generally were so keen to avoid (Woolcock, 1989: 23). In relation to the question about thresholds 
(and thus the scope of EC merger control) the German government advocated the view that these 
should be set at a high level, namely at a yearly turnover of ECU 10 billion. In other words, the 
Commission would be given the power to regulate mergers with an aggregate global turnover above 
this amount whereas all other mergers would fall under the competency of the member states. The 
consequence would be that only relatively few (and very large) mergers would be subject to the 
Commission’s regulation. The German position in this question was probably based on the 
assumption that the national merger regulation regime was  functioning well, so there was no need 
to give the Commission more power in this area than absolutely necessary.  
 
As already mentioned the UK had established a merger sub-unit of regulation as the first country in 
Europe. Whereas the German government (and the BKartA) was keen to ensure that the 
Commission’s merger regime would be as similar to their domestic regime as possible, the British 
government was keen to avoid the introduction of a European level merger regime that would be 
based on anything remotely similar to the British “public interest” criterion. For many years the 
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British government had opposed the idea of giving the Commission the power to regulate mergers 
at all. Yet although some members of the Conservative government remained reluctant, others 
began to perceive the need for a regulation. In particular, it was the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, Lord Young of Graffham who succeeded in making the UK government take a more 
positive stand in relation to this question. Hence, in November 1987 the Minister for Corporate and 
Consumer Affairs, Francis Maude, who represented the UK government in the negotiations, 
informed his colleagues in the Council that although the UK government could not accept the 
proposals put forward by the Commission, it was now open-minded and willing to discuss a 
regulation (The Times, 1987). Or as it was expressed in an October 1988 Memorandum by the 
Department of Trade and Industry: ‘The UK has reserved its position on the principle of an EC 
merger control regulation, while expressing its willingness to take part constructively in 
discussions’ (DTI, 1988). 
 
In other words, the British government was not in a hurry to give birth to a new European level 
merger subunit of regulation. At a meeting between the national ministers and the Commission in 
Luxembourg in June 1988, Maude was the only minister who rejected the need, in principle, for EC 
merger control. On behalf of the UK government he inter alia argued that the proposed thresholds 
were too low (meaning that too many companies would be subject to the Commission’s scrutiny); 
that the time limits suggested by the Commission were unacceptable; that Britain wanted to 
preserve the right to veto a merger decision made by the Commission if vital national interests were 
at stake; and that a system entailing industrial policy at the European level was unacceptable 
(Sunday Times, 1988a). As regards this latter point, the Under Secretary of the Department of Trade 
and Industry, Mr Treadgold, informed the House of Lords’ European Communities Committee that 
‘the Government believes that the criterion for prohibition should be competition’ and added that 
‘UK experience of the authorities trying to pick winners, the government believes, has shown how 
misguided that policy is, and therefore it does not want the Community to be tempted down that 
road’ (House of Lords, 1989: 78). We can thus conclude that with respect to the question of the 
criteria of merger regulation the position of the British government was now very similar to that of 
its German counterpart. Precisely like the German government it wanted to moderate the 
aforementioned Article 2(3) in the Commission’s proposal of December 1988, the article that gave 
the Commission some possibility to pursue other goals than ensuring competition in the internal 
market. Both governments were in other words subscribing to and advocating a position grounded 
in the neoliberal USDR. Regarding the question of threshold values, the UK government shared the 
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German view that these should be set at the high level of ECU 10 billion (Woolcock et al.,1991:17). 
Again, this can be seen as reflecting that the government considered the national merger regulation 
regime to be well functioning and thus saw no reason to weaken it unnecessarily.  
 
The French position in relation to the question of EC merger control shifted significantly over the 
sixteen years the discussions lasted. Unlike the UK and Germany, France did not have a 
particularly well developed national merger subunit of regulation and changing governments in 
France (and also Italy) had actively pursued industrial policies in order to create “national 
champions” that would be able to compete internationally. Fearing that the Commission would 
undermine their ability to pursue such policies, French governments had never been among the 
strongest advocates of an EC MCR, especially not one based on strict “competition only” criteria. 
Indeed, the domestic merger subunit had been established in the 1970s precisely with a view to 
avoiding such interference from the Commission (see section 5.3). Yet towards the end of the 
1980s, the attitude of the French government began to change. Inside France a debate was going on 
between, on one hand, those who defended the traditional view that French industry had to be 
shielded from international competition and that the state should continue its attempts to foster 
national champions and, on the other hand, those who believed the introduction of a European level 
regime would be an advantage to French industry as it would make it easier for French firms to 
restructure across borders and moreover serve to strengthen France’s image as a pro-European 
country77.  
 
The French government notwithstanding seemed to be increasingly in favour of an EC merger 
regulation as the end of the 1980s drew nearer. In June 1988 Edith Cresson, the French European 
Affairs Minister, made it clear that the French government did not in principle oppose an EC 
merger control regulation that would take precedence over national competition law (Financial 
Times, 1988a). However, she also made clear that the French did not want a regulation at any price. 
Commenting on the criteria of regulation in the Commission’s April 1988 proposal Cresson said 
that she considered them to be ‘too legalistic’ and inflexible, failing to ‘take into account the need 
for European firms to consolidate in the face of American and Japanese competitors’ (quoted in 
Sunday Times, 1988a). That she talked of European as opposed to French firms can be seen to 
reflect a shift in the position of the French government; namely a shift from position grounded in 
the national-mercantilist USDR towards a Euro-mercantilist position. This discursive shift was 
related to the explosive rise in cross-border mergers accounted for above. That is, those 
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governments who had traditionally been trying to facilitate economic growth through the promotion 
of “national champions” gradually realised that their national markets were too small, if companies 
that could compete internationally were to see the light of day. This induced a shift in the position 
of the French and Italian governments: ‘In the changed circumstances generated by the SEM there 
was something of a U-turn; both states transferred their wish for industrial competitiveness from the 
national to the European level. The French in particular wanted “European champions”, and a 
strong national presence in such firms’ (Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998: 100). Both governments now 
wanted the Commission to be able to pursue industrial policies precisely as the aforementioned 
Article 2(3) in the Commission’s December proposal would allow it to do. The two countries’ main 
concern was that the Commission would be too restrictive in its regulation of mergers and not take 
non-competition considerations sufficiently into consideration. In relation to the question of 
jurisdiction the French government preferred a threshold of 5 billion ECU (Europe Daily Bulletin, 
1988), that is, a threshold lying between the British/German proposal of ECU 10 billion and the 
Commission’s proposal of ECU 1 billion . 
 
In the centre of the negotiations stood the Commission (backed up by transnational capital actors), 
eagerly trying to draft a text that it would be possible for the direct programmers to reach agreement 
on. Within the Commission, Delors strongly supported the regulation and lent his weight to it. But 
the essential work was done by the two Commissioners for Competition, Sutherland and then 
Brittan, and their staff (Faull, Interview). When Brittan replaced Sutherland in early 1989 a great 
deal of the basic negotiations had been done. But Faull recalls that  
 
‘a number of the very big issues were left. Where were the thresholds? What would 
the final test be? Would it simply be a dominant position test or would there be some 
inclusion of criteria relating to the employment, social and other consequences of a 
merger? Would there be any exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction above and 
below the thresholds?’ (Faull, Interview) 
 
Hence, at this late stage it was anything but a foregone conclusion that the governments would be 
able to reach agreement. However, Brittan made the adoption of the regulation his top priority 
(Brittan, Interview78) and believed from the outset that a solution could be reached. He later recalled 
that  
 
‘I was not as pessimistic as you might have expected from the long history of failure 
to reach agreement. And the reason why I was not so pessimistic was that I knew 
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from what I was hearing in Britain – which is of course one of the Eurosceptic 
countries least enthusiastic about handing competencies to the European 
Commission – that in fact there was strong desire on part of the business community 
that this regulation should be agreed. And the fundamental reason was that they were 
getting fed up with going around to several jurisdictions when they had a merger 
case. They wanted a one-stop-shop. And that view I picked up myself because before 
coming to the Commission I was approached by almost every business interest that 
you could ever imagine that had anything to do with the European level. So I knew 
what their concerns were’ (Brittan, Interview) 
 
Within twelve months of his tenure as Commissioner, Brittan achieved his goal: on 21 December 
1989, under the Presidency of the French government, the Council reached agreement on 
Regulation 4064/89.  
 
Let us begin with the criteria of merger regulation. Here the MCR states in Article 2(3) that ‘A 
concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be declared incompatible with the common market’. The concept of “concentration” refers not only 
to standard mergers, but also to joint ventures, acquisition of a majority stake and take over bids. 
Although it is not clarified how the Commission defines such “dominant positions”, the MCR ‘does 
fairly clearly limit the relevant criteria to ones relating to competition’ (Neven et al., 1993: 5). 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that there is no mention of the Commission being allowed to pursue 
industrial policy goals. Instead Article 2(1) now reads that the Commission among other things 
shall take into account ‘the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the 
development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and 
does not form an obstacle to competition’ (emphasis added).  
 
This is interesting given the long history of disagreements over the content of this article. Indeed, 
whereas his predecessor had, in what one might see as an uncharacteristically diplomatic act,  
retained the language of industrial policy in Article 2(3) in a failed attempt to please in particular 
the French government, Brittan had no such intentions. As he later wrote  
 
‘I was determined that the Merger Regulation should not be used as a way of 
imposing an industrial policy on Europe, although there were quite a number of 
participants in the debate who wanted to do just that. Whether it was because they 
wished to create European Champions, or wanted to allow social considerations to 
have an important impact, they wanted the wording of the Regulation to be 
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sufficiently broad for the Commission to be able to consider matters going well 
beyond the effects of the mergers in the relevant market’ (Brittan, 2000: 3).  
 
Brittan himself was of course ‘solely in favour of a pure competition regulation’ (Brittan, 
Interview). Consequently, in an amended proposal for a merger regulation of March 1989 Brittan 
and the Commission made sure to leave out the provisions that would have allowed the 
Commission to regulate mergers on the basis of industrial and social policy criteria (Brittan, 
Interview). This was definitely not only a question of Brittan’s personal ideological preferences, but 
in large part also a necessity if member states like Germany and now also the UK were to accept the 
regulation (Faull, Interview). In other words, in a move that was only logical given the broader 
ideational developments, the Commission moved from the Euro-mercantilist “EC industrial policy” 
camp to the “pure competition test” neoliberal camp. Even Delors supported a “pure competition” 
regulation ‘because he was persuaded that that was the only thing that was going to be adopted. But 
he was concerned to ensure that there was enough language in the text to allow for other 
considerations to come into play, possibly’ (Faull, Interview). 
 
Yet the problem remained that the French government, now backed up by Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
had now come to defend the position that the Commission should be given some discretionary 
powers so that it could be flexible in its assessment of mergers. In this way it was hoped that the 
merger regulation would not prevent the establishment of “European champions” that could 
compete internationally. That fundamental disagreement regarding the criteria of merger regulation 
thus continued to exist was confirmed on a number of informal meetings between France, UK and 
Germany in the beginnings of 1989 (Woolcock, 1991: 19). It is thus interesting to note that 
ultimately the neoliberal “competition only” USDR prevailed. That is, although ‘the development of 
technical and economic progress’ is mentioned in Article 2(1) of the MCR as something that can be 
taken into consideration, it is also made clear that the preservation competition is the name of the 
game. As Woolcock et al., (1991: 20) noted, ‘it seems unlikely that the narrowly defined criteria 
contained in the regulation will ever be used to pursue EC industrial policy objectives’. Or as 
Brittan (2000: 3) himself expressed it: ‘In the end, the supporters of an industrial policy were 
effectively beaten back, and the Regulation gives clear primacy to the competition criterion, with 
only the smallest nod in the direction of anything else’. 
 
The big question is why in particular the French government accepted to be “beaten back”. The 
main reason seems to have been that French capital actors wanted the regulation and that there was 
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no way Germany and the UK would have accepted a regulation based on the Euro-mercantilist 
USDR. As Faull puts it, ‘I think they [the French government, HB] felt at that stage that France had 
more to gain by stopping protectionist merger decisions in other countries than it had to lose by 
having a regulation based on a pure competition test. So the French joined in’ (Faull, Interview). In 
addition to this, it was probably of some importance that France had the Presidency in the second 
half of 1989. The prestige involved in reaching agreement in this area after 16 years of failure gave 
the French government an extra incentive to let the negotiations come to a conclusion. 
 
If the French government had to make significant concessions in relation to the question of criteria, 
it was more successful with respect to the question of jurisdiction (the scope of EC merger control). 
Here it reads in Article 1(2) of the MCR that a merger has “Community dimension” when ‘(a) the 
aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5,000 million, 
and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State’. 
Mergers of this magnitude fall under the Commission’s jurisdiction and must be pre-notified to the 
Competition DG, whereas all other mergers fall under member state jurisdiction. However, for 
instance it appears from Article 9 that member states are, under certain conditions, able to request 
the Commission that they conduct a national investigation of a merger that is considered to affect 
‘competition in a distinct market within its territory that does not form a substantial part of the 
common market’ (Art. 9(3)) and which would thus have been approved by the Commission. In 
addition to this Article 22(3) of the MCR also allows member states to request that the Commission 
reviews mergers even if they do not have a Community dimension.  
 
So how can this outcome be explained? On one hand, countries like Germany and the UK preferred 
a high threshold (ECU 10 billion) so that the Commission’s jurisdiction would be relatively limited. 
On the other hand, the Commission, Italy and a number of smaller countries such as the Benelux 
countries and Denmark preferred a low threshold (around ECU 1 billion) that would make the 
Commission’s field of activity significant. Towards the end of 1989 the ERT, which had so far not 
made its precise position with respect to this question clear, also came out in favour of a low 
threshold. In a position paper from December 1989 it was declared that the ‘ERT would support the 
lowest feasible threshold level, especially having regard to the anticipated period of heightened 
merger activity before 1993. Accordingly, the target threshold should not exceed two thousand 
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million ECU’ (ERT, 1989a). That the ERT members would prefer a low threshold is 
understandable; insofar as the regulation would establish a one-stop-shop for mergers with a 
Community dimension (something most or all mergers involving transnational capital actors would 
probably have if the threshold level was set at a low level), transnational companies could avoid 
national control altogether. Finally, the French government took a middle position and suggested 
thresholds around ECU 5 billion. 
 
In its amended March 1989 proposal, the Commission proposed that a merger should fall under its 
jurisdiction if the aggregate global turnover of the merging parties exceeded 5 billion ECUs (as 
opposed to the ECU 1 billion proposed by the Sutherland-Commission in its’ December 1988 
proposal) or if the EC level turnover exceeded ECU 100 million unless each of the two companies 
had more than 66 % of their aggregate turnover in one member state. These threshold levels would 
then after a transition period of four years be subject to revision in the Council. Even though the 
German government insisted on the ECU 10 billion threshold until May 1989, and even though also 
the British government opposed a threshold at this low level until the end, this was the compromise 
that formed the basis for the final agreement. However, in the MCR the EC level turnover threshold 
was raised from the ECU 100 million suggested by the Commission to ECU 250 million79. It is 
worth noting that the thresholds were hereby set at a level twenty-five (!) times higher than the 
threshold originally proposed by the Commission in 1973. Hereby the scope for EC merger 
regulation was obviously made much more limited than the Commission had initially envisaged. 
 
However, the adopted MCR did not entail quite as clear a division of competencies between the 
Commission and national authorities, as some had hoped for. In particular the business community 
strongly disliked Article 9(3), an article the inclusion of which was insisted upon by the German 
negotiators and which, consequently, became known as the “German clause”. With the inclusion of 
the “German clause” the German government ensured that the national authorities would continue 
to be able to regulate mergers of great significance to the German home market and the clause can 
thus be seen as a compensation for threshold values that were set at a much lower level than the 
Germans would have preferred. As UNICE put it in one of its position papers, ‘the “German 
Clause” … is unacceptable to industry because its effects come close to constituting a double 
barrier’ (UNICE, 1989a). Indeed, this article did weaken the one-stop-shop regime wanted by 
industry. But the German government insisted – under the influence from BKartA – that it was 
included in the merger regulation and threatened to veto the whole regulation if such a clause was 
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not included (Woolcock et al., 1991: 18). As regards Article 22(3) of the MCR (which allows 
member states to request that the Commission reviews mergers even if they do not have a 
Community dimension) this was included in the regulation as compensation to those member states 
that wanted lower thresholds than those ultimately agreed upon. Among these states were the 
Netherlands and the article is thus known as the “Dutch clause”. 
 
Finally it should be mentioned that the MCR sets out a timetable for decisions. The assessment of 
mergers with Community dimension can fall into two stages. There is a one-month screening stage 
where mergers that do not raise concerns (in relation to the abovementioned criteria) are be 
approved (possibly with certain conditions) (Article 10(1)). Mergers that do raise concerns proceed 
to a second stage where a more detailed investigation is performed. Within four months the 
Commission has to decide whether the merger can be permitted (possibly with certain conditions) 
or not – and the opinion of an Advisory Committee consisting of Member State representatives has 
to be taken into account in reaching this decision (Articles 10(3) and 18). Yet the power of this 
Committee was limited; as stated in Article 21 ‘the Commission shall have sole competence to take 
the decisions provided for in this Regulation’, only ‘[s]ubject to review by the Court of Justice’.  
 
To recapitulate, the form and content of the merger sub-unit of regulation established with the MCR 
was modelled on neoliberal ideas of regulation. That is, ultimately the (democratically accountable) 
member state governments were not enabled to overrule the (not so democratically accountable) 
Commission’s decisions in certain merger cases, reflecting the neoliberal commitment to the 
separation of key institutions from democratic accountability. And ultimately, the MCR leaves little 
or no room for regulation of mergers that takes into account non-competition considerations, just 
like the neoliberal USDR prescribes. With the neoliberal USDR prevailing it seems fair to 
categorise its two most important advocates, namely the governments of Germany and the UK as 
the primary programmers when looking at the outcome of the negotiations. The Competition DG 
and its pro-active Commissioners also deserve this label. The other governments participating in the 
negotiations can cautiously be categorised as secondary programmers. Although being direct 
programmers (and thus by no means insignificant) these governments had to accept the neoliberal 
USDR but made an impact at the level of CIR, especially regarding the threshold level and the 
clauses defining the division of labour between the Competition DG and NCAs. A number of other 
external, but indirect, programmers can also be placed in this category: namely transnationally 
oriented capital actors, NCAs (in particular the OFT and the BKartA) and the Court. Centre-left, 
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National-mercantilist and Euro-mercantilist ideas of regulation were not reflected in the text of the 
MCR and such we can say that they were marginalised. This also goes for the programmers 
supporting the centre-left USDR, including unions and the centre-left parties in the Parliament. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: The 1989 MCR – programmers and ideas 
 Programmers Ideas 
 
Primary The governments of Germany and 
Britain. The Competition DG 
(including Sutherland and Brittan) 
Neoliberal USDR 
Secondary France and other member state 
governments, transnationally oriented 
capital actors, national competition 
authorities (OFT, BKartA) and the 
Court. 
 
Marginalised Unions and centre-left parties in the 
Parliament 
Centre-left and mercantilist ideas 
of regulation 
 
 
6.8. In conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to explain the continued failure to reach agreement on an EC 
MCR throughout most of the 1980s and the adoption of the MCR in 1989. We are now in a position 
to answer the second and third sub-questions. First, why did the Commission’s proposals for a 
MCR fail to gain support from the member states in the 1970s and most of the 1980s? The short 
answer is that the various programmers (direct and indirect, internal and external) advocated 
positions grounded in incompatible USDRs, making it impossible to reach agreement on the content 
and form of the MCR. The slightly more elaborate answer is that a number of “contextual factors” 
resulted in the reluctant or hostile attitude of both governments and capital actors. In the previous 
chapter we saw that these included a limited number of cross-border M&As; an economic crisis that 
member states chose to deal with through national initiatives such as state aids for declining 
industries; and a resulting stagnation of the European integration process and the EC competition 
unit of regulation. In this situation neither member states nor important capital actors generally saw 
any need for an EC merger subunit of regulation. This was also the situation in the early part of the 
1980s, rendering it impossible to reach agreement on the revised proposals for a MCR. Second, why 
was it eventually possible to adopt a MCR and why was designed the way it was? The answer is 
that the wider settings within which the negotiations over the MCR took place changed significantly 
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in the course of the 1980s, contributing to a gradual change in the position of key programmers. 
Figure 6.1 is an attempt to illustrate this.  
 
Figure 6.1: Explaining the 1989 MCR 
 
 
After the mid-1980s the broader rise of neoliberal ideas impacted on Europe’s competition units of 
regulation, where it was translated into a vision of competition policy as an instrument of regional 
market making which would have as its sole objective the preservation/creation of competition and 
which would be enforced with no or very limited political involvement. A gradual and partial 
neoliberal turn took place not only in the British, French and German competition units and the 
wider ensembles of regulation of which they formed part, but also in the EC competition unit of 
regulation which experienced a revitalisation in the course of the decade. This was related not only 
to the rise of neoliberalism but also to the re-launch of the European integration process, which was 
to no small extent caused by the efforts of the capital actors in the ERT. Partly as a result of 
neoliberal policies and initiatives an explosion in the number of cross-border M&As took place the 
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mid-1980s, reflecting an increased transnationalisation of capitalism. In these changed settings a 
number of programmers shifted position. Among the direct programmers, the German government, 
under influence from the BKartA, remained a strong advocate of a position grounded in the 
neoliberal USDR. The French and Italian governments moved from a national-mercantilist to a 
Euro-mercantilist position and finally accepted EC merger regulation based on the neoliberal 
USDR. In the course of the 1980s the Irish and UK governments also endorsed the neoliberal 
USDR as did the Commission. Crucially, indirect programmers in the form of capital actors such as 
ERT and UNICE also moved away from the national-mercantilist position and now favoured an EC 
merger subunit of regulation based on either the neoliberal or the Euro-mercantilist USDR. Other 
indirect programmers, namely unions and majorities in the EESC and the Parliament, continued to 
advocate a position grounded in the centre-left USDR. Ultimately, these ideas/programmers were 
however marginalised as the 1989 MCR ended up as a neoliberal text, which did not really allow 
for non-competition factors to be taken into consideration in the regulation of mergers and which 
did not allow for “political discretion”.  
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7. The 1990s and onwards: merger control in the era of 
neoliberal hegemony 
 
After our long journey through the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s we have now arrived at the final 
stop: the period stretching from the early 1990s to 2007. The main phenomena to be explored are 
EC merger regulation in the 1990s onwards and especially the 2003 revision of the MCR. In other 
words, the chapter should enable us to answer the fourth and last sub-question posed in section 1.1, 
namely ‘how has the MCR been implemented by the Commission and how can the revision of it in 
2003 be explained?’ In what follows we first focus on neoliberal hegemony and the 
transnationalisation of capitalism (section 7.1) and the main developments in the European 
integration process (section 7.2). Against this background we briefly look at the “neoliberalisation” 
of the different subunits making up the EC competition unit of regulation and the 
internationalisation of competition regulation (section 7.3). We then explore the nature of the 
comprehensive “modernisation” of Regulation 17 (section 7.4) before considering the 
“Europeanisation” of the national merger subunits of regulation in Germany, France and the UK 
(section 7.5). Having outlined these various “contexts”, section 7.6 analyses how the Competition 
DG has implemented the MCR in the 1990s onwards and section 7.7 investigates the processes 
leading up to the adoption of a revised MCR. After a brief conclusion summarising the answer to 
the above-mentioned sub-question, a postscript to the chapter takes a look at the challenges to the 
hegemonic neoliberal type of competition regulation (section 7.9). 
 
 
7.1. Neoliberalism and the transnationalisation of capital 
 
The 1980s were the decade when the neoliberal GDR gradually became hegemonic. At first it 
served as the basis for what van Apeldoorn et al. (2003: 38; see also Overbeek, 2000: 248-249) 
refer to as a “deconstructive project” that provided ‘the most convincing analytical and prescriptive 
framework of the crisis of Keynesianism’ and which thus provided intellectual ammunition for the 
disruption of the post-war social orders of embedded liberalism/social democracy. In its second 
phase, neoliberalism, or more precisely various neoliberal USDRs, gave rise to a series of strategies 
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aimed at liberalising, deregulating, privatising and internationalising the existing socioeconomic 
order (2003: 38; Jessop 2006: 8). At this stage the proponents of neoliberalism sought to discredit 
all alternative visions and elevate neoliberal ideas to the only credible and legitimate perspective 
around. In its third phase, which is the one stretching from the early 1990s to the present (the period 
covered in this chapter), neoliberalism had become the hegemonic GDR in most parts of the 
capitalist world. This state of affairs was clearly related to, but not explained away by, a change in 
the underlying balance of power between capital and labour, which had now shifted decisively in 
favour of especially transnationally oriented capital. 
 
To say that the neoliberal GDR has become hegemonic is not, of course, to say that all (or any) 
contemporary Western societies are accurately modelled on the neoliberal vision of society. This is 
clearly not the case: the extent to which the neoliberal GDR has served as the basis for the 
programming of important legal-regulatory institutions differs from society to society. As such 
important differences between the various models of capitalism in Europe endure. Nor is it to deny 
that neoliberal policies/strategies are frequently criticised and opposed by various social groups. 
The point is rather that when looking at the broader development in the European societies, these 
are in no uncertain manner moving in a neoliberal direction and have been doing so since the 1980s. 
The most important reason for this is that the neoliberal discourse is now, implicitly or explicitly, 
endorsed by a large majority of those who occupy positions of power in many both national and 
supranational institutions. As Harvey explains, 
 
‘the advocates of the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence 
in education (the universities and many “think tanks”), in the media, in corporate 
boardrooms and financial institutions (treasury departments, the central banks), and 
also in those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that regulate 
global finance and trade. Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode 
of discourse’ (2005: 3) 
 
The members of this transnational elite, which also includes political decision-makers belonging to 
both the political right and to “third way” social democratic parties, have to a considerable extent 
succeeded in institutionalising neoliberalism as ‘an uncontested and incontestable dogma’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2004: 29). The neoliberal GDR provides the political and economic elites with a 
common language and now constitutes the framework through which most of them understand 
social reality. These elites are backed up by an obliging army of neoclassical economists who are 
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only happy to confirm that competition and the marketisation of the public sphere are blessings. 
Despite their well-documented failure to predict anything at all such economists do not hesitate to 
make precise predictions about what will happen in some distant future and, on this basis, prescribe 
far-reaching (neoliberal) reforms of existing societies that need to be urgently implemented if not an 
irreparable loss of competitiveness and other catastrophes are to be the outcome. Hereby the 
political ideology of neoliberalism is elevated to a scientific truth, and real political debate is 
effectively undermined (see Nielsen, 2006: 36-39 for a brilliant discussion of this). As this 
indicates, all alternative visions and projects are on the defensive in the era of neoliberal hegemony:  
 
‘The discourse of neoliberal internationalism has become … a hegemonic, 
incontestable and virtually naturalised and self-evident set of arguments and beliefs. 
This hermetic field of vision defies critique and dissidence, such that alternative 
visions or voices are marginalised and silenced, or meet with formidable resistance. 
This monolithic imagination, in turn, flattens the political spectrum and renders the 
political articulation of alternative positions difficult, if not impossible’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2004: 28).  
 
Consequently, political disagreements tend to be less fundamental than they were in previous eras; 
that is, they are often not rooted in diverging USDRs, but concern instead various CIRs that are all 
broadly compatible with neoliberalism. So for instance, it is not considered necessary to debate 
whether competition is only a good thing, nor does the question of whether competition regulation 
should also take into account, say, employment considerations become a real issue. Mainstream 
politics, then, in large parts consist of a dialogue between agents who find themselves in broad 
agreement with the neoliberal GDR and the various USDRs – and any challenge to this discourse is 
perceived of as naïve or unrealistic and illegitimate. In this sense, the current era is one of neoliberal 
hegemony. 
 
This hegemony, like other historical hegemonies, is sustained by particular practices and social 
structures. As briefly mentioned above it is premised upon, and contribute to reinforce, the 
weakened position of the working classes vis-à-vis capital. But it must also be seen as the outcome 
of a struggle within the capitalist class, where its transnationally oriented fractions increasingly 
transcended or prevailed over those organised at and oriented towards the domestic level. As such, 
the hegemony of neoliberalism has to be seen in the context of increased integration at the 
transnational level of productive and financial capital (what is often referred to as economic 
globalisation). Finance capital is almost by definition international in its orientation, but after the 
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breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s, its international integration intensified 
significantly, especially from the 1980s and onwards. This was in no small part due to the new 
system that replaced the old: ‘Domestic governments retracted exchange controls, dissolved former 
price and interest rate cartels, lowered access barriers for foreigners to banking activities and stock 
exchange membership and allowed trading in new financial instruments’ (Lütz, 2006: 30). In the 
EC the introduction of the SEM (see Chapter 6) and the Economic and Monetary Union (see below) 
further contributed to facilitate the transnational integration of finance.  This integration reached far 
beyond the borders of the EU. As one scholars observes: ‘By the late 1990s international financial 
activities were so intertwined with domestic financial markets that for all intents and purposes there 
was one global financial system that included all the developed countries and many developing and 
formerly Communist countries’ (Frieden, 2006: 385). To mention but one statistic, world foreign 
exchange trading trebled from 1989 to 2004 where it reached a level of $1,900 billion per day 
(Glyn, 2006: 66; see also Toporowski, 2005). 
 
Yet what sets the current epoch truly apart from previous ones is not so much the 
transnationalisation of finance as the transnationalisation of production. This phenomenon is closely 
related to the increase in number and size of TNCs. According to data from UNCTAD, reproduced 
in Robinson (2004: 55-56), their number increased from 7,000 in 1970 to 37,000 in 1993 and 
53,000 in 1998. In 2000 their number exceeded 60.000, accounting for approximately two-thirds of 
world trade. The global value of TNC sales went from $ 2.5 trillion in 1982 to $ 5.4 trillion in 1990 
and reached $15.7 trillion in 2000. As Robinson points out, such figures cannot be taken as direct 
indicators of the degree to which companies are transnational. Instead he refers to UNCTAD’s 
“transnationality” index of 2001, according to which the largest 25 TNCs are in fact genuinely 
transnational, in the sense that, on average, 59.9 per cent of their assets, sales and employment are 
foreign (2004: 56). The increasing importance of TNCs is also reflected in the rise in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) – that is, investments that are made to acquire interests in companies operating 
outside of the economy of the investor. Bieler & Morton (2001b: 4), referring to UNCTAD data, 
report that outflows of world FDI rose from $ 88 billion in 1986 to $ 225 billion in 1990, which is 
equivalent to an average annual increase of 26 per cent. After a downturn in FDI levels in the early 
1990s it rose again from 1993 onwards, reaching $ 424 billion in 1997. The extent to which the 
Western European economies were integrated towards the end of the 1990s, is also reflected in the 
fact that FDI flows were significantly higher here than anywhere else in the world in the period 
from 1998 to 2003 (see Glyn, 2006: 100-01; also Robinson, 2004: 22-27). 
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Now, FDI is closely related to, and in many cases identical to, the phenomenon of cross-border 
M&As. That is, FDI often takes the form of acquisitions of foreign companies or parts of them. For 
instance, Robinson (2004: 59) notes that ‘just over four-fifths of FDI was in M&As in 1997, with 
the remainder going to new or start-up investments’. Consequently, it is not terribly surprising that 
the 1990s witnessed a massive increase in the number of cross-border M&As. As we have seen in 
Chapter 6, a merger wave had already swept across the EC from around 1987 and to the end of the 
decade where it reached its peak in 1990. Here we can add that it formed part of a somewhat 
broader merger wave in the developed world, which was led by American and British firms, with 
some French firms also joining in towards the end of the boom (Evenett, 2003: 8). The value of all 
the cross-border M&As taking place during this wave rose from $ 74.5 billion in 1987 to $ 135 
billion in 1990 (Evenett, 2003: 26). In the early 1990s, the number and magnitude of cross-border 
M&As seems to have declined. The value of cross-border M&As taking place in 1991 and 1992 
was merely $ 69.9 billion and $ 66.9 billion (which is not surprising given the downturn in FDI in 
this period). It was only from the mid 1990s and especially from 1995 onwards that a new merger 
wave was set in motion, the magnitude of which was without historical precedent. In the EU, 
mergers were increasingly used to gain a strong position in the internal market. This was for 
instance documented in a 1995 survey from the accountancy company Price Waterhouse, which 
found that 45 % of Europe’s top 500 companies were intending to grow by acquisition over the next 
year (European Voice, 1996c).  
 
Once this new wave reached its peak in 2000 its value was $ 823.4 billion – or more than five times 
as much as the peak of the previous wave (Evenett, 2003: 8, 26; see also Schmidt, 2002: 18). The 
size of many of the firms involved in mergers this time around was massive. One indicator of this is 
the number of so-called “mega deals”, a concept denoting transactions with a value exceeding $ 1 
billion: the number of such M&As rose from 45 in 1996, to 58 in 1997, 89 in 1998, 109 in 1999 and 
then reached 175 in 2000 (Evenett, 2003: 31). In comparison with the merger wave of the late 
1980s, this new wave was not primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon as it also involved a 
much larger number of German, French, Spanish and Nordic firms than previously (Evenett, 2003: 
9, 30; Gaughan, 2000: 3). Many of the M&A deals in this wave ‘left a hangover of bad debt and 
broken companies’ (International Herald Tribune, 2007) resulting in a slowdown in merger activity 
for a couple of years (when seen in a global perspective). However, in 2006 the number and 
magnitude of M&As surpassed all records, with a global $3.79 trillion worth of deals, which was an 
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increase of 38 percent from 2005 (International Herald Tribune, 2007). Indeed, an article brought 
in the financial press on 22 November 2006 could report that ‘[o]f the top 10 biggest deals ever, 
eight have been announced since the beginning of this year’ (International Business Times, 2006).  
 
In 2007 the global M&A activity continued to reach new heights. A Bain & Company newsletter 
reported several remarkable findings for the first half of the year: the global M&A value reached 
$2.7 trillion, an increase of 62% when compared to the same period of 2006; the value of cross-
border M&As set new records, their share of the total number totalling 48 %; the number of hostile 
bids quadrupled to a number of 407, as compared to the 108 such bids in the first half of 2006; the 
average deal size went up 50 % from $132 million to $198 million; 5 of the top ten global deals 
involved bids from US-based companies whereas 4 involved European acquirers; European M&As 
set new records, reaching a new high value of $1.1 trillion, representing a 80 % increase over the 
first half of 2006; the number of European deals rose 9% in the period, reaching 6,349; cross-border 
M&As in Europe reached a record value of $582 billion (Bain & Company, 2007: 1-4). Despite a 
significant fall in the volume and number of M&As in the second half of the year, the total value of 
such deals in 2007 reached an astonishing $4.74 trillion, hereby surpassing all previous records 
(Financial Times, 2007g). As we shall see later (in section 7.6 below) this explosion in big mergers 
in recent years has been reflected in the number of notifications received by the Competition DG. 
 
 
7.2. European integration in the 1990s onwards 
 
In the 1990s onwards, the European integration process was intensified and broadened to the extent 
that Frieden (2006: 383) can note (like others have noted before him), that the EU now has ‘all the 
economic hallmarks of a country: a single market, a single currency and central bank, a common 
trade policy, and common economic regulations on such matters as antitrust and the environment. 
For all economic intents, Western Europe [is] one economic unit – indeed, by most measures, the 
largest economic unit in the world’. With the adoption of the “Maastricht Treaty” (hereafter: EU 
Treaty) in February 1992, the EC Treaty was revised in important respects. The EU was born, based 
on three pillars, namely the existing EC (pillar 1), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (pillar 
2) and Justice and Home Affairs (pillar 3). Institutionally speaking, the Parliament was given more 
powers (under the so-called co-decision procedure), the use of qualified majority (as opposed to 
unanimity) voting in the Council was extended somewhat and the Court was given powers to 
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impose fines on member states in case these did not comply with its rulings or failed to implement 
EC laws. Whereas the SEA had clarified the EC’s powers in areas such as environmental and social 
cohesion policies, the EU Treaty not only strengthened these but also extended the Community’s 
powers into new areas such as consumer protection and education. However, it seems fair to say 
that the most remarkable feature of the EU Treaty was that it set out a timetable for the completion 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (which would have to be established no later than 1 
January 1999) as well as stringent criteria that were to ensure the convergence of the Member State 
economies prior their participation in the EMU. These included that member states were not 
allowed to run budget deficits of more than 3 per cent of GDP; that their public debt would have to 
be no more than 60 per cent of GDP; and that the level of inflation was not to be higher than 1.5 
percentage points above the average level existing in the three EMU member countries with the 
lowest level of inflation.  
 
The convergence these criteria were meant to bring about was of course a particular type of 
convergence, namely one modelled on a neoliberal USDR known as “monetarism” (see section 
6.2). That is, the criteria would hinder effective Keynesian counter-cyclical demand management 
policies and moreover put the national welfare states under pressure. Another “neoliberal feature” 
of the EMU was that the European Central Bank, which would be in charge of conducting the 
monetary policy of the Euro-zone, was programmed to not only be politically independent (or to put 
it differently, it would not be subject to democratic pressures); it would also, above all, have as its 
task to ensure low inflation (also at the cost of high unemployment) (see e.g. Gill, 2001 and 
Jespersen, 2000 for insightful discussions of the EMU). As such, the EMU ‘can be interpreted in the 
spirit of Margaret Thatcher’s vision of destroying the post-war corporatist consensus between 
capital, the state and labour and replacing it with monetarist stabilisation and supply-side flexibility’ 
(Young, 2000: 80)80.  
 
The ERT which had played a decisive role in the European integration process in the 1980s (see 
section 6.3) continued to do so in 1990s81. From the beginning of the decade, the ERT’s orientation 
became increasingly neoliberal. According to van Apeldoorn (2002: 132) this was related to the rise 
of the globalist fraction ‘within the ranks of the ERT and the European transnational class more 
widely’. This was reflected in a changed composition of members (especially after the merger with 
Groupe des Présidents, see section 6.3) with the Europeanist fraction now becoming a minority 
(and its “protectionist” inclinations becoming a minority view). The Roundtable’s increasingly 
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neoliberal orientation is reflected in its publications, where it, for instance, calls for “flexible” 
labour markets and limited social and environmental policies, while strongly supporting the EMU. 
Of particular interest in the present context is what van Apeldoorn refers to as the ERT’s neoliberal 
“competitiveness discourse”. On this view the competitiveness of European business is ensured by 
exposing it to global competition, rather than protecting it from it: ‘Now competitiveness is about 
survival of the fittest in a fully open environment of a global free market’ (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 
172). In order for business to be able to compete, of course the societies in which business operates 
have to adapt: in fact the societies now enter a competition of who is capable of providing the best 
business environment (as defined along neoliberal lines). According to this discourse, then, the goal 
of ensuring the competitiveness of business always comes first when designing new policies or 
transforming old ones – and this applies to all policies, including social, environmental and 
educational policies. 
 
The Roundtable not only identifies competitiveness as the root of all good; from the early 1990s it 
also pointed out an instrument that can be used to bring competitiveness about, namely 
benchmarking (ERT, 1996 contains the most detailed discussion of this). To put it briefly, the idea 
behind benchmarking is to measure your own performance against the performance of the best, on 
this basis setting up targets or benchmarks that you have to reach. So, for instance companies can be 
measured on their ability to accumulate as much profit as their competitors, whereas countries can 
be measured on their ability to attract investments. If one does not rank among the best (and not 
everyone can do that all the time!), clearly action needs to be taken. Companies have to lower their 
costs of production, for instance by sacking employees or by merging, whereas countries have to 
lower taxes, cut social welfare transfers, relax their environmental policies etc. Bench-marking, 
then, is an instrument that can be used to put countries under permanent pressure to adjust. There is 
no question that the ERT has been successful in selling its message to the EU-system: from the mid 
1990s “competitiveness” and “benchmarking” became focal points in many EU, and in particular 
Commission, publications. This was not a coincidence but the result of a number of seminars, where 
ERT member invited governments and EU officials to discuss benchmarking and competitiveness. 
On the ERT’s initiative the Competitiveness Advisory Group was formed by the Commission in 
1995 (Davignon, Interview). The group, which primarily consisted of prominent business leaders 
but also, inter alia of representatives from the trade unions, had as its purpose to ensure that 
competitiveness remained on top of the EU agenda when policies were being designed. When the 
group delivered its biannual reports to the heads of state and government in the European Council 
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the message was identical to the one they could (and can) hear from the ERT: competitiveness, 
competitiveness, competitiveness! 
 
In March 2000 the European Council adopted the so-called Lisbon Strategy, which has as its 
declared purpose to ‘make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and the most dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world’ (European Council, 2000)82. For instance, this is to be 
brought about through investment in research and development and through reforms of social 
security systems and labour market policies. Mostly these reforms are to be implemented by means 
of… benchmarking. Although social cohesion and a good environment are also mentioned as goals, 
there is a clear hierarchy between the various elements in the strategy in the sense that other goals 
are to be achieved through competitiveness. That the Lisbon strategy in many respects sounds like 
an echo of the ideas promoted by the ERT throughout the 1990s is, again, not a coincidence. As 
Baron Daniel Janssen of Solvay, chairman of ERT’s Competitiveness Working Group, explained in 
a speech delivered to the annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission in 2000, ‘The European 
Round Table of Industrialists and our Competitiveness Working Group were very much involved in 
the preparation of the [Lisbon, HB] Summit’ (Janssen, 2000)83. It is thus not terribly surprising that 
the ERT members, together with UNICE and other business groups, have been strong supporters of 
the Lisbon Strategy. Hence, they have also frequently voiced their dissatisfaction with the ability or 
will of the member states to implement it sufficiently84.  
 
The point is of course not to suggest that the European Union’s policies are or have in every detail 
been designed by the ERT. Clearly this is not the case: both EU institutions and member state 
governments by definition enjoy a substantial degree of operational autonomy from the ERT and 
other members of the transnational capitalist class. The point is that the ERT and other capital 
actors have played an important role in establishing the neoliberal GDR (or “competitiveness 
discourse”) as the dominant horizon which shapes the overall direction of European integration and 
governance through the various USDRs it is translated into. But over time the EU bureaucracy has 
gradually become a powerhouse that disseminates this discourse: ‘the ruling social, economic and 
political forces in Europe have channelled the process of European integration into an apparatus 
ensuring and reproducing the hegemony of neoliberal policies and ideas in European countries’ 
(Milios, 2005: 208).  
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In addition to the developments described above, a few others also deserve mentioning. Delors was 
succeeded as Commission President by Jacques Santer (Luxembourg) who served from 1995 to 
1999 and Romano Prodi (Italy) who served until October 2004 where he was replaced with the 
current President, José Manuel Barroso (Portugal). The EU-12 was enlarged with new member 
states. First with Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, then with ten Eastern/Central European 
countries in 2004, and finally with Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Partly with a view to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the EU after the enlargements, the EU treaty was amended on more than one 
occasion. First with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which for instance introduced the notion of 
“flexible integration” and increased the use of qualified majority voting in the Council while 
enhancing the role of the Parliament somewhat; then with the 2003 Nice Treaty which e.g. 
introduced a new voting procedure (“double majority voting”), further extended the use of QMV 
and refined the concept of “flexible integration”. In October 2004 representatives of the EU 
member states signed the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, widely known as the 
European Constitution, which inter alia aimed at streamlining the decision-making procedures in 
the “EU-27”. However, when the French and Dutch voters rejected the constitution in referenda in 
2005 the ratification of the treaty had to be given up (see e.g. Johnson & Turner, 2006: 36-44 for a 
brief overview of the content of the various treaties). In December 2007 the constitution’s 
successor, the “Reform Treaty”, was signed in Lisbon by representatives of the 27 member states. 
 
 
7.3. EC competition regulation in neoliberal times 
 
The neoliberal shift was also reflected in the EC competition unit of regulation. This shift had 
already been initiated in the 1980s and was manifested in the 1989 MCR regulation. However, from 
the early 1990s onwards, the neoliberal GDR became increasingly reflected in the Commission’s 
rhetoric and practice. Indeed, ‘EU competition policy has gradually been transformed into a tool to 
serve the interests of all those economic, financial, social and political forces which depend on free 
competition, market liberalisation and state deregulation’ (Petrella, 1998: 293). As Hooghe & 
Marks (1999: 84) explain, ‘[t]he neoliberal agenda, or parts of it, has gained support in several 
directorate-generals of the Commission (DGs), particularly those implementing the internal market 
such as the powerful directorate-general for competition (DG IV). The market liberal activism of 
DG IV has several sources, but a major factor was the recruitment of enthusiastic market supporters 
during the 1980s’. Another, and related, “source” is the ideological inclinations of the Competition 
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Commissioners that have served from the 1990s onwards (see also Appendix II for a historical 
overview of the Commissioners serving in this area). 
 
We have already noted in the previous chapter how Leon Brittan, who served as competition 
commissioner until 1993 was a hardcore neoliberalist. Karel van Miert (Belgium) who took over 
after Brittan was initially expected by many to be ‘too ready to take a non-competition line when 
issuing competition decisions’ but ended up carrying ‘the label of liberal within the ranks of the 
College of Commissioner’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 43). Like van Miert, Mario Monti (Italy) who 
became the new Commissioner of competition in 1999 was not a vociferous neoliberalist. He liked 
to keep a low political profile, as when he stated in an interview that ‘[o]n some occasions you are 
criticised by the left and on the other by the right, but at least you feel that you do not belong to 
either’ (cited in Willmes & Duursma, 2005: 8). However, one should be in no doubt that Monti was 
a strong advocate of neoliberal policies. Indeed, BusinessWeek online (2002) reports that Monti ‘has 
been championing free markets longer than almost anyone in Europe’ and adds that he, in his 
previous position as a professor of economics at Bocconi University, ‘spoke out frequently in 
favour of deregulation, liberalization, and competition’. Neelie Kroes (Netherlands), who replaced 
Monti in 2004, and who ‘has plenty of experience of commercial reality, having been a director of 
many large European and American companies’ (Sunday Business, 2004), has made no secret of her 
neoliberal inclinations. On several occasions she has emphasised the virtues of competition and 
made no secret of her contempt for protectionism (see section 7.9 below). 
 
Neoliberal ideas have been and are reflected in all the various subunits of the EC competition unit 
of regulation (of which we will deal with merger control in some detail in section 7.6). It is not so 
much that the fundamental rules have been changed: indeed, the competition provisions of the EU 
Treaty remain virtually unaltered, although they were renumbered with the Amsterdam Treaty, to 
the effect that Articles 85, 86 and 92 have become Articles 81, 82 and 87. The neoliberal shift is 
rather reflected not only in the way the Commission interprets the rules and in the meticulousness 
and eagerness with which it enforces them, but also in the instruments it has devised in order to 
make the rules effective. 
 
As McGowan (2007b: 5) points out, EC cartel policy ‘provides an apt illustration of an 
increasingly pro-active and aggressive Commission’. Whereas, the Commission had previously (in 
the era of embedded liberalism) allowed for certain cartels, this changed in the neoliberal epoch. 
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The drastic increase in the size of the fines levied on the parties involved in cartels can be seen to 
reflect the Commission’s changed attitude from the mid 1980s. McGowan notes that ‘[b]y today’s 
standards the initial fines seem ridiculously light as a deterrent’ (2007b: 6). He contrasts a 1969 
ECU 500,000 fine and a 1983 fine of ECU 1,250,000 with a 1986 fine of ECU 58 million and 
writes that even the latter ‘pale into insignificance in the light of developments in the 1990s when 
the DG COMP intensified its campaign’ (2007b: 6). As part of this campaign the Commission 
issued a Leniency Notice in 1996 (later to be revised in 2002 and 2006), which seeks to give firms 
involved in cartels an incentive to report the cartel to the Competition DG, by offering them full 
immunity or at least a reduction in the fine that would otherwise have been imposed on them. 
Considering the magnitude of the fines the Commission has been imposing on such companies in 
the 1990s onwards, and in particular in the past few years (see below), this might in fact constitute a 
strong incentive 
 
No fine has probably attracted as much attention as the one imposed by the Commission on 
Microsoft in 2004 (a decision that was upheld by the CFI in 2007). The record fine of 497 million 
Euros was levied on Microsoft because the Commission found that the company had abused its 
dominant position under Article 82 (previously Article 86) of the EC Treaty. More concretely it 
was held that Microsoft had abused its position by not only refusing to provide suppliers of server 
operating systems with interoperability information needed by these firms to be able to compete 
effectively against Microsoft’s own supply of server operating systems, but also by tying its Media 
Player with its Windows operating system. Although 497 million Euros sounds like an astronomical 
figure, several commentators have raised doubts as to whether it will have any impact on a 
company like Microsoft that has over 50 billion Euros in cash reserves (see e.g. Johnson & Turner, 
2006: 119). Nevertheless, the case underlines the Commission’s increased willingness to apply the 
competition provisions, even in a case that was always destined to cause a lot of controversy.  
 
From the 1990s and onwards the Commission has also begun pushing for liberalisation of key 
utility and infrastructure sectors (such as energy, post and transport) where state owned companies 
enjoyed monopoly status. Such companies had previously (in the era of embedded liberalism) often 
been exempted from competition regulation since the public services they performed were regarded 
to be in the public interest (Wilks, 2005a: 125-126; see also Bannerman, 2002: 33). This tougher 
approach was only possible because of the broader turn towards neoliberalism (see also Smith, 
2005: 317).  
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In the state aid subunit of regulation, the Commission has also become increasingly aggressive 
from the mid 1980s onwards (see also section 6.4). The “State Aid Scoreboard” was launched by 
the Commission in 2001 as the benchmarking instrument by which it would measure progress 
towards the goals of the Lisbon agenda. As Monti put it, ‘This Scoreboard will … reinforce the 
process of peer pressure. I hope that the Scoreboard will lead to a vigorous debate on State aid in 
Member States and stricter respect of the existing rules by all concerned, in particular the Member 
States themselves’ (Commission, 2001a). The current Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, 
made clear from the outset of her tenure, that she would make state aid control a top priority. In 
2005 a reform of the subunit was initiated with the so-called State Aid Action Plan, which was 
presented by the Commission as policy to ‘promote growth, jobs and cohesion’ (Commission, 
2005). In line with this plan, the Commission has ‘stepped up efforts to accelerate the execution of 
recovery decisions’ (decisions whereby the Commission oblige member states to recover illegal aid 
from the beneficiaries) with the result that by the end of 2006 71 per cent or ‘some €6 billion of 
illegal and incompatible aid had been effectively recovered’, which constituted ‘a significant 
improvement compared with the situation in December 2004 when only 25% had been repaid’ 
(Commission, 2007a). It appears from the Spring 2007 “Scoreboard” that the Commission took 608 
decisions on unlawful aid in the 2000-2006 period. Germany was the country involved in most 
cases (148), followed by Italy (105), Spain (70) and France (63) (Commission, 2007b: 12-13). If 
measured by subsidy level per capita ‘Germany emerges as one of the worst culprits and the 
neoliberal UK one of the most reluctant to award subsidies’ (Wilks, 2005a: 125). This clearly 
suggests that the Commission’s aggressive management of the state aid subunit is particularly 
difficult to cope with for (and perhaps poses a threat to) the continental models of capitalism.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the neoliberalisation of EC competition regulation has been supported and 
promoted by the ERT and other European level capital actors. In the previous chapter it was 
described how the ERT enjoyed easy access to Commissioners such as Peter Sutherland (who 
became a member of the ERT in 1997 as Chairman of BP) and Leon Brittan. There are no reasons 
to assume that this changed under later Competition Commissioners. For instance, Baron Daniel 
Janssen of the ERT noted in 2000 that  
 
‘The Commission plays the lead role in many areas of economic importance and it is 
extremely open to the business community, so that when businessmen like me face 
an issue that needs political input we have access to excellent Commissioners such 
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as Monti for competition, Lamy for world trade, and Liikanen for electronic-
commerce and industry. This is in addition to our normal and regular contacts with 
national ministers…’ (Janssen, 2000) 
 
The Roundtable’s neoliberal profile shines clearly through in the various publications where 
competition policy is mentioned. It its 1992 action plan for Europe, Rebuilding Confidence, it 
appears that   
 
‘Competition Policy … must adapt to the new economic realities of world-wide 
competition. Industry needs the freedom to restructure its operations at European 
level, where strong competitors can grow and flourish. It is then the market’s job to 
decide which companies live and die. Authorities are there to ensure that market 
works fairly. It is industry’s job to rebuild competitiveness. The Community’s 
competition policy should now be reviewed in the light of the single market and the 
needs of global competitiveness’ (ERT, 1992: 9; see also ERT, 1991: 43) 
 
That the globalist (and neoliberally inclined) fraction had prevailed within the ERT also appears 
from the 1993 Beating the Crisis report where it is proclaimed that 
 
‘Competition should be judged against a global perspective and the needs of 
competing on world markets. Competition in the Single Market is the best way to 
develop world players. Government should not try to create “European Champions” 
but nor should it try to block their development. There should be a bias towards the 
freedom of action’ (ERT 1993: 25) 
 
The Roundtable’s most elaborate discussion of the EC’s competition policy can be found in the 
1994 memorandum Freedom to compete: Competition policy issues for European business which 
was prepared by a working group led by Floris Maljers of Unilever and Etienne Davignon. Here the 
Roundtable expressed its support for the policy, stating that ‘ERT members believe that the EC 
Competition Policy has in general served European business well and much has been achieved by 
the Commission’ (ERT, 1994: 1). The latter was given credit for its awareness of ‘the advantages of 
speedy decisions in merger control cases’, although the Competition DG’s role as ‘policeman, 
prosecutor and judge’ was criticised (1994: 3-4). Moreover, the ERT-members had become so fond 
of the one-stop-shop regime that they suggested to extend it significantly: 
 
‘The emergence of the single market suggests to Business that the ultimate objective 
should be a single authority. This may be controversial, but certainly the near term 
objective should be to achieve a “one-stop shop”, where any transaction is reviewed 
at one level only’ (1994: 5) 
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In a 1995 discussion paper, UNICE also expressed its support for ‘an effective competition policy 
which promotes the dynamism of European business and enhances its competitiveness on world 
markets’ (UNICE, 1995: 4). However, the paper contains a call for a far-reaching reform of EC 
competition policy, in particular with respect to the administration and scope of Article 85. For 
instance, UNICE argued in favour of a more ‘flexible interpretation of article 85(1)’ and for a 
simplification of the procedural rules (1995: 9, 12). 
 
In December 2000, in the wake of the Lisbon Strategy, the ERT also called for a reform of EC 
competition policy, stating that the strategy ‘cannot be pursued, let alone realised, unless 
competition has space to flourish’ (2000: 1). In particular the Roundtable called for less strict 
“market definitions” by the Commission in the light of the changed economic environment 
(globalisation). More precisely it was argued that globalisation ‘creates larger markets with much 
greater market volumes  larger markets increase the “optimum size” of companies  larger 
optimum sizes mean that EU companies have to grow in size if they are to reap the benefits of scale 
economies in global markets’. As globalisation at the same time intensifies competition in all 
regional markets, scale ‘is the key for many EU companies to maintain global competitiveness’ and 
hence it (globalisation) ‘forces EU companies to grow in size both organically and through 
acquisitions/mergers in order to achieve new efficiencies’ (ERT, 2000: 1-2). In other words, the 
transnational capital actors attempted to use the Lisbon Strategy and “globalisation” as a lever to 
obtain a competition policy that would not prevent them from growing even bigger. 
 
Indeed, the type of competition unit of regulation called for by the ERT and other transnational 
capital actors is one which entails as little involvement by NCAs as possible; which allows them to 
“concentrate” almost as much as they like, so that they can absorb other companies through M&As; 
and which prevents uncompetitive companies from engaging in cartels and other protectionist 
agreements that can shield them from the forces of competition. Keeping this latter standpoint in 
mind it is interesting to take a look at Table 7.1 which lists the ten largest fines ever imposed by the 
Commission on companies. 
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Table 7.1: Ten highest cartel fines per undertaking (since 1969) as of 28 November 2007 
Year Undertaking ** Case Amount in €* 
2007 ThyssenKrupp elevators and escalators 479,669,850 
2001 F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG vitamins 462,000,000 
2007 Siemens AG gas insulated switchgear 396,562,500 
2006 Eni SpA synthetic rubber 272,250,000 
2002 Lafarge SA plasterboard 249,600,000 
2001 BASF AG vitamins 236,845,000 
2007 Otis elevators and escalators 224,932,950 
2007 Heineken NV Dutch beer market 219,275,000 
2006 Arkema SA methacrylates 219,131,250 
2006 Solvay SA / NV hydrogen peroxide 167,062,000 
Source: reproduced from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, accessed on 8 January 
2008 
* Amounts corrected for changes following judgments of the CFI and Court. 
** If more than one legal entity of the same group were subject to the decision, they are counted as one undertaking for 
the purpose of this table. 
 
 
Not only does it appear from the table that all these fines were imposed after 2000 and that seven of 
them dated from either 2006 or 2007, with the Euro 480 million fine levied on ThyssenKrupp in 
2007 topping the list. It is even more remarkable, well in fact quite astonishing, that the five largest 
fines were all imposed on companies that were represented in the ERT. Solvay (number ten on the 
list) was also an “ERT company” at the time of the fine, whereas two other companies, namely 
BASF and Heineken, have also been represented in the ERT (albeit not at the time of the fine). If it 
can be assumed that these companies were not subject to miscarriages of justice, one could be 
excused for wondering whether there is not a good deal of hypocrisy involved in the TNC’s 
consistent calls for open competition. At least it seems that certain companies find it difficult to 
practice as they preach.  
 
In the 1990s onwards the first steps toward the internationalisation or globalisation of competition 
regulation have also been taken. The Commission and the US antitrust authorities have been in the 
forefront pushing for coordination (as opposed to harmonisation) of competition law enforcement, 
hereby attempting to meet the challenges that an increasingly global market place poses to this unit 
of regulation. The EU and the US authorities have concluded bilateral agreements with each other 
and with e.g. Canada and Japan, hereby allowing the authorities in these jurisdictions to share 
information and coordinate activities. The US-EU cooperation agreement, which entered into force 
after the mid-1990s, has for instance resulted in close cooperation in a number of merger cases, 
including the GE/Honeywell case to which we will come back in section 7.6 below. 
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This process has been actively promoted by the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), a private 
elite network that brings together Chairmen/CEOs from leading US and European companies. 
According to its webpage, the goal of TABD ‘is to help establish a Barrier-Free Transatlantic 
Market which will serve as a catalyst for global trade liberalisation and prosperity’85. The initiative 
for the network, which was formed in the mid 1990s, was initially taken by the US Secretary of 
Commerce Ron Brown and Martin Bangemann and Leon Brittan of the Commission. Hence, the 
network has close contacts with the US administration, to the most important European 
governments and to the Commission and has on a number of occasions successfully advanced 
transatlantic trade liberalisation (see e.g. van Apeldoorn, 2002: 11186). Many of the current 
European participants in TABD are or have been members of the ERT, in their capacity as 
Chairmen/CEOs of companies such as BASF, BAT, Lafarge, Philips, Shell, Siemens and Unilever. 
The EU Chairman of TABD is currently Martin Broughton, the chairman of British Airways, who 
is also an ERT member87.  
 
Since the network’s beginning, the TABD has pushed for convergence of EU and US competition 
policies, for instance arguing in its first report that ‘The EU and US should develop convergent 
procedures to vet mergers’ and that ‘The US and the EU should agree to make worldwide “market 
access” for all companies, foreign and domestic, a priority objective’ (TABD, 1995: 8). More 
recently, the TABD has urged ‘continued vigilance against any policies that promote national 
champions or use the cloak of patriotism or national security to prevent overseas investment’. In 
this context it argued in favour of the removal of ‘any artificial national or state constraints on 
mergers or acquisitions while retaining robust competition policy to guard against the abuse of 
dominant market positions’ adding that the governments ‘should also work together with business 
to remove barriers to cross-border banking mergers and acquisitions both within the EU and across 
the Atlantic’ (TABD, 2007: 11). 
 
But the internationalisation of the competition units of regulation has extended well beyond 
bilateral agreements. EU and US competition authorities have pushed for multilateral agreements, 
consisting of ‘a common set of rules and mechanisms for dispute settlement’ applying to large 
groups of countries (Johnson & Turner, 2006: 115-116). The EU, and more precisely the 
Commission, has been the strongest supporter of the adoption of common rules at WTO (see e.g. 
Van Miert, 1998: 11). One reason for this support has to some extent been the stated goal of 
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becoming able to fight hardcore international cartels and to avoid the burden placed on merging 
companies having to deal with several competition authorities. However, another and certainly not a 
less important reason is that the EU and the US seek to use competition policy as an instrument to 
consolidate the neoliberal social order on a global scale. By linking it to international trade 
agreements, ‘competition policy could potentially become yet another tool for prying open markets 
– whether the markets of developing countries, activities provided by the public sector or state 
enterprises, or specific industries given special treatment for public policy reasons’ (Lee & Morand, 
2003: 3). Indeed, as Hoekman & Holmes (1999: 9) point out, ‘efforts to put competition-related 
issues on the WTO agenda are largely driven by classic producer interests in major OECD 
countries’. That is,  
 
‘The main interest of the EU and US is to use competition policy disciplines as an 
export-promoting device and to reduce the scope for conflict in the approval of 
mergers between large firms; they are less interested in subjecting the behavior of 
their firms in foreign markets to international disciplines that will benefit foreign 
consumers’ (Hoekman & Holmes, 1999: 5) 
 
Unsurprisingly, such efforts have been supported from the outset by the transnational business 
community, not least the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, 2003)88. Notwithstanding this, 
it has not been able to reach any agreement on competition issues within the WTO (mainly due to 
resistance from developing countries) and hence the negotiations are currently suspended. 
Meanwhile, ‘the EU has placed itself among a network of interlinking organisations seeking to 
develop a multilateral framework for competition’ (Johnson & Turner, 2006: 116). Besides the 
WTO, this network comprises the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition, which brings together 
high-level competition officials from around the world and the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group 
of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, which promotes the “culture of competition” in 
developing countries.  
 
The most important forum for the coordination of the various competition units of regulation is the 
International Competition Network (ICN) which was established in 2001. Initially created by 16 
competition authorities, including those of the EU, US, Japan and Canada, it now includes 100 
agencies from 88 jurisdictions in both developed and developing countries. The ICN is a “virtual” 
forum that ‘cooperates closely with and seeks input from existing international organizations … 
such as the OECD, WTO and UNCTAD’ (ICN, 2005: 2). Acknowledging that ‘[a]ntitrust 
enforcement at times may impose unnecessary costs and uncertainty on the business community 
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and marketplace’, the ICN ‘works to promote sound and principled procedural and substantive 
standards that help minimize such burdens and leave pro-competitive, efficiency enhancing conduct 
free to flourish’ (ICN, 2005: 1). It does not itself have legislative powers or any competition rules to 
enforce, but seeks to exert an influence through softer instruments such as “best practice 
guidelines”. The work of the ICN takes place in a number of working groups that, for instance, deal 
with issues related to mergers and cartels (see Budzinski, 2004 for more details on the ICN). In its 
2007-2008 Work Plan, the ICN Merger Working Group states that its mission ‘is to promote the 
adoption of best practices in the design and operation of merger review regimes’. Besides 
representatives from various competition policy authorities, this ‘working group also includes 
representatives from the OECD and from the legal, economic, academic and business communities’ 
(ICN, 2007). Indeed, the work of the ICN is strongly supported by business groups. For instance, 
the ICC has established a “Taskforce on the International Competition Network”. It appears from a 
2002 speech given by the chair of this taskforce, Klaus F. Becher, that ‘private sector groups such 
as the ICC, the OECD´s Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the International 
Bar Association have formally supported the work of the ICN’ (ICC, 2002b). Becker also made 
clear that ‘business is working with increasing commitment for a global antitrust convergence and 
to assist competition agencies in their efforts to make these regimes hopefully harmonious, at least 
transparent, nondiscriminatory and simpler’. 
 
 
7.4. The “modernisation” of Regulation 17  
 
Although the possibility and desirability of a comprehensive reform of EC competition policy was 
seriously discussed from the early 1990s, it was only towards the end of the decade that a reform 
process was officially set in motion by the Commission. In April 1999, while Karel van Miert was 
still Competition Commissioner, the Commission published a White Paper on Modernisation of the 
Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. The White Paper proposed that the 
existing EC competition unit of regulation which was based on pre-notification and centralised 
authorisation in the sub-units of cartels and abuses of dominant positions, was replaced with a 
system that was based on ex post regulation and a more decentralised application of the competition 
provisions in these subunits. A former Director General of the Competition DG, Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, has suggested that  
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‘The White Paper […] is the most important policy paper the Commission has ever 
published in more than 40 years of EC competition policy. It suggests a legal and 
cultural revolution in proposing the fundamental reorganization of the existing 
responsibilities between the Commission, national antitrust authorities and national 
courts’ (Ehlermann, 2000: 537) 
 
Nonetheless, the White Paper was accepted ‘virtually in its entirety’ (Wilks, 2005a: 435) by the 
member states, and hence its content was to no small extent reflected in the proposal for a 
regulation that was submitted to the Council by the Commission in September 2000 and 
subsequently adopted in December 2002. The new Regulation 1/2003 (hereafter: Regulation 1), 
which entered into force in 1 May 2004 (the very same day the EU was enlarged with ten new 
member states), replaced Regulation 17. As a number of scholars have observed, the implications of 
this reform (which also extends into the merger area, as we shall see below) are far-reaching. 
McGowan (2005: 987) suggests that ‘[t]he momentous changes contained within the reforms 
represent nothing less than a real revolution in the way competition policy will now be enforced and 
implemented’. And according to Wigger & Nölke (2007: 487) the 2004 reform ‘is the most 
important change in the history of EU competition policy’. 
 
In particular, three changes introduced with Regulation 1 deserve mentioning. First, the reform 
grants additional investigative powers to the Commission, allowing it, for instance to conduct 
interviews with individuals from a company and to search domestic premises of such individuals 
(see e.g. McGowan, 2005: 994; Monti, 2007: 410). Second, the enforcement of EC competition 
regulation is “decentralised”. This means that NCAs are going to be involved in the enforcement of 
EC competition rules, for instance enabling them to approve agreements with reference to Article 
81(3) (formerly Article 85(3)) without the Commission’s acceptance. Whereas the EC competition 
unit of regulation was previously managed by the Competition DG, parts of it are now also to be 
managed by 27 NCAs. In order to allocate cases among the NCAs and to ensure a coherent 
application of rules, the European Competition Network (ECN) was formed in 2002 (the year 
Regulation 1 was agreed). The stated purpose of this “decentralisation” is to provide a speedier and 
more uniform handling of cases and to allow the Commission to refocus its resources (Johnson & 
Turner 2006: 107-108). However, some scholars have suggested that the real purpose is to 
centralise even more power in the Commission. Indeed, the ECN is not a network of equal partners; 
on the contrary, it is a hierarchical network where the NCAs are not allowed to reach decisions that 
contradict the Commission’s decisions and where the NCAs have to send a draft to the Commission 
before adopting a decision, hereby enabling the Commission not only to comment on the decision 
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but also to actually remove the case from the NCA and take it on itself (McGowan, 2005: 993; 
Monti, 2007: 517). In other words, the Commission is not the architect of a “revolution” that 
undermines its own power and central position as a competition policy enforcer; on the contrary it 
‘has engineered an audacious coup that has extended its powers, marginalised national competition 
laws, and corralled the national competition authorities’ (Wilks, 2005b: 438; see also Riley, 2003). 
 
Third, the old notification system is abolished. Regulation 17 entailed a system where companies 
with a “community dimension” could notify all sorts of commercial agreements (with the exception 
of mergers) to the Commission, which would then either prohibit the agreement or grant exemption 
with reference to Article 85(3). As Wigger & Nölke (2007: 496) explain, ‘[t]he logic of this system 
was that everything not permitted was forbidden. Once the Commission gave its approval or 
exemption decision, the deal was automatically immune from legal prosecution’. Under Regulation 
1 all ‘agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty which do 
not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that 
effect being necessary’ (Regulation 1: Art. 1). This means that the old ex ante notification system is 
replaced with an ex post system, where it is very much up to companies themselves to figure out if 
an agreement constitutes a breach of Article 81(1) or whether it meets the criteria to be exempted 
under Article 81(3). This, however, does not only involve self-assessment: the new system gives 
companies a strong incentive to “look after” their competitors and take them to court if they have 
reason to believe that their agreements should be prohibited under Article 81(1). In other words, the 
new system involves a significant “privatisation” of EC competition law, where capital actors are to 
play a much more active role than they have previously done. This change has not been without 
effects. According to data presented by Wigger & Nölke (2007: 497) only 5 per cent of competition 
cases in the EU-25 were brought to national courts by private parties prior to the enactment of 
Regulation 1; in the two years following its enactment 51 per cent of the competition cases resulting 
in national court judgements had been initiated by various private actors. 
 
The stated purpose of this “privatisation” of competition policy enforcement is to benefit both 
companies and the Commission. The former are freed from the burden of notification and the latter 
is now able to concentrate its efforts on those cases that involve serious distortions of competition. 
However, again one might well question whether this was also the real motive behind the change. 
For one thing the old notification system, while not being perfect, provided businesses with a 
certain degree of legal certainty. This was widely appreciated in the business community and, even 
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though the Commission was also criticised for being too slow and inefficient, the system itself 
enjoyed support not only from business but also from some member states (see e.g. FRG, 1999). 
Despite the stated goal of Regulation 1 to increase certainty for business, the “privatisation” has the 
exact opposite effect. This can come as no surprise to the Commission, which is indeed ‘aware that 
firms find it next to impossible to understand what constitutes an anticompetitive agreement under 
Article 81(1)’ (Monti, 2007: 411). Hence, large parts of the European business community are not 
particularly pleased with the new system which they fear will lead to ‘a situation of increased legal 
insecurity and significant transaction costs’, and UNICE and other business groups ‘therefore 
strongly counterbalance efforts for further legal modifications that enhance the possibilities of 
litigation’ (Wigger & Nölke, 2007: 500, 501; see also Martin, 2007). The consequence of 
“privatisation” is that businesses ‘will require ever increasing legal and economic advice before 
implementing agreements, and this favours larger firms with greater economic resources’ (Monti, 
2007: 411-412). Yet it certainly also favours the legal profession serving the business community, 
and indeed much seems to suggest that, although business groups such as ERT, UNICE and 
AmCham-EU were involved in the reform processes (McGowan, 2005: 987)89, it was to no small 
extent a coalition consisting of law companies, legal experts and the Commission that pushed for 
changes in this field (Wigger & Nölke, 2007: 504; Wilks, 2005b: 447). 
 
In the processes leading up to the reform, the Commission did much to portray itself as an 
institution that was heavily burdened by the notification system. This system was said to have 
forced the Commission into a reactive mode where too many resources were wasted on the 
notification of harmless agreements, while too little effort was made to fight more serious breaches 
of EC competition law. For instance, it appears from the Commission’s Twenty-sixth Report on 
Competition Policy that in the period from 1989 to 1996, only in 13 percent of its cases had the 
Commission become involved on its own initiative, in the rest it was involved due to complaints or 
notifications (Commission, 1997: 341-342). Moreover, the Commission had only prohibited nine 
notified agreements between 1962 and 1999 (where the White Paper was published). Although this 
number does not take conditional exemptions into account, it still clearly indicates that the notified 
agreements were generally not those involving serious breaches of the rules (Monti, 2007: 397). As 
mentioned above this system was rightly criticised for being inefficient – and as the Commission 
was keen to point out the 2004 enlargement would only aggravate this situation as one could expect 
the Competition DG to be almost drowned in new notifications. This was one of the problems that 
privatisation and “decentralisation” was hoped to solve. 
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However, some scholars have questioned whether the old system was indeed functioning as badly 
as claimed by the Commission (e.g. Riley, 2003; Wilks, 2005b: 438). For one thing it is doubtful 
whether the Competition DG was overburdened by notifications. Whereas it had received over 200 
notifications a year in the 1989-1998 period, the number fell drastically between 1999, where a new 
block exemption system was introduced, and 2004 where the new system entered into force:  
 
Table 7.2 Number of notifications received by the Competition DG 1999-2004 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
162 101 94 101 71 21 
Source: Data from the Commission as cited in Monti (2007: 400)  
 
 
Moreover, the Competition DG had been able to reduce the backlog of cases: whereas more than 
3000 notified agreements had been pending in 1980, this number had been reduced to 473 in 2004 
(Monti, 2007: 400). This seems to suggest that the Commission might have exaggerated the extent 
to which it was overburdened – and the extent to which the EU enlargement would paralyse it. 
Indeed, a number of commentators have pointed out that there is no guarantee that the new system 
is going to be more efficient than the system it replaces. For instance, the new NCAs of the 
accession countries have little experience with the enforcement of competition policy and are 
perhaps also less persuaded about the need for this type of regulation (see e.g. Monti, 2007: 414-
423 for a discussion of some possible flaws of the new system).  
 
This suggests that the “modernisation” of the EC competition unit of regulation is not merely some 
practical or bureaucratic arrangement that is meant to ensure its smooth operation “post-
enlargement”: it should certainly also in no small part be seen as an attempt to consolidate the 
prevailing neoliberal USDR.  Indeed, far from constituting an attempt to genuinely “re-nationalise” 
competition law, ‘policy makers in the Commission were seeking commitment to a neoliberal 
European economy, to the privileging of competition as against employment or social welfare, and 
to a pan-European integrated market that may imply major shifts in the location of economic 
activity’ (Wilks, 2005a: 437). Wigger & Nölke point out that the reforms constitutes ‘a substantial 
shift from the Rheinish to the Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism’ with the result that ‘[s]hort-term 
efficiency considerations are likely to take precedence over wider socio-economic concerns, such as 
the protection of SMEs or technology transfer through inter-firm collaboration’ (2007: 505). Indeed, 
it seems correct to say that the reforms contribute to consolidate the hegemony of the neoliberal 
215 
 
USDR by ensuring that this discourse will serve as the basis for competition regulation not only at 
the EU level but also at the national level throughout the EU-27. As such the reforms also constitute 
a further break with the post-war compromise of embedded liberalism and the prevailing form of 
competition regulation in the era of the KNWS (where the “wider socio-economic concerns” 
mentioned above by Wilks and Wigger & Nölke were often taken into consideration).  
 
 
7.5. The “Europeanisation” of national merger control 
 
It should be clear from what has been said in the previous sections that a fundamental 
transformation of the EC competition unit of regulation has taken place over time. In the course of 
this process, the Competition DG has become increasingly powerful and self-confident, and EC 
competition policy has come to overshadow national competition law. In this section we once again 
turn our attention to national merger control/competition regulation in the UK, Germany and France 
and briefly look at how the national subunits of regulation have gradually and partially been 
“Europeanised” in order to make them more compatible with EC merger control. 
 
Britain. As we saw in the previous chapter, a rather radical neoliberal shift took place in the UK in 
the 1980s. In the monetary area this entailed a commitment to monetarist principles; in the 
industrial policy area it involved much less state intervention in the market; and in the social policy 
area it was reflected in cuts in unemployment benefits, social assistance and housing allowances for 
single mothers, unemployed and youth (Schmidt, 2002: 76). Notwithstanding the socially 
imbalanced nature of these policies, they contributed to lower unemployment and brought down the 
social security deficits (2002: 78) and were by and large continued under the Conservative, John 
Major government (1990-1997). In 1997 the Labour Party, now renamed “New Labour”, came to 
power. The new Tony Blair government, with its so-called “Third Way” policies, did not in most 
respects break with the neoliberal path followed since the late 1970s. Although committed to an 
increase in social equality, ‘the three successive Labour Governments under Blair’s continuing 
authoritarian plebiscitary tutelage have deliberately, persistently, and wilfully driven forward the 
neo-liberal transformation of Britain rather than halting or reversing it’ (Jessop, 2006: 9). That is, 
New Labour ‘has willingly committed itself to further liberalization and de-regulation in many 
areas, old and new; to the privatization or, at least, corporatization, of most of what remains of the 
state-owned sector; [and] to reliance on expensive ‘private-finance initiatives’ as a way of raising 
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funds for public investment whilst keeping such borrowing off the government’s balance sheet’ 
(2006: 11; see also Coates, 1999). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the British competition unit of regulation was not formally 
reprogrammed in the 1980s, albeit a more implicit neoliberal shift took place also in this area, 
especially in the wake of the Tebbit guidelines. Despite proposals for reforms British capital actors 
managed to block major changes in this area in the 1980s and most of the 1990s90. This stalemate 
came to an end when the New Labour government came into power. In its election manifesto it had 
promised a reform of the existing competition unit of regulation and after a round of consultations 
(and some delay due to Conservative opposition) the Competition Act was adopted in the Parliament 
in 1998. The Act, which came into force in 2000, ‘marks a fundamental shift in the core 
characteristics of the traditional UK policy’ (Eyre & Lodge, 2000: 69). As a number of scholars 
have pointed out, the Act involves a significant “Europeanisation” of the British regime (e.g. Eyre 
& Lodge, 2000: 69-71; Suzuki, 2000; Utton, 2000: 281). Articles 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty were 
incorporated into the Act (Eyre & Lodge, 2000: 69)91; UK authorities were given investigative 
powers similar to those held by the Commission; the MMC was renamed the “Competition 
Commission” (CC); and an Appeals Tribunal was established (Cini, 2006; Kryda, 2002: 256).  
 
The Act changed nothing in the field of merger control which had been excluded from the reforms, 
but it had barely been implemented before, in October 2000, Trade and Industry Secretary, Stephen 
Byers, announced that a major reform of the merger control regime was going to take place (DTI, 
2000). The essence of the reform, which was reiterated in a 2001 DTI White Paper, A World Class 
Competition Regime (a title very much in the spirit of the neoliberal era of benchmarking), was to 
limit the involvement of political decision-makers in merger decisions and to make competition the 
all-important criterion of merger regulation (DTI, 2001). With the new merger system, which 
formed part of the 2002 Enterprise Act and came into force in 2003, the Trade and Industry 
Secretary is no longer to take part in the process of merger regulation, except in exceptional cases 
(e.g. related to national security), meaning that politically independent competition authorities, 
rather than democratically accountable ministers take the final decision (Scott et al., 2006: 8). In 
other words, the new British regime is modelled on a neoliberal type of merger regulation, not 
unlike the one that was introduced at the EC level in 1989 (see section 6.7). Moreover, a new 
“substantial lessening of competition” (or SLC) test was introduced, meaning that the CC now 
decides whether or not a merger can be approved solely on the basis of whether it has resulted (or 
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can be expected to result) in a SLC. It is worth noting that this test is different from the 
“dominance” test used by the EC, although the both concern a merger’s effect on competition in a 
given market. Yet the SLC test is associated with the US antitrust regime, which since the 1914 
Clayton Antitrust Act has prohibited mergers that “substantially lessen competition” (see section 
4.1). As Vickers (2004: 456) points out, competition had already for a long time been the criterion 
used in British merger regulation and as such ‘the reform crystallised in law how practice had 
developed’. Yet ‘the sole emphasis on competition rather than public interest is a tell-tale sign of a 
change in outlook’ (Arestis & Sawyer, 2005: 204) and that this competition-only vision was 
institutionalised while a Labour government was in power is a testimony to the extent to which the 
neoliberal USDR has become hegemonic. 
 
Germany. Whereas a shift towards neoliberalism had already taken place in the monetary unit of 
regulation in the mid 1970s (in the form of monetarism, see section 6.2), steps towards a 
“neoliberalisation” of other areas of the “social market economy” were not taken before the 1990s. 
At this juncture, the now unified Germany suffered from high unemployment (11 percent by the 
mid 1990s) with a resulting increase in welfare expenditure (29.6 percent of GDP in 1995), that put 
the social security system under great pressure (Schmidt, 2002: 73). However, political realities 
made it impossible for the Kohl government to implement more than minimal cuts in the social 
security system. Only under the government led by Gerhard Schröder of the SPD (1998 -2005) did 
more neoliberally inspired reforms take place, not least in the pension system where a freeze on 
increases was adopted and a partial privatisation took place (2002: 73-74). In the 1990s, the Kohl 
government did however respond to the (perceived) declining competitiveness of German business 
in both capital and product markets by initiating a process of privatisation and deregulation: ‘[i]n 
addition to the massive privatization programme in East Germany, major monopolistic public 
service providers in telecommunications and air and rail transport were privatized while highly 
regulated markets such as stock markets, electricity, and road haulage were deregulated’ (Schmidt, 
2002: 72; see also Ryner, 2003 for a discussion of Germany’s political economy in the neoliberal 
era). This process did in no small part take place due to pressure from the Commission and the 
Competition DG which, as we saw in section 7.3 above, turned its attention to the public sectors 
and government intervention in the market in the 1990s (see also Quack & Djelic, 2005: 271).92  
 
With the increased prominence of EC competition policy in the 1990s onwards, the relationship 
between German competition authorities (primarily the BKartA) and the Competition DG has also 
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changed dramatically. Following Quack & Djelic (2005: 276-277) one might distinguish between 
three phases in this relationship: from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s the German competition 
authorities were influential in shaping European level competition policy; from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-1980s the interconnections between the BKartA and the Competition DG were rather 
limited; and since the mid-1980s the interactions between the two have become much stronger but 
now with influence mainly going from the Competition DG towards the German competition 
regime. Indeed, the BKartA has increasingly been ‘relegated to a subordinate position’, also 
because it has ‘manoeuvred itself into inward looking isolation with an exaggerated self-belief in its 
mission and an over-legalistic and case-oriented approach towards competition policy’ (Lodge, 
2003: 236; see also Wilks & Bartle, 2002). Unsurprisingly, this subordination to the Competition 
DG has not been welcomed by the BKartA, and hence the 1990s were to some extent characterised 
by increased “system friction” or “ideational mismatch” between BKartA and the Competition DG 
and indeed also hostility between the German governments and the Commission (Lodge, 2003: 236, 
248). For instance, the BKartA time and again criticised EC competition policy, not least EC 
merger control, arguing that the creation of a politically independent “European cartel office” would 
be desirable (see e.g. McGowan & Cini, 1999; Pollack, 1998: 235). An important reason for the 
lack of German enthusiasm with respect to the reforms of Regulation 17 and, as we shall see below, 
the MCR was that these ‘[a]lterations to the EC competition law approach represented not just 
challenges to the philosophy underlying German competition law. They also exposed the German 
inability to veto such change in the absence of potential coalition partners in the Council and the 
inability to generate an alternative to a status quo that was widely regarded as untenable’ (Lodge, 
2003: 248). In particular, the abolition of the ex ante notification system, which was a German 
device, was a pill that was hard to swallow.   
 
However, in the wake of the economic problems in the unified Germany, a debate over the German 
competition law, the GWB, took place in the mid 1990s and a reform process was initiated. In 
particular German industry, as represented by the BDI, ‘argued that German competitiveness could 
be enhanced by reducing the burden on national business by harmonizing the domestic with 
European competition law’ (Eyre & Lodge, 2000: 72). That is, the BDI called for a Europeanisation 
of German competition law – and the government responded with a draft proposal that would have 
entailed full harmonisation (Quack & Djelic, 2005: 274). This was openly opposed by the BKartA 
and the Monopoly Commission, with the former accusing the BDI of attempting to undermine the 
German competition unit of regulation. After four years of controversy, the GWB was reformed in 
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1999. The new law did not go as far in the direction of Europeanisation as the BDI had wished for 
(Eyre & Lodge, 2000: 72). Nevertheless, various adaptations to EC competition law were effected. 
In particular, ‘§1 and §19 GWB represented Europeanized provisions by adopting the prohibition 
approach of Article 81 and Article 82, respectively’, and moreover ‘the existing split between ex 
ante and ex post controls was replaced by a pure ex ante approach for mergers above DM 1bn’, 
hereby creating a system that was similar to the European one (Lodge, 2003: 238, 239).  
 
In 2005 yet another reform of the GWB entered into force, this time in response to the adoption of 
Regulation 1 (see the previous section). This law involved ‘further substantial adaptations of 
German law’ to EC law including ‘the abolition of the obligation to notify and seek approval of 
agreements between undertakings and the adjustment to European provisions of substantive 
exemption requirements for horizontal and vertical agreements’ (BKartA, 2005; see also Wise, 
2005a for a detailed discussion of the modernised German competition law). The new law also 
facilitates private antitrust litigation in order to compensate for this loss of regulatory control, 
hereby allowing private parties to sue infringers for damages under Articles 81 and 82. Although it 
is too early to say what the outcome of this change will be, it could potentially constitute a radical 
break with German competition law traditions (Rinne & Walz, 2007: 126; Wurmnest, 2005). 
Should private antitrust litigations become the order of the day in Germany, it could possibly 
undermine some of the foundations of the German model of capitalism. Indeed, as Wigger & Nölke 
(2007: 500) point out, ‘[t]he volatility induced by private enforcement makes strategic long-term 
investments or commercial collaborations more risky’ hereby tending ‘to erode the Rhenish 
comparative advantages in high skill and high technology products, which inter alia are based on 
incremental innovation sustained by long-term investment’ (see also Buxbaum, 2005). 
 
France. Since the 1980s France’s state-led model of capitalism has been transformed in some 
important respects. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was the socialist Mitterrand 
government that abandoned Keynesian economic policies, opting instead for monetarism as well as 
for somewhat less interventionist industrial policies and privatisation. As such a process towards a 
more market-based model was initiated and this process has been followed under subsequent 
governments. The result is, as Prasad (2005: 358) explains, that ‘the French state is no longer as 
interventionist as it was during most of the postwar period: price controls have been abolished, 
many industries have been privatized, labor and financial markets have been deregulated, and 
increasing integration with Europe has forced adherence to a more liberal monetary and exchange 
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rate policy’. However, it would be mistaken to present this as a full-blown shift away from the 
French model of capitalism: ‘it is privatization that has been the most noticeable feature of French 
neoliberalism, while taxation and social costs remain undiminished’ (2005: 358). Indeed, in the 
1980s, French governments actively expanded the social security and public service systems, and  
the attempt to cut down such expenses in the 1990s onwards has met with great resistance (Schmidt, 
2002: 84-87; see also Clift, 2001 for a more detailed discussion of France’s contemporary political 
economy). Although France has thus moved towards a more market-based form of capitalism in the 
last two decades, neoliberalism is neither embraced wholeheartedly by the political elite nor by a 
majority of the population. Indeed, there is a real fear that France will end up as a loser in the 
competition game if neoliberalism is taken too far. Since the beginning of the decade this has 
resulted in a protectionist or “national mercantilist” backlash in both political rhetoric and practice, 
to which we will come back in section 7.9 below. 
 
Both French and EC competition policies have played and play an important role in the 
neoliberalisation of the French economy. According to the Chair of the Conseil de la Concurrence, 
Marie-Dominique Hagelsteen, French competition law ‘is part and parcel’ of ‘the reforms 
undertaken over the past 20 years to move towards a profound liberalisation of the economy and 
disengagement of the State’, adding that ‘this move is irreversible’ (quoted from Annex to Wise, 
2005b: 78). The pressure to liberalise the French economy has to a large extent come from the EU. 
However, as Schmidt (2002: 83) points out, ‘EU deregulatory policies promoting competition and 
the opening of the market in sectors such as telecommunications, electricity and transport have been 
particularly difficult for France to absorb, since they undermined the central role of national 
champions in infrastructural services…’. Notwithstanding this, a number of public companies have 
been privatised. For instance, Électricité de France and Gaz de France, the state-owned power and 
gas companies, have been functioning on private sector lines (that is, without state guarantees) since 
2005 (EIU Viewswire, 2007: 1).  
 
The 1986 ordinance which laid the foundations of modern competition law in France (see section 
6.2) has been used to create the conditions for a much more competition-oriented regulation of the 
French economy than previously. For instance, the Conseil fined France Telecom, Électricité de 
France and Gaz de France for unfair competitive practices. On more than one occasion, French 
competition authorities have been re-programmed in order to align them with EC competition 
policy: in 1992 the Conseil was empowered to apply the EC Treaty’s Articles 85 and 86; in 2001 a 
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comprehensive modernisation of the competition law, for instance introduced a clemency procedure 
and enabled the Conseil to levy more severe fines on companies, hereby reflecting similar 
development at the EC level; and in 2002 new merger control rules came into force, hereby 
introducing a pre-notification system for mergers falling above certain thresholds (and below the 
EC thresholds), not unlike system under the MCR (Wise, 2005b; LeBoeuf et al., 2002). However, 
both the content and form of French merger control continues to fall short of neoliberal ideals (and 
thus also of a complete Europeanisation). Mergers are regulated on the basis of more than just a 
competition criterion: both economic and social progress are factors that can be taken into 
consideration, with the result that ‘companies stand a better chance of obtaining clearance if they 
can show that their merger will create or save jobs’ (EIU Viewswire, 2007: 4). And moreover, the 
Minister of Economy continues to be centrally involved in the process (LeBoeuf et al., 2002), 
hereby leaving room for political involvement in merger control. 
 
To recapitulate, the merger subunits of regulation in the UK, Germany and France have gradually 
been “Europeanised” (and hence also neoliberalised) in order to integrate them with the EC merger 
subunit. However, the stakes involved in neoliberalising/Europeanising competition regulation 
differ from one country to the next. The stakes are relatively low in the UK as neoliberal 
competition regulation “fits” the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism well, whereas they are higher in 
Germany and France where this type of regulation does not necessarily sit easily with the models of 
capitalism found here. To a large extent this accounts for the remarkable reversal in attitudes: 
whereas the UK government was for many years one of the main critics of EC competition policy 
and very reluctant to cede any powers to Brussels in this area, it is now one of the strongest national 
proponents of the Competition DG’s tough policies against various forms of protectionism. And 
whereas Germany was previously a leader in the competition policy area, ‘the “former best pupil” 
has turned today into a rather reluctant adapter’ (Quack & Djelic, 2005: 273) with the BKartA on a 
number of occasions making no secret of its distrust of the Commission. It should also be 
mentioned that the Europeanisation of competition law is not limited to the countries discussed 
above. A major reform of the Spanish competition unit of regulation is in progress, in large part due 
to the changes introduced at EU level in 2004 (see Callol, 2007 for details). In other countries such 
as Italy and the Netherlands EU type competition regulation were adopted in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and according to McGowan (2005: 988) eight of the then fifteen NCAs were in a 
position to apply Article 81 directly by the end of 1998.  
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7.6. EC merger regulation in the 1990s onwards 
 
The MCR entered into force on 21 September 1990. A separate department within the Competition 
DG, the so-called Merger Task Force (MTF), was programmed to deal with all merger cases with a 
“Community dimension” as defined in the MCR (Lyons, 2004: 247). As briefly mentioned in 
section 6.7 the review of mergers is divided into two phases. Phase 1 is a one month screening stage 
which begins the moment the Competition DG receives notification of a merger. Provided that the 
notified merger does in fact have a community dimension the outcome of the screening process is 
that the merger is either approved (with or without conditions attached) or that proceedings are 
initiated in cases where the merger gives rise to serious doubts about its effects on competition. The 
outcome of such Phase 2 investigations, which are to last no longer than four months, is that a 
merger is either prohibited, allowed unconditionally or allowed subject to various remedies that are 
decided through negotiations with the involved companies. In this process the opinion of the 
Advisory Committee, consisting of Member State representatives, has to be taken into account. 
Importantly, it is not up to the MTF or the Competition DG to take the final decision: formally the 
Competition DG makes a recommendation to the College of Commissioners (consisting of the full 
group of Commissioners) which takes the final decision. This decision can be appealed to the CFI. 
However, this is generally speaking a lengthy process ‘and business realities mean that it is 
extremely difficult to resurrect a merger prohibition that has been overthrown on appeal’ (Lyons, 
2004: 248). In effect, then, the Commission is investigator, prosecutor and judge in the regulation of 
mergers. 
 
Under the 1989 MCR the MTF’s assessment of mergers is based on the “market dominance” (MD) 
test. Art 2(3) of the MCR states that 
 
‘A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of 
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market’  
 
In other words, the MD test consists of two steps: first it is assessed whether a given merger is 
likely to create or strengthen a dominant position; if this is the case, then the question becomes 
whether competition is going to be “significantly impeded”. In other words, mergers involving a 
significant impediment of competition  (second step) can only be blocked in so far as it can be 
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rendered probable that they also involve market dominance (first step) (Weitbrecht, 2005: 67-68). 
One of the most crucial yet delicate aspects of the first step is the definition of markets: ‘This can be 
extremely difficult and controversial, as market definition is often the deciding factor in the 
approval of a merger, and firms and the Commission often disagree on this point’ (Cini, 2002: 242). 
That is, the narrower the definition of the market, the greater the likelihood that a merger will lead 
to or strengthen dominance. In defining markets, both product markets and geographical markets 
are taken into account and although “market dominance” is not reduced to a question of market 
share, it has been suggested that ‘a finding of dominance is more likely as market shares increase 
above 40% and it may be very difficult to refute when the share goes over 60%’ (Morgan, 2001: 
460). In the second step, a number of aspects are considered in order to establish whether 
“dominance” will also result in a “significant impediment to competition”. At this stage, it will 
often be considered whether the merged entity’s current competitors have the strength to make it 
unattractive for it to raise prices; whether entry into the market by new competitors is likely and 
sufficient to prevent anti-competitive effects; whether the merged entity is likely to behave in such a 
way as to raise its rivals costs and/or erect new market barriers to potential entrants; and whether 
buyers and suppliers will be able to obtain the goods/services produced by the merged entity 
elsewhere (see Cini, 2002: 243; Monti, 2007: 250-256)93.  
 
Whereas the MD test was a suitable instrument in situations where a single firm’s dominance was 
created/strengthened through a merger, the Competition DG was from an early stage well aware 
that mergers in oligopoly markets that would distort competition without creating a dominant 
position, would escape control. Consequently, ‘it waited for a strong case to establish a legal basis 
for finding that mergers increasing concentration in oligopoly markets could be blocked’ (Monti, 
2007: 311). In 1992 the Competition DG challenged the merger between Swiss food group Nestlé 
and French mineral water supplier Perrier on grounds of “collective dominance” (a merger that was 
subsequently cleared subject to certain conditions, see Dinan, 1999: 348). To simplify somewhat, 
this concept was used to denote a situation where two or more companies tacitly (as opposed to 
explicitly) coordinate their behaviour and come to act as one company in an oligopoly market. This 
initiated the development of a new doctrine in the 1990s that allowed the Commission to control 
certain mergers in oligopoly markets, a power that was subsequently confirmed by the Court (see 
Monti, 2007: 311-316; Morgan, 2001: 461; Weitbrecht, 2005: 67).  
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From the early 1990s the Competition DG came under attack from the BKartA and the German 
government. Most importantly it was claimed that ‘the Commission’s enforcement of the Merger 
Regulation is excessively lax and “politicized”, with the Commission approving mergers which 
should have been blocked, and improperly applying social and industrial policy criteria to merger 
decisions’ (Pollack, 1998: 235). As regards accusation of “laxness”, at least one commentator has 
suggested that a number of mergers in oligopoly markets escaped the MCR’s net in the early 1990s 
and that it was partly due to pressure from the BKartA that the Commission devised the notion of 
collective dominance in order to remedy this gap (see Ridyard, 1992). The charge of 
“politicization” is mainly related to the involvement of the College of Commissioners in merger 
decisions, which e.g. entails a risk that Member State governments are able to persuade “their” 
Commissioner to defend various national special interests (see below). Although there have on 
some occasions been heated discussions in the College (see below), it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which its involvement has actually affected the outcome of merger decisions. As regards the 
question of the criteria of merger regulation, it has already been indicated above that competition is 
the name of the game (see also section 6.7). Levy (2003: 196) notes that ‘[t]he Commission has 
consistently rejected suggestions that its appraisal take account of industrial, social, or employment 
considerations’ and other analyses of the subject confirms that indeed it hasn’t (see Banks, 1997; 
Monti, 2007: 291-300).  
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Table 7.3: Notifications and decisions under the MCR, 1990-2007 * 
 Cases 
notified 
Cases withdrawn 
(Phase 1 or 2) 
Approved 
(Phase 1 or 2) 
Approved with 
conditions (Phase 1 or 2) 
Prohibited 
1990 11 0 5 0 0 
1991 64 0 48 6 1 
1992 59 3 44 7 0 
1993 59 2 50 2 0 
1994 95 6 80 4 1 
1995 110 4 92 6 2 
1996 131 6 110 3 3 
1997 168 9 119 9 1 
1998 224 9 199 16 2 
1999 276 12 225 23 1 
2000 330 13 281 38 2 
2001 335 12 304 20 5 
2002 277 4 240 15 0 
2003 211 0 205 17 0 
2004 247 5 222 16 1 
2005 313 9 278 18 0 
2006 356 9 327 19 0 
2007 402 7 373 22 1 
Total 3668 90 3202 241 20 
Source: calculated on the basis of statistics downloaded from the Competition DG website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/statistics, accessed on 8 January 2008. 
* As decisions are not always reached in the same year a notification is made and as not all forms of decisions have 
been included here, the figures do not tally. 
 
Table 7.3 shows the number of notifications received by the Commission under the MCR and its 
subsequent decisions from the enactment of the regulation in 1990 to the end of 2007. For one 
thing, one can notice that the annual number of notifications shows a very clear upward tendency, 
rising every year from 1993 to 2001 and again from 2003 to 2007, where it reached its peak at the 
level of 402. Commissioner Kroes has pointed out that this increase in notifications reflects that 
‘[t]he proportion of cross-border (as opposed to domestic) mergers has grown considerably’ and 
that this “merger tsunami” shows ‘that the market itself is adapting to change, and that European 
companies are adapting to global competition’ (Kroes, 2007). Yet this rise in notifications has 
inevitably increased the Competition DG’s workload, especially as ‘[i]t is not unknown for 
companies to submit over a million pages of documentation in support of a proposed deal’ 
(Bannerman, 2002: 10). The next thing to notice is that the vast majority of the notified mergers, 
namely 87.3 %, were approved unconditionally in either Phase 1 or 2. Here it can be added that the 
bulk of these unconditional approvals were given in Phase 1. In other words, in almost all cases EC 
merger regulation has not served to impede or prevent mergers with a “community dimension” from 
taking place; on the contrary it has served to ease their completion in those situations where 
multiple NCAs would otherwise have been involved. 
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It also appears from the table that in 241 cases the Commission has utilised its right (under Articles 
6.2 and 8.2 in the MCR) to approve proposed mergers subject to various conditions. That is, if the 
Competition DG finds that a given merger would distort competition, it can make a deal with the 
involved parties in which the latter commit themselves to, for instance, sell off part of the merged 
company or license technology to one of its competitors with a view to eliminate the distorting 
effects. Finally, it follows as a logical consequence from what was said above that the number of 
mergers that were prohibited under the MCR has remained at a very low level. Indeed, it appears 
from the table that only 20 out of the 3668 notified mergers, or 0.55 %, were blocked by the 
Commission. However, in addition to this 90 cases were withdrawn, ‘often because the 
modifications needed to satisfy the Commission were unacceptable and because of prohibition 
fears’ (Morgan, 2001: 459). 
 
It almost goes without saying that it is only possible to provide a snapshot view of some of the most 
interesting and important cases here. Fortunately, readers interested in detailed accounts of 
particular cases or in comprehensive overviews will have no difficulties in finding this in the 
copious literature on competition law written by legal scholars (see e.g. Faull & Nikpay, 2007 or 
Monti, 2007).  
 
Alcatel/Telettra. On 10 December 1990 the Commission received notification of a proposed 
acquisition by French company Alcatel of 69.2 % of the shares of Telettra, the telecommunication 
subsidiary of Italian Fiat. This operation, which would make Alcatel the leading telecommunication 
equipment provider in the world and which also involved Spanish telecommunication company 
Telefonica, was viewed with concern in the Competition DG, not least by Commissioner Brittan 
(Ross, 1995: 132). Yet other Commissioners (in particular Martin Bangemann, the Industry 
Commissioner) saw the merger as an opportunity to create a “European champion” and President 
Delors was aware of Alcatel’s ‘close ties to the French government’ and ‘the likely effect of a 
negative decision in France, should DGIV succeed in block it’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 128). It 
was thus anything but a foregone conclusion that the Competition DG would be able to get the 
approval of the College of Commissioners to block the merger. Instead a deal was made between 
the Commission and the involved parties where Telefonica agreed to sell its shareholdings of 
Alcatel and Telettra. This was the first time a merger was conditionally approved under the MCR 
(Cini & McGowan, 1998: 128). Some commentators see this as an early and rare example of a 
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merger that was cleared due to industrial policy considerations (Monti, 2007: 299), although no 
such considerations are mentioned in the Commission’s decision (see Commission, 1991). 
 
ART/De Havilland. On 13 May 1991 Aérospatiale and Alenia, the French and Italian state owned 
aircraft manufacturers, notified the Commission of their intention to take over Canadian company 
de Havilland, a subsidiary of Boeing. The Competition DG believed that ‘ATR-de Havilland 
together would be strong enough to wipe out British Aerospace and Fokker, ATR’s major EC 
competitors who, not coincidentally, were major corporate objectors to the merger’ (Ross, 1995: 
177). As this would give it a dominant position and distort competition, Commissioner Brittan 
decided that this was to be the first concentration to be prohibited under the MCR. However, both 
the French and the Italian governments put pressure on “their” Commissioner to allow the deal, and 
Commissioner Bangemann (Germany) once again played the “Euro-champion card”, arguing ‘that 
the industrial advantages of the merger exceeded the drawbacks’ and ‘rejecting DGIV’s neoliberal 
approach and their market analysis in this case’ (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 129). President Delors 
was also in favour of the merger and it was only due to Brittan’s ability to persuade a small majority 
of his colleague Commissioners that he got his way in the end: with nine votes to seven, the 
takeover was prohibited (Ross, 1995: 178). This decision was announced in October 1991 and 
provoked bursts of anger from in particular the French and the Italian governments and ‘became a 
big, major public affair’ (Faull, Interview; see also European Voice, 1996c; McGowan, 2000: 138). 
If there had been any doubt before, it had been clarified now: the MCR was ‘Not an Industrial 
Policy Instrument’ (Hawkes, 1992). 
 
MSG Media. During Karel van Miert’s tenure as Commissioner nine mergers were prohibited. The 
first of these (and the second to be blocked under the MCR) was the proposed joint venture between 
two German media companies, namely Bertelsmann and Kirch Group, and the state owned 
Deutsche Telekom. According to the Competition DG, the joint venture, known as MSG Media, 
would have led to the creation/strengthening of a dominant position and distortion of competition in 
three markets, including those for Pay-TV. Hence the merger was blocked in November 1994, 
despite opposition from the DGs for industry and telecommunications (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 
129; Dinan, 1999: 384; European Voice, 1996c). A few years later, in 1998, the Commission 
blocked another planned venture in the Pay-TV market involving Bertelsmann and Kirch Group. 
According to Dinan (1999: 384), ‘Bertelsmann’s refusal to make more concessions allowed the 
Commission to claim that its decision was unanimous, whereas the Commission was divided on the 
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issue, not least because of intensive lobbying from the media giants involved and from German 
politicians’ (see also Morgan, 2001). Monti (2007: 142) cites this as a prime example of a decision 
that relies on an “unconvincingly narrow” market definition, because the Commission defined Pay-
TV as a separate market hereby facilitating the easy identification of dominance.  
 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. On 18 February 1997 the Commission received notification that the 
two US-based aerospace giants Boeing and McDonnell Douglas intended to merge in a $13.3 
billion transaction. The new company, still named Boeing, would be the largest aerospace company 
in the world and the second largest defence supplier (McGowan & Cini, 1999: 191; Morgan, 2001: 
463). The US Department of Justice cleared the merger and concluded that no remedies were 
necessary, while the Competition DG was concerned about the strengthening of Boeing’s market 
position and the reduction in the number of global producers in the sector (Levy, 2003: 206). The 
case quickly became highly politicised, with US president Bill Clinton making ‘a series of direct 
telephone calls … to a number of prime ministers and presidents of major European governments’ 
(Moravcsik, 1998b: 2). The Commission’s College was divided over the issue of whether the 
merger was to be prohibited, and according to Bannerman (2002: 43), Commissioner van Miert 
‘threatened to resign before the deal was eventually allowed through with additional commitments 
from the companies’. This was the first time the Competition DG and US competition authorities 
reached different conclusions and it had as a consequence that a lot of effort was put into the 
enhancement of EU-US cooperation and coordination in the field of competition regulation (Levy, 
2003: 206-207; see also Morgan & McGuire, 2004: 40 and section 7.3). 
 
Mannesmann/Vodafone. Another interesting case that deserves mentioning was UK-based mobile 
telecommunication corporation Vodafone’s DM 200 billion bid for the giant German 
telecommunications and engineering group Mannesmann AG which was announced on 13 
November 1999. The bid was rejected by Mannesmann’s executive board, in turn prompting 
Vodafone to appeal directly to the Mannesmann shareholders, offering them to exchange their 
shares to the ratio of 53.7 Vodafone shares for one Mannesmann share. This was a historic move 
that not only constituted ‘the world’s biggest hostile takeover bid’ but also ‘the first ever major 
cross-border raid on Germany AG’ (Garrett, 2001: 84). Indeed, the bid was widely interpreted as an 
attack on the corporate culture in the social market economy (where hostile takeovers were rare) 
and it was met with strong opposition from prominent politicians, including Chancellor Schröder, 
and from the main union representative on the Mannesmann board, IG Metal. However, the 
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Mannersmann CEO, Klaus Esser, did not want to prevent the takeover by involving politicians in 
the case or by using other tricks. According to Garrett (2001: 89), Esser, like the CEOs of 
companies such as Daimler-Chrysler and Allianz, represented ‘Germany’s new international 
managerial class’ who ‘sought to assure their firm’s survival through major purchases beyond 
German borders’. Previously Mannesmann had acquired UK mobile operator Orange Plc and a 
crucial element in Mannesmann’s defence against the hostile bid was to make an alliance with the 
giant French media company, Vivendi SA, an alliance which would make Mannesmann too 
expensive for Vodafone to purchase. However, Vodafone responded to this threat by allying itself 
with Vivendi in the beginning of 2000, hereby crushing Mannesmann’s defence. If many of the 
shareholders had previously been hesitant, this move persuaded many of them to sell and on 3 
February 2000 the takeover was announced by the CEOs of the two companies (Garrett, 2001: 94; 
see also Morgan, 2001). Later, in April 2000, the Commission, where Monti had been the 
Commissioner in charge of competition since 1999, cleared the merger subject to certain remedies, 
most notably that ‘Orange Plc including all its subsidiaries will be de-merged as a stand-alone 
business’ (Commission, 2000a; see also Monti, 2007: 253-254).  
 
In the first decade of merger regulation under the MCR (1990-2000) 13 mergers had been 
prohibited. However, in 2000 and 2001 ‘an increasingly forceful, confident, and creative approach 
to its application’ could be witnessed (Levy, 2005: 104). For instance, mergers were now assessed 
on the basis of a broader range of economic theories, and the Commission not only sought to 
broaden the notion of “collective dominance”, but also to identify single-firm dominance in 
situations where a merger would have led to market shares below 40 per cent. In part as a result of 
this, a rather high number of mergers, namely five, were prohibited in 2001 – presumably with the 
result that a number of other mergers were dropped in advance with a view to avoid prohibition 
(2005: 104-105; Commission, 2002a: 236-240 contains an account of its decisions in these cases). 
 
GE/Honeywell. The most remarkable prohibition case in 2001 was American industrial 
conglomerate General Electric’s proposed purchase of aerospace and electronics company 
Honeywell. The case was interesting not only because it was the first time the Commission banned 
a merger between two US based TNCs, but also because the merger had been cleared by the US 
Department of Justice subject to certain remedies (for instance that Honeywell’s helicopter unit was 
sold off) (Weitbrecht, 2002: 407). But the Commission feared that the merged company would 
“bundle” its services with a view to keep out competitors, hereby enabling it to impose higher 
230 
 
prices on consumers (Commission, 2002a: 237). Consequently, it did not consider the remedies 
imposed on the companies by the US Department of Justice to be sufficient, and despite further 
proposals put forward by GE in order to save the deal, the merger was formally blocked on 3 July 
2001 (Morgan & McGuire, 2004: 41). The different decisions adopted by the EU and US authorities 
did not stem from a lack of communication between the two (an ongoing dialogue was taking place) 
but rather from the use of different competition theories and diverging ways to interpret evidence 
(Bannerman, 2002: 11, 49; Morgan & McGuire, 2004: 50). After its decision the Commission came 
under attack from both sides of the Atlantic. A cheering section of economists, lawyers, US antitrust 
officials and commentators in the financial press pointed to economic and procedural weaknesses in 
the foundations of EC merger regulation. The Commission was e.g. criticised for relying on 
speculation about future behaviour rather than on sound economics in the assessment of the merger 
and for wearing too many hats (Levy, 2005: 106). As the Chairman of GE, Jack Welch, put it, ‘it’s 
very difficult to be in a process where the prosecutor is also the judge’ (Time, 2001).  
 
In Chapter 6, it was mentioned that the companies of ERT members were involved in quite a few 
mergers in the 1980s (prior to the adoption of the MCR) (see section 6.6). After 1990 several 
companies that, at some stage, have been represented by the CEO/Chairman in the ERT have been 
involved in mergers with a “Community dimension”. Some of these companies have already been 
mentioned above, namely Nestlé (ERT from 1983 onwards), Alcatel (ERT from 1990-1997), 
Bertelsmann (ERT from 1994-2002) and Vodafone (ERT from 2002-2003). Although the number 
of mergers that were prohibited by the Commission from 1990 to August 2007 has been rather 
small, namely 20, five of these cases involved companies that at some stage have been represented 
in the ERT. Apart from the two abovementioned proposed mergers involving Bertelsmann, this 
applies to a 1997 proposed merger involving Deutsche Telekom (ERT from 1999-2007), a 1999 
proposed takeover involving Volvo (ERT from 1983-1994 and 2002 onwards) and a 2004 operation 
involving ENI (ERT from 2005 onwards). In these cases, as in the vast majority of cases involving 
ERT member companies more generally, it was the “member company” that tried to acquire 
another company, not the other way around. In some other cases, a notification involved two ERT 
companies. This was for instance the case when a subsidiary of German energy company E.ON 
(ERT from 1994 onward) notified its intension to overtake two subsidiaries of Hungarian oil and 
gas group MOL (2002 onwards) in 2005, an operation that was subsequently approved by the 
Commission subject to certain remedies. 
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To give an indication of the extent to which “ERT companies” have been involved in mergers in 
period covered in this chapter, table 7.4 shows the number of notifications under the MCR from 
1990 to August 2007 involving companies that were represented by their CEO/Chairman in ERT in 
2007. Certainly, far from all of these companies were represented in the ERT in the whole period, 
and other companies that were represented in the Roundtable prior to 2007 have been involved in 
numerous mergers from 1990 onwards.  
 
Table 7.4: Notifications to the Commission under the MCR by companies “represented”  
in the ERT in August 2007, 1990-August 2007 
Company name*  Notifications** Company name* Notifications** 
AB Volvo (Volvo) 13 Nokia 4 
Air Liquide 4 Norsk Hydro 9 
Akzo Nobel 5 OMV 5 
AstraZeneca  2 Renault 4 
BASF 14 Repsol YPF  2 
Bayer  10 Rio Tinto  1 
BP 15 Rolls-Royce 2 
British Airways 6 Royal Dutch/Shell 
(Shell) 
18 
British American 
Tobacco (BAT) 
4 Royal Philips Electronics 
(Philips) 
23 
BT 21 Saint-Gobain  2 
Carlsberg  4 SAP 5 
CIR 1 Siemens 46 
Eczacibaşi Group  0 Smurfit Kappa Group 0 
Endesa 8 Solvay 11 
Eni 10 SONAE, SGPS 
(SONAE) 
4 
E.ON 14 STMicroelectronics  3 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
(Roche) 
3 Suez 2 
Fiat 3 Telefónica 10 
Heineken  5 ThyssenKrupp 9 
Investor AB (Investor) 2 TOTAL 6 
KONE Corporation 
(KONE) 
1 Umicore 5 
Lafarge 8 Unilever  5 
MOL 1 Vivartia 0 
Nestlé  17 Total 347 
Sources: information on ERT members at the time of writing stems from http://www.ert.be/members_a_to_z.aspx 
Information on notifications involving these companies stems from the Commission data base: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/ 
*In order to ensure consistency and avoid too much trouble, mergers involving subsidiary companies or subdivisions of 
“ERT companies” are left out. As such the table provides a cautious or conservative picture of the amount of mergers 
involving these companies.In those instances where the Commission has shortened the company name in its registration 
of the case, the shortening appears in brackets.  
** Include mergers, joint ventures, acquisitions of a majority stake and take-over bids. 
 
As it appears from the table almost all of the companies were involved in mergers with a 
“Community dimension” in the period in question. In the 17 year period the companies were, on 
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average, involved in approximately 7.5 notifications. Siemens, Philips, BT, Shell, Nestlé and BP 
were the most active companies in this regard. It is perhaps worth noting that three of these 
companies, namely Shell, BP and Nestlé were ranked in the top ten in the 2007 FT500, in which the 
Financial Times lists the 500 largest companies in Europe, measured by their market value. The top 
ten also includes two other ERT companies, namely Total and Roche. The remaining five 
companies on the 2007 FT500 (Gazprom, HSBC, GlaxoSmithKline, EDF and Novartis), which 
although not represented in the ERT are clearly giant European TNCs, have also all been involved 
in “Community dimension” mergers, the total number of which is 25 (Financial Times, 2007f)94. 
This confirms that M&As are an important mechanism through which the concentration of capital 
takes place, and gives us some idea of why EC merger regulation is an area of significant 
importance and interest to TNCs.  
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this analysis of the Competition DG’s 
regulation of mergers in the 1990-2007 period. First, it has been precisely as “neoliberal” as the 
formulations used in the MCR would lead one to expect. That is, it seems that industrial and/or 
social policy considerations have not entered the regulation of mergers, nor have effects on national 
models of capitalism. Merger control is thus based on an approach that only looks at the effects on 
competition. Second, the attempts to influence the Competition DG’s decisions in merger cases 
have apparently proved unfruitful. Although some cases have resulted in controversies in the 
College of Commissioners, the latter has always followed the Competition DG’s recommendation. 
In short, the operational autonomy of the DG in merger cases has been substantial: it seems that it 
has neither given in to pressure from governments nor from capital actors (whether European or 
American). Despite the close relationship between the Commission and the ERT, and despite the 
vital role played by the latter in pushing for the adoption EC merger rules in the late 1980s, it does 
not seem that ERT companies have been given preferential treatment by the Competition DG. 
Third, the EC merger subunit of regulation has primarily served to facilitate cross-border M&As 
and only prevented a very limited number of them to go through.  
 
 
7.7. Reforming the EC merger subunit of regulation 
 
The increase in the number of notifications accounted for above was not only due to an increase in 
large mergers. For one thing the scope of the thresholds defining whether a merger has a 
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“Community dimension” has been eroded over time as a result of inflation. According to Morgan 
(2001: 456-457) ‘the original ECU 5 billion worldwide threshold was equivalent to some £3.7 
billion when the MCR was adopted but worth only £2.6 billion by September 2000’. Moreover, the 
thresholds have been supplemented with a new threshold. It appears from the MCR that in 1993, the 
Commission is bound to review how the regulation works, in particular with respect to the 
thresholds. Already from the early 1990s the Commission was in favour of a lowering of both 
thresholds (worldwide and Community) but van Miert and the Competition DG realised that this 
was unlikely to happen given the political climate at this stage. Hence, in 1993 the Commission 
announced its decision to postpone the review of the thresholds until 1996. On the basis of 
consultation with member states, industry, the law community and others, a Green Paper on the 
Review of the Merger Regulation was published in 1996 in which it was suggested that the turnover 
thresholds were lowered to ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million, respectively (see Commission, 
1996: 2). According the estimates of the Commission this would bring an additional 65 to 80 cases 
a year within its jurisdiction (European Voice, 1996b; see also Davison & Fitzpatrick, 1996 on the 
review). Capital actors were divided over the issue, with some arguing in favour of a reduction and 
others, including UNICE and ICC, had mixed views due to the diverging positions of their members 
(Commission, 1996: 16). At the political level the proposal was supported by Italy and the smaller 
member states. However, it came up against strong opposition from especially the German 
government which received support from the French, British and five other governments in the 
Council (Cini & McGowan, 1998: 132; European Voice, 1996a). Hence, it was not possible for the 
Commission to get the qualified majority it needed for its proposal. Instead a second set of lower 
turnover thresholds was introduced (the so-called secondary or supplementary thresholds), designed 
to address the problem of multiple filings to NCAs. Those changes came into effect in March 1998 
and did, according to Morgan (2001: 457), result in approximately 25 extra notifications per year. 
 
However, it was only in the context of the broader reform of the EC competition unit of regulation 
accounted for in section 7.4 above that significant changes were introduced in the merger subunit. 
The processes leading up to the adoption of a revised MCR in 2003 were initiated by the 
Commission in the summer of 2000. It had become apparent to the Commission that, despite the 
introduction of the supplementary thresholds, there were still a lot of cases falling beneath the 
thresholds that had to be notified in a variety of member states. Initially this was the problem that 
the review of the MCR was mainly intended to address (Competition DG Senior Official, 
Interview95; see also Commission, 2000b). As John Vickers, the Chairman of the OFT, explains, the 
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initial ‘[s]timulus for reform on jurisdictional issues came from a desire shared by competition 
authorities and the legal and business communities for a better way to ensure that multi-
jurisdictional mergers are reviewed by the authority or authorities best placed to address them, and 
to avoid undue duplication and regulatory burden’ (Vickers, 2004: 457). However, events in 2001 
and 2002 triggered a broader review of the MCR. 
 
In December 2001 the Commission adopted a Green Paper on the Review of the Regulation 
4069/89 (Commission, 2001b). The Green Paper does not describe the Commission’s position but 
outlines possible ways in which the MCR could be reformed, addressing a number of issues related 
to jurisdiction, substance and procedure. It will suffice to mention a few of the most 
important/controversial suggestions here. As a solution to the problem of multiple filings a so-
called 3+ system was proposed. This would entail that ‘concentrations which do not meet the 
thresholds laid down in Article 1(2) have, nevertheless, a Community interest when it comes within 
the jurisdiction of three Member States’ (2001b: 18). It also pointed to the need to find a mechanism 
that could facilitate easier referral of cases between NCAs and the Commission. Moreover, the 
Commission expressed its willingness to hear the views of employees and in particular consumers 
‘in the context of ongoing merger control procedures’ and asked for suggestions as to how this 
could be facilitated (2001a: 55). Finally, a debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the MD test 
used in the Commission’s assessment of mergers (see section 7.6 above) as opposed to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the SLC test was launched. This latter test was used the US, Canada and 
Australia but had also been introduced in national competition law in the UK (see section 7.5) and 
Ireland. Here it was concluded that ‘experience in applying the dominance test has not revealed 
major loopholes in the scope of the test. Nor has it frequently led to different results from SLC-test 
approaches in other jurisdictions’ (2001b: 40).  
 
Interested parties were invited to comment on the Green Paper, and when the deadline was reached 
towards the end of March 2002, the Commission had received 114 written comments. Around half 
of these came from capital actors, a quarter came from law firms and the rest came from trade 
unions, consumer organisations and academics. Whereas the Commission’s intentions to find a way 
to deal with the problem of multiple findings and to ease the referral of cases between national and 
EC level was generally welcomed by the respondents, opinions differed as to whether the 
Commission’s concrete proposals were in fact useful (see Commission, 2002b: 2-15; Monti, 
2002b). As regarded the question as to how the views of consumers and employees could be heard 
235 
 
in merger regulation processes, the position of most capital actors was clear: merger decisions 
should be taken independently of such views (on the basis of a competition-based test). It is 
‘unnecessary to change those rules as this could risk undermining the competition focus of the 
Commission’s analysis and cause uncertainty and delay’, as it reads in UNICE’s position paper 
(UNICE, 2002: 8, emphasis added). The ERT agreed: 
 
‘The ERT Competition Policy Task Force doubts the advisability or utility of 
expanding the role of consumer organisations in the European Commission’s 
decision-making process regarding merger control. It believes the same is true for 
employees ... Greater involvement of such groups risks diverting attention from the 
competition focus of the Commission’s analysis and increasing both uncertainty and 
delay’ (ERT, 2002: 4, emphasis added) 
 
The similarity in the formulation used here and elsewhere in the ERT and UNICE position papers,  
but also the almost identical positions of many of the business groups and law firms responding to 
the Green Paper, was by no means a coincidence. UNICE’s position paper was drafted in the 
organisation’s Competition Working Group, which was chaired by Peter Plompen of Philips (a 
company that has been “represented” in the ERT from the outset). As a Senior Staff Member of 
UNICE explains: 
 
‘What we always try to do with respect to our position papers is to have other 
business organisations saying the same thing. And there are a lot of organisations in 
Brussels: You have all the different sectorial organisations representing for instance 
the chemical industry and pharmaceuticals; there is the ICC which has a lot of law 
firms and American companies as its members, and we don’t; and you have the ERT. 
And we always try to give the same message. We don’t want to create an opportunity 
for the Commission to play us off against each other. So we are usually closely 
involved with each other with respect to our drafting process: they know what we’re 
drafting and the other way around. Also, a lot of members of our working group are 
also involved in the ICC and people from CEFIC are involved in our working group. 
So there is quite a lot of coordination and people basically know what the others are 
doing. You also see that the ERT would always make sure that they say the same 
thing as we do, and we would not say things that they don’t say. There’s a lot of 
coordination. It’s a conscious policy to try to make a big front of business 
organisations saying the same thing’ (UNICE Senior Staff Member, Interview96). 
 
Somewhat unexpected the question regarding MD versus SLC test became the perhaps biggest issue 
in the responses to the Green Paper and in the subsequent negotiations between the member states. 
As a Senior Official at the Competition DG who was involved in the process recalls, ‘when it was 
put in, in the first place it was not regarded by us as being a really central concern; it was a concern 
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that we had heard marginally over the years. But it became a much bigger discussion during the 
course of the consultations on the Green Paper and we were a bit surprised by the extent to which 
there were people who felt that there was a defect in the existent test’ (Competition DG Senior 
Official, Interview). In particular, the Irish and British governments and competition authorities 
expressed strong support for the SLC test in their responses to the Green Paper. As the DTI put it,  
 
‘We see SLC as a test that is fundamentally better adapted to merger control, 
primarily because it is directly grounded in economic analysis and the impact of a 
merger on competition in a way that the concept of dominance is not. It is also a 
more flexible test than dominance, making it particularly well suited to tackling 
oligopolistic markets’ (DTI, 2002: para 34; see also Irish Delegation, 2002). 
 
This position which was also supported by many economists (Competition DG Senior Official, 
Interview), was based on a critique of the MD test. The latter was claimed to create a serious “gap” 
in the EC regulation of mergers in oligopoly markets, the very same gap that the Competition DG 
had attempted to close in the 1990s with the notion of collective dominance (see section 7.6 above). 
As the DTI noted in its position paper the Competition DG’s use of this notion had proven 
problematic and given rise to a number of appeals to the CFI (at this stage these appeals were still 
pending).  
 
The BKartA submitted a detailed response to the Green Paper in which it concluded that ‘[t]here are 
no convincing reasons to convert the criterion for prohibition from a dominance test to the SLC’ 
(BKartA, 2002: 30). Of course the MD test was not only used by the BKartA in its own assessment 
of mergers, but it had also been embedded in the 1989 MCR due to German pressure (see section 
6.7). In a joint article, the BKartA President and its Head of Unit of German and European Merger 
Control argued that there was no evidence ‘for the assertion that the MD test fails to catch merger 
projects raising competition concerns or that they can be evaluated more comprehensively by means 
of the SLC test’ (Böge & Müller, 2002: 498; see also BKartA, 2001). Pointing out that the BKartA 
had ‘always been able to make a decision in the interest of competition’ in the ‘more than 30,000 
merger projects examined since 1973’ they concluded that  
 
‘it is more than questionable whether the disadvantages [of introducing a new test] – 
legal insecurity, lack of decision-making practice by the courts and new divergence 
of provisions within the European Union – should be accepted. It cannot be 
objectively justifiable to replace well-proven standards without good cause’ (2002: 
498). 
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It is perhaps worth noting that the DTI position paper states that the introduction of the SLC test at 
the national level in the UK enjoys ‘strong support from the competition law community’ while 
remaining silent on the position of capital actors (DTI, 2002: para 34). This was perhaps no 
coincidence because business groups such as CBI, BDI, ERT, the ICC, UNICE and many others did 
all strongly oppose the introduction of the SLC test at the EC level. The main stated reasons for this 
opposition was that a new test ‘would result in a great deal of legal uncertainty’ (BDI, 2002: 11), 
that it ‘would increase legal uncertainty’ (CBI, 2002:2) and that it ‘could produce a substantial 
period of uncertainty’ (UNICE, 2002: 4) or in fact ‘lead to even more uncertainty’ (ERT, 2002:2). It 
was also frequently pointed out that the MD test was the one used in the majority of national 
regimes (see e.g. ICC, 2002a). Individual companies such as British Telecom, Shell and Vodafone 
also expressed their preference for the MD test (see BT, 2002; Shell, 2002; Vodafone, 2002). 
However, those respondents representing US transnational capital were somewhat less dismissive 
towards the introduction of the SLC test. AmCham-EU encouraged ‘a thorough examination of the 
implications of the alternative tests’ before a new test was introduced (AmCham-EU, 2002), 
whereas the Boeing Company, referring to the above-mentioned Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case, 
pointed out that the MD test ‘causes difficulties for United States companies such as Boeing not 
only because it is a different basic standard than that applicable under United States antitrust law 
but also because this different standard has been interpreted in ways that have led to actual and 
serious conflict between the two jurisdictions’ (Boeing, 2002: 3-4). The American Bar Association 
also expressed its support for the SLC test (ABA, 2002), whereas many international law firms such 
as Baker & McKenzie, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Landwell, Slaughter & May and White & 
Case argued against it for reasons similar to those given by the BKartA and the majority of capital 
actors (see e.g. Baker & McKenzie, 2002). 
 
It is interesting to note that the Green Paper itself and the vast majority of responses to it, concern 
concrete ideas of regulation (CIR), not more fundamental questions related to diverging USDRs. 
That is, the Green Paper and almost all respondents took for granted that mergers should be 
regulated on the basis of a competition criterion alone, whereas social and/or industrial policy goals 
should not be taken into consideration. Hence, the main focus is on the more harmless questions 
regarding MD versus SLC test and details regarding the coordination of tasks between the 
Competition DG and NCAs. However, some trade unions, most notably the ETUC, did challenge 
the neoliberal “competition only” view, arguing that ‘employment considerations have to be 
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integrated into the merger control regulation’ and suggesting that ‘[t]he Commission should not 
approve a merger if the Company has not evaluated the consequences of the merger for 
employment and location, nor unless it has made plans on how to tackle negative consequences for 
employment’ (ETUC 2002: 2-3). Yet this was most certainly a minority view which did not 
resonate well with the view of the Commission (see below). 
 
After the consultation period had ended and before the Commissions presented its ‘Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings’ in December 2002, 
some important developments took place. Prior to this juncture only one of the Commission’s 
merger decisions had been overruled by the Courts (Maudhuit & Soames 2005a: 57). But between 
June and October 2002 the CFI annulled three of the Commission’s high-profile decisions, namely 
its prohibitions of the proposed Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Lavel/Sidel 
mergers. In these rulings the CFI attacked the economic analyses underpinning the Commission’s 
decisions. The proposed Airtours merger was banned on the basis of an analysis that pointed to the 
likelihood of “collective dominance” if it was allowed to go through. Yet in its ruling the CFI 
concluded that the Commission had failed to prove that such a situation was going to arise post-
merger and it was pointed out that the prohibition was based on ‘errors, omissions and 
inconsistencies of utmost gravity’ (Para. 404). The ruling moreover clarified what the standards for 
identifying collective dominance should be and also raised the standards of proof that the 
Commission would have to meet if it was to prove its case (see Dethmers, 2005 for more details). In 
a similar vein the CFI identified serious flaws in the Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Lavel/Sidel 
cases, e.g. concluding that the Commission’s decision in the latter was ‘vitiated by manifest errors 
of assessment’ (cited in Morgan & McGuire, 2004: 45; see also Lyons, 2004: 248-249). 
 
It is not only interesting to note that in these decisions, ‘the CFI at times acts as an economic expert, 
implicitly claiming for itself a superior expertise in economic analysis’ (Gerber, 2004: 493). It is 
also worth remembering how, in the past, the Commission and the Court had worked closely 
together to expand the EC’s powers in the field competition of regulation (see section 6.4), a 
partnership which has proved instrumental in transforming the Commission into a powerful and 
self-willed regulator. One might speculate whether the three 2002 CFI rulings indicate that the 
lower court desired a new division of labour in the EC’s control of mergers. That is, perhaps a 
motive behind the rulings was to set in motion a process that could ultimately bring about a new 
system in which the Courts would have a much more prominent role in the control of mergers. An 
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interview with the President of the CFI, Judge Bo Vesterdorf, which was published in September 
2002, seems to support such speculation. Here he suggested that ‘[t]he Commission might consider 
whether the sole responsibility to prohibit mergers should remain with the Commission, or whether 
one should change the system into something like the U.S. system’ (Reuters News Service, 2002). 
As Vesterdorf did not forget to point out in the interview, in the US it is up to courts to decide 
whether a merger is to be prohibited. 
 
Needless to say, the three CFI judgments constituted a major blow to the Commission, not least the 
Competition DG’s MTF, and provided additional fuel to the critique of the Commission’s economic 
analyses in merger cases. As Commissioner Monti acknowledged, ‘our record in the merger area is 
less glorious after these Court rulings’ (Independent, 2002). One of his officials put it in less 
diplomatic terms, ‘We have been wiped off the table ... The Court’s message is simple and strong: 
there is something rotten within our system’ (Financial Times, 2002a). A reform process had 
certainly already been initiated prior to the judgments, and as such they cannot be seen to have 
caused this process. But they probably contributed to make the changes in this field somewhat more 
far-reaching than they would otherwise have been (see also Christensen et al., 2007: 425; Lyons, 
2004: 249). 
 
On 11 December 2002, the Commission announced that it had ‘decided the most far-reaching 
reform of its merger control regime since the entry into force of the EU Merger Regulation in 1990’ 
(Commission, 2002c). And the Commissioner emphasised ‘the proposal’s business friendly 
character. After all merger control is not about blocking mergers. It’s about ensuring consumers 
continue to benefit from sufficient innovation, choice and competitive prices’ (Financial Times, 
2002b). Concretely, the Commission had adopted a reform package consisting of three elements:  
 
(1) Draft guidelines for horizontal mergers. The purpose of these guidelines, on which the 
Commission invited comments from interested parties, was ‘to make the theoretical framework 
underlying our economic assessment of mergers clear and transparent and thus as predictable as 
possible’, as the Director of the MTF, Götz Drauz, explained (Drauz, 2002: 392). 
(2) A series of non-legislative measures aimed at improving the decision-making process. These 
inter alia included the appointment of peer review panels composed of experienced officials that 
would scrutinise merger decisions and the creation of a post of Chief Competition Economist in the 
Competition DG. The role of the Chief Economist would be to provide guidance, both on the 
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general use of economics and econometrics in the application of EU competition rules and in 
individual competition cases. Hereby the Commission hoped to enhance its economic capabilities97. 
Later, in April 2003, it was also announced that the MTF would be disbanded. Instead a merger unit 
would be created within each of the five sector specific departments of the Competition DG. 
(3) A proposal for a revision of the MCR (Commission, 2002d).  
 
After the consultation period and the three CFI rulings it had become apparent within the 
Competition DG that it would be necessary to come up with some solution to the question of 
substantive test in the proposal for a revised MCR (Competition DG Senior Official, Interview). On 
one hand, the CFI rulings had created uncertainty regarding the “collective dominance” concept, but 
on the other hand, a number of respondents had clearly expressed their support for the existing MD 
test, afraid that a new test would create legal uncertainty. The Commission decided against 
proposing the SLC test (see also Maudhuit & Soames, 2005b: 76), but did as Drauz puts it find ‘that 
it was important to remove this uncertainty pro-actively rather than to wait for an opportunity to 
obtain legal clarification through court rulings. For this reason it is proposed to clarify that the 
Dominance test covers all cases where the harm to consumers arises...’ (Drauz, 2002: 392). That is, 
in the Commission proposed to insert a clarification in the explanatory memorandum for the MCR 
that  
 
‘the notion of dominance within the meaning of this Regulation should ... encompass 
situations in which, because of the oligopolistic structure of the relevant market and 
the resulting interdependence of the various undertakings active on that market, one 
or more undertakings would hold the economic power to influence appreciably and 
sustainably the parameters of competition ... even without coordination by the 
members of the oligopoly (Commission, 2002d: p. 21) 
 
It also appears from the draft proposal that the Commission, in the light of the responses received 
during the consultation period, had abandoned its idea to introduce the 3+ system. Instead some 
alternative measures designed to ‘ensure, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, that the best-
placed authority should examine a particular transaction, while at the same time seeking to reduce 
the incidence of “multiple filing”’ (Commission, 2002c). No new mechanism that could be used to 
give more weight to the views of consumers and employees was proposed. However, in recital 32 it 
reads that the regulation ‘should be interpreted and applied with respect to’ the ‘fundamental rights 
and ... the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’. And in recital 42 it was stated that ‘[t]his Regulation in no way detracts from the collective 
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rights of employees, as recognised in the undertakings concerned’ (Commission, 2002d: recitals 32 
and 42). Importantly, however, these airy formulations were not translated into the actual articles in 
the operative part of the draft regulation. 
 
From the outset of 2003 diplomats from the various member states, many of whom were associated 
with the different NCAs, met in a Council working group where they negotiated on the basis of the 
Commission’s proposal. From the outset it was clear that it would be necessary to reach agreement 
not much later than November that year, if the new rules were to come into force before the 
enlargement of the Union on 1 May 2004. Not only would it be inexpedient for the new countries if 
they would have to implement the old competition rules knowing that they would soon be replaced; 
the member states were also acutely aware that ten new participants would complicate the 
negotiations significantly (Diplomat A, Interview98, Diplomat C, Interview99). The meetings in the 
working group were chaired by the Commission and diplomats from the forthcoming member states 
participated as observers who were allowed to express their views. During 2003 the diplomats met 
approximately twenty times, often over two days, in negotiations that were, according to one of 
them, ‘extremely intense’ (Diplomat A, Interview). 
 
The two main bones of contention in these negotiations were the questions of substantive test and 
how the allocation of cases between the Commission and the NCAs could be optimised (Diplomat 
A, Interview; Diplomat C, Interview). Many models regarding how this latter issue could be solved 
were discussed. During these discussions the Italian negotiators proposed that one could take a look 
at the turnover thresholds. As we saw in Chapter 6, these thresholds had been a matter of great 
controversy in the debates in the 1980s and this was not a dispute that the Commission would like 
to see re-opened. In the Annex to the 2001 Green Paper it had concluded that the thresholds levels 
were appropriate and in a skilful manner it avoided this becoming an issue again. One of the 
diplomats involved in these negotiations recalls how this was done: 
 
‘When the Commission makes a proposal for revision of a regulation, then in order 
to ensure its readability they send out the whole regulation and then all the motions 
for amendment are marked with grey and everything not up for amendment is 
outside the proposal [and marked with white, HB], in other words it’s not up for 
discussion ... That’s the Commission’s argument. That’s because the Commission 
will say that it has the right of initiative in the EU – we [the member states, HB] do 
not have the right of initiative, so we cannot make proposals for amendments 
different from those set out by the Commission. That was the Commission’s 
argument all the time. And the articles dealing with threshold values were not 
242 
 
marked with grey, meaning that they were outside the area of discussion’ (Diplomat 
A, Interview) 
 
Another involved diplomat adds that ‘we were some countries that were flabbergasted that we could 
not discuss anything in the white area if it was related to the grey. Normally a regulation is a 
consistent whole … and if you change one element this might effect other elements ... the 
Commission believed that we should only look at the grey tools, even though some of us believed 
that some of them could have effects in the white area’ (Diplomat B, Interview100). In this manner 
the Commission attempted to take, and was successful in taking, charge of the negotiations and 
hereby to a significant degree affect their outcome. In the end, the negotiators settled on a model 
that would allow companies to request the Commission to review transactions that do not have a 
“Community dimension”, but which may be reviewed by at least three NCAs. Provided that none of 
the NCAs in question object to this the Commission is given exclusive competence to review the 
merger (Article 4(5)). 
 
As has already been hinted at above, the question of whether the existing MD test should be 
replaced with the SLC test or alternatively merely be “clarified” (as proposed by the Commission), 
became the most contentious issue in the negotiations. Here, the British diplomats appeared as the 
strongest and most clamorous advocate of the introduction of the new test (Diplomat A, Interview). 
In November 2003, the Minister for Employment Relations, Competition and Consumers, Gerry 
Sutcliffe described the position of the UK government in terms very similar to those used in the 
DTI’s response to the 2001 Green Paper. He maintained that the SLC test ‘is fundamentally better 
adapted to merger control than dominance’ because ‘it is more directly grounded in economic 
principles’ and provides ‘greater flexibility to deal with all forms of anti-competitive mergers’. He 
added to this that ‘our principal concern is to plug the potential gap in the existing dominance test, 
which might mean that the regulation cannot deal with non-collusive oligopolies. It is important to 
do this in as straightforward a way as possible, minimising the risk of any anti-competitive mergers 
slipping through the Commission’s net’ (House of Lords, 2003).  
 
In the opposite corner stood the German diplomats, insisting that the MD test should be preserved 
and threatening to veto any other outcome. In the words of one of the diplomats involved in these 
negotiations, the Germans were defending and holding on to a ‘rather inflexible position’ (Diplomat 
B, Interview). Initially Germany enjoyed support from the Netherlands and Italy but these countries 
gradually withdrew this support, with the result that the Germans ended up being more or less 
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isolated in the negotiations (Diplomat A, Interview; Diplomat B, Interview). Whereas the British 
and German negotiators had strong and unambiguous preferences in relation to the “test issue”, the 
stance taken by the negotiators from most other countries was more pragmatic. In particular, it 
seems that the main preoccupation of the negotiators from many of the smaller member states was 
that the test should be clear and usable (Diplomat A, Interview).  
 
Since the publication of the proposal for a revised MCR, capital actors such as UNICE and ERT 
had been extremely worried that the Commission was indeed trying to introduce a new test. As a 
UNICE Senior Staff member puts it, ‘[i]t was only when the proposal came out that we saw that 
they wanted to go ahead with the SLC test. At the time of the Green Paper that didn’t seem like a 
risk’ (Interview). Once it became apparent towards the end of 2003 that the introduction of a new 
test was indeed not an unlikely outcome of the negotiations in the Council’s working group, the 
working groups dealing with competition policy matters in both UNICE and the ERT started a 
carefully coordinated campaign in order to stop this from happening. In a letter to the member 
federations dated 6 October, the UNICE working group on competition wrote that the new test 
‘would widen the scope of the present merger control system to an unacceptable extent’. Members 
were thus ‘urged to communicate UNICE’s concerns regarding discussions in the Council working 
party to their national representatives’ and they were moreover urged ‘not to agree to any major 
changes to the current merger control system’ (UNICE, 2003). On 21 November 2003, the CEO of 
Air Liquide, Alain Joly and Wolfgang Kopf, the convenor of ERT’s competition policy working 
group, wrote a letter to Commissioner Monti in which they made clear that they were ‘greatly 
concerned at the Commission’s proposal contained in the draft revised Merger Regulation to move 
away from the dominance test towards a “substantial lessening of competition” test’. In their view, 
‘the dominance test is entirely compatible with modern economic theory’ and a move to the SLC 
test  
 
‘could lead to additional costs for European business by lowering predictability, not 
only in the short to medium term through the switch from one paradigm to another, 
but also permanently through increasing the Commission’s scope for discretionary 
intervention’ 
 
It furthermore appears from the letter that ‘extensive discussions’ between the ERT and the 
Commission’s MTF ‘have not allayed our concerns’ (ERT, 2003). A UNICE Senior Staff Member 
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describes the campaign against the new test as “intense”: ‘certainly with respect to the lobbying it 
was very intense ... we really tried to do our best at a very high level to influence this’  (Interview). 
 
One might speculate whether, in addition to the concerns related to the predictability of the system, 
a reason for ERT companies’ opposition to a new test stems from a fear that a new test would 
possibly make it easier for the Commission to block the type of transactions that such companies 
are typically involved in, namely mergers in markets where a significant concentration of capital 
has already taken place prior to the merger (oligopoly markets). As mentioned above, the old test 
made it difficult to block such mergers if a situation of market dominance was not likely to result. 
The applicability of the “collective dominance” concept (which had been invented by the 
Commission in order to cope with this very problem) had been significantly weakened and arguably 
undermined by the Airtours judgment. The fact that the Commission did not prohibit any mergers 
between 2002 and May 2004 when the new MCR came into force, can be seen to indicate that its 
eagerness to attack mergers under the old MCR and the MD test had been hamstrung somewhat. 
Levy (2005: 110) cites a number of transactions in 2003 and 2004 ‘that many expected to be 
challenged’ but which were approved by the Commission. These included the Carnival/P&O, 
Sony/BMG and Oracle/PeopleSoft mergers. In the latter case the Commission ‘had been making 
threatening noises about blocking Oracle’s attempted takeover of PeopleSoft’ but then ‘appeared to 
relent in the face of a U.S. court decision allowing it’ (Wall Street Journal, 2004). Transnational 
capital actors may well have considered this status quo to be a desirable state of affairs, providing 
them with a degree of freedom they had not previously enjoyed.  
 
The ink had barely dried on Joly and Kopf’s letter to Monti before it was announced on 27 
November 2003 that the Council had reached agreement on a revised MCR, and that it would be 
formally adopted at one of its forthcoming meetings. A compromise with respect to the test question 
had been reached: the Spanish and French diplomats had proposed a solution which took into 
account both the desire not to undermine the case law that had been established under the MD test 
and the perceived need to introduce a test that could for sure be used to control mergers in 
monopoly markets. The result was the so-called “significant impediment to effective competition” 
(SIEC) test. In Art 2(3) of the new MCR it thus reads that  
 
‘A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the 
common market or a substantial part of it, in particular by the creation or 
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strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market’  
 
One could be excused for thinking that this formulation is very similar, almost identical, to the one 
contained in the old MCR (see section 7.6). Yet in fact this is ‘a remarkable and elegant exercise in 
semantics’ (Weitbrecht, 2005: 68) that makes it unnecessary for the regulator to identify 
“dominance” before a merger that results in a “significant impediment” to competition can be 
blocked. In the working group the German diplomats were not pleased with this solution, which 
was not considered to constitute an improvement on the MD test. Accordingly, they came up with 
various alternative formulations, but the negotiators from the other member states preferred the 
French-Spanish compromise. Until the end it seemed like a genuine possibility that Germany would 
veto the agreement, and indeed they threatened to do so two days before the Council meeting in 
November. But as one of the diplomats involved in the negotiations recalls, this did not give the 
Germans a strong position at this rather late stage in the negotiations: 
 
‘The Commission succeeded in isolating the Germans, so the only ones not 
completely satisfied with the outcome were the Germans. If the proposal was vetoed 
there would be one villain. So you can say, on one hand they were in a strong 
position, but on the other hand they had to be prepared to be the scapegoat if no 
regulation was adopted’ (Diplomat B, Interview). 
 
The prospect of being responsible for the failure of the Union to get a new merger regulation 
probably prompted the Germans to accept the new test in the end (Diplomat A, Interview). 
However, there is no doubt that neither the Germans nor important European capital actors were 
particularly pleased with the introduction of the new test. On the German view, which was 
expressed by the President of the BKartA, Ulf Böge, the introduction of the SIEC test ‘resulted in 
the EU now having three “tests” which increased legal insecurity for companies. There had been no 
practical need for this amendment’ (BKartA, 2003). A similar opinion was expressed by the 
Secretary-General of UNICE, Philippe de Buck. In his 2004 essay ‘Modernising European Merger 
Policy: A Business View’, he wrote that the introduction of a new test was ‘unnecessary and 
disproportionate’ and that ‘[t]he Commission should not underplay the uncertainty which is created 
but take it extremely seriously’. Indeed, ‘[t]he wide discretion which the Regulation grants to the 
Commission should be exercised with great care and reserve’ (De Buck, 2004). 
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In the working group negotiations over the revision of the MCR, it was never discussed to take into 
account social and industrial policy considerations in the regulation of mergers. However, the EECS 
was consulted by the Council and in its Opinion, which was adopted with 102 votes to 27 (16 
abstentions) at its plenary session of 24 September 2003, a number of amendments were proposed. 
One of these was that the Commission should take into account ‘employment trends in the 
economic sector and in the areas in which the merging companies’ productive facilities are located’, 
in addition to the things it already considers. The EESC also suggested that the following passage 
was added to the operative part of the regulation (in Article 4(2)): ‘Simultaneously with, or 
immediately following, notification of the Commission, the notifying persons or enterprises shall 
also notify representatives of the employees of the enterprises involved in the concentration’ 
(EESC, 2003).  
 
In the Parliament, which was also consulted, the question of employment considerations was raised 
in a debate that took place on 8 October 2003. Here Ieke van den Burg of the Socialist Group 
argued that the Competition DG, in the regulation of mergers ‘should consider aspects other than 
competition in the narrow sense of the word’. More precisely, the socialists called for a wider 
definition that would make it possible to take into consideration ‘the contribution that 
concentrations can make to improved production and marketing systems, to international 
competitiveness, to consumer interests and to the creation of jobs and the employment situation in 
general’. And in line with previous proposals from the ETUC and the EECS, the socialists called for 
a ‘serious and fully-fledged consultation of employee representatives within the procedures’ 
(Parliament, 2003a). Commissioner Monti, who was present in the Parliament during the debate, 
responded to these requests by pointing out that the regulation of mergers should not ‘be cluttered 
with measures to stimulate or safeguard employment: there are other instruments for that’ and that 
enough was already done to get the ‘input that workers’ representatives can provide in the 
procedure’ (Parliament, 2003a). If majorities in the Parliament had subscribed to a position 
grounded in the centre-left USDR in this field in the 1970s and 1980s, this was no longer the case: 
In its legislative resolution of 9 October in which it approved the Commission’s proposal and 
proposed various amendments, there was no mentioning of the social and industrial policy 
dimension (see Parliament, 2003b). Now the centre-left USDR was a minority view that only a few 
Parties in the Parliament adhered to.  
 
247 
 
In any case, it will not come as a big surprise that this USDR, in the form of the above-mentioned 
proposals made by the ETUC and the EESC, was not reflected in the text that the member states 
finally agreed upon. Once again, centre-left ideas and their advocates were marginalised. Indeed, 
the philosophy that had hitherto been underpinning the Competition DG’s regulation of mergers 
was never questioned in the negotiations. All direct programmers (member states) and most indirect 
programmers (in particular capital actors, law firms and officials from the Commission) subscribed 
to a neoliberal USDR regarding how competition, in this case mergers, are to be regulated, namely 
on the basis of a competition test alone. Due to this fundamental agreement on the basic ideas, it is 
difficult to categorise these programmers in terms of “primary” and “secondary”. Arguably, the 
Competition DG, which was the main driving force in the processes leading up to the revision, and 
the UK government (which was much more pro-active than it had previously been) were the 
primary programmers, whereas the rest of the governments, capital actors and law firms were all 
secondary. In any case, with no Member State government and no important EU institution 
challenging the neoliberal USDR, it was all too easy to ignore those who advocated a different view 
– and indeed that was what happened. It is rather ironic that the new MCR entered into force on 1 
May 2004, a date also known as International Workers’ Day. 
 
Table 7.5:  Revising the MCR – programmers and ideas  
 Programmers Ideas 
 
Primary The Competition DG and arguably also 
the UK government  
Neoliberal USDR 
Secondary The other member state governments, 
transnationally oriented capital actors, 
law firms. 
 
Marginalised Unions and centre-left parties in the 
Parliament 
Centre-left USDR 
 
 
7.8. In conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to find out how the MCR has been implemented by the 
Commission and to explain the revision of the MCR in 2003. If we begin with the implementation, 
it seems safe to conclude that it has fully reflected the neoliberal USDR underpinning the 
formulations in the 1989 MCR. That is, the Competition DG has not been taking into account 
industrial and/or social policy considerations in its regulation of mergers, but only looked at effects 
on competition. Moreover, those governments and capital actors who have attempted to influence 
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the Competition DG’s decisions in merger cases have been unsuccessful. In its regulatory practice 
the DG seems to have been able to detach or liberate itself from outside influences (the CFI being 
the main exception), with the result that it enjoys a substantial degree of operational autonomy. It 
has not, however, used this autonomy to prohibit a large number of M&As: to the contrary only a 
small proportion of the notified mergers have been banned, and hence it seems fair to say that the 
main function of the EC merger subunit of regulation has been to ease or facilitate mergers with 
“Community dimension”. 
 
Turning to the revision of the MCR in 2003 (see also Figure 7.1), the perhaps most noteworthy 
aspect of the negotiation processes was that all the direct programmers as well as almost all the 
indirect programmers advocated positions based on the neoliberal USDR. Indeed, at this juncture 
only some unions (including the ETUC), a majority in the EESC and a minority in the Parliament 
advocated a centre-left position. Consequently, alternatives to merger control based on a neoliberal 
USDR were hardly discussed in the processes leading up to the adoption of the revised MCR, which 
consequently ended up as a purely neoliberal document. That this was the case was not surprising: 
all the subunits making up the EC competition unit of regulation are based on a neoliberal vision of 
competition regulation – as are the increasingly “Europeanised” national merger subunits of 
regulation in the UK, Germany and (to a smaller extent) France. Moreover, the wider ensemble of 
regulation of which the competition unit forms part has generally (but of course not exclusively) 
been grounded in neoliberal USDRs from the mid 1980s onwards.  
 
The outcome of the negotiations were also influenced by the intensified transnationalisation of 
capitalism throughout the period, which resulted in an increased number of cross-border M&As and 
thus also an increase in the number of notifications received by the Competition DG. This made it 
relevant to review the allocation of cases between the DG and NCAs. Moreover, the CFI rulings 
overturning three of the Competition DG’s merger decisions prompted the programmers to look at 
the test used by the Commission when assessing mergers. Indeed, this turned out to be the most 
“controversial” part of the negotiations. The German negotiators backed up by not only the BKartA 
but also an overwhelming majority of European capital actors argued strongly for the preservation 
of the MD-test. The UK and Irish negotiators backed up by a few capital actors and the British law 
community argued that this test was outdated and that the SLC-test would be more appropriate. In 
the end a compromise was reached with the so-called SIEC-test. To explain the timing in the 
agreement one needs to see the negotiations over the MCR revision in the context of the wider 
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reform of EC competition policy, the timing of which was related to the enlargement of the EU with 
ten new countries on 1 May 2004. That is, the direct programmers were well aware that with ten 
more countries involved in the negotiations it would be even harder to agree on a text and hence 
they did their utmost to come to an agreement before the end of 2003.  
 
Figure 7.1: Explaining the revision of the MCR 
 
 
 
7.9. Postscript: challenges to neoliberal competition regulation 
 
‘Competition as an ideology, as a dogma, what has it done for Europe? Fewer and 
fewer people who vote in European elections and fewer and fewer people who believe 
in Europe’ (French President Sarkozy, quoted in Financial Times, 2007a).  
 
Even though the neoliberal “competition only” discourse of regulation has been hegemonic for 
some time, this does not mean that alternative discourses are completely absent. It was already 
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noted in the above discussion of the processes leading up to the revision of the MCR that 
proponents of the centre-left USDR made themselves heard. However, such ideas constitute a 
minority view that is not taken seriously by those with genuine decision-making powers. The Euro-
mercantilist perspective also seems to have few proponents nowadays, even in the Commission’s 
DG for Industry which was traditionally a committed supporter of a strong European industrial 
policy. Since the end of the 1980s, this DG has adhered ‘to a new style industrial policy approach 
which sees competition as the basis of competitiveness. It has practically divorced itself from earlier 
promotions of Euro-champions and come to accept that competitiveness on world markets can only 
be realized if there is genuine competition within the European market’ (McGowan & Cini, 1999: 
189). To put it differently, ‘in the realms of European discourse and institutions alike, competition 
has been elevated to an exalted status, a “highest good” that brings all other virtues, including 
international economic competitiveness’ (Smith, 2005: 316). This means that the emergence of a 
strong, interventionist EC industrial policy is very unlikely indeed. However, there have been calls 
for a different type of EC competition and industrial policy from in particular Germany and France. 
In April 2002, the Financial Times published a letter written by the German chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder, in which he argued that ‘[a] competitiveness-orientated industrial policy must … form 
part of the EU’s Lisbon strategy’. Such a policy would ‘not forget the need for social solidarity and 
employee participation in decision-making’ and would differentiate between sectors according to 
their position in global markets (Financial Times, 2002c). Although the letter was formulated in a 
rather diplomatic language, its content clearly went against the neoliberal “competitiveness through 
competition” view, which leaves no room for differentiation and solidarity and which seeks to avoid 
employee participation. As such it ‘reflected a fundamental challenge to the EU approach to 
industrial policy’ (Smith, 2005: 315).  
 
French governments have also challenged the Commission’s neoliberal competition policy. 
Arguably, the current French President Nicolas Sarkozy is the leader of the “mercantilist” counter-
movement. As Minister of Finance, Sarkozy argued that ‘neither France nor Europe can become 
industrial deserts... It is not a right for the state to help industry. It is a duty’ (quoted in Murray, 
2004: 8). These were not merely empty words: on a number of occasions he (and the French 
government) has pursued interventionist policies in order to save large French companies. This was 
the case in September 2003 when Alstom, a leading French engineering company which is e.g. 
known for its production of cruise ships and high-speed trains, almost went bankrupt. Only because 
of an emergency 1.2 billion Euro loan from the government did the company manage to survive. 
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The Commission, which was upset that the government had not asked for its permission to grant the 
loan, was not too keen to approve the rescue plan. But the government, and Sarkozy in particular, 
put pressure on the Commission by arguing that it would bear the sole responsibility for the loss of 
up to 70,000 jobs should it decide not to accept the subsidy. The outcome was a complex deal 
between the French government and the Commission, where the latter only approved the subsidy 
subject to certain remedies, including that Alstom has to sell some of its subsidiaries whereas the 
French government has to sell its stake in the company (Murray, 2004: 14-15). Sarkozy celebrated 
this agreement as a triumph on ‘a victory tour of Alstom’s factories in Belfort and La Rochelle, 
which helped boost his poll ratings’ (Murray, 2004: 15). 
 
In August 2004 French President Jacques Chirac called on the EU to ‘strongly support the creation 
of European industrial champions’ and spoke in favour of ‘a European competition policy that truly 
takes into account the realities of international competition’ (EU Observer, 2004). Prior to this, in 
June 2004, Schröder and Chirac had issued a joint statement in which they made clear the need for 
government intervention in order to create ‘the industrial champions that Europe needs’ in order to 
be competitive in world markets (International Herald Tribune, 2004). In this context the two 
political leaders had also agreed to set up a joint industry forum comprised of business leaders in a 
bid to boost industrial cooperation. Unsurprisingly, this announcement was not met with enthusiasm 
from the Commission. In particular, internal market Commissioner Fritz Bolkestein made no secret 
of his feelings. In a letter to the Financial Times entitled ‘Let the market choose Europe’s 
champions’, Bolkestein wrote that ‘I cannot help feeling that I am in a time warp. I have to pinch 
myself to make sure that I am not back in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s. Or even under the mercantilist 
regime of Jean Baptiste Colbert in King Louis XIV’s France’. His argument against interventionist 
industrial policies was the familiar one that governments and bureaucrats are unable to ‘second-
guess the market’ and ‘tend to pick losers, not winners’. The neoliberal “competitiveness through 
competition” mantra was also repeated: ‘The key to prosperity is ensuring the right conditions for 
business investment, in particular in innovative sectors. An essential condition is strong 
competition. When companies are faced with stiff competition or the threat of takeover, they are 
forced to innovate and come up with better-quality products at lower prices’ (Financial Times, 
2004). 
 
If the challenge to the neoliberal type of competition regulation has very often been Euro-
mercantilist at the level of discourse, it has been purely national-mercantilist in practice. That is, 
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with little or no prospect of a different kind of industrial policy at the European level, the challenge 
to the Commission has instead taken the form of national protectionism. So why is there a national-
mercantilist backlash? In effect European companies are being exposed to increasingly tough 
competition on an increasingly international scale. The Commission’s neoliberal type of 
competition regulation serves only to intensify this competition and companies react by engaging in 
cross-border M&As in order to remain or become competitive in world markets. However, many 
governments do not like to lose control of national industries in key sectors. Indeed, there is a 
genuine fear in such countries that they will not be net beneficiaries of economic globalisation, the 
result inter alia being a loss of jobs and other negative social effects. In March 2006, the Financial 
Times reported how ‘Italy is almost literally cracking up under exposure to competition from 
Eurozone partners and from China in textiles and shoes’ and that ‘Paris is reacting with even more 
fury than Rome at finding that the EU is proving as much a transmission belt bringing the forces of 
globalisation in as a bulwark keeping them out’ (Financial Times, 2006e). This is the background 
against which protectionism, or “economic patriotism” as French Prime Minister Dominique de 
Villepin characterised the phenomenon, should be seen. 
 
Indeed, in recent years a number of conflicts between member state governments and the 
Commission have surfaced. Although governments cannot as such stop cross-border mergers and 
takeovers that fall under the Commission’s jurisdiction, they can still frustrate bids in various ways. 
Suffice it to give a few examples of this. The attempt by Italian company Enel to take over Franco-
Belgian Suez Group was hindered by the French government’s opposition: in order to prevent the 
deal, the government managed to force through a merger between the Suez Group and Gaz de 
France (Financial Times, 2007b). This merger was later conditionally approved by the Commission. 
The Italian government has gone to great lengths in order to prevent a foreign takeover of Telecom 
Italia and in December 2006 it managed to derail the bid for Autostrade, the country’s main 
motorway operator, from Spain's Abertis (Financial Times, 2007c). This latter merger had already 
been cleared by the Commission. The Spanish government attempted to hinder the takeover of 
power company Endesa by German Eon. The Financial Times (2006c) quoted a Spanish official 
saying that ‘Spain is merely following Italy, France and Germany which have all taken steps to 
protect their energy sectors’. The Polish government has attempted to prevent Italian UniCredit 
from merging its Polish subsidiary Pekao with a subsidiary of German HVB, fearing that the 
merged entity would constitute a threat to state-owned PKO Bank Polski (Financial Times, 2006f). 
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The German government struggled hard to preserve a law that protects Volkswagen from being 
taken over by foreign companies (Economist, 2006), and the French government has also 
introduced various measures to prevent hostile foreign takeovers of French companies and declared 
11 sectors off-limits to foreign investment (Financial Times, 2006d). When India’s Mittal Steel 
announced its hostile takeover bid for Luxembourg based steel company Arcelor it came up against 
tough opposition from, in particular the French, Belgian and Spanish governments. However, the 
takeover, which was discussed at a meeting between President Chirac and Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh (Financial Times, 2006b), was allowed to go through in June 2006, hereby 
creating the world’s largest steel company. Of course, not all member states are unhappy with the 
neoliberal policies of the Commission. For instance the UK, a country with an Anglo-Saxon model 
of capitalism, has openly supported the fight against protectionism. For instance, in the context of 
the Mittal-Arcelor case Alan Johnson, the UK Secretary of Trade and Industry, echoed the 
Commission’s oft-repeated point of view when he said that ‘[m]easures to protect key industries 
from foreign takeovers where there are no state security issues are futile and self-defeating. The 
paradox of protectionism is that it destroys what it seeks to protect’ (Financial Times, 2006a).  
 
It is not only in the merger area that the Commission has been challenged. In the state aid area, 
member state governments, not least the French and German, have arguably become more willing 
than previously to challenge the Commission’s decisions. This is for instance possible under Article 
88 of the Treaty which empowers the Council, acting unanimously, to overturn state aid decisions 
“under exceptional circumstances” (see Cini, 2007 for examples of Article 88 and other challenges 
in the state aid area). 
 
Many of the abovementioned cases have led to proceedings under Article 226 of the EC treaty, 
many of which are still ongoing (see also Galloway, 2007). Meanwhile, the national-mercantilist 
countermovement has been strengthened by the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President. 
We saw above how Sarkozy, as Minister of Finance, became associated with protectionist policies. 
And from the outset of his tenure as President, Sarkozy has openly challenged the neoliberal 
competition ideology at the European level. The European Constitution, which had been signed by 
member states representatives in 2004, gave more prominence to competition than it had previously 
enjoyed: that is, whereas the EC Treaty had mentioned “undistorted competition” as something that 
had to be ensured in order to attain the objectives of the Community (Article 3), the Constitutional 
Treaty elevated competition to an objective in itself, stating that the EU ‘an internal market where 
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competition is free and undistorted’ (Constitutional Treaty, Art 1-3(2)). As mentioned in section 
7.2, the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands, 
prompting the political leaders of the EU to come up with a new treaty, the Reform Treaty. What is 
particularly interesting about the Reform Treaty in this context is that the commitment to free and 
undistorted competition was dropped from the “objectives” section. This was due to the efforts by 
Sarkozy. At the June 2007 EU summit in Germany he made his intentions to break with the 
neoliberal competition ideology clear, making provocative statements such as the one quoted in the 
beginning of this section. Informing his colleagues that competition is ‘not the meaning of life’ and 
that ‘[t]he word “protection” is no longer taboo’ he insisted on the removal of the “free 
competition” formulation from the EU’s objectives and got his way (Financial Times, 2007e). 
 
The reactions to this move were quite predictable. Capital actors expressed their concern: the ERT’s 
secretary general, Win Philippa, commented that it ‘would be food for people arguing in favour of 
economic nationalism’, adding that ‘[t]his could have a very negative effect. We are worried’. And 
BusinessEurope’s director for legal affairs said that ‘We would be worried if this had an effect on 
EU competition policy’ (Financial Times, 2007a). Some commentators in the financial press were 
outraged; not least Wolfgang Munchau of the Financial Times who talked about ‘the madness of 
Europe’s drift to mercantilism’, characterising the move as “insane” and informing his admiring 
readers that ‘Europe’s future does not lie in ideas of the pre-enlightenment era’ (Financial Times, 
2007d). Some EU experts also jumped on the bandwagon, describing the move as ‘an important and 
decisive step’ that would remove competition as the foundation stone of the EU (see Politiken, 
2007)101. As one scholar put it, ‘the evil of protectionism is now, more than ever, alive and kicking’ 
(Bavaso, 2007: 3). Despite such (over)reactions, the fact remains that the move was a symbolic act 
as opposed to a legally significant change. As mentioned above, the attainment of free and 
undistorted competition was not an “objective” in the EC treaty, only in the Constitution where it 
for obvious reasons had no legal effect whatsoever. Hence, the consequence of not including the 
reference to free and undistorted competition in the “objectives” section would, legally speaking, 
merely seem to be to preserve the status quo, not to initiate some radical shift towards 
protectionism/mercantilism.  
 
As this section opened with a statement made by one of the “protectionists” it seems appropriate to 
let one of the neoliberalists, namely Commissioner Kroes, have the last word. The following extract 
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from a 2007 speech confirms that the Commission continues to be tireless in its efforts to combat all 
forms of protectionism and illustrates that its rhetoric is more aggressive than ever before: 
 
‘Politicians have a duty to accompany people and companies through change. It is 
not good politics to play King Canute and try to hold back the tide. Yet that is 
exactly what we are seeing when some European governments try to advocate 
“matching aid” to prop up failing companies, or when they put unjustified obstacles 
in the way of cross-border mergers. I’m not at all convinced their protectionist 
sandcastles will fare any better than Canute did with the oncoming tide. Wouldn't it 
make more sense to give people the tools they need to build seagoing crafts and ride 
the waves?’ (Kroes, 2007) 
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8. Conclusions 
 
This concluding chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first two sections the substantive 
argument advanced in the previous chapters is summarised and a number of themes related to the 
way the history of European level merger control has been explained in this thesis are reflected 
upon. This also entails some considerations as to how the critical political economy perspective on 
regulation could be further developed. The third section contains a review of the way the existing 
literature has theorised the history of EC competition policy or parts of it. Finally, the fourth section 
explicates the alternative agenda for the study of EC competition policy, of which the current work 
can be seen to form part. 
 
 
8.1. The history of European level merger control: summarising the argument 
 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to shed light on the overall history of European level 
merger control. The research question guiding the analyses was ‘what were the main causes of the 
major developments in the history of European level merger control?’ To answer this question four 
sub-questions, each concerning major developments in the merger area, were formulated. The 
purpose of this section is to gather up the threads, summarising how these sub-questions were 
answered in the previous four chapters. 
 
Sub-question 1: Why were merger rules not included in the EC Treaty when such provisions were 
contained in the ECSC Treaty? 
 
To answer this question Chapter 4 looked into the processes leading up to the adoption of the two 
Treaties and related the diverging outcomes with respect to merger rules to broader contextual 
developments. In the processes leading up to both treaties two major USDRs on the basis of which 
the various programmers articulated their respective positions were identified. These were a “pro-
concentration USDR” according to which mergers (and cartels) should not be hindered by the new 
supranational institutions and a “pro-competition USDR” (which drew on ideas from the US 
antitrust tradition and German ordoliberalism) according to which the preservation of competition 
through the establishment of a well-functioning European level competition unit of regulation was 
257 
 
desirable. Due to some important developments in the broader contexts within which the 
negotiations over the two Treaties took place, the constellations of programmers subscribing to 
positions grounded in these USDRs changed over the course of the 1950s – and this does much to 
explain why merger rules were included in one treaty but not the other. 
 
In the processes leading up to the adoption of the ECSC Treaty, the proponents of the pro-
concentration USDR were important capital actors and a number of political parties in Germany, 
France, Italy and Belgium. Although these programmers were not a unified group, they generally 
believed that their national heavy industries needed to “concentrate” and hence they saw no need 
for a supranational bureaucracy that would hinder this process. The proponents of the pro-
competition USDR were the primary direct programmers, namely the governments of France, 
Germany and the US. The programming outcome reflected that the latter, which was an occupying 
power in Germany at the time, pushed strongly for competition provisions in order to avoid that the 
ECSC itself became a “gigantic cartel”. In a situation where the prospective ECSC member 
countries had no or very little experience with competition regulation and were dependent on US 
aid for the reconstruction of their economies it became possible to reach agreement on the 
provisions despite the strong opposition they were up against. This was especially the case because 
US antitrust ideas resonated quite well with the ordoliberal ideas to which leading members of 
Germany’s political elite subscribed and because the French government, and Monnet who 
negotiated for France, saw the merger provisions as a way to prevent German re-concentration.  
 
Whereas the ECSC Treaty was negotiated against the background of economic crisis and with the 
Second World War still fresh in the collective memory, the situation was completely different in 
1957 when the EC Treaty was adopted: the threat of war seemed less imminent; the European 
economies were booming; and the US no longer had as decisive an impact on politics in Europe. 
This had consequences for the competition rules that were included in the Treaty. With the 
Americans not taking part in the negotiations and the French government not being particularly 
keen on establishing a general European level competition unit of regulation, the most important 
direct programmers in favour of such rules were those leading members of the German government 
who were influenced by ordoliberal thinking. Whereas the constellation of programmers advocating 
the pro-competition USDR had hereby been weakened significantly, the pro-concentration USDR 
was to some extent strengthened as the French government now advocated a position grounded in 
this discourse. However, at the same time various capital actors did not take much interest in the 
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proposed competition rules of the EC Treaty, not least because they did not (and didn’t have any 
reason to) expect that competition regulation would become a prominent feature of the EC. The 
outcome of the negotiations reflected these significant changes in the constellations of programmers 
subscribing to the two discourses. On one hand, the inclusion of competition rules in the EC Treaty, 
which established a competition unit of regulation consisting of four subunits, was a victory for the 
German negotiators and the ordoliberals (supported by the Dutch government). On the other hand, it 
was not the case that the provisions reflected a wholehearted commitment to ordoliberalism, as the 
conventional wisdom would have us to believe. Indeed, the pro-concentration USDR is strongly 
reflected in the provisions in the sense that the latter allowed for significant concentrations of 
capital, for instance by not mentioning mergers with as much as a word.  
 
Sub-question 2: Why did the Commission’s proposals for a MCR fail to gain support from the 
member states in the 1970s and most of the 1980s? 
 
To answer this question Chapter 5 and 6 identified four USDRs (each constituting a distinct 
perspective on the desired content, form and scope of merger control), to which various 
constellations of programmers subscribed: a national-mercantilist USDR the main proponents of 
which were the governments of France, Italy, and (in the 1970s) the UK, as well as most capital 
actors and some parties in the Parliament; a Euro-mercantilist USDR which gave rise to the position 
advocated by the Commission; a position grounded in a neoliberal USDR which was (at least in 
principle) favoured by the German and Danish governments; and a centre-left USDR which gave 
rise to a position subscribed to by majorities in the Parliament and the EESC, and probably also 
most trade unions. The outcome of the negotiations, namely that no agreement could be reached, 
reflected that the national-mercantilist position prevailed. The proponents of this position were 
oriented towards national industrial policy and the creation of “national champions”, and not 
particularly keen on European level merger rules that could potentially interfere with national 
policies. 
 
To understand why such ideas prevailed one needs to look at the wider settings in which the 
negotiations took place in the 1970s and most of the 1980s. That is, it should be seen in the context 
of the social order “embedded liberalism”, with its combination of KWNSs and a predominantly 
nationally oriented (Fordist) type of capital accumulation. With the regulation of capitalism being 
primarily national in scope and with a low number of cross-border M&As taking place in the 
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Common Market few programmers located outside the European institutions saw the need for 
European level merger control. The Commission had made its 1973 proposal for a MCR during a 
brief moment of Euro-enthusiasm among member states and in the immediate aftermath of the 
Court’s ruling in the Continental Can case. But especially after 1973, when the Golden Age came to 
an end and a long and deep economic crisis began, did member states respond to the American 
challenge by opting for national, rather than European, initiatives. That is, national industrial 
policies, often entailing various forms of state aid for declining industries and other forms of 
protection of national firms against outside competition, became an increasingly popular instrument 
in most or all member state. In this period of “economic nationalism”, the European integration 
process stagnated as did the EC competition unit of regulation.  
 
A major reason why no agreement on an EC merger regulation could be reached was fears among 
member state governments that such rules could serve as an instrument to undermine or hinder 
national industrial policies related to M&As. The merger subunits of regulation that came into being 
in the course of the 1970s were thus established at the national as opposed to the European level. 
Indeed, it is interesting (but perhaps not surprising) that although the merger subunits that took 
shape in Germany, France and the UK in this era differed in some respects, they were designed in 
ways that made them compatible with the way capital accumulation was facilitated in the broader 
ensembles of regulation of which they formed part. In particular M&As were regulated on the basis 
of various “public interest” criteria, meaning that a broad range of objectives (including 
employment and industrial policy considerations) could be taken into account and political 
decision-makers were allowed to overrule the decisions made by competition authorities. Hereby it 
was ensured that the emergence of big (Fordist) enterprises could be allowed even in situations 
where they would undermine competition and the full employment commitment underlying the 
KNWSs could also be taken into account in this subunit. 
 
Sub-question 3: Why was it eventually possible to adopt a MCR and why was designed the way it 
was? 
 
To answer this question the changes in the constellation of programmers subscribing to the four 
USDRs were explored and these changes were linked to some significant developments in the wider 
contexts. During the course of the 1980s a major shift took place, not only in the competition units 
of regulation but also in the wider ensembles of regulation of which they form part. In many 
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member states and at the EC level neoliberal ideas of regulation gradually became influential, first 
by providing intellectual ammunition against the KNWS, later by serving as the ideational basis for 
reforms of the existing ensembles of regulation. This disruption of the compromise of embedded 
liberalism was clearly related to, but not explained away by, a change in the underlying balance of 
power between capital and labour, which had now shifted decisively in favour of capital. But it was 
also related to a transformation of the European business community itself, the prevailing fractions 
of which had now become those orienting themselves beyond the national level and who thus 
perceived of free markets on a regional or even global scale as attractive. The neoliberal GDR gave 
rise to a USDR which prescribed a type of merger control that had as its sole declared objective the 
preservation/creation of competition and which was to be enforced with no or very limited political 
involvement. This was related to the way competition is perceived: whereas it was previously 
widely understood to be a phenomenon with both positive and negative effects, it was now elevated 
to a blessing. The neoliberal discourse underpinned a partial re-programming of national 
competition units in the 1980s and 1990s, although it did not take place synchronously or to the 
same extent in the various EC countries. For instance it was much more pronounced in the UK than 
in France or Germany, hereby reflecting developments in the wider ensembles of regulation. 
 
At the EC level important developments took place as well. The integration process gained 
momentum in the mid 1980s with the SEA and the “1992 programme”. Capital actors, more 
precisely the members of the ERT, were a main driving force behind the latter initiative, arguing 
that Europe needed a genuine internal market if the economic crisis was to be overcome. As 
mentioned, the EC competition unit of regulation had stagnated throughout the 1970s and in the 
early 1980s. The Competition DG had been forced to temporarily re-programme itself, turning the 
blind eye to serious violations of EC competition law and in some cases even promoting “crisis 
cartels”. Although the SEA did not as such introduce any significant changes in the competition 
area, the broader momentum of the integration process enabled strong Commissioners such as 
Sutherland and Brittan, backed up by the Court, to play a much more pro-active role than their 
predecessors of the 1970s had done. The outcome was a revitalisation of the EC competition unit of 
regulation which paved the way for the establishment of a European level merger sub-unit in the 
late 1980s.  
 
From the early to the mid 1980s, the support for the national-mercantilist discourse crumbled. The 
UK joined the neoliberal camp and capital actors now increasingly oriented themselves towards the 
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international level. Towards the end of the 1980s, the ERT became a strong supporter of EC merger 
regulation, perceiving of it as an instrument that could be used to ease cross-border restructuring. 
Indeed the number of cross-border M&As exploded after the mid 1980s, in response to the 1992 
programme and deregulation and liberalisation more generally, and this “merger madness” was a 
process that a number of ERT companies were very actively involved in. However, it was only after 
a number of meetings between Commissioner Sutherland and ERT members that the latter became 
persuaded that an EC regulation would constitute an attractive alternative to the several national 
jurisdictions. The Commissioner and his staff also met with representatives from UNICE several 
times, and the latter now joined the ERT, AmCham, CEFIC and other representatives of 
transnational capital in their promotion of clear, and preferably neoliberal, supranational rules in the 
merger area. Meanwhile the Commission also joined the neoliberal camp, whereas the French and 
Italian governments became supporters of the Euro-mercantilist position before finally giving in to 
the neoliberal majority. As regarded the centre-left position, it continued to enjoy support from 
unions and majorities in the EESC and the Parliament. But as the latter institutions do not have any 
real powers in this field, and as the heyday of the trade union movement was long gone at this point, 
this position was easily marginalised. Consequently, the MCR that was eventually adopted was very 
much a neoliberal text. That is, member states were not empowered to overrule the Commission’s 
decisions in merger cases (whereby the room for “political discretion” was limited significantly) 
and mergers were to be regulated on the basis of a pure competition test (employment 
considerations etc. were thus not to be taken into account). 
 
Sub-question 4: How has the MCR been implemented by the Commission and how can the revision 
of it in 2003 be explained? 
 
In Chapter 7 the way the MCR has been implemented in the 1990s onwards by the Commission was 
investigated, looking both at a number of interesting “cases” and at some quantitative data. On the 
basis of this it can be concluded that the MCR has been implemented in the spirit intended by those 
who programmed the Competition DG. That is, the enforcement of the rules has served to facilitate 
large M&As and has taken place on the basis of the neoliberal ideas embedded in the MCR. As 
regards the latter, there is no evidence to suggest that the Competition DG has regulated mergers on 
the basis of industrial and/or social policy considerations. To the contrary, regulation is based on a 
test that concerns the effects on competition (“market dominance” and later “significant impediment 
to effective competition”). This is clearly in line with the neoliberal USDR. So is the fact that 
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neither political decision-makers nor capital actors have been successful in influencing the 
regulatory practice of the Competition DG. Indeed the latter seems to enjoy a very significant 
degree of operational autonomy from outside influences, which is precisely what this USDR 
prescribes. Finally, the EC merger subunit has not first and foremost served to prohibit M&As: of 
the 3668 mergers that were notified to the Competition DG between 1990 and the end of 2007, only 
20 were prohibited and 3202 were approved unconditionally. This clearly suggests that the subunit 
has done what in particular transnationally oriented capital actors want it to do: making it easier for 
large companies to merge across borders.  
 
To understand the neoliberal type of EC merger control and the way the MCR was revised in 2003 
one needs to see the subunit as forming part of a bigger picture. From the 1990s onwards, neoliberal 
ideas of regulation had become hegemonic, not least in the various EU institutions and in the EC 
competition unit of regulation as a whole. Moreover, the neoliberal vision of competition regulation 
is reflected in increasingly “Europeanised” merger subunits of regulation in the UK, Germany and 
(to a smaller extent) France. The hegemony of neoliberal ideas in both the wider GDR and the 
competition USDR is promoted not only by the Commission and other supranational institutions; 
transnational capital actors (including the ERT, the ICC and the TABD) remain among the most 
committed supporters of such ideas and hence also, of ever more vigorously enforced competition 
regulation, preferably at the global level. 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, the processes leading up to the revision of the MCR in 2003 above all became 
a testimony to the hegemony of the neoliberal USDR. All the direct programmers as well as the vast 
majority of indirect programmers advocated positions based on this USDR. The only “rival” at this 
juncture was the centre-left position which was promoted by some unions (including the ETUC), a 
majority in the EESC and a minority in the Parliament. This alternative was thus easily 
marginalised (and hardly discussed) in the processes leading up to the adoption of the revised MCR, 
which consequently ended up as a purely neoliberal document. The most contentious issue in the 
negotiations was the question of what “competition only” test should be applied by the Competition 
DG in its regulation of mergers (a topic that had become relevant after the CFI rulings overturning 
three of the Competition DG’s merger decisions). The German negotiators backed up by the 
BKartA and an overwhelming majority of European capital actors wanted to retain the MD-test, 
whereas the UK and British negotiators backed up by a few capital actors and the British law 
community argued in favour of the SLC-test. In the end a compromise was reached with the so-
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called SIEC-test. The outcome of the negotiations were also influenced by the intensified 
transnationalisation of capitalism throughout the period, resulting in an increase in cross-border 
M&As and thus also in notifications received by the Competition DG. This made it relevant to 
review the allocation of cases between the DG and NCAs. To explain the timing in the agreement 
one needs to see it in relation to the enlargement of the EU with ten new countries on 1 May 2004. 
To avoid the inclusion of ten more countries in the negotiations, the direct programmers did what 
they could to come to an agreement before the end of 2003 – and succeeded in doing so.  
 
 
8.2. Reflections on the history of European level merger control  
 
It has been argued throughout the thesis that “context matters”: that the history of European level 
merger control has to be understood in the light of the development of the broader whole of which it 
forms part. If one adopts a longitudinal perspective it becomes clear that the settings in which 
merger control takes place have changed dramatically. In particular two major shifts can be 
observed. First, an ideological shift from “left” to “right” has taken place, manifested in the move 
from embedded liberalism towards neoliberalism. Second, the prevailing orientation of capitalist 
production and accumulation has shifted from national towards international markets, a process that 
has been accompanied by (and reinforced through) the internationalisation of regulation. An 
underlying theme in this thesis, which is worth spelling out here, has been how these two shifts 
have been translated into a profound transformation in the way competition is regulated in Europe. 
As also suggested elsewhere (see Buch-Hansen & Wigger, 2008), this transformation relates both to 
the content, form and scope of competition policy (including merger control). Content: whereas 
competition was regulated on the basis of various “public interest” criteria (including effects on 
employment) in the era of embedded liberalism, its content has by and large been limited to a 
“competition only” focus in the neoliberal era. Form: whereas political (democratically 
accountable) decision-makers were involved in different ways in competition regulation in the era 
of embedded liberalism, their influence on the regulatory practices of competition authorities has 
been reduced in the era of neoliberalism. Now competition regulation is to take place on the basis of 
sophisticated and presumably objective economic analyses rather than on the basis of “political 
discretion”. Scope: whereas the NCAs arguably enjoyed a certain primacy over the Competition DG 
in the era of embedded liberalism, they have come to play second fiddle in the era of neoliberalism, 
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where an increased internationalisation and even globalisation of competition regulation can be 
witnessed.  
 
However, ascribing so much importance to various contexts gives rise to certain difficulties. For 
one thing, the dynamic contexts identified as important in the previous chapters are not clearly 
demarcated independent variables. To the contrary they are often closely related to each other, 
making it difficult to establish their relative significance. Perhaps more importantly the actual links 
between contextual shifts such as those described in the previous paragraph and developments in 
the merger control area are not always some that can be shown to exist by means of empirical data. 
One cannot go to, say, the Commission’s archives in Brussels and find some old document that 
explicitly establishes a connection between embedded liberalism and a particular type of 
competition regulation. The alternative we can opt for is to show how specific contextual 
developments actually make sense of specific developments in the merger area, hereby justifying 
the assumption that there is an actual link. So, on the basis of knowledge about the nature of the 
“embedded liberalism compromise” and of competition units of regulation in this era, we can make 
the case that the latter’s concern with employment effects were in all likelihood related to the full 
employment commitment underlying the former. The merit of looking at the comprehensive picture 
is that it allows us to take a historically specified perspective on the history of merger control (and 
competition regulation more generally). Of course the far more convenient (and in my view 
inadequate) approach is to simply focus on the developments in the EC merger control area. This is 
the approach the vast majority of scholars in this field have chosen (see also section 8.3 below).  
 
Another theme worth reflecting on is how much various capital actors have been able to influence 
the regulation of mergers in the EC. In section 3.3 the importance of capital actors was emphasized 
whereas it was suggested in section 3.6 that regulatory institutions by definition possess a degree of 
“operational autonomy”. In the previous chapters we have tracked the evolution of the institution 
responsible for the enforcement of the EC competition rules, namely the Competition DG and seen 
how, in particular from the mid 1980s onwards, capital actors have taken a keen interest in EC 
merger control. Now, if one analysed the evolution of the EC merger subunit of regulation from a 
“traditional” neogramscian perspective one would expect the influence of capital actors (/class 
fractions) on the design of the rules to be of a direct and tangible nature, and hence the operational 
autonomy of competition authorities and governments to be rather confined. Indeed this was pretty 
much what I expected to find when I embarked on this PhD project some years ago. Yet the 
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analyses presented in the previous two chapters show that it is rather difficult (or at least not 
plausible) to uphold this perspective on EC merger control.  
 
On one hand the support from ERT and the UNICE members proved to be crucial in relation to the 
adoption of the 1989 MCR and capital actors more or less got the “one stop shop” they wanted. On 
the other hand, it seems clear that capital actors had no or very little impact on the concrete design 
of the MCR and that their intensive campaign to preserve the MD test in the process leading up to 
the revision of the MCR in 2003 failed completely. This suggests that the operational autonomy of 
the Competition DG is significant, as does the fact that neither capital actors nor governments have 
apparently managed to influence its decisions in merger cases. To describe the nature of the 
influence capital actors have had on the way the Competition DG is programmed to regulate 
mergers perhaps the distinction introduced in the theory chapter between USDRs and CIRs comes 
in handy. That is, we can say that whereas capital actors have had little or no say on the concrete 
design of the merger control rules (CIR) in 1989 and 2003, their support for the broader discourse 
on the basis of which mergers are regulated (USDR) is of vital importance. We can take this point 
further and suggest that as long as this USDR is hegemonic and the Commission acts on the basis of 
it, it is unlikely to come up against opposition from capital actors and member states that it will not 
be able to overcome.  
 
So how can we account for the fact that the Competition DG has become so powerful? Part of the 
explanation is that this, seen from the perspective of the majority of those member states that 
programmed it in the first place, is an unexpected and indeed unintended consequence. That is, they 
did not expect EC competition regulation to be a particularly salient area and hence gave the DG the 
sole responsibility (together with the Court) for the implementation of the rules with the adoption of 
Regulation 17 (see section 4.6). This allowed the DG to develop its powers incrementally over the 
years, not least through its partnership with the Court. Seen from this perspective, the powerfulness 
of the DG is almost an accident. Another part of the explanation relates to the agency of those 
positioned in the DG. In particular it will be recalled how the revitalisation of the EC competition 
unit of regulation in the 1980s was led by energetic, charismatic and ambitious Commissioners such 
as Sutherland and Brittan, who had a leadership style that differed greatly from that of their 
predecessors. However, the revitalisation was not reducible to their agency: it was conditioned by 
the broader neoliberal turn, the renewed momentum of the integration process and the 
transnationalisation of capitalism.  
266 
 
 
In Chapter 2 the philosophical foundations of the thesis (a version of critical realism) were 
explicated. It will perhaps be recalled that it was stated here that I, abstractly speaking, consider it to 
be the primary purpose of my social scientific practice to explore the structurally conditioned and 
ideationally mediated interplays between agents and the outcomes of such interplays (section 2.4). 
In this context a distinction was made between agential, ideational and material mechanisms and it 
was suggested that all three types of mechanisms are by definition involved in causing or blocking 
any given social events and phenomena. As it was made clear in section 2.5 these concepts were not 
used directly in the empirical analyses but were instead translated into theoretical concepts and 
ideas that were used in the analyses of the history of European level merger control. But the 
question remains whether it is fruitful to distinguish between these types of mechanisms. Based on 
the empirical analyses I believe the question can cautiously be answered in the affirmative. That is, 
in each of the previous four chapters important developments in the history of merger control were 
explained with reference to agential mechanisms (various types of programmers), ideational 
mechanisms (various ideas of regulation) and material mechanisms (such as the transnationalisation 
of capitalism and the increase in cross-border M&As). Consequently, I would argue that an account 
of the development in this area that fails to take into account all three kinds of mechanisms would 
be incomplete (see also section 8.3 below).   
  
This said, a reason for being somewhat sceptical is that the distinction may give the impression that 
the three types of mechanisms are more separable than is actually the case. Arguably the distinction 
is too rigid since one type of mechanism always presupposes the other two if it is to make a 
difference. So for instance a phenomenon such as competition confronts companies and societies as 
a pre-existing objective structure existing independently of how they choose to interpret it. As such 
competition is a material mechanism. But it only exists and makes a difference because it is 
reproduced or transformed through actions based on ideas. Likewise the empirical analyses show 
that a USDR only become significant if agents occupying important structural positions accept and 
advocate them (which is why the centre-left USDR was not reflected in the 1989 MCR let alone in 
the revised 2003 version). And agents are of course never acting in a structural or ideational 
vacuum. In other words, the different types of mechanisms form part of a whole and should not be 
analysed in isolation from each other. To be sure, there is no denial of this inseparability in this 
thesis, but I keep an open mind as to whether there are better ways to conceptualise mechanisms. 
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There are important themes that have been touched upon in the previous chapters which it has not 
been possible to give the kind of attention they deserve within the confines of this thesis. What I 
particularly have in mind here are the effects of the neoliberal type of competition and merger 
regulation on the broader society. That is, the analyses have focused much on the impact of the 
whole on the part but could have done much more to illuminate the impact of the part on the whole. 
Indeed, competition regulation is one element in a wider ensemble of regulation and it thus has 
effects that go far beyond its concrete objects of regulation, be they mergers, state aid, cartels, 
market dominance or liberalisation. There is much more at stake here than it might appear at prima 
facie: besides the obvious effects on price levels, there are effects on employment and the allocation 
of resources in society. Moreover, the Commission’s aggressive enforcement of neoliberal 
competition policies may resonate well with the UK’s model of capitalism, but threaten to 
undermine parts of the German and French models (see also Wigger & Nölke 2007). This is 
certainly a theme that ought to be central in future research on EC competition policy (see also 
section 8.4 below). 
 
The critical political economy perspective outlined in Chapter 3 has, in my view, been helpful in the 
analyses of the history of European level merger control. Its merits include that it conceptualises 
competition and mergers as capitalist phenomena and sees competition regulation as one unit in the 
wider ensemble of regulation that stabilises capitalism in a given social space; that it highlights the 
contingent and political nature of competition regulation; and that it operates with different types or 
levels of ideas, hereby linking broader discursive developments to developments in the competition 
policy area. This said, the perspective could certainly also be further refined, both through a 
“dialogue” with more or better data and through engagements with theoretical literatures that it has 
not been possible to draw inspiration from here (either because of time restraints or because the 
author is not yet familiar with them).  
 
One strand of theory which it could be particularly interesting and fruitful to engage with is that of 
Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) (see e.g. Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). 
For one thing, CDA is committed to a critical social science along the same lines as the theoretical 
perspective advocated in this thesis. That is, ‘CDA has emancipatory objectives, and is focussed 
upon the problems confronting what we can loosely refer to as the “losers” within particular forms 
of social life – the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or race relations, 
and so forth’ (Fairclough, 2001b: 125). Moreover, CDA is explicitly grounded in critical realism 
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(see e.g. Fairclough et al., 2004) and is thus directly ontologically compatible with the theory 
advocated here. The commitment to critical realism is inter alia reflected in the fact that CDA, 
unlike certain postmodernist forms of discourse analysis (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), does not 
reduce everything to discourse nor does it only concern itself with language or text. Rather, it is 
argued that social reality consists of both discursive and non-discursive elements, and discourses are 
seen as ‘diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned – differently 
positioned social actors “see” and represent social life in different ways, as different discourses’ 
(Fairclough, 2001a: 7). This means that one can only understand the significance of a particular 
discourse by seeing it in the context of the wider economic and political context of which it forms 
part – which is of course precisely what I have attempted to do in this thesis (see also Buch-Hansen 
& Nielsen, 2005: 87-88).  
 
However, elements from CDA could help to bring the analysis of the discursive dimension of 
European (competition) regulation forward. In the theory/analyses presented in this thesis 
“discourse”, in the form of GDRs and USDRs, has been used to denote sets of ideas about 
regulation. Although this has proved to be a fruitful way to conceptualise discourse, it could (and 
should) be emphasised that such discourses not only describe reality, or a part of it, and prescribe 
particular (regulatory) practices; they also serve to legitimise certain social structures and particular 
practices (in section 8.4 we will come back to how the neoliberal competition policy discourse is 
legitimised). And just as discourses can provide misleading descriptions of reality, so the practices 
they serve to legitimise can have effects that differ quite a bit from those postulated by the 
(proponents of a) discourse. The possible “gap” between discourse and reality in the field of EU 
competition policy is something it would be interesting to explore in greater detail (see also section 
8.3 below). Here CDA might come in handy as it ‘is concerned with the truth, truthfulness and 
appropriateness of texts, their production, and their interpretation. That is, it is concerned with the 
relationship between semiosis and the material and social world; persons and their intentions, 
beliefs, desires etc; and social relations’ (Fairclough et al., 2004: 32). 
 
CDA can also be used to make us more aware of how the hegemonic neoliberal discourse functions. 
Of particular interest here is the concept of “order of discourse”, which denotes ‘a social structuring 
of semiotic difference – a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of 
making meaning’ (Fairclough, 2001b: 124). In an order of discourse ‘some ways of making 
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meaning are dominant and mainstream…; others are marginal, or oppositional, or “alternative”’ 
(2001b: 124). So, as Fairclough (2001b: 129) explains:  
 
‘Global capitalism in its neoliberal form is pervasively constructed as external, 
unchangeable, and unquestionable – the simple “fact of life” which we must respond 
to. The social problem here is that feasible alternative ways of organizing 
international economic relations which might not have the detrimental effects of the 
current way (for instance, in increasing the gap between rich and poor within and 
between states) are excluded from the political agenda by these representations’  
 
Looking at the EC competition unit of regulation, it would be relevant to produce systematic textual 
analyses of the way the Commission and the other advocates of the neoliberal USDR have been and 
are constructing an order of discourse which marginalises alternative types of competition 
regulation – such as the type prevailing in the epoch of embedded liberalism.  
 
It would also be interesting and important to investigate how, in the process of “hegemonising” 
neoliberalism, elements associated with the previous discourse are incorporated into the neoliberal 
USDR where they are gradually given a different meaning. What I have in mind here is the concept 
of “public interest”. In the era of embedded liberalism, a competition unit of regulation based on 
public interest criteria was one that took into account a broad range of objectives, such as 
employment, consumer protection and industrial policy goals. Although this is still how the concept 
is widely understood, one can also witness how representatives from the Commission now use this 
“signifier” to refer to a different, or at least more delimited, “referent”. For instance, former 
Competition Commissioner Monti gave a speech at the 2000 UNICE Conference on Competition 
Policy Reform, where he noted that ‘[u]nlike competition authorities, who act in the public interest, 
the central function of courts is to safeguard the rights of private individuals’ (Monti, 2000). 
Unremarkable as this observation might seem, it is still worth noticing that, noted in passing in an 
interposed sentence, it is apparently suggested that competition authorities by definition act in the 
public interest – even if they (like the Commission) have adopted a “competition only” approach.  
More recently, Director General of the Competition DG, Philip Lowe gave a speech where he noted 
that ‘[a]s we all know, competition is not an end in itself, but an instrument for achieving public 
interest objectives, notably consumer welfare’ (Lowe, 2006: 2). Here public interest objectives are 
more or less reduced to consumer welfare – at least no other objectives are mentioned. And as it 
happens, consumer welfare is, in the neoliberal view, brought about by ensuring competition in the 
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market, and is therefore not something that requires the Commission to deviate from its current path 
in the slightest.  
 
 
8.3. Theorising the evolution of EC competition policy: the existing literature 
 
The reason why it was considered necessary to construct the critical political economy perspective 
on regulation outlined in  Chapter 3 was that the existing attempts by political scientists to theorise 
the history of European level merger control (and competition regulation more generally) suffer 
from some important shortcomings102. This is not to say that other theories are without merits (they 
are certainly not!); only that they, in my view, are missing out on significant aspects in their 
explanations of developments in the competition regulation area103. In this section we will review 
the theoretical perspectives that have been applied to analyses of the history of EC merger 
competition policy (or parts of it), dealing in turn with intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, principal-agent theory and the varieties of capitalism perspective. 
Arguably it is a bit unconventional to discuss the theories applied in the existing literature this late 
in a thesis. But my reason for doing so is to be able to do it on the basis of (some of) the knowledge 
presented in the previous four chapters.  
 
Schwartz (1993) approaches the area from a traditional intergovernmentalist perspective, arguing 
that ‘the evolution of Community merger control supports the thesis that the Community’s member 
states, rather than the Community’s institutions, remain the ultimate charters of the Community’s 
future. Interstate bargaining driven by national interest [...] continues to characterise the 
Community’s development’ (1993: 610). Although Schwartz is correct to emphasise the important 
role played by member states (in effect Germany, France and the UK) at certain junctures in the 
development of EC merger control, it is quite misleading to suggest that the evolution of this policy-
area can be adequately explained in terms of interstate bargaining. For one thing this is to seriously 
underestimate the well-documented importance of supranational institutions in this area, not least in 
the long periods between bargains between member states. Moreover, it is probably due to the 
intergovernmentalist perspective that Schwartz overlooks (or has nothing to say about) the crucial 
involvement of transnational capital actors such as the ERT and UNICE. This perspective is also 
blind to the fact that the content and form of the MCR was strongly shaped by neoliberal ideas and 
that this was due to the broader discursive shift which was taking place from the mid 1980s 
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onwards. Finally it should also be mentioned that Schwartz makes an overly pessimistic assessment 
of the MCR, suggesting that ‘the efforts to draft a unified system to control European mergers 
ended poorly’ (1993: 661) because the final text ‘failed to resolve key disputes which had plagued 
the decades of negotiations, such as the demarcation of Community and national jurisdiction, the 
criteria for evaluating mergers, and the procedures the Commission was to follow in undertaking 
evaluation’ (1993: 609). As we saw in section 6.7 these issues were in fact by and large resolved 
with the MCR, which would indeed hardly have been adopted had this not been the case. It is 
tempting to speculate as to whether Schwartz’s failure to acknowledge this is related to the 
intergovernmentalist perspective and its focus on conflicting national interests. 
 
Büthe (2007; see also Büthe & Swank, 2006) and McGowan (2007a) both suggest that 
neofunctionalism constitutes a convincing theoretical perspective which can be used to explain the 
broader developments in the EC competition policy area. As Büthe explains, this perspective 
emphasizes the importance of “subnational actors”, in particular business groups, and 
“supranational actors”, such as the Commission, and expect them to ‘act in concert’ in order to 
realise common goals. In particular subnational actors are expected to ‘push for a shift of authority 
from the national to the supranational level if such a shift allows them to achieve their goals more 
efficiently’ (2007: 180, emphasis removed). Clearly neofunctionalists are correct to identify 
business groups as important actors, also in the context of EC competition policy where, as 
McGowan (2007a: 11) correctly points out, the 1989 MCR was only adopted due to pressure from 
groups such as the ERT and UNICE104. However, it is also a problematic perspective in certain 
respects.  
 
First, why was the Competition DG given far-reaching powers with the EC Treaty and Regulation 
17? Not because of pressure from subnational actors – to the contrary most business groups would 
certainly have opposed it, had they considered competition policy an important area. Second, why 
did a shift in the attitude of (some) subnational actors actually take place in the 1980s? It would 
seem that neofunctionalism lacks an answer, which is related to the fact that it has little or nothing 
to say about the nature of the various objects of regulation. That is, it lacks a theory of capitalism, 
let alone of phenomena such as mergers and competition. These phenomena merely have the status 
of exogenous variables that only become significant though the “always already formed” 
preferences of subnational actors. That such actors have themselves undergone a major 
transformation which is related to the broader transformation of capitalism is thus also something 
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neofunctionalism neglects. Third and related to this, neofunctionalism lacks a notion of what has 
been referred to as “discourses of regulation” in this thesis. McGowan is clearly aware of the 
importance of such discourses, noting that the Competition DG ‘came of age in the 1980s on the 
back of a neo-liberal agenda to secure greater European competitiveness’ (2007a: 9). This would 
seem to suggest the need for a theoretical perspective that takes competing ideas or discourses into 
account. At the end of the day, there are thus good reasons to dispute Büthe’s claim that 
neofunctionalism is ‘most promising as a theory of institutional change in the EU’ and ‘yields … a 
superior explanation of the politics of competition in the EU over the last fifty years’ (2007: 193). 
 
Bulmer (1994; see also Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998) analyses the evolution of merger control from 
a historical/sociological institutionalist perspective á la March & Olsen (1989) and argues that ‘the 
major changes reflected how the EC institutions have mediated various pressures at critical stages in 
the integration process’ (Bulmer, 1994: 426). Although Bulmer provides one of the most well-
researched and convincing accounts of the processes leading up to the adoption of the 1989 MCR, it 
would seem that the chosen theoretical perspective can only be used to throw light on the 
institutional dimension  rather than on the “various pressures” (discussions of the latter only appear 
in the empirical analyses). As such, competing ideas/discourses, mergers, competition, political 
struggles and the nature of capitalism are all phenomena that this theoretical perspective says 
nothing about. And indeed, it offers no guidelines that can be used to explain how institutions 
mediate “various pressures”. Accordingly, as Bulmer concedes with admirable honesty, it ‘cannot 
offer a comprehensive explanation of why the MCR could be agreed in 1989, and not sixteen years 
earlier’ (1994: 442). That is not to say that this theoretical perspective is without merits: to the 
contrary, it serves to highlight the importance of supranational institutions, governance structures 
and norms of governance (see Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998: 107). 
 
In an in many respects brilliant analysis of the 2003-2004 “modernisation reforms” of EC 
competition, Wilks (2005b) makes use of insights from both principal-agent theory and 
sociological institutionalist theory105. Seen through the prism of the former theory, the Competition 
DG can be conceptualised as an agent to whom a number of principals, namely member states or 
NCAs, have delegated power, for instance with a view to enhance the efficiency of rule 
enforcement (2005b: 436). Wilks suggests that the modernisation with its so-called 
“decentralisation” of power to NCAs (see section 7.4) can be interpreted in two ways from this 
perspective. From one reading, it can be interpreted ‘as a renegotiation of delegated powers in 
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which the principals have chosen to take back a greater degree of authority’ (2005b: 337). However, 
Wilks finds more evidence in support of a second reading. According to this the modernisation was 
‘an imperialist move by the Commission to centralize competition enforcement and to consolidate 
its control over an increasingly assertive group of NCAs’ (2005b: 446). Although Wilks refers to 
the principal-agent theory as a ‘powerful framework’ that ‘offers compelling insights’ (2005b: 433), 
it is not quite clear that the theory as such contributes that much to his empirical analyses (which, 
on the contrary, do offer “compelling insights”). It can be used to turn attention to the division of 
labour between the Competition DG and the NCAs/member states, but does not really contribute to 
the explanation of why the latter accepted the Competition DG’s ‘extraordinary coup’, as Wilks 
calls it (2005b: 437). In fact, this theory says nothing whatsoever about the context in which the 
institutions in question are located, nor does it say anything about the ideological dimension of 
competition regulation. 
 
This latter problem is recognised by Wilks, who concedes that principal-agent theory ‘conceals the 
political goals behind the delegation’ (2005b: 437). This is the reason why he brings in the 
sociological institutionalist perspective, which ‘suggests relocating the decision to delegate in a 
wider political context’ and which is ‘critical of the supposedly apolitical nostrum of … competition 
agency independence’ (2005b: 437). Although Wilks should be commended for suggesting a more 
contextualising and critical perspective, he fails to show that sociological institutionalism helps him 
to do so. This is not terribly surprising as this perspective, just like the principal-agent theory, has 
little to say about the context in which institutions are located (at least the part of the context which 
does not consist of other institutions) and as it is not exactly known for its ability to serve as the 
basis for critical social science. To sum up, Wilks fails to demonstrate that the combination of 
principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism provides a sufficient theoretical framework.  
 
Wigger & Nölke (2007) provide an innovative and insightful analysis of the 2003-2004 EC 
competition policy reforms from a “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) perspective. A main strength of 
this contribution is that it constitutes an attempt to link competition policy to wider models of 
capitalism, arguing that the reform ‘can be understood as a substantial shift from the Rhenish to the 
Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism’ (2007: 505). Another merit of this contribution is that it 
supplements this more structural perspective with an actor-oriented account, identifying some of the 
various groups that have pushed for this shift (2007: 489). Although Wigger & Nölke’s article is an 
exciting contribution to the literature in this field, and constitutes perhaps the first attempt to 
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investigate the broader effects of the developments in the EC competition policy area, their 
theoretical perspective can be criticized in certain respects. For one thing, the VoC perspective is 
too simplistic in its distinction between only two forms of capitalism, as if all of continental Europe 
had just one and the same model of (coordinated) capitalism (a tendency that can also be witnessed 
in Hall & Soskice 2001). As we have seen in this thesis, both the models of capitalism and the 
competition policies that developed in Germany and France after the war were different in 
important respects. In other respects they had much in common – also with the competition policies 
of the “Anglo-Saxon” UK. As such, variety is one important thing the VoC perspective lacks.  
 
Moreover, and related to this, this theoretical perspective can be criticized for being too static. That 
is, not only does its focus on institutional diversity within the two types of capitalism mean that it 
deals inadequately with the profound transformation of capitalism that has taken place over time; it 
is also much more convincing as a perspective on institutional continuity within “a variety of 
capitalism” than on fundamental institutional changes106. This is problematic as it means that the 
varieties of capitalism approach ends up as an insufficient appendage to Wigger & Nölke’s account 
of the significant transformation of EC competition policy that has taken place over time. Finally, it 
could also be pointed out that the VoC perspective offers little in terms of a discussion of concepts 
that are important to any account of developments in the EC competition field. That is, concepts 
such as competition, competition policy, mergers and merger control. In sum, Wigger & Nölke 
deserve much credit for moving the discussion of EC competition policy in a new and interesting 
direction, but could be criticized for not aligning themselves with a better “theoretical partner” than 
the US centric VoC approach107. 
 
 
8.4. Competition and competition policy: an alternative agenda 
 
‘[W]hat has become of the freedom presented to us sixty years ago? Is it now no 
more than a stock market profit? Our highest constitutional value no longer protects 
civil rights as a priority, and has rather been wasted at cut prices, so that it now only 
serves the so-called free-market economy in line with the neoliberal Zeitgeist. Yet 
this concept, which has become a fetish, barely conceals the asocial conduct of the 
banks, industrial associations and market speculators. We all are witnesses to the fact 
that production is being destroyed worldwide, that so-called hostile and friendly 
takeovers are destroying thousands of jobs, that the mere announcement of 
rationalisation measures, such as the dismissal of workers and employees, makes 
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share prices rise, and this is regarded unthinkingly as the price to be paid for “living 
in freedom”’ (Günter Grass, 2005). 
 
As we saw in the previous section, political scientists have analysed competition policy in Europe 
from a number of different theoretical perspectives. The resulting contributions have certainly done 
much to illuminate various aspects of the competition policy area and consequently neither the 
theoretical perspective nor the empirical analyses presented in this thesis have been designed to be 
diametrically opposed to such work. This said, I do see my work as forming part of an emerging 
alternative research agenda that seeks to break with a number of tendencies in the prevailing 
discourse on EC competition policy108. What distinguishes this agenda is that: (1) it tells a story not 
only of continuity but also of deep transformations; (2) it seeks to analyse the evolution of EC 
competition policy in the light of developments in the broader ideational and material context; and 
(3) it highlights the profoundly political nature of competition policy and takes a more balanced 
perspective on the nature of competition109.  
 
Whereas it should already be clear what the first two mentioned features entail, the latter has yet to 
be unfolded. In section 3.1 a distinction was made between conservative and critical theoretical 
perspectives in the field of EUS. While the former takes the desirability of the current social order 
(and thus its ensemble of regulation) for granted, the latter asks how it (or a part of it) came into 
being and considers its negative effects. The literature on competition policy is exemplary in this 
respect: here it is almost never questioned whether competition is actually only a wonderful thing 
that always has the postulated positive effects. This is, of course, the case in the works of 
mainstream economists. Typical of the prevailing view in this literature is the suggestion by 
Eekhoft & Moch (2004: 1) that ‘competition benefits almost everyone’ and is ‘the permanent 
driving force behind individuals, as it rewards successful activities and penalises laziness and 
failure’. But it is also a view one can find reproduced in the political science literature dealing with 
this topic, as when Tim Büthe opens a chapter on competition policy in the EU with the following 
statement: ‘Competition causes suppliers of goods and services to lower prices, raise quality, and 
innovate. It is crucial for maximizing social welfare in a market economy’ (Büthe, 2007: 175).  
 
Likewise, competition policy is often conceptualised in a strangely “neutral” way – as something 
that merely aims, in various ways, at protecting competition but which does not really have any 
negative effects at the societal level. For instance, Motta (2004: 30) defines competition policy as ‘a 
set of policies and laws ensuring that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way 
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as to reduce economic welfare’.  This certainly resonates very well with the prevailing neoliberal 
discourse which, as we have seen, entails a completely one-dimensional perspective on competition 
and competition policy: the former is great and the latter should only serve to preserve/bring about 
the former. By elevating this political view to an unquestioned premise, much research on 
competition/competition policy ends up being inherently conservative, hereby serving to reproduce 
or even reinforce the hegemonic ideas of regulation.  
 
So what does a more critical perspective involve? First of all it is clear that it can entail different 
things and in this context one should not confuse the critical perspective advocated here with what 
could perhaps be described as ultra-liberal perspectives. Ultra-liberalists agree with neoliberalists 
that competition is a blessing. But they refuse to acknowledge that the invisible hand of the market 
cannot do the job of safeguarding competition and insist that competition policies by definition have 
some highly undesirable effects. This is, for instance, the view of the most well-known exponent of 
the so-called Chicago School in economics, Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman:  
 
‘My own views about the antitrust laws have changed greatly over time. When I 
started in this business, as a believer in competition, I was a great supporter of 
antitrust laws; I thought enforcing them was one of the few desirable things that the 
government could do to promote more competition. But as I watched what actually 
happened, I saw that, instead of promoting competition, antitrust laws tended to do 
exactly the opposite, because they tended, like so many government activities, to be 
taken over by the people they were supposed to regulate and control. And so over 
time I have gradually come to the conclusion that antitrust laws do far more harm 
than good and that we would be better off if we didn’t have them at all, if we could 
get rid of them. But we do have them’ (Friedman, 1999) 
 
At times, EC competition policy has also been criticised from this “competition good, competition 
policy bad” perspective. Here the (ultra-)liberal think tank called Centre for the New Europe has 
been at the forefront, for instance arguing in its 2004 report From Antitrust to Disaster: An 
Overview of European Union Competition Policy that ‘[b]ecause of the competition policy actually 
adopted by the European Union, around 780,000 may presently be unemployed who would 
otherwise have jobs’ (Gabb et al., 2004: 4). Although the authors of the report later acknowledge 
that this figure is “questionable” (2004: 22), they are convinced that EC competition policy does not 
only drive away business from Europe; it also deters those remaining from investing in research and 
development (2004: 16-19). But then of course competition policy is not the only problem – indeed, 
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any ‘[a]ttempts to regulate enterprise by government officials must be counterproductive to the 
progress of humanity’ (2004: 20).  
 
Unlike this ultra-liberal perspective, the perspective advocated here seeks to adopt a more balanced 
understanding of the phenomenon of competition and is not against competition regulation per se. 
Let us begin with competition. On one hand, it is undeniable that some degree of competition is a 
good thing in a market: certainly it provides companies with an incentive to keep down prices and 
innovate and as such it can and often does have some positive effects. On the other hand, many 
politicians and academics would do well to not only see the phenomenon of competition through 
rose-coloured spectacles. There is also a dark side to competition which is completely neglected in 
the neoliberal discourse. For one thing it is obvious that the owners of uncompetitive companies 
often pay a high price if the latter are exposed to strong competition, as do the people employed in 
such companies (ultimately, in the form of unemployment) and possibly also the communities  in 
which such companies are located. Indeed, in the global economy there is no guarantee whatsoever 
that competition always has positive effects at the societal level in a given society. As mentioned in 
Section 3.2 companies may react to competition by engaging in M&As. These do not necessarily 
have negative employment effects, but often they do. This is not surprising when it is taken into 
consideration that M&As are often ‘motivated by the desire to exploit synergies between the 
operations of the acquirer and the target with a view to reducing costs and improving efficiency’ 
(Chapman, 2003: 325). Hence, there are numerous examples of mergers that have resulted in job 
losses. For instance, it appears from a 2001 report from the International Labour Organisation that 
‘almost 130,000 net jobs were eliminated as a result of M&As in the European financial services 
during the 1990s’ (ILO 2001: 64). Notwithstanding this, only very limited systematic research into 
the effects of mergers on employment, exist. This may in part be due to methodological problems 
related to counter-factual analyses, where one tries ‘to assess what would have happened to 
employment levels in the acquired firm if it had remained an independent enterprise’ (Chapman 
2003: 326). Yet one may also suspect that, had this not been considered an irrelevant question seen 
from the perspective of the prevailing neoliberal discourse, more resources would have been 
invested in research that could provide well-founded answers. 
 
It is also absolutely crucial to keep in mind that competition is not just something that involves 
companies: in the era of neoliberal globalisation regions, states and cities compete against each 
other with a view to attract business investments, just like universities, hospitals and other public 
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and semi-public institutions have been subjected to the logic of competition. This is of course 
wonderful, if one sees the world through the prism of neoliberalism: here strong competition in all 
corners of society is seen as a precondition for competitiveness. However, as the so-called Group of 
Lisbon pointed out in their 1995 book Limits to Competition, it is also problematic in several 
respects. First, the desire to win the war of competition may involve ‘sacrificing the interests of the 
most vulnerable people’ in European societies (Group of Lisbon, 1995: 97). This will ultimately be 
the result if such societies are further reformed in a direction where values such as tolerance and 
solidarity are eclipsed by neoliberal values such as egoism and self-sufficiency. Whereas such 
societies are generally considered desirable by the owners and managers of transnational capital, 
they may contribute to worsen the lives of the vast majority of citizens. Second, the idea that 
everyone can be more competitive is absurd: not everyone can be the best student in class. The 
proponents of the competitiveness discourse forget to mention that it ‘contributes to the 
development of social exclusion: the noncompetitive people, firms, cities, and nations are left 
behind. They are no longer the subject of history’ (1995: 98). Third, the neoliberal competitiveness 
discourse is problematic because it is misleading: 
 
‘It sees only one dimension of human and social history, that is, the spirit of 
competition. The spirit of competition and aggression is a powerful engine for 
action, motivation, and innovation. It does not, however, act in isolation nor is it 
disconnected from other engines such as the spirit of cooperation and solidarity. 
Cooperation is also a fundamental phenomenon in human history, produced and 
determined by society. … The ideology of competitiveness either ignores or 
devalues cooperation, or it instrumentalizes it to its own logic…’ (Group of Lisbon, 
1995: 98) 
 
For these and other reasons it is plausible to break with the one-dimensional perspective on 
competition and instead recognise that it is a phenomenon that has both pros and cons. This, to be 
sure, is not a particularly new or original discovery: indeed, it is probably correct to say that this 
was the prevailing view in the era of “embedded liberalism” and it remains the view of those who 
subscribe to centre-left, national-mercantilist and Euro-mercantilist ideas of regulation (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).  
 
The “alternative agenda” also entails a perspective on competition policy that seeks to highlight the 
latter’s political nature. Hence, rather than putting forward a narrow definition of competition 
policy, it was suggested in section 3.4 that it can in principle serve a number of different objectives 
in a given social space, an important one of which is to remedy some of capitalism’s inbuilt 
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contradictions. Indeed, as mentioned in section 8.2 over time the content and form of European 
competition policy has been transformed profoundly. That is, whereas it used to be a unit of 
regulation that sought to facilitate Fordist growth while taking into account the full employment 
commitment underlying the KNWS it is now based on a neoliberal “competition only” USDR 
which favours Europe’s competitive companies; and whereas political (democratically accountable) 
decision-makers used to be involved in the management of many of Europe’s competition policies, 
the latter are now managed by authorities that are independent from the political system (and thus 
not particularly democratically accountable themselves). 
 
Taking into consideration the important impact EC competition policy has on the various member 
states and their citizens, it is not surprising that this unit of regulation has to be legitimised 
somehow. This is where “the consumer” enters the picture: time and again it is repeated in speeches 
and documents from the Competition DG that the main purpose of the whole thing is to protect the 
interest of the European consumers. So for instance, in the foreword to the Commission’s pamphlet 
on EU competition policy and the consumer, Director-General Philip Lowe, explains that the 
promotion of competition is important because ‘[i]t helps to lower prices and increase choice for 
European consumers’ (Commission, 2004). In a similar vein Jonathan Todd, the Commission’s 
competition spokesperson, is quoted on the Competition DG’s webpage saying that ‘Competition 
Policy is basically applying rules to make sure that companies compete with each other and, in 
order to sell their products, innovate and offer good prices to consumers’110.  
 
For one thing it is quite symptomatic of the neoliberal discourse that it is the citizens in their 
capacity as consumers that competition policies are said to protect. There is of course no 
mentioning of the fact that such consumers are not just consumers. That is, often the same 
“consumers” will be employees in companies where they are permanently forced to do wonders if 
they want to keep their job. However, when they get home from work late in the day or when they 
lose their job because their employer engages in a merger (or simply goes under in the war of 
competition), they can take delight in the fact that their mobile phone bill will, on average, be 
somewhat smaller than it would have been had not the Commission ‘opened the 
telecommunications sector completely to competition on 1 January 1998’ (Commission, 2004: 13). 
Moreover, it will be cheaper for them to use air transport due to the liberalisation of this sector, 
whereas ‘prices have remained unchanged or have even increased’ (!) in the other markets that have 
been liberalised, including ‘electricity, gas, rail transport and postal services’ (Commission, 2004: 
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13; see also Hvelplund & Meyer, 2007). Whether a majority of the European citizens are actually in 
favour of exposing previously state-owned companies to market forces is of course besides the 
point here: they were never asked for their opinion. 
 
This brings us neatly to the next point, namely that the neoliberal type of competition policy in 
Europe does not primarily serve to safeguard the consumers: above all, it serves to further the 
interests of Europe’s large, competitive companies. Carchedi (2001: 126) puts it well:  
 
‘In reality … the aim of antitrust legislation has very little to do with consumers. The 
protection of the interest of consumers (if this is the case) is a by-product (in spite of 
claims to the contrary) rather than being the primary purpose of this legislation. The 
protection of the interest of the tiny majority of the powerful is smuggled into the 
collective consciousness as being the protection of the overwhelming majority of the 
society’ 
 
This is particularly clear in the area which we have paid particular attention to in this thesis, namely 
the regulation of mergers. As it will be recalled from section 7.6 only 20 out of the 3668 M&As that 
were notified to the Competition DG from 1990 to the end of 2007, were prohibited. This confirms 
what the Commission has also openly acknowledged: namely that the main purpose of this subunit 
of regulation is not to prevent cross-border mergers but to facilitate them. It is thus not surprising 
that TNCs, such as those represented in the ERT, are among the strongest supporters of EC 
competition policy. This brings us to a paradox at the heart of the neoliberal type of competition 
regulation. On one hand the Commission and the TNCs praise the virtues of competition. On the 
other hand the Commission is extremely reluctant to prevent massive concentrations of capital from 
taking place. And a number of ERT-companies have themselves taken part in illegal cartels, hereby 
in effect contributing to undermine competition. Indeed, of the ten largest fines that the Commission 
has ever imposed on companies involved in cartels (as of November 2007), eight involved TNCs 
that were or had been members of the ERT (see section 7.3)! Against this background one could be 
excused for wondering whether certain proponents of the neoliberal “competition only” discourse 
really do believe in strong competition – or if their main concerns are to ensure that weaker 
competitors are exposed to competition and that social and industrial policy considerations are 
eschewed from the regulatory practices. 
 
Now, it is a well-established fact that the EU system suffers from a massive democratic deficit (see 
e.g. Andersen & Burns, 1996). From the outset the EC was an elite-driven project and the political 
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leaders of the member states know all too well that large segments of Europe’s citizens are anything 
but pleased with the current type of EU governance. Indeed, this is one important reason why most 
populations in Europe have not been asked for their opinion when new treaties were adopted – and 
why majorities of those populations that were asked often rejected the steps towards further 
integration (of the neoliberal sort) they were meant to approve of. In 2005, the Constitutional Treaty 
was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands to the chagrin of the political and economic 
elites. Commenting on the outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, Slovenian 
philosopher Slavoj Žižek made the following observation: 
 
‘When commentators described the no as a message of befuddled fear, they were 
wrong. The real fear we are dealing with is the fear that the no itself provoked within 
the new European political elite. It was the fear that people would no longer be so 
easily convinced by their “post-political” vision.’ (Žižek, 2005) 
 
For this very reason, the same political elite has decided not to ask the European citizens for their 
approval of the Constitutional Treaty’s successor, the so-called Reform Treaty – despite the fact 
that the two are by and large identical111. Only in Ireland did a referendum take place in 2008, the 
outcome of which was a clear rejection of the Reform Treaty. 
 
The research agenda suggested here does not involve being critical of competition policy per se. 
Indeed, competition policies are considered necessary elements in the broader ensemble of 
regulation in a capitalist social space. But the existing EC competition unit of regulation is very 
much part and parcel of the democratic deficit in the wider ensemble of which it forms part. Indeed, 
Europe’s populations have no chance whatsoever to influence developments in this field through 
conventional democratic channels – and as such they can only await the next steps in the 
Commission’s seemingly never-ending quest to further neoliberalise the European societies. One 
does not have to be a radical socialist (as is the author of this thesis indeed not) to think that the 
current type of neoliberal regulation, both in the competition field and elsewhere, is a disgrace to 
Europe and the principles of democracy that, paradoxically, Europe’s political leaders and 
representatives of the various EU institutions never waste an opportunity to praise. Academics and 
other citizens who are unhappy with this state of affairs have an obligation to make their voice 
heard and to call for a different type of EC competition regulation, namely one that is based on a 
democratic mandate and which serves the interests of the large majority of the Europeans (and not 
only in their capacity as consumers) rather than merely the large competitive companies. It is hoped 
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that the current thesis has contributed to illuminate the nature of the neoliberal type of merger and 
competition regulation in Europe and that it can hereby serve to provide some of the intellectual 
ammunition needed to challenge the hegemonic discourse in this field. 
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10. Appendixes 
Appendix I: Abbreviations and Acronyms 
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 FDP Free Democratic Party (G) 
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (G) 
 GDR General discourses of regulation 
BKartA Bundeskartellamt (G)  GWB Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
(G) 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy (EU)  IoD Institute of Directors (UK) 
CBI Confederation of British Industry  ICC  International Chamber of Commerce 
CC Competition Commission (UK)  ICN  International Competition Network 
CDU Christian-Democratic Union (G)  KNWS Keynesian National Welfare State 
CEFIC European Council of Chemical 
Industry Federation 
 M&As Mergers and acquisitions 
CFI Court of First Instance (EU)  MCR  Merger Control Regulation (EU) 
CIR Concrete ideas of regulation  MD test “Market dominance” test 
 
CNPF 
Conseil National du Patronat 
Français (FR) 
 MMC Monopolies and Mergers Commission (UK) 
CSU Christian-Social Union (G)  MTF Merger Task Force (EU) 
DG Directorate General (EU)  NCA National Competition Authority 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
(UK) 
 OFT Office of Fair Trading (UK) 
EC European Community  RCT 
SEA  
Rational Choice Theory 
Single European Act 
ECN European Competition Network  SEM Single European Market 
ECSC European Coal and Steel 
Community 
 SLC test “Significant Lessening of Competition” test 
EESC European Economic and Social 
Committee 
 SPD  Social Democratic Party (G) 
EMU The Economic and Monetary Union  TABD  TransAtlantic Business Dialogue 
ERT European Roundtable of 
Industrialists 
 TNC  Transnational corporation 
ETUC European Trade Union 
Confederation  
 TUC Trade Union Congress (UK) 
EU European Union  UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe 
FDI Foreign direct investment  USDR Unit-specific discourses of regulation 
 
  WTO World Trade Organisation 
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1
 Strictly speaking it would be more correct to refer to this treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rome, as the 
EEC Treaty. With the so-called Merger Treaty in 1967 the institutions of the ECSC, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and the EEC were merged after which it became normal practice to refer to the “merged entity” 
as the “EC”. In the present context, there is little point in retaining a distinction between the EEC and EC and 
henceforth only the latter designation is therefore used. 
2
 There are, however, examples of legal scholars who apply a “law in context” perspective on EC competition law. See 
Gerber (1998) and Monti (2007). 
3
 In section 8.3 the theoretical perspectives applied to EC competition policy by political scientists are discussed in 
greater detail. 
4
 In order to ensure the anonymity of some of the interviewees it will not appear from quotes whether they have been 
translated or not. 
5
 I use the terms “philosophy” and “philosophy of science” interchangeably in this thesis.  
6
 It is well known that the term “paradigm” is associated with Thomas S. Kuhn’s position in the philosophy of science – 
a position outlined in his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996). However, as Kuhn used the term in a 
rather erratic manner in this book (see Masterman, 1970) it was less than clear exactly what a paradigm is. In order to 
avoid this type of confusion we can say that two theories or approaches belong to the same paradigm if they share a 
number of ontological assumptions, are based on a shared general conception of how (social) science is carried out and 
what the purpose of theory is, use the same sort of language and in addition to this deal with similar questions. 
7
 The formulations used in this paragraph are similar to those of Buch-Hansen & Nielsen (2005: 11), some of which I 
may not have been the originator of. 
8
 It is perhaps worth noting that some EU scholars use the concept of “social ontology” in a manner that differs from the 
way it is used here. According to Christiansen et al. (2001: 3) social ontology includes ‘intersubjective meanings, 
norms, rules, institutions, routinized practices, discourse, constitutive and/or deliberative processes, symbolic politics, 
imagined and/or epistemic communities, communicative action, collective identity formation, and cultures of national 
security’. Apparently, this list is not even exhaustive as Christiansen et al. (somewhat confusingly) also include “human 
consciousness and ideational factors” (2001: 3) and later “identity, community and collective intentionality” (2001: 6) 
in their concept of social ontology. In any case, the problem with this is that “social ontology” is here used to refer to a 
number of social phenomena in the real world, rather than to conceptualisations of such phenomena.  
9
 Likewise, Dessler states that ‘the richer and more comprehensive the underlying ontology, the better the theory’ 
(1989: 446). To be sure, not all scholars agree that ontologies should be as “rich” as possible. Hollis & Smith have thus 
argued that ontologies should be as simple as possible. However, this has to be understood in relation to their – in my 
view rather absurd – argument that we can only choose between “understanding” (a hermeneutic approach to social 
science) and “explaining” (a positivist approach) and that elements from the two can never be consistently combined 
(see Hollis & Smith, 1990).  
10
 Here I am not going to explain how this synthesis was possible. For a detailed explanation cf. Ole Wæver’s (1996: 
161-164; 1997: 15-19) brilliant account for what he calls the “neo-neo synthesis” in IR theory. 
11
 The term neo-positivism is used here because not all rationalists happily accept to be called positivists (see e.g. 
Schneider & Aspinwall, 2001: 181-182) and because positivism is an anything but unambiguous label (for instance, 
Halfpenny (1982) identifies no less than 12 varieties of positivism). Accordingly, it is necessary to emphasise that what 
we are dealing with here is a rather moderate version of positivism that has little in common with, for instance, the type 
of (logical) positivism associated with the Vienna Circle. See e.g. Benton (1977) or Manicas (1987) for excellent 
discussions of the different types of positivism. 
12
 Or, as two rationalist scholars put it, ‘[r]uthless egoism does the trick by itself’ (Burley & Mattli, 1993: 54). 
13
 To be fair, it should be mentioned that it can be debated whether neofunctionalism should be counted as a rationalist 
theory. A number of scholars – including Ernst Haas, the “father” of neofunctionalism (see Haas, 1958) – claim that 
neofunctionalism (NF) is compatible with a moderate constructivist position (cf. Haas, 2001; Ruggie, 1998: 11; Wendt, 
1999: 3), whereas others suggest that it is ‘firmly established within the rationalist camp’ (Jachtenfuchs, 2002: 652). I 
would consider neofunctionalists to belong to the rationalist camp as they accept ‘soft rational choice ontology which 
puts them closer to utilitarianism than most constructivists consider acceptable’ (Haas, 2001: 22). In his 2001 piece on 
constructivism and NF, the late Haas briefly reflected on the agency-structure problem and claimed that ‘my NF has no 
concern with structures at all’ (2001: 29). As I have argued at some length elsewhere (Buch-Hansen, 2003) Haas hereby 
radically misrepresented at least the early version of NF. The following quote from the “early” Haas, in which he 
describes his own NF, will suffice to drive home this point: ‘the superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over 
crucial political choices is assumed as permanent; the determinism implicit in the picture of European social and 
economic structure is almost absolute. Given all these conditions ... the progression from a politically inspired common 
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market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states, is automatic. The inherent logic of the 
functional process, in a setting such as Western Europe, can push no other way’ (Haas, 1967: 327, emphasis added).  
14
 Morse makes a similar point when she writes that ‘The economist’s view of the person, as it now stands, is that the 
person is a pure stimulus-response machine. The preferences are given; the relative prices are given. The person is 
completely reactive. We might say that the person’s behaviour is perfectly predetermined, or predestined, once the 
utility function has been formed. There presently is no scope within economics for the genuinely creative act, for the 
uniquely personal contribution’ (1997: 182). 
15
 Smith (1997) describes reflectivism as a position that also covers feminist theory, normative theory, critical theory 
and historical sociology. What matters in the present context is the epistemological disagreements between 
positivists/rationalists and postmodernists/poststructuralists. 
16
 It is probably correct to say that in EU studies constructivism represents an “imaginary middle position” between 
rationalism and reflectivism– because fact it that reflectivism has never really been an influential position in this field. 
To my knowledge, only a very limited number of studies of European integration based on reflectivism has been 
produced. The discourse analyses of Diez, (2001a; 2001b), Larsen (1997) and Wæver (2000) could be candidates – but 
whether they are actually grounded in genuinely reflectivist epistemologies is an open question. More obvious 
candidates are Smith (2000; 2001) and I.Ward (1995). 
17
 Examples of studies of European integration that explicitly draws on March & Olsen are Armstrong & Bulmer 
(1998), Bulmer (1994), From (2002), Sweet & Sandholtz (1997) and Wind (1997; 2001). In addition to this, it would 
seem that a number of constructivists subscribe to positions that are more or less compatible with sociological 
institutionalism. See also Wiener (2005) for a good discussion of constructivism and sociological institutionalism in 
EUS. 
18
 In addition to the kind of constructivist agency-structure approaches discussed here, some constructivists in IR have 
advanced an agent-centred approach that ‘tends to take transnational actors as autonomous entities rather than as 
embedded in, and indeed constituted by, transnational structures’ (Van Apeldoorn, 2004: 148, emphasis removed). 
19
 As Joseph (2007: 353) observes: ’Wendt and other constructivists are so keen to emphasise the ideational that they 
often turn a two-way relationship into a one-way one’. 
20
 I owe this point and formulation to Peter Nielsen. 
21
 In the Possibility of Naturalism Bhaskar argues in favour of position called “critical naturalism”. On one hand this 
position entails a commitment to naturalism – viz. ‘the thesis that there is (or can be) an essential unity of method 
between the natural and the social sciences’ (1979: 3). Yet on the other hand it is also argued that there are a number of 
ontological, epistemological and relational differences between the objects of study in the natural and the social 
sciences and that this places a number of limits on the possibility of naturalism (1979: 56-69). In the present context the 
question of naturalism is not a matter of concern. 
22
 To be sure, some rather formal schemes have been developed that at an abstract level propose steps in scientific 
practice grounded in critical realism. Bhaskar has outlined two schemes called, respectively, the RRRE model and the 
DREI model (see e.g. Bhaskar, 1975: 125; 1989: 91; 1991: 160), whereas Danermark et al. (2002: 108-112) propose a 
scheme which is claimed to bring together the most important elements from Bhaskar’s two models. Now, my suspicion 
is that such schemes have generally not been very helpful (among other things because they say little or nothing about 
the function of theory). This is also reflected in the fact that they are rarely followed by those critical realists who do 
empirical work (see also Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005: 64). 
23
 See Benton & Craib (2001: 1-3) on the concept of underlabouring. For a classic critique of the “underlabourer 
conception”, see Winch (1958: 3-24). 
24
 Examples par excellence of such theoretical straitjackets would be neorealist IR theory á la Waltz (1979) and, in the 
context of EUS, Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (see section 2.2). 
25
 As Smith (2000: 31) has perceptively pointed out, ‘rationalist theory, far from being the explanatory theory it claims 
to be, instead provides a political and normative account of European integration whereby (positivist) notions of how to 
explain a given “'reality” in fact constitute the reality of European integration’ (Smith, 2000: 31). 
26
 This is also related to what is sometimes referred to as ”the hermeneutic circle”, namely that ’we cannot know the 
part without understanding the whole of which it forms part, and at the same time we cannot understand the whole 
without understanding the parts that make it up’ (Benton & Craib, 2001: 104).  
27
 To be sure, this type of research is rarely mentioned in mainstream textbook introductions to EUS. For partial 
exceptions, however, see Bache & George (2006) and Rosamond (2000). Manners (2006) contains an interesting 
overview of the various strands of critical research in EUS, that looks not only at historical materialisms but also at e.g. 
feminist and postmodernist positions.  
28
 Among these were also a number of Soviet studies of the “capitalist integration” of Western Europe countries. See in 
particular Kniazhinsky (1984) and Maximova (1973). 
29
 See also Nielsen (2004: 193) on the wider tendency of classical Marxism to end up as a rather self-contained yet 
fractioned intellectual phenomenon. 
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30
 The most developed neogramscian perspective is often referred to as the “Amsterdam Perspective” (see e.g. Holman, 
2004; Overbeek, 1990; van Apeldoorn, 2002; van der Pijl, 1984 for brilliant works made by the key “members” of this 
“school”). The theory presented here has not been constructed in opposition to this perspective; to the contrary it draws 
inspiration from it. But at the same time it also diverges from it in many respects and as such it does deserve its own 
label, the “Copenhagen Perspective” being one option. 
31
 In fairness it should be noted that Bourdieu is making this statement in a discussion of “status competition”, not 
economic competition. 
32
 Marx refers to this latter phenomenon (which includes mergers) as “centralisation”. But as the phenomenon is now 
generally referred to as “concentration”, also in the literature referred to in subsequent chapters, I find it practical to do 
this as well in order to avoid conceptual confusion. 
33
 To say this is not to advance a teleological or deterministic argument, thereby contradicting the agency-structure 
model outlined in section 2.4. Because as Collier (2004: 144) points out, ‘the concentration of capital can happen only if 
people perform acts of working, investing, undercutting competitors in the market, buying up other firms, and so on. 
The point is that we can predict, with some degree of certainty, that people will do this. But no one is saying that the 
predicted outcome will occur whatever people do’. 
34
 Robinson (2004: 69) makes a similar point when he remarks that ‘the structures of the global economy came about as 
the unplanned outcome of strategic decisions taken by thousands of firms (i.e., by individuals who make decisions 
within firms), but these structures then present themselves to capitalists and other social agents as a reality conducive to 
further actions toward transnationalization’.  
35
 A distinguishing feature of capitalism is that the process of exploitation manifests itself as a purely economic process. 
Whereas, say, the feudal lord often had to use coercive power in order to exploit his workers, this is not the case under 
capitalism. Here the exploitation simply appears as an exchange of commodities (labour power in exchange for a wage), 
thereby making it appear simply as an economic matter. In one important sense, then, capitalism involves a formal 
separation of the political/legal and economic spheres so that ‘the social functions of production and distribution, 
surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social labour are, so to speak, privatised and they are 
achieved by non-authoritative, non-political means’ (Wood, 1995: 29, see also 2003: 10-14). But this formal separation 
should not disguise that the economic sphere is in the most fundamental sense embedded in other spheres and depends 
on other spheres if the expanded reproduction of capital is to be secured (see also Rupert, 1993: 73 and section 3.4). 
Referring to the extraction of surplus value as “exploitation” might sound a bit dramatic or as a political value-
judgement, but as Collier points out, the term ‘acquires its negative value-judgement, not in addition to what it means, 
but because of what it means’ (2004: 82).  
36
 See also Adkins (1993) for a discussion of class analyses and critical realism. 
37
 Recent class-based analyses of European integration include Chari & Kritzinger (2006), Holman & van der Pijl 
(1996), Taylor & Mathers (2002), and van Apeldoorn (2002). See e.g. Robinson (2004), Sklair (2001) and van der Pijl 
(2006) for studies that focus on the formation of a transnational capitalist class and Bottomore & Brym (1989) for some 
studies that focus on the national level. On the continued relevance of class analysis see also Sørensen (2002). 
38
 It should also be added that fractioning also takes place within the working class. As one scholar notes, ‘A white-
collar worker in the service industry is clearly in a different fraction of labour than a blue-collar worker at the assembly 
line of a car manufacturer. Workers they are, however, in that they are forced to sell their labour power, used by capital 
for the extraction of surplus value and the accumulation of profit’ (Bieler, 2003: 1-2). 
39
 As Monéger (2006: 275) explains, ‘[r]egulation, in British and American English, means, not only regulation as a 
legal system of rules, but regulation as an action, a procedure of control, either ex ante or ex post … [i]t is an intriguing 
word, in which can be mixed politics, economics, philosophy and law’.  
40
 An ensemble of regulation is not a new word for what Parisian regulation theorists refer to as “modes of regulation”. 
As already described the concept of regulation is used in its narrow sense in the present thesis, whereas regulation 
theorists use it in a more inclusive sense. Consequently, a mode of regulation denotes ‘an emergent ensemble of rules, 
norms, patterns of conduct, social networks, organisational forms and institutions’ which can stabilise a particular 
economic system (Jessop, 1997: 291; see also Lipietz, 1987: 14-15).  
41
 A “unit of regulation” refers both to the institution(s) enforcing the rules in a particular area and to the regulation of 
this area itself. As such it differs from the IPE literature’s concept of “regimes”, which denotes ‘sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of International Relations’ (Krasner, 1983: 2). 
42
 “Object of regulation” is a concept borrowed from Jessop (see Jessop & Sum, 2006a: 44, 84).  
43
 I owe this idea to Angela Wigger (conversation). 
44
 ‘Competition occupies so important a position in economics that it is difficult to imagine economics as a social 
discipline without it. Stripped of competition, economics would consist largely of the maximizing calculus of an 
isolated Robinson Crusoe economy. Few economists complete a major work without referring to competition’ 
(Demsetz, 1982: 1). 
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45
 This has resulted in (apparently justified) accusations that the Chicago School is inconsistent (see e.g. McChesney, 
1991): on one hand its proponents argue that political interventions are an evil, on the other they nevertheless argue in 
favour of some degree of political regulation when making policy recommendations. 
46
 In these regards the neogramscian perspective is similar to that advocated by prominent Marxist state theorist, Nicos 
Poulantzas (on the latter’s view of this, see Ougaard, 2004: 63). It is also possible to point to other similarities between 
the two perspectives. Neogramscian scholars would follow Poulantzas in his rejection of instrumentalist theories of the 
state and agree that ‘the contemporary state is not a simple tool or instrument that can be freely manipulated by a single 
coherent “will”...’ (1975: 158). Moreover some of these scholars agree with Poulantzas (1975: 158-161) that the state 
enjoys a certain degree of “relative autonomy” in relation to the prevailing class fractions. For instance, neogramscian 
scholar Otto Holman (2001: 168-69) writes that ‘...the state has to organise and safeguard the interests and hegemony of 
the bourgeoisie as a whole. The state can accomplish this only when it can take a stand as an autonomous subject vis-à-
vis the separate fractions of the bourgeoisie’ (see also e.g. Cox, 1987: 19; 1996: 479, Gill & Law, 1993: 113). In doing 
this, the state is said to play a decisive role in securing the coherence of capitalist societies.  
47
 For instance, Cox (1996: 149) suggests that it can mean everything ‘from marriage and the nuclear family, through 
the state, diplomacy and the rules of international law, to formal organizations like the United Nations and the 
International Monetary Fund’ (see also e.g. the various conceptions to be found in Aspinwall & Schneider, 2001; 
Jessop, 2001; Torfing, 2001). 
48
 See Jessop (2003a and 2003b) and Joseph (2002) for interesting discussions of the notion of “hegemony” from a 
critical realist perspective. 
49
 No co-ordinated plan for carrying out the de-concentration of the German economy was prepared and consequently 
the Allies’ were left to carry out the process individually in their respective occupation zones. See e.g. Lovett (1996) 
and Djelic (1998: 79-81) on the resulting dissimilar legislation and enforcement practices. 
50
 In 1958 when two large German steel companies, the above-mentioned ATH and Phoenix-Rheinrohr, attempted to 
merge, hereby creating by far the  largest company in the community, it became known that the High Authority 
intended to use its powers and would impose certain conditions on the companies. The application for authorisation of 
the merger was then withdrawn, something that brought about a burst of anger in Germany. According to McLachlan & 
Swann (1967b: 45) this case forced the High Authority to ‘re-examine its previous thinking on the question of size’ with 
the result that, since 1958, ‘not only has this particular merger been subsequently approved, but the High Authority has 
also become one of the strongest advocates of larger groupings in the European steel industry – provided that the danger 
of monopoly is kept at bay’ (see McLachlan & Swann, 1967a: 197-218 for a more detailed discussion of the ECSC in 
this area).  
51
 This seems to lend some support to the Mandel’s thesis that ‘the movement towards Western European economic 
integration via the Common Market is a product of capitalist concentration on an international scale: an attempt by 
capitalism to reconcile the level of development of the productive forces and the degree of monopolistic concentration 
with the survival of the national state’ (1975: 143) 
52
 Until 1999 this directorate was known as “DG IV”, but was then renamed DG Competition. In this thesis the DG is 
simply referred to as the Competition DG. 
53
 The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, after which all agreements previously authorised under the Treaty now 
have to be reviewed under the rules of the EC Treaty. 
54
 A report of the Netherlands’ State Secretary for Economic Affairs showed that of the 258 mergers and other forms of 
amalgamations involving Dutch industry in the period from 1958 to mid-1965 only 8 involved enterprises from another 
EEC country. 175 involved other Dutch enterprises, 42 US and Canadian enterprises and 26 UK enterprises 
(McLachlan & Swann, 1967b: 38: see also Canellos & Silber, 1970 on concentration in the EEC in the 1960s). 
55
 Another “bureaucratic” obstacle to cross-border mergers arose from the relationships between public and private 
administrations in countries like France and Italy. In France, with its system of extensive governmental economic 
planning, the relationships between business and public authorities were particularly close, and it was not going to be 
easy for foreign companies to establish similar relationships. And in Italy, with its economy which was permeated by 
corruption, the foreign businessman ‘must learn how to bribe. A misplaced bribe can have catastrophic consequences 
for him personally as well as for his company’ (Mazzolini, 1975: 44).  
56
 Some “members” of Europe’s financial capital fraction did in fact prepare for involvement in cross-border mergers in 
order to meet the American challenge. As Ross (1998: 355) explains, ‘European banks felt themselves to have been left 
behind by the Americans; they were short of the skills, the time and the resources required to challenge the competitive 
advantage which the Americans were exploiting’. In the 1960s and 1970s, they thus formed a number of “banking 
clubs” with participation from many of the big European banks. To give but one example, by 1974 the club called 
European Banks International Company brought together Deutsche Bank (Frankfurt), Société Générale (Paris), 
Midland Bank (London), Banca Commerciale Italiana (Milan), Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank (Amsterdam), Société 
Générale de Banque (Brussels) and Creditanstalt Bankverein (Vienna). In some cases the banking clubs were 
understood by their participants as a preparatory step before an eventual merger that could not yet be realised ‘given the 
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regulatory, tax and legal differences among European banking markets’ (Ross, 1998: 356). Many of the banking clubs 
were therefore formed with the purpose of promoting European economic integration, especially in the monetary area, 
but also as a means of sharing information. However, the political influence of the banking clubs appears to have been 
rather limited. And as the European integration process slowed down significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, the lacking 
prospect of real cross-border mergers between the European banks meant that the clubs were gradually closed down in 
the course of the 1970s. 
57
 To be sure, one should not exaggerate the extent to which de Gaulle undermined the European integration process 
(see e.g. Dinan, 1999: 40-41). In particular, the General saw the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a potentially 
highly attractive feature of the EC as it would guarantee French producers high agricultural prices and subsidise exports 
of EC agricultural products to the world market. Only due to the CAP was de Gaulle willing to reluctantly embrace the 
Common Market.  
58
 According to figures referred to in Overbeek (1990: 100-102), the share of UK exports to the Common Market went 
from 13.9 % in 1958 to 21.0 % in 1963  and in the same period the share of British direct investment in the EC went 
from 5.5 % to 16.9 %. 
59
 In particular two of doctrines established by these rulings deserve mentioning. The 1963 Van Gend en Loos ruling 
established that certain provisions of the EC Treaty have direct effect, meaning that the Treaty gives individuals and 
companies certain rights independently of national law (see e.g. Johnson & Turner, 2006: 53; Weiler, 1999: 19-20). And 
in the 1964 Costa v. ENEL case it was ruled that Community law would also supersede national law. Hereby the 
doctrine of supremacy was established with the result that, as the Court put it in a later ruling, ‘every national court 
must … apply Community law in its entirety … and must accordingly set aside any provisions of national law which 
may conflict with it’ (quoted in Dinan, 1999: 304). Such landmark decisions constituted significant steps in the 
direction of increased European integration, even if this only gradually became apparent to policy-makers, scholars and 
others. 
60
 Industrial policy, like competition policy, is a term that can have different referents. Here we will understand it 
broadly as policies that seek to aid particular industries or companies, for instance in order to enable them to compete 
internationally. A European level industrial policy had also been an important element in the European response to the 
American challenge envisaged by Servan-Schreiber. The national scale would be too narrow to generate ‘50 or 100 
firms which, once they are large enough, would be the most likely to become world leaders of modern technology in 
their fields’ (Servan-Schreiber, 1968: 117). His idea was thus to transfer the interventionist industrial policies of France 
(see section 5.3 below) to the European level in order to promote the emergence of a number of flagship companies that 
were competitive vis-à-vis their US counterparts.  
61
 The economy remained on an upward growth trajectory from 1950 to 1973, with an annual growth rate (measured in 
real GDP) that averaged 2.8% in 1950-1960 and 3.1 % in 1960-1973. However, this should be seen in relation to 
average annual growth rates elsewhere in this period. For instance, the German average growth rate was 8.2 % in 1950-
1960 and 4.4 % in the 1960-1973 period (Coates, 2000: 5; see also Dormois, 2004: 12 on GNP developments). Indeed, 
with growth rates only approximately half of the OECD average, Britannia was not ruling the waves in the “Golden 
Age”. The relative British decline that had begun in the 1890s thus continued in the Pax Americana era where British 
industry gradually lost ground to its European competitors (see Coates, 2000: 43-52 for more details and an interesting 
discussion of the reasons for this decline). In the 1950s and 1960s, Britain was lagging well behind the EC countries 
and the US in industrial investments and industrial productivity with the outcome that her share of world industrial 
production fell from 8.6 % in 1950 to 5.4 % in 1970 (Overbeek, 1990: 123). 
62
 Fishwick (1982: 10) points to a paradox in the UK system: ‘in the UK in the 1960s one government organisation (the 
Industrial Reconstruction Corporation) was trying to organise industry into larger units, while another government 
institution, (the Monopolies and Mergers Commission), was delaying and in some cases, preventing moves to increase 
concentration because of possible market implications’. 
63
 Indeed, in the 1960s ‘neither the British nor the Germans felt a strong need to challenge the hold of enterprises that 
had managed to achieve a dominant position in their national markets. A tolerance for concentration was exhibited in 
many ways’ including that ‘neither country was prepared to control mergers or to limit the activities of dominant firms’ 
(Vernon, 1974: 6). The same held true for many of the other European countries, including France and Italy.  
64
 In 1964 only 78 officials were employed in the Competition DG (Wilks & McGowan, 1996: 231). Today, the number 
is approximately 600 (see Wilks 2007: 445). 
65
 According to Fishwick (1993: 115), the Court’s ruling left a rather odd paradox in EC law: ‘a merger involving at 
least one firm in a dominant position might be prohibited under article 86 … ; a merger between a small number of 
equal size firms would contravene no law even if it created a 100 per cent impregnable monopoly’. 
66
 It is interesting to note, that these USDRs bore some resemblance to the three “political projects” identified by van 
Apeldoorn (2001: 74-76; 2002: 78-82) in his seminal study of the re-launch of European integration in the 1980s and 
1990s: Here a distinction is made between (1) a “neoliberal project” according to which European integration should 
primarily be about deregulation and liberalisation of markets; (2) a “neomercantilist project” according to which 
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European integration should be about the creation of a strong European “home market” that is defended against 
competition from non-European companies (by means of tariff walls etc.) and; (3) a “social democratic project” 
according to which European integration should be about protecting the European type of welfare state against 
neoliberalism and economic globalisation). Each of these “projects” can be seen to embody a particular GDR – that is, 
an overall perspective on how the economy in a given socio-economic formation ought to be regulated.  
67
 Italy was the country that was most critical towards the Commission’s 1973 proposal. It not only opposed that 
mergers should be regulated before they had taken place; it was also opposed to the fact that the regulation would also 
apply to public companies. In addition it also questioned the legal basis on which the Commission had based its 
proposal, as it believed that it would in fact require a fundamental amendment of the Treaty. 
68
 However, that one case turned out to be the perhaps most controversial case in the history of the German merger 
control system (Wilks & McGowan, 1995: 55). The case arose in 1987 when the liberal Minister of Economics, Martin 
Bangemann, proposed a merger between Daimler Benz and MBB in order to help Airbus, an airline consortium that 
received significant state aid from the German governments and which was partly owned by MBB (see Schwartz, 1993: 
630). The outcome of the merger would be a huge conglomerate that would employ 380,000 people and account for 5 
per cent of Germany’s GDP. The BKA banned the merger as it would give the conglomerate a dominant position in the 
airline and defence markets, but was then in 1989 overruled by the new Minister of Economics, Helmut Haussman, who 
allowed the merger to go through (Wilks & McGowan, 1995: 55).  
69
 The remaining part of this section draws on, and reproduces a number of (translated) formulations used in, Buch-
Hansen (2006). 
70
 Interview with Etienne Davignon in Brussels on 1 June 2006. Davignon was the Commissioner responsible for 
industrial affairs between 1981 and 1985, where he was also vice-president of the Commission. From 1986 to 2001 he 
was a member of the ERT in his capacity as chairman of the Belgian bank Société Générale de Belgique. 
71
 The EC Presidency rotates every half year. 
72
 Ortoli also became a member of the ERT (from 1988 to 1990) as director of French oil company Total. 
73
 Interview with Jonathan Faull in Brussels on 24 March 2006. Faull was an important member of Leon Brittan’s 
cabinet and directly involved in the processes leading up to the adoption of the MCR in 1989. He is currently Director 
General of the European Commission’s Justice, Freedom and Security DG. 
74
 Moreover, The Italian government still wanted public firms to be exempted from regulation whereas Luxembourg 
now wanted purely fiscal holding companies to be completely exempted. 
75
 Telephone interview with Peter Sutherland on 26 April 2006. Sutherland was Competition Commissioner from 1985-
1989. He is now chairman of BP and of Goldman Sachs International and a member of ERT, the Trilateral Commission, 
the Bilderberg Group and the Foundation Board of the World Economic Forum. 
76
 The ERT’s interest in the merger area is also underlined by the fact that the theme of its seventh “Youth Conference” 
was cross-border mergers in Europe (see ERT, 1989b). These conferences brought together young managers from of 
ERT member’s companies in order to involve them in various issues related to European integration and the challenges 
faced by business. One might see these conferences as a platform for the creation of a common worldview among the 
upcoming managers of transnational capital.  
77
 Schwartz (1993: 648-649) provides an interesting account of how these conflicting views over the desirable French 
negotiation position was rooted in three ministries; namely the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Industry was generally associated with the by now well-
known French view that an EC merger regulation would not be in the interest of French industry, as it would prevent it 
from restructuring and moreover hinder national industrial policies. For a long time it was thus opposed to the adoption 
of a regulation and argued that, insofar as the Commission was granted powers in this area, its decisions (or at least the 
most important ones) ought to be subject to national review. The prevailing view in the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance was that an EC regulation was desirable, although it was agreed that national review of Commission decisions 
would be required. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was the generally accepted view that an EC regulation would be 
in the French interest, not least as it would be good for France’s image. From around mid-1988 the position of the two 
first mentioned ministries changed: the Ministry of Industry now began to wholeheartedly support a regulation that 
would establish a clear division of labour between the national and the supranational level (and which would thus not 
entail a national review of the Commission’s decisions), whereas the Ministry of Economics and Finance now 
vehemently  opposed the EC regulation, arguing for instance that the proposed thresholds were too low and that vital 
French state interests would be in danger if the regulation was adopted. In other words, it ‘urged that industry’s wish for 
judicial clarity take a back seat to the French public interest and the need to maintain antitrust hurdles to foreign 
acquirers’ (Schwartz, 1993: 649).   
78
 Telephone interview with Lord Leon Brittan on 6 February 2006. Brittan was Competition Commissioner from 1989 
to 1993. He is now a legal consultant at Herbert Smith. 
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79
 Some business groups had also argued in favour of a higher EC level threshold than the one initially proposed by the 
Commission. In a position paper dated 6 July 1989 AmCham for instance argued that the 100 million ECUs threshold 
should be increased to at least ECUs 200 million (see AmChamEU, 1989).  
80
 This is not, of course, to say that the EMU was Thatcher’s idea. Indeed, the UK decided not to join the EMU – as did 
Denmark after the EU Treaty had been turned down in the 1992 referendum. It is not possible to go into a discussion of 
the complex processes leading up to the introduction of the EMU and the Euro here. The reader will have no difficulties 
in finding such discussions, as there are probably few dimensions of European integration/governance that have 
attracted more attention from academics than the EMU (see Dyson & Featherstone 1999 for the perhaps most detailed 
and well researched account). It should be mentioned, however, that it was strongly supported by important segments of 
transnational capital. The promotion of the EMU did not take place through the ERT as its members were at this stage 
(in the late 1980s) divided over the issue. An example of an early member who was not in favour of the EMU was 
Maersk Mc Kinney Møller (A.P. Møller), who left the ERT in 1992 in response to the Roundtable’s increasingly 
neoliberal profile. Instead a number of ERT members from companies such as Philips, Fiat, Solvay and Total formed 
the Association for a Monetary Union of Europe in 1987, an organisation that had Etienne Davignon, the former EC 
Commissioner of Industry, as its president. Although the precise impact of the organisation’s extensive lobbying 
activities at both national and European has not yet been sufficiently documented, it seems relatively safe to assume that 
it had been difficult if not impossible to introduce the EMU had it not enjoyed support from (or even been opposed by) 
important capital actors (see also van Apeldoorn, 2002: 155-156).  
81
 This and the following three paragraphs draws on, and reproduces a number of (translated) formulations used in, 
Buch-Hansen (2006). 
82
 This entails, among other things, that the EU countries should, by 2010, have annual growth rates of 3 per cent and 
employment rates close to 70 per cent. 
83
 The ERT had been invited by Antonio Guterres, Prime Minister of Portugal and the President of the European 
Council to contribute to the preparations for the Lisbon European Council. 
84
 This and the previous section draws directly on Buch-Hansen (2006: 118-119) and indirectly on van Apeldoorn 
(2002: 158-189). 
85
 http://www.tabd.com/about, accessed on 19 September 2007. 
86
 See also http://www.tabd.com/about, accessed on 19 September 2007. 
87
 American members include well-known companies such as The Coca-Cola Company, Ernst & Young, General 
Electric and Microsoft. 
88
 On its webpage the ICC describes itself as ‘the voice of world business championing the global economy as a force 
for economic growth, job creation and prosperity’. Its members are thousands of companies from over 130 countries. 
See http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html, accessed on 22 September 2007.  
89
 We have already seen above how the ERT had called for a reform from the mid 1990s onwards. UNICE had also 
argued in favour of a reform in 1995: ‘This was one of the first times that we really asked for a more economic 
approach’ (UNICE Senior Official, Interview). 
90
 In the mid-1980s the DTI actively began exploring whether a major reform of the regime would be desirable, 
reaching the conclusion in a 1988 Green Paper that indeed a reform seemed necessary. Despite the publication of a 
1989 White Paper which recommended a far-reaching reform of the “restrictive practices” policy which was modelled 
on the EC system, the conservative government did, ‘for reasons which have never been fully explained’ (Robertson, 
1996: 211), not translate it into legislation that could be adopted by the British Parliament. However, according to one 
scholar, big business was opposed to ‘the introduction of EU-based monopolies control in which market dominance was 
prohibited in principle’ (Suzuki, 2000: 4). Despite new DTI Green Papers in 1992 and 1996 which confirmed the need 
for reform and suggested a system which in some respects were modelled on the EC model (see e.g. Cini, 2006; Eyre & 
Lodge, 2000: 68-69), little actual progress was made. Again, one reason for this might have been that the CBI did not 
favour a change of the existing system – at least not in the early 1990s, where it was argued that a tougher form of 
competition regulation would undermine the competitiveness of British business. According to Suzuki, the CBI-staff 
working on competition policy issues were ‘in-house lawyers of big companies’ which ‘may explain why the CBI’s 
representative opinion was more sceptical about the regulation over industrial concentration than any other issue’ (2000: 
11; see Zahariadis, 2004 for more details on the positions of the various involved programmers). 
91
 One article in the Act explicitly reads that ‘The purpose of this section is to ensure that so far as is possible (having 
regard to any relevant differences between the provisions concerned), questions arising under this Part in relation to 
competition within the United Kingdom are dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of 
corresponding questions arising in Community law in relation to competition within the Community’ (Competition Act, 
article 60). 
92
 For instance, ‘[i]n air transport ... ECJ decisions, followed by Commission action, ultimately forced deregulation on a 
number of reluctant governments ... while the mere threat of ECJ action in the telecommunications and electricity 
sectors helped bring all parties to the table’ (Schmidt, 2002: 55). One of those “reluctant governments” was Germany’s 
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(see Schmidt, 1998 for more details). Another area where EC competition policy has contributed to neoliberalise the 
German model is that of finance. An important feature of the social market economy is the existence of public/non-
commercial savings banks, including the Länder banks that have certain industrial policy commitments and are 
subsidised by municipal and Länder governments (Lütz, 2006: 27). However, since the 1990s, ‘German private banks 
have used the “opportunity structure” of European competition policy to question the status of their competitors in the 
public banking system’ (Lütz, 2006: 29). In 1994 an alliance of German, French and British banks filed a complaint to 
the Commission, arguing that the government of North Rhine-Westphalia had illegally subsidised the Westdeutsche 
Landesbank. In 2002 the Commission opened proceedings against five other Länder banks on similar grounds and in 
2004 a compromise was reached with the involved parties, namely that the six Landesbanken would have to repay 4.3 
billion Euros to their Länder governments (Lütz, 2006: 29). In another case, the European Banking Federation, which 
represents private banks in Europe, complained to the Commission about the state liability guarantees for the 
Landesbanken, on the grounds that these guarantees put public banks at an unfair advantage vis-à-vis their private 
counterparts. In 2005 the various involved parties ‘reached the historic compromise to remove public guarantees from 
state banks by July 2005’ with the result that although ‘infusions of public capital are still possible ... they have to be 
accepted in Brussels’ (Lütz, 2006: 29). There is thus no question that EC competition policy has played and plays an 
important role in the neoliberalisation of Germany’s social market economy – which is obviously not to say that it has 
been the only important mechanism in this context. 
93
 Horizontal mergers have accounted for the vast majority of notified transactions, although the Commission has also 
dealt with vertical and conglomerate mergers (Levy 2003: 198). 
94
 That the 46 ERT companies are among Europe’s largest (measured in terms of market value) is confirmed by the 
FT500: More than half of them (namely 25) were in the top 100, and the top 200 comprised 36 of these companies. One 
can also note that the four ERT companies that are not even included in the FT500 list, namely CIR, Eczacibaşi Group 
the Smurfit Kappa Group and SONAE have been involved in a very limited number of mergers with “Community 
dimension”. Such companies are probably represented in the ERT for other reasons than their size in terms of market 
value, such as their geographical location or sectorial belonging. 
95
 Interview with Senior Official of the Competition DG in Brussels on 7 March 2006. This Senior Official was 
centrally involved in the processes leading up to the revision of the MCR.  
96
 Interview with a UNICE Senior Staff Member of in Brussels on 7 March, 2006. This Senior Staff Member was 
centrally involved in UNICE’s working group on competition policy. 
97
 In July 2003 Lars-Hendrik Röller was appointed Chief Competition Economist. In July 2006 he was replaced by 
Damien Neven. See also Wigger (2008a: 306-309) for an interesting analysis of the “microeconomisation” of EC 
competition regulation. 
98
 Interview with diplomat involved in the negotiations over the revision of the MCR, February 2006. 
99
 Interview with diplomat involved in the negotiations over the revision of the MCR, February 2006.  
100
 Interview with diplomat involved in the negotiations over the revision of the MCR, June 2006. 
101
 My translation from Danish 
102
 It should not come as a surprise that this thesis has analysed the transformation of EC competition policy from a 
(critical) political economy perspective, rather than from a pure political science perspective. However, in the absence 
of theoretically informed political economy analyses of this topic (the main exception being Wigger & Nölke, 2007), 
the various political science analyses are the most relevant to discuss here. That is, they clearly have much more in 
common with the present work than do the contributions produced by economists and legal scholars.  
103
 One major problem is that all the theories applied in the existing literature are conservative – that is, they take more 
or less for granted that competition is by definition a good thing and do not really seek to fundamentally challenge the 
prevailing neoliberal type of competition regulation. This issue will be dealt with in section 8.3.  
104
 It is surprising, however, that Büthe (2007) and Büthe & Swank (2006) say nothing about the role played by the ERT 
in their empirical analyses. 
105
 Wilks & Bartle (2002) also apply principle-agent theory to an analysis of EC competition policy. 
106
 I have borrowed this argument from the discussion of the varieties of capitalism approach found in Kang (2006). 
107
 In addition to these shortcomings in the “varieties of capitalism” approach itself, I would also dispute two aspects of 
the empirical analyses contained in Wigger & Nölke’s article. First, their account of developments in the EC 
competition field is overly “German-centric”. That is, it reproduces a tendency in the literature to exaggerate the extent 
to which EC competition policy has been shaped by German ordoliberals (see especially Gerber, 1998). It follows from 
the arguments made in Chapter 4 and 5 that other ideas and agents (such as “anti-competition” ideas and the French 
government) were influential from the outset, with the result that the EC competition unit of regulation was far less 
ordoliberal than it is often assumed. Second, whereas the strong link the two authors make between ordoliberalism and 
Germany’s social market economy is convincing, it is less clear that the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism necessarily 
goes together with a “Chicago School” perspective on competition policy. Certainly this School has had a strong impact 
on US antitrust in the last few decades. But it seems more problematic to argue, as do Wigger & Nölke, that the 2004 
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EC competition policy reform marks a shift ‘from ordo-liberalism to the Chicago School’ (2007: 498). In this context it 
is, for instance, suggested that the re-wording of the MD test (into a SIEC test) constitutes a move towards a Chicago 
School model and ‘radically breaks with the European tradition of pursuing broader goals in competition law 
enforcement’ (2007: 499). However, if the argument advanced in Chapter 7 is correct, then this would seem to 
exaggerate the importance of a minor (and quite unexciting) technical change, and arguably to overlook that, in EC 
merger control, the MD test was never applied with a view to pursue “broader goals”.  
108
 Contributions forming part of this emerging research agenda include Buch-Hansen (2007), Buch-Hansen & Wigger 
(2008), Chari & Kritzinger (2006), Wigger (2007, 2008) and Wigger & Nölke (2007). Although taking a theoretical 
perspective that differs much from the one taken in these contributions, Wilks (2005b and 2007) also contain elements 
of a critical analysis of recent developments in EC competition policy. 
109
 It must be stressed that I am talking about tendencies here: I do not mean to suggest that the current thesis differs 
from each and every work on EC competition policy in all three respects. 
110
 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/consumers/index_en.html, accessed on 5 December 2007. 
111
 According to Open Europe, an independent think tank, 96 % of the articles in the Reform Treaty are copied directly 
from the Constitutional Treaty. See http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/pressrelease.aspx?pressreleaseid=51, 
accessed on 5 December 2007. 
